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ABSTRACT
JIMMY CARTER'S FOREIGN POLICY: THE BATTLE FOR POWER AND
PRINCIPLE
Frances M. Jacobson
Old Dominion University, 2008
Director: Dr. Simon S. Serfaty

Evaluating the foreign policies of presidents while they are in office or shortly
after their tenure ends can sometimes lead to conclusions that prove to be unsound in the
future. The case of Harry Truman exemplifies this. When he left office in 1952 his
approval rating was in the 20 percentile range. Yet, he set the tone and direction of
United States foreign policy that led eventually to the successful conclusion of the Cold
War. The foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter was also generally viewed as a
failure by many scholars in the field, both during his time in office and for some years
beyond. Another analysis is now due.
This work reviews five issue areas of Carter's foreign policy: the Panama Canal
treaties, arms transfers and human rights, Southern Africa, Camp David Accords, and the
Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. It argues that Carter pursued policy choices that
proved to be in the best interests of the United States in the long run. These issues were
and are some of the most contentious that any president has been faced with in the post
war world. Emotions ran high on many of them, which can create a toxic environment
for many politicians, most of whom either have their eye on the next election or on their
legacy. Carter, however, was not held prisoner to either of these. He consistently did the
right thing, but seldom the popular thing. Camp David was the exception, and he has
been given high praise for his work in helping to stabilize the Middle East, a region that

is filled with old hatreds and grievances. It is difficult to achieve anything positive there
and most presidents shy away from the Arab-Israeli problem because it yields little or
nothing in political rewards. Carter's policies were not without their critics, however,
and he got few accolades for his work on the other areas of concern that this work covers.
This work has examined Carter's foreign policy from the vantage point of what
we know now, and argues that he tried to work within a framework of power and
principle. It concludes that while his steady diplomacy, his prudence, and his refusal to
use a military option except as a last resort made him unpopular at the time, in hindsight,
he was successful in working for the long term national interests of the United States.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The foreign policy of the Carter Administration is commonly viewed as a failure
because of perceived uncertainty, false starts and changes in direction, and the inability to
assess the international landscape correctly. Carter's personal integrity and values were
not enough to secure the White House in 1980. In fact, argues Douglas Brinkley, he was
"damned with faint praise," with pundits saying that he would be remembered for what
did not happen on his watch.1 The early literature, especially, is littered with titles such as
Eagle Entangled", Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration , and The Carter
Implosion 4 that point to disappointment. From the start it was argued that there was a
basic conflict between the politically inexperienced outsiders who came to Washington in
1977, and the politically savvy insiders already there.5 According to some critics, for
example, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski,'s "architectural contribution"
to Carter's foreign policy had been built over the years on intellectual cliches that added
to the President's seeming confusion.6 This work, on the contrary, argues that the Carter
policies were more successful than was appreciated at the time, especially from the
perspective of what we know now.
This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14' ed.
1
Douglas Brinkley, "The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The "Hands On" Legacy of Our Thirtyninth President" Diplomatic History 20 no. 4 (fall 1996): 505-529. Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture,
delivered at Chicago, 20 March 1996.
2
Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds. Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign
Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, Inc., 1979).
3
Garland A. Haas, Jimmy Carter and the Politics of Frustration (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland and Co., 1992.)
4
Donald S. Spencer, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988).
5
Haynes Johnson, In the Absence of Power: Governing America (New York: Viking Press,
1980).
6
Simon Serfaty, "Brzezinski: Play it Again Zbig," Foreign Affairs 32 (autumn 1978): 3-21.

Not every assessment of the administration was entirely negative. Thus, Stanley
Hoffmann gives a fairly sympathetic appraisal of the administration, insisting that one of
Carter's greatest achievements was the aggressive re-assertion of idealism in the United
States' foreign policy.7 Hoffmann goes on, however, to point out that four years later
there had been too many disappointments for people to remember that Carter had restored
a sense of unity in the country, with the appeal to the nation to behave as a champion of
certain inalienable values that had been severely damaged during the Vietnam War and
Watergate scandal. As the administration put its values into action, America's prestige
began to rise. Carter also recognized that the world had changed - that power was now
more diffused than it had been since 1945. This, concludes Marina v. N. Whitman, was
"leadership without hegemony."8 Carter's style was clumsy, according to some; and the
core of his failure, according to Hoffmann, was in the area of Soviet-United States
relations. There seemed to be strategic incoherence, as the administration struggled to
come to terms with the myriad regional problems, especially those concerning human
rights. To Hoffmann, two archetypes were in competition: the "Popeye" archetype of
the United States as the guardian of stability and law and order through military strength,
and the missionary archetype helping the poor abroad and bringing American values to
the underprivileged. Neither archetype fit, and Americans in their desire for simplicity
reverted to their faith in American exceptionalism.9

7

Stanley Hoffmann, "Requiem."
Marina v.N. Whitman, "Leadership Without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy,
Foreign Policy 20 (autumn 1975): 138-160.
9
Donald M. Fraser, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Basic Questions Regarding
Principles and Practice," International Studies Quarterly 23, Special Issue on Human Rights: International
Perspectives (June 1979): 174-185.
8

3

This study will return to the initial judgments and appraise Carter's time in office
in the context of what we know now. His policies will be analyzed within the broad
context of the ideas of power and principle,10 arguing that he tried to find a middle
ground, always mindful that a successful foreign policy must combine both of these
attributes. His overarching goal, one that surely helped to define his approach to specific
issues, was to "make United States foreign policy more humane and moral." ".. .he
genuinely believed that as President he could shape a more decent world."11 In a speech
at Notre Dame early in his presidency, Carter said that he believed "that we can have a
foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses
power and influence, which we have, for humane purposes."12 Carter thought that power
should provide the means to achieve morally desirable ends; and he also believed that the
two must be complementary. His top advisors, National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus States Vance, agreed. Utilizing power to the
exclusion of principle would inevitably lead to failure. Values mattered in this
administration, and this raised questions on the part of the political right about whether an
effective United States foreign policy should include morality and idealism as well as
power. On the other hand, the left believed that in the search for justice in the world, the
United States could not leave out moral or ethical questions, especially those affecting
human rights. At times it seemed that power and principles conflicted, but Carter was
successful in not sacrificing justice in favor of order. Some scholars have argued that his

10

This is, in fact, the title of Brzezinski's memoirs: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle:
Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1985).
1
' Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 48.
12
President Jimmy Carter, speech at the University of Notre Dame, 22 May 1977 in Public Papers
of the Presidents of the United States, vol. 1. Washington: Federal Register Division, National Archives
and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1977, 954.
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emphasis on human rights, especially when it concerned the Soviet Union, was
ineffective and even dangerous. It could drive a "beleaguered politburo leadership to feel
less able and less willing to pursue detente and international cooperation with the United
States."13 Others disagree.14 From the vantage point of 2008, Carter had a far-sighted
identification of United States national interests, and he mounted a sustained effort to
pursue them. This study will contribute to an understanding of how principles and power
can be balanced in order to project an effective foreign policy; how they sometimes clash;
and how the dilemmas Carter encountered interfaced with both, often making policy
choices difficult. He and some in his administration tried harder than is usual to think
about the longer future and about how ethical policies could affect the United States for
the better. This makes his administration as a whole a valuable case study in American
idealism in the 20 l century.
Five issue areas will be addressed: the Camp David Accords, the Iranian
Revolution and hostage crisis of 1979, arms transfers, the Panama Canal Treaties, and
Southern Africa. These issue areas are where the administration's greatest successes
occurred. Strategic concerns and their interplay at the regional level will be a factor, as
will human rights. By bringing hindsight to bear, current policies towards a very troubled
Middle East and Persian Gulf region, trends towards nuclear proliferation, a restless Latin
America, and a still neglected Africa can be analyzed.
This work argues that Christianity was a primary motivator in Carter's policies.
This, along with a strong faith in the. values of the United States, led him to pursue goals

14

George Quester, "Consensus Lost," Foreign Policy 40 (autumn 1980): 18-32.
Hoffmann, "Requiem."
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that other presidents shied away from.15 "Christian pragmatism" might best describe
Carter's policies. This means simply the application of the Christian principles of
freedom and a sense of responsibility to economic and political issues, with the
understanding that dogmas and generalizations will be discarded if they do not contribute
to the establishment of jtice in a given situation. While there is no "Christian" economic
or political system in the West, which puts a "wall of separation" between church and
state, there is a Christian attitude. It does not pretend to be God, but, rather, understands
that as human beings one must make choices between greater and lesser evils.16 Which
policy option is more or less just is the question to be answered. Some of the threads of
Christianity and its impact on United States foreign policy are discussed in the literature
review. The nature of the world Carter inherited which helped to condition his policies is
another important issue. The study will examine the broad setting that Carter inherited.
It will also examine the dilemmas he faced and the options he had. It argues that Carter's
foreign policies that are examined in this research were much more successful than is
commonly believed, due to his patience and diligence; or, to put it another way, his
prudence. Another element to be examined concerns his closest advisers. It will
scrutinize the positions taken by Brzezinski and Vance on the various issues to determine
how policy was influenced, and whether the choices were perceived by other actors as
being correct.
The role of the press will also be looked at. It never warmed up to Carter, and
gave him net negative coverage for forty-seven of the forty-eight months he was in
15

See Alan C. Lamborn, "Risk and Foreign Policy Choice," International Studies Quarterly 29
(December 1985): 385-410.
16
Reinhold Niebuhr, ed., Faith and Politics (New York: George Braziller 1968), "Theology and
Political Thought in the Western World," 55-56, first published in The Ecumenical Review and used by
permission.

office. This contributed to the perception of weakness and vacillation. Furthermore, the
press failed to realize that there were unavoidable contradictions in many policies. Far
from educating the public on the complexities and contradictions, they perpetuated the
myth of coherence. The consensus in United States foreign policy had been shattered by
the Vietnam War, but Henry Kissinger, national security advisor who later became
secretary of state under Nixon and Ford, papered over the contradictions and lack of
consensus. They were hidden on his watch. Carter, an open and honest man, exposed
them by tackling the issues, some of which were long neglected, in a straightforward,
open, and fair manner. The Middle East is probably the best example of these
contradictions, a region where the United States gives substantial support to Israel, yet
has a stake in the moderate Arab regimes, and a vital interest in the availability of oil.17
The East-West domination of foreign policy led to a series of proxy wars between
the Soviet Union and the United States, fought out in the Third World. Caught in a maze
of unresolved contradictions, Carter brought to his administration advocates of an
alternative approach to the Third World. Four different policy goals stand out. First, the
United States would no longer automatically equate its interests with the survival of
right-wing dictatorships against their domestic opponents, even those with Marxist
leanings. Second, it would be cooler to regimes that grossly violated human rights, and
would not overlook these violations just because a government claimed to be
anticommunist. Third it would establish working business relations with non-aligned

l7

Thomas L. Hughes, "Carter and the Management of Contradictions," Foreign Policy 31
(summer, 1978): 51; see also Stanley Hoffmann, "The Hell of Good Intentions," Foreign Policy 29 (winter,
1977-78): 3-26. For a brief discussion on his openness with the press, see "Why is Jimmy Smiling? Why
Not?" Time Archive, April 4, 1977, available at www.time.com/time/printout/0.8816,947846.00.htrnl.
Accessed 23 January 2007. See also, "The State of Jimmy Carter," Time Archive, February 5, 1979,
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nations on the left that were willing to conduct their economic affairs in a way that was
not harmful to the West. Fourth, it would treat Third World states on their own merits, as
legitimate negotiating partners, not just as pawns in the United States-Soviet Union
competition. He faced an uphill battle, with critics across the political spectrum. The
drive to reverse course was primarily led, however, by those in the center and on the
right. Two themes dominated their challenges: the need to back diplomacy with threats
of force, and the need to sustain friendly regimes against all attacks. By 1980, this group
claimed that Carter was an appeaser because he had failed to practice a "muscular
diplomacy."
The remainder of this introduction will discuss the themes of power and principle.
It will include a short discussion on their historical role in the 20th century, briefly
introduce the major actors and their views on power and principle, and review the rivalry
between the National Security Council and the Department of State over the control and
direction of United States foreign policy, which surfaced openly during the Iranian
hostage crisis. It will also examine the themes of human rights and arms sales and will
preview the five issue areas that will be examined in this study.
POWER
Power can be defined as A's ability to get B to do something that B would
otherwise not do. Some scholars differentiate between hard and soft power.19 Hard
power is the ability to project, use, or threaten force. Realists, such as Hans Morgenthau,
believe that the world is a Hobbesian one in which war of all is waged against all.
Realism has been the dominant paradigm in foreign policy since at least the 1960s, and it
18

Tom J. Farer, "Searching for Defeat," Foreign Policy 40, Tenth Anniversary (fall 1980): 157,

159.
l9

See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power, (Oxford: University Press, 2002).
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postulates that the world is anarchical, meaning there is no overarching world
government, and this puts states into a self help situation. Security is the most important
thing, and because states live in a bad neighborhood, they are socialized to seek security.
Thus, states will build up their militaries accordingly. Morgenthau laid the groundwork
for much of realism's basic tenets.

However, he saw in realism an effort to build a

bridge between normative and empirical thinkers so that leaders could craft their policies
on foundations that were "ethically sound and realistically conceived."21 E.H. Carr also
wrote that
"the Utopian, fixing his eyes on the future, thinks in terms of creative spontaneity
the realist, rooted in the past, in terms of causality. All healthy human
action...must establish a balance between Utopia and reality....22
This is the most effective way to craft a successful foreign policy.
Today there is not much room within the realist paradigm for the choice of moral
values that might seem on the surface to conflict with the national interest. Wilsonian
idealism, or liberalism as it is known today, dominated United States foreign policy from
1919 to 1939 and beyond. Some writers in the interwar years believed that the postwar
world could be made more stable and just than any period in previous history. The
overwhelming catastrophe of World War One was seen as the result of the power politics
of previous generations from the time of the Napoleonic Wars. Balance of power, which
was supposed to check ambitious, was unreliable. They believed that war resulted from
patterns of state interactions that could be changed through "moral education and the

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations,4th ed (New York: Knopf, 1967).
Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy (New Jersey: Princeton, 1992), 5.
22
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939 (First Harper and Row ed. New York: Harper
and Row, 1964).
21

9
collective action of the peoples of the world.

The education of the public would be

essential. Today, liberals generally think that international organizations and regimes can
lessen anarchy, and that cooperation can occur. They lengthen the shadow of the future,
connect the present to the future, identify and punish defectors, and provide
transparency.24
Soft power is another form of power. It is the ability to set the agenda in ways
that shape the preferences of other powers, and it arises from values.25 It is very much
about image and is an important part of modern day power. It is about getting the other
side to follow you because they want to, not because of intimidation.26 Carter set the
example for the post-Vietnam world, with his commitment to diplomacy, his endless
patience, and his adherence to principle; while, at the same time, creating the Rapid
Deployment Force, proclaiming the Carter Doctrine, and strengthening the joint
command capabilities of the military. These actions connected United States hard and
soft power. Today the United States' soft power - the "summation of economic leverage,
cultural pull, and intellectual clout that has made the United States the preeminent force
in the world - " is being challenged for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
China's rapid rise to power, for example, is judged to be benign by many nations in Asia,
but there are worrisome signs, and history suggests that it is difficult to deal with rising
states. There are two prongs to the United States' approach to China - engaging and
hedging. These two prongs, which also connect hard and soft power, need to be
integrated more effectively. The United States, according to Campbell and O'Hanlon,
23

McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, 6.
Kenneth Oye Cooperation Under Anarchy, (Princeton: University Press, 1985).
25
Nye, Paradox of American Power.
26
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic
Books, 1990).
24
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should cultivate allies and friends, provide foreign aid in a targeted manner, strengthen
and use military power prudently as a stabilizing influence, develop better intelligence
capabilities, and demonstrate a sustained political will. Evolutionary military policies,
not radical changes, will be the most effective in reminding China that the United States
is the guarantor of regional stability, but the United States should also work with Asian
nations, including China, on mutual security goals. In the meantime, the second and
equally important battlefield is the "hearts and minds" struggle with Islam today. This
battlefield includes Asia as well as the Middle East, and the United States should launch a
strong diplomatic initiative beginning with Indonesia, the largest Islamic nation in the
world. The United States provided post-tsunami relief that dwarfed China's contribution
and that highlighted America's economic and military strength. The aftermath of this
shared experience has opened a window for a long-term partnership.27
In the broad picture, Indonesia connects with the Middle East. An emphasis on
democracy, human rights, and values helped to win the Cold War, and a broad policy
framework for Islamic countries that features foreign assistance, diplomacy, and other
soft programs, coupled with a strong military and effective homeland defenses, could be
an effective tool in fighting Islamic extremism.
Historically, the United States has projected a positive image about beliefs and
culture to the world at large. Projecting a nation's norms and ideology are sources of
power. George Kennan, a realist, understood this when he advised the United States to
put a positive image before the world and stay true to American values, in his "Long
Telegram" in 1947. These differing uses of power are an important element to be
27

Kurt M. Campbell and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Hard Power, (New York: Basic Books, 2006),

200-209.
28

Ibid., 140-141.
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analyzed in the Carter administration.. The interaction between the state department and
the national security council, which became especially important in the Iranian hostage
crisis, will be examined to ascertain whether either agency had complete control over the
direction of policy.
th

During the 20 century the United States used both hard and soft power - at times
separately, at times jointly, practicing Wilsonian idealism even as it built a militarized
state as the realists wanted. Historians disagree on when America entered the century that is, whether it was 1898 or 1917. Both can be argued, but whatever one concludes,
the nation entered the world stage in 1898 with a projection of hard power, became an
imperial power, with territories, protectorates, and a colony; and shortly thereafter
became closely entwined in another of Europe's "world wars" in 1917. After World War
I was over, the United States failed to use its hard power a single time in Europe or Asia,
even in the threatening decade of the 1930s. Its involvement in World War II produced
the acquisition and use of the greatest power ever known in history. When the war was
over in 1945 the nation used a combination of hard and soft power, rebuilding Europe
with Marshall Plan aid; encouraging the early cooperation of France and Germany with
the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); leading the United
Nations (UN) police action against North Korea; rebuilding Japan economically and
agreeing to protect it militarily; and more. Although not always evident at the time, this
combination of power and principle worked very well until the country became
embroiled in Vietnam. The Vietnam War shattered the foreign policy consensus in the
United States, ruined at least two presidencies, and led to a more assertive Congress in
the realm of international affairs. This was Carter's inheritance.

12
The Carter administration is recognized for understanding that power, especially
economic power, was more dispersed in the 1970s than it had been previously, and tried
to work within that framework, as did Nixon before him. As Richard Rosecrance has
argued, the rise of the European Community and Japan as strong trading states now
presented new challenges, because their cooperation could not always be certain, in spite
of the fact that the United States was the guarantor of their security. 29 The multipolar
world played a role in the decisions of the administration, especially those on arms
transfers and the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. Some argue that economic
interdependence renders military power unusable, but Joseph Nye refutes this, claiming
that military power dominates economic power; exercising it, however, brings higher
costs. That is, relative to cost, there is no guarantee that it will be more effective than
economic means in securing goals.30
To many, power is often equivalent to force. Eighteenth and nineteenth century
Utopians were often ridiculed for their beliefs that force was an aberration in the
international system. With the development of modern technology in the nineteenth
century they believed the use of force was self-defeating."

Presented in this light,

Utopian ideas seem hopelessly outmoded, especially in the twenty-first century.
However, this was not the dominant strain of liberal internationalist thought in the
twentieth century. Liberal internationalists are more likely to view force as a last resort,
rather than a first, but it is in their toolkit. This is the school into which Carter should be

Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State, (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
Robert O.Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence 3d ed., (New York:
Longman, 2001).
31
Kenneth Waltz, "Force, Order and Justice," International Studies Quarterly 11 (September
1967): 278-283.
j0
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placed. A fuller discussion of liberal internationalism as well as realism appears in the
literature review.
Democrats, especially, have been painted as the anti-war party, unwilling to use
force to accomplish goals which are in the national interest. This, however, can be
debated; the rising political right of the 1970s and 1980s began constructing the picture,
and became more successful at the time of the Iranian hostage crisis.32 With the blessing
and encouragement of the Iranian government, fifty-two Americans were held hostage for
444 days, being released only after Ronald Reagan was elected president. Although all
the hostages came home alive, Carter was depicted as a failure - a weak man, unwilling
to do what was necessary to end the crisis. The truth is quite the opposite, in light of
what we know now, and as this work will argue. The litany of accusations against the
Democrats went on during the Clinton administration as well, in spite of a number of
successful policy initiatives. With America facing a terrible debacle in Iraq, it is time for
new ideas on national security, which might in actuality mean a return to traditional
diplomacy, utilizing such things as well thought out economic sanctions and the use of
international organizations, all overlaid with a generous portion of prudence, as the
country stands firm on its principled positions. Iran could, once, again, be the place
where Carter-like uses of American power might be successful as the United States tries
to deter Iran from building nuclear weapons.

For a discussion of the effects of the word "hostage" see Scott L. Harris, "The Rhetorical
Dimensions of a Crisis: A Critical Evaluation of the Iranian Hostage Situation" (PhD diss., Northwestern
University, 1989).
33
Campbell and O'Hanlon, Hard Power, 30-31.
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PRINCIPLE
Carter is commonly credited (or cursed) for getting human rights issues back on
the international political agenda. He traces his concern for them back to his upbringing
in a segregated south. 4 Born in Plains, Georgia, Carter inherited the legacy of the
American Civil War - namely the refusal of whites "to accept the children of liberated
slaves as legal or social equals." After whites were disenfranchised for being loyal to the
South, they considered themselves justified in controlling the political system of their
region after Northern domination ended. Rural dominance in most of the South was
guaranteed by basing election results on counties, rather on the votes of individual
citizens. The Depression fueled the resentments against the federal government all over
again. Personal relationships between blacks and whites on the Carter family farm were
quite different from those of today, however. Their daily lives were closely intertwined,
in spite of the fact that segregation and white superiority was accepted. For whites who
were lazy or dishonest, or who had personal habits that were repulsive, "white trash" was
a harsher epithet than any racial slur. Carter relates that his final judgment of people he
knew was based on their own character and achievements, not on their race.

Blacks

were unable to vote, serve on juries, or otherwise participate in the political process in the
South; and this opened Carter's mind and heart to the black majorities in Southern Africa
who suffered under a similar system.
One of the most pertinent themes in United States history is that the American
people have a humanitarian spirit - they stand up for justice and fair play. Carter's
concern for human rights was a source of power for the United States; it did not erode it
34
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as was argued by some. After the Vietnam War, most Americans were anxious to restore
America's moral position in the world, and in 1976 they turned to Carter to do this.
Asking what some of the attributes of a superpower are, he suggests that they might very
well mirror those of a person. "These would include a demonstrable commitment to
truth, justice, peace, freedom, humility, human rights, generosity, and the upholding of
other moral values."36 He believed that there is no inherent reason why the United States
cannot be the ".. .international example of these virtues. Our government should be
known, without question, as opposed to war, dedicated to the resolution of disputes by
peaceful means, and, whenever possible, eager to exert our tremendous capability and
influence to accomplish this goal." He also believed that by following these precepts,
America's own well being would be enhanced and that the trust of others, along with
their admiration and friendship for the United States would be restored.37 Although
Carter wrote these words in 2005, it seems obvious that these values had been developed
over the course of his life and that he has tried to remain true to them, whether dealing
with the Soviet Union or Southern Africa, and whether popular or not. These principles
of seeking justice, peace, freedom, humility, human rights, generosity, and other moral
values will be examined in the course of this study to ascertain their role in his
administration. Brzezinski writes that when Carter took office it seemed that United
States foreign policy was stalemated on the level of power and "excessively cynical on
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the level of principle. We were determined to demonstrate also the primacy of the moral
dimension in foreign policy."38
National Security Council vs. United States State Department
Carter was determined to lead the country in a new direction. No longer would
the Soviet Union be the sole fixation of the United States. Instead, every country would
be recognized as being unique, with its own problems, and the United States would not
simply try to achieve a position of strength against one adversary, the SU. Military
solutions would be viewed skeptically. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance agreed;
Brzezinski was less enthusiastic, but swallowed his doubts in the early days.39
Brzezinski, as Kissinger before him, went to work quietly to make the NSC the nerve
center for foreign policy. Carter, according to Brzezinski, wanted a simplified structure
of governmental agencies in general, and that meant a sleek and lean structure of the
NSC. Brzezinski proposed the establishment of two basic committees; one was to be the
Policy Review Committee (PRC) which would deal with three categories of issues:
•

Foreign policy issues, including both regional and topical;

•

Defense policy issues; and

•

International economic issues.

The various departments would take the leadership role. That is, a Foreign Policy
Committee would be chaired by the secretary of state, while a Defense Issues Committee
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would be chaired by the secretary of defense. The second committee was the Special
Coordination Committee (SCC) which was charged with:
•

Intelligence policy issues;

•

Arms control; and

•

Crisis management.

At a meeting at St. Simon, an island off the coast of Georgia, President-elect Carter
announced this plan to those present, which included the members of his new cabinet and
his principal staff assistants. These included Carter's chief of staff Hamilton Jordan and
his press secretary Jody Powell. Cyrus Vance became Secretary of State; Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense; Michael Blumenthal Secretary of the Treasury; Griffin Bell
Attorney General; Cecil Andrus Secretary of the Interior; Bob Bergland, Secretary of
Agriculture; Juanita Kreps Secretary of Commerce, Ray Marshall Secretary of Labor,
Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Patricia Roberts Harris
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; and Brock Adams Secretary of
Transportation. There were a few others of cabinet rank who also met with Carter's top
officials as equals: Bert Lance, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; James
Schlesinger who would become the first Secretary of Energy; Andrew Young
Ambassador to the United Nations; Charles Schultze Chairman, Council of Economic
Advisors; and Robert Strauss, Special Trade Representative, as well as Brzezinski. In his
memoirs, Brzezinski writes that Carter's announcement "will enable me on my return to
Washington to draft or actually to redraft my proposals on the NSC, to send them down
for his approval, and thereby establish the basis for a system that I can use effectively."40
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In hindsight it seems clear that he put a structure into place that would tend to concentrate
foreign policy decisions in the NSC, which he believed was the logical location.
Although Brzezinski writes that he agreed with Carter's desire to create a more
humane foreign policy, not all would agree that this played anything more than a minor
role in the policies he suggested.41 Some argue that Brzezinski was convinced that EastWest relations should be at the core of United States foreign policy. He was a realist who
believed in the conflictual nature of politics, and who also believed that Soviet ideology,
which stressed the importance of a world order dominated by socialism, intensified
conflict. Others disagreed. Brzezinski conceived and became the first director of the
Trilateral Commission, a group sponsored by David Rockefeller, which had Carter,
Vance and Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal as members. It grew out of
opposition to the bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union which was the focus of the
Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. Brzezinski stressed good relationships with allies,
especially Europe and Japan. He gave poor grades for the Nixon-Kissinger policies for
its treatment of Japan and its indifference to Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs). He
called for a new framework between advanced nations, for giving the oil producing
countries a stake in that framework and for including the LDCs. In 1970 he argued that
joint scientific and technological endeavors by the United States and the Soviet Union
could help stimulate a sense of common purpose. By 1974, it seemed obvious that his
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stance had hardened, and he criticized the SALT agreement for conceding numerical
superiority to the Russians on the basis of American technical superiority.42
Cyrus Vance, the new secretary of state, was also concerned that the NSC should
be organized in a way that "would permit a thorough airing of key policy issues without
engaging the senior foreign policy and national security advisers in time-consuming
debate to no useful end." Vance points out that the personal dimension would be
unusually important in the Carter administration. He believed that Carter was
unpretentious himself and did not like inflated egos in others. He emphasized team work
and collegiality. Vance supported this approach with one critical reservation. He
believed that "only the president and his secretary of state were to have the responsibility
for defining the administration's foreign policy publicly." However, as time went on, a
serious breach of this understanding developed in spite of Carter's acceptance of the
principle. Also, as time went on, Brzezinski increasingly began to take on the role of
policy spokesman. Vance claims that as divergences grew between Brzezinski's and his
own statements on policy, Brzezinski became "a serious impediment to the conduct of
our foreign policy." It also became a political liability because it appeared to Congress
and foreign governments that the administration did not know its own mind.43
Historically, two patterns of presidential leadership have guided the NSC. Some
presidents prefer to be intimately involved in defining national strategy and its
implementation as well; others reserve decision making for themselves but abstain from
the day-to-day supervision of policy, permitting a strong secretary of state to dominate.
42
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Broadly speaking, Carter exercised the presidential style. The head of the NSC benefits
enormously from the presidential pattern, becoming not just a policy coordinator, but also
an adviser on policy choices. But Carter emphasized that the secretary of state would be
the chief policy adviser and wanted him to be the lead player. Brzezinski claims that
Carter soon became disillusioned, finding that the state department did not have many
new or innovative ideas.
Brzezinski, for his part, claimed that Vance did not communicate effectively and
therefore the president asked him to be more outspoken. He recounts that after his
appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows, Carter, and sometimes Rosalynn, would
call to praise his performance. Brzezinski believes that this unfortunately fed the image
that the national security advisor overshadowed the secretary of state. This had adverse,
consequences for both him and the president. One of the most telling disagreements
concerned the Iranian Revolution, when no clear policy goals emerged partly because of
a flawed policy process, exacerbated in part by the growing dispute between Vance and
Brzezinski.44
Vance recounts that the structure of the NSC proposed by Brzezinski largely
retained the previous system of specialized committees, but unlike the Nixon
administration, the departments would assume the leadership roles. He was concerned
about the relative distribution of responsibility within the organization. Vance believed
that the secretary of state should play the paramount role on all foreign policy issues and
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some national security issues; because he felt that "nothing is more central than that
military instruments be always seen as means of, and not ends of, foreign policy."45
About a week after the meeting on St. Simon, the president accepted a procedure
proposed by Brzezinski for recording the views and recommendations that would emerge
from the meetings of the two central committees of the NSC. When no policy
recommendations emerged, the national security advisor, using the notes of a staff
member, would prepare a summary report for the president. If a meeting of agency
principals made recommendations for a policy, Brzezinski would submit a presidential
directive (PD) to Carter for his signature. In neither case were the summaries or PDs to
be circulated to the SCC or PRC participants for review prior to their submission to the
president. This gave the national security advisor the power to interpret the thrust of the
discussions or frame the policy recommendations of the department principles. Vance
adamantly disagreed with this process and went to the president, but Carter said that he
preferred it because of the danger of leaks if the documents were circulated before they
reached his desk. Unfortunately, as Vance stresses, leaks had become a way of
governing in Washington, in order to promote or discredit certain courses of action. The
department heads were welcome to go to the White House to view any draft proposals if
they liked, but time constraints inhibited this activity. Vance admits that he made a
serious mistake on not insisting that the draft materials be reviewed before they went to
the president. He found, as time went on, that often there were serious errors in
interpretation of various discussions, and that the documents were too "terse," losing the
nuance and interrelationship between or among issues.
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Brzezinski had a close relationship with Carter which preceded the presidential
campaign. As Brzezinski and the others were establishing the Trilateral Commission,
they decided to include two governors on it, one Republican and one Democrat. They
decided that, instead of the usual Northeast Democrat, it might be interesting to have one
from the South. Carter was attractive, at least in part, because they believed that he had
opened up trade offices for Georgia in Brussels and Tokyo. This was obviously their
man. However, they then discovered that it was his predecessor who had done that.
Nonetheless he got on the Commission. By 1975 it was obvious that Carter was running
for president. Carter asked Brzezinski to attend the press conference where he would
announce his candidacy, and Brzezinski agreed. As usual the press did not treat Carter
very well, and certainly did not take him seriously. Carter handled the situation superbly,
telling the reporters he would win the Iowa Caucasus, and the New Hampshire primary,
and they would keep George Wallace below 40 percent in Florida. The press would then
have to change its tune. Brzezinski came away convinced that this was a man to be
reckoned with. He was also impressed with Carter's courage on the issue of peace
between the Arabs and Israelis, and with his emphasis on the need to focus on the
Palestinian question, which was barely on the radar screen at the time. Throughout the
campaign Brzezinski advised Carter on foreign policy issues. By the time Carter
appointed him Assistant for National Security Affairs, the two men had a well developed
personal relationship. Brzezinski thought Carter would be reasonably tough and realistic
in foreign affairs, yet would be guided by certain basic principles, a source of America's
strength. As for what Carter liked about Brzezinski, Brzezinski believed that it was his

ability to communicate quickly and to the point, and to crystallize a clear Democratic
foreign policy in the future.4
Vance's fear of time-consuming, tedious, and often aimless debate at the senior
level came to pass. Eventually, he found it easier to go to the president, Brzezinski,
Harold Brown (the secretary of defense), or other department heads to avoid timeconsuming formal meetings. As the United States- USSR relationship deteriorated and
policy differences began to spill over, more issues were drawn upward to the political
level. Senior officials increasingly monitored the details of policy implementation. For
Vance, his nightly report to the president contained a brief report on and an analysis of
important developments. He also used it to raise issues directly with the president.
Unlike most other documents, this one bypassed the NSC.47 An informal system
paralleled the formal.
Two other ways of communicating were the President's weekly breakfast and a
weekly lunch that Brzezinski, Brown and Vance held. Both of these proved especially
helpful, according to Vance, because they were free of the constraints of formal agendas,
"agency positions, and bureaucratic infighting." Furthermore, there were no note takers
present. It provided a forum for an unrestrained exchange of views among the top three
of the president's foreign policy advisors and more and more became a place where
agreement could be reached quickly on a broad range of national security issues, much to
the annoyance of other agencies. The agreements were quickly followed by policy
recommendations to the president.
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PREVIEWS OF THE ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED
Panama Canal Treaties
During Lyndon Johnson's administration long simmering Panamanian
nationalism exploded when some American students raised the American flag on a Canal
Zone campus, an act that violated a ban on flying either the Panamanian or American
flag. Massive rioting broke out and Panama broke diplomatic relations with the United
States. Three days of bloodshed followed with four American soldiers and twenty
Panamanians dying. Dozens more were injured. The loss of life plus the fact that the
Canal's locks and dams were vulnerable to sabotage gravely concerned Johnson and the
American military. The Panamanian president, Robert Chiati, demanded that all existing
treaties between the two countries be revised. Johnson concluded that it was indeed time
to take another look at them. After diplomatic relations resumed, the two countries
agreed to renegotiate the treaties. By June 1967 the Johnson administration had
succeeded, and it announced agreement on three treaties. No further progress was made,
however, because Congressional opposition to the changes was so strong that they were
never submitted for ratification; and in 1968 when General Omar Torrijos came to
power in Panama he renounced them. Four years later the Nixon administration
announced that a "set of principles" had been agreed to. These principles effectively
called for the elimination of the concept of United States control over the Canal in
perpetuity which had been part of the original treaty constructed by John Hay, the United
States secretary of state, and Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a French businessman connected
with the New Panama Company, and which was signed in November 1903. The Canal
became an issue in the 1976 primaries when Ronald Reagan accused the Ford
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administration of keeping a "mouse like silence" in the face of "blackmail" from
Panama's "dictator." Reagan claimed that "When it comes to the Canal, we built it, we
paid for it, it's ours and we should tell [Omar] Torrijos and Company that we are going to
keep it!"48
When Carter took office in 1977 he recounts that it became clear that if the United
States was going to negotiate seriously with Panama, it would have to begin immediately,
and any agreement would have to include giving control over the Canal to Panama and
acknowledging Panamanian sovereignty. It would be an uphill battle. A Senate
resolution had been introduced in 1975, signed by 38 senators, which opposed giving
sovereignty over the Canal Zone to the Panamanians. The public also strongly opposed
relinquishing it.49
The debate was exacerbated by the events of the past decade: Vietnam,
Watergate, inflation, the oil crisis, and the loss of military and economic supremacy. A
real fear of national decline was in the air. Relinquishing sovereignty over the Canal
seemed to symbolize a decline in American will to maintain global pre-eminence. The
president might have been tempted to duck the issue. However, at the forceful urging of
Vance, Carter moved on this issue during his first week in office.50 Brzezinski agreed.
Vance was particularly well versed on Latin America, having been Johnson's personal
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emissary during the anti-American riots in 1964, and Brzezinski had an excellent advisor
in Robert Pastor who had worked on those issues during the campaign.5
Carter faced mounting dangers to the security of the Canal, a hostile public, and a
reluctant Senate. The military informed Carter and Congress as well, that the Canal
could not be defended permanently if the United States did not maintain a working
relationship with Panama. In other words, America needed to exercise its power in a
different way if it wanted to protect the canal over the long term from possible
destruction. In addition, this seemed like a chance to signal to all of Latin America that
the Carter Administration understood that the relationship between the two regions had
changed and it was prepared to work to construct more mature relationships based on
mutual respect.52 Carter was convinced that the country needed to "correct an
injustice..." to sever a "diplomatic cancer, which was poisoning our relations with
Panama."53 Carter knew the Canal was under serious threat of attack if we did not act
soon. Harold Brown, according to Carter, also came to the same conclusions. Brown
understood that the nation had traditional security interests in Latin America, dating back
to the Monroe Doctrine, and Panama was especially important.54 One helpful element in
the Canal fight was the wave of anti-imperialism that was in the international air. Today,
these considerations seem to be the perfect mesh of power and principle; that is, the
opportunity to solve a festering problem and to right a long-standing wrong. It became,
however, the perfect storm - a "fire bell in the night" - that foreshadowed a rocky future.
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Carter claimed that the issue was a litmus test of how the United States, a superpower,
would treat a "small and relatively defenseless nation that had always been a close
partner and supporter."55 The issue was as thorny as the ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles, but Carter succeeded in his efforts where Woodrow Wilson failed. Although
the treaties were successfully negotiated and ratified, it came at an extraordinarily high
price politically. In the moment, however, it seemed like a new beginning to the
country's relationship with Latin America.
This part of the study will examine the question of whether Panama gained
sovereignty by ratifying the treaties, or exchanged one form of colonialism for another. It
argues that the treaties were not a bad bargain for Panama, contrary to what Richard Falk
argues,56 rather, it was the best that could be gotten. The United States in fact did send a
more humane signal to Latin America, and was not just another form of what some
detractors of the country's policy toward Latin America have termed "Yankee
imperialism."57
Arms Transfers
Carter believed that the world was awash in arms and it would be a better place if
the United States and other nations could restrain the trafficking in them. He joined the
issues of arms transfers and human rights, something that Congress had begun. Issuing
Presidential Directive 13 (PD 13), he created an additional step in building a set of
guidelines for a new arms export policy.
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The international sale of arms is not new in history, and it has usually been seen
as a legitimate function of government. From its earliest days, the country supplied arms
to Latin America as former colonies struggled for independence from Spain. Continuing
along this line, it also supplied arms to Texas in its war for independence. This set the
tone for the next 150 years. International trafficking in arms picked up during World
War I, then experienced a decline during the Great Depression. World War II saw a rise
in sales once again.58 The Cold War continued to keep the arms merchants busy, but
Congress became concerned over the growth of sales when they expanded from $3.8
billion in 1965 to more than $20 billion by the time Carter took office.59
In 1976 Congress passed the International Security and Arms Export Control Act,
or simply the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), in an effort to dampen down this trade.
This act set the parameters within which the executive branch could act. By the time
Carter took office, not only NATO allies were getting significant arms, but other,
unsavory, nations with bad reputations on human rights were purchasing large quantities.
Many people did not want to see the nation as the chief arms merchant in the world, but
there are both costs and benefits in arms transfers, and these must be weighed carefully in
considering which countries should receive arms. The circumstances of a region can and
have led to dangerous confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States: the
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Yom Kippur War is a good example. Moscow began to escalate deliveries of arms to the
Arab states after hostilities began, and made it clear that it would stand behind its clients,
possibly intervening with its own forces. The United States resorted to massive air lifts
of arms and put its forces on the highest alert. The decision in peacetime to sell arms
thus led to a genuine risk of direct confrontation between the two superpowers.
During the Nixon-Ford years there were rising tensions between the executive and
legislative branches of government over the direction and control of United States oreign
policy, with Congress taking a more assertive role. These tensions led to the passage of
the AEC A, which contained a clear policy statement on arms transfers as well as a human
rights policy. This was contained in Section 502B(2) of the act. The language contained
such phrases as "consistent patterns of gross violations" of human rights and denied arms
to governments who were guilty of this. There were powerful lobbies at work, including
much of the Foreign Service as well as the military industrial complex that wanted to
continue business as usual. The Foreign Service believed that the United States' position
in troubled regions could be enhanced by the sale of arms to certain states, while the
military industrial complex was interested in maintaining the lucrative markets for their
wares. The human rights lobby also contributed to the conversation, hoping for a
substantial decline in those sales. Carter, wanting to maintain a strong international
posture for the nation, tried to find some middle ground, by Using both power and
principle to enhance America's prestige in the world, while at the same time not
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damaging the defense industry. It proved to be difficult, but Carter crafted a balanced
policy.61
The Arab-Israeli Conflict
Another urgent question that the administration sought to address early was the
Arab-Israeli conflict. The story of Abraham's children was not a happy one, and
problems created by World War I and its aftermath had bedeviled the diplomats of the
20* century. Deadly problems had simmered beneath the surface for years, but when
Israel declared its independence on May 15, 1947, open warfare broke out. Five Arab
nations declared war on Israel. At the end of this war, Israel controlled all of Palestine,
except the Gaza Strip which was later administered by Egypt, and the West Bank of the
Jordan River which was governed by Jordan. Both of these areas were taken in
subsequent warfare in 1967. By the early 1950s the Arabs considered the creation of the
Jewish state a "heinous crime," and committed themselves to its annihilation. They
blamed the imperialist West for the catastrophe. About 700,000 Palestinians fled into
neighboring Arab countries after the 1948 war and were poorly assimilated, if at all.
They became a constant source of trouble to Israel.62 In 1977 Carter inherited the
problem. He moved quickly to find a formula for convening a peace conference. He
concluded that the best chance for peace would come by separating Egypt from the other
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Arabs' conflict with Israel. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, and Menachem Begin,
prime minister of Israel, began secret negotiations and both concluded they would be
better off dealing with each other directly, rather than dealing with the conflict through
Washington which wanted a comprehensive peace. Any agreement reached would serve
each country's national interests. Sadat's spectacular trip to Jerusalem in November
1977 broke down barriers, but when Begin did nothing spectacular to reciprocate, no
agreement was reached. Miles apart, the two ended up relying on Carter's sincere desire
and strong ambition to reach some accord. Carter's unprecedented personal intervention
resulted in the 1978 Camp David Accords.63 Vance recounts that a door had opened for
genuine peace and just in the Middle East.64 However, there was a certain vagueness in
the language of the Accords, which led to problems later. It took longer than the Carter
team wanted for the two sides to sign a treaty, but the following March the EgyptianIsraeli Peace Treaty was signed. Sadat paid for this with his life in 1981, but this cold
peace has held.65 This was the first treaty ever between an Arab state and Israel and
certainly did not solve all the problems. For example, the West Bank-Gaza negotiations
were not resolved, although it had been a top priority. Nor was the principle of a freeze
on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories solved. Not even the United States had
the power to force these issues, but Carter achieved a remarkable victory nonetheless.
Brzezinski calls Carter a "skillful debater, a master psychologist, and a very effective

63

Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, x, xi; see also Ghassan Bishara, "Zbigniew Brzezinski: Peace at an
Impasse," Journal of Palestine Studies 14 (autumn 1984): 3-15 for a discussion of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem
and what it accomplished.
64
Vance, Hard Choices, 227.
See William B. Quandt, Peace Process (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001);
see also Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New
York: Knopf, 1981), 356-358; Stein, Heroic Diplomacy, x, xi; William B. Quandt, "Camp David:
Peacemaking and Politics," Journal of Palestine Studies 16 (summer 1987): 139-140.

32

mediator. Without him, there would have been no agreement."6 Brzezinski also gives a
great deal of credit to Vance and recounts that he felt that the press did not give him
enough recognition for his contribution. With Egypt and Israel at peace, the Egyptian
army would be absent in any ensuing Arab-Israeli war. Without the Egyptians the Arabs
had little hope of winning any war, and even with the Egyptians their chances were slim.
The focus later shifted to the Palestinian predicament, especially after Yassar Arafat
entered the public stage. Subsequent events have made any peace between the
Palestinians and the Israelis seem unlikely. Although in principle many would like to
see an autonomous Palestinian state, this has not come to pass. Carter writes that in any
peace negotiations, the United States must convince all parties that it will be fair and
unbiased; that the Arabs must recognize the reality that is Israel, and the Israelis must
acknowledge Palestinian claims to equality and self determination in a portion of their
homeland.
This study will examine the principles sought by Carter in the Egyptian-Israeli
agreement and those that were subsequently achieved. In general, the administration
believed that the settlement should be based on the principles contained in United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242, which would exchange land for peace.
The study will evaluate the success or failure of the treaty in moving forward to a
comprehensive peace in the region. Gaza, the West Bank, and settlements in the
Occupied Territories will also be examined from the stance of 2008. This work argues
that Carter laid the groundwork for a lasting peace, and that the chances for peace were
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much better for the region than before the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Although several
presidents have tried to achieve this, none has been willing to put in the time, effort, or
patience that lay behind Carter's stunning success.68
Southern Africa
In his 1977 speech at Notre Dame University, Carter stated that the United States
was "committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Southern Africa. The time has
come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order...." He believed
that change must come quickly, and he stated that the United States stood ready to work
with both European allies and African states to transform Southern African society while
protecting it from external interference.69
The Western history of Southern Africa can be traced back as far as the Dutch
landing in the region in 1652, and has continued into the modern era. Dutch, French,
English and Germans began to settle in the region, and collectively they comprise the
Afrikaner portion of today's population. The Europeans were able to enslave the native
inhabitants, mostly through warfare. When the English appeared in the late 18th century
and gained control over the Cape of Good Hope, there began a long conflict between
them and the Afrikaners. After the British abolished slavery in its empire in 1836,
disgruntled Afrikaner farmers (Boers) moved northward, coming into conflict with other
indigenous groups, such as the Zulus. As diamonds and gold were discovered in the
region, more Europeans came and British investment rose sharply. Many blacks
migrated to work in the mines, and mine owners built hostels to house and control the
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workers, which created a pattern that extended throughout the region. The racial
discrimination continued into the 20l century.
Although the United States worked for human rights and an end to racial
discrimination after World War II, its own segregationist policies hampered its efforts
abroad. Carter has quite a bit to say about his administration's efforts to make human
rights a cornerstone of his foreign policy, but there is little in his memoirs on this subject
as it pertains to Southern Africa. Vance, however, devotes two chapters to the topic. He
points out that Kissinger had put into motion negotiations on the Namibia and Rhodesia
conflicts, but these were fragile. Further, America's relationship to black Africa was not
good. Because of the country's support for the losing side in the Angolan civil war, most
blacks across the region thought that the United States was concerned only about African
problems to the degree they affected East-West relations. They also assumed that it
wanted to protect its own interests through "a strong Republic of South Africa shielded
by a barrier of black client states dependent upon Pretoria's political, economic, and
military support." It was clear from the outset that this negative image had to be
changed.
The administration recognized that by aligning itself with majority rule in the
region, it could increase American influence and minimize Soviet influence. This would
be the best way to prevent Soviet and Cuban exploitation of the racial conflicts. The
principles to be sought after were majority rule, self-determination, and racial equality as
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a matter of basic human rights.71 Edgar Lockwood, the Director of the Washington
Office on Africa,72 adds free market capitalism to the list of principles.73 To do otherwise
would convince the Africans that they were being used as Cold War pawns. The policies
pursued in Southern Africa were not well understood by the public and were not popular
in Congress. Because e some black guerrilla groups were supported by the Communists,
some conservatives thought that the administration supported Communism, and worked
hard to convince it to support white minority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Some
liberals and black organizations in the United States, on the other hand, believed that the
administration was too cautious in its approach. The President, according to Vance,
believed that it was in the long term interests of the nation to support majority rule and
refused to do what was politically expedient. Again, Carter was besieged from left and
right.
Most of the administration was in agreement with Carter's position on the
principle of majority rule. Brzezinski recounts that his role was secondary, but that he
had a group of strong advisors who educated him on the issues. These included such men
as Thomas Thornton, Henry Richardson, and Jerry Funk Vance's advisors were United
States Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, Richard Moose, and Anthony
Lake, who worked under the President's direction. Brzezinski defines his role as mainly
making certain that the administration did not ignore East-West issues, mainly the Soviet-
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Cuban military presence in Africa. He was afraid that this Communist presence might
frighten whites in the region to oppose any power sharing arrangements.
Edgar Lockwood thought that Carter's appointment of Andrew Young as his
Ambassador to the United Nations was outstanding; because he was a living testament
that non-violent political activism can propel blacks into the political elite. Carter said
that Third World nations finally had an advocate who understood their problems.75
This section of the study will examine the region as a whole, especially the
conditions in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, which seem to be the key states on
which majority rule rested. It will argue that the administration stuck to the principles
Carter sought, and Carter prevented it from getting sidetracked by the Soviet-Cuban
presence. The United States was successful in preventing the Soviets making gains in the
region while at the same time it contributed to the principle of majority rule.
Iran and the Unraveling of A Presidency
Arguably, the Iranian Revolution and subsequent hostage crisis presented the
greatest challenge to the Carter administration. United States interests in Iran date back to
World War II when the country began to see itself as Iran's protector. This was in
response to the British and Soviet occupation of the country in order to block German
influence. When the war was over, the British withdrew their troops, but kept control of
Iranian oil. The Soviet troops, on the other hand, did not withdraw from the north, and
actively encouraged a separatist movement in the province of Azerbaijan. Harry Truman,
president of the United States "talked tough" to the Soviets, who subsequently withdrew.
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In addition, Truman convinced the British not to interfere with Iranian nationalization of
the oil industry because this might drive them into the Soviets' arms. Iran, therefore,
gained at least some control over the oil revenues. Seven international oil companies
(five of which were American) replaced the old Anglo-Iranian company. These now
marketed Iranian oil. Mohammed Mossadegh, who had engineered the nationalization
process, decided to oust the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. At the time, 1953, the
nation saw "red" everywhere and became suspicious that if Mossadegh turned Iran into a
republic, Communist influence would rise and the country could possibly become a
Soviet satellite. Dwight Eisenhower was now president of the United States, and he was
convinced Mossadegh was a Communist. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
assisted by right wing Iranian army officers, engineered a countercoup, consolidated the
shah's power, and removed Mossadegh. The United States then became Iran's chief
supplier of technical, economic, and military aid.

The military aid grew enormously

under the Nixon and Ford administrations.
When the Carter administration took power, Vance envisioned a "far less
intimate" relationship, but a more active role in the Middle East, completing the process
initiated by Kissinger after the Yom Kippur War. This was to shift the American position
westward in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement and a strengthened Middle
East collective security structure.77 Vance recalls that the Carter administration's
relations with Iran followed an approach similar to other administrations after World War
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II, although Iran and the United States drew closer together during the Nixon-Ford years
as military cooperation increased. The United States viewed Iran as a major force for
stability in the Persian Gulf region. Its military strength, along with its tilt toward the
West, ensured access to oil and acted as an obstacle to would be Soviet expansion.
Although the United States approach to the relationship was similar at least in some ways
to those of previous administrations, there were differences in how bilateral relations
were conducted, especially in the arena of arms sales and human rights. By January 1977
there seemed to be progress towards modernization under the direction of the shah.
There was opposition from fundamentalist Islamic clergy and the landed class, but
economic growth and a "facade of Western institutions obscured the narrowness of the
shah's political base and the deep internal problems of a traditionalist society in
752

transition. The economic changes had not been accompanied by real political change."
The "Nixon Doctrine," saw regional states as being surrogates for American military
power, and in 1972 the Nixon administration began to sell the shah almost any weapon he
wanted. A well-armed Iran would take the place of a American military presence, which
Vietnam had made impossible anyway. No one foresaw that the huge price increase in
oil would allow the Shah to buy very large quantities of military hardware.
The military buildup was not accompanied by political reform, however, and it
became an area of concern to Congress. It appeared that the shah's ambitions went well
beyond Iran's borders. The shah's record on human rights was abysmal, but knowledge
about the opposition to him was sketchy, mainly because the Nixon-Ford administration
was reluctant to make contact with it. Vance believed the opposition consisted of
Vance, Hard Choices, 314; see also Bruce W. Jentleson, "Discrepant Responses" for a
discussion of the influence of senior advisers on presidential decision making.

39
"Westernized secular politicians (grouped around the old social democratic National
Front coalition), religious fundamentalists, leftist radical students and intellectuals, and
the small Tudeh (Communist) party."79 Demonstrations grew and increasingly turned
violent and, unknown to the administration, the shah, because of his illness, had lost
touch with political reality. Although the State Department assured the shah that the
administration supported him "without reservation" in the crisis, it would not try to tell
him how to handle his own internal problems. Brzezinski thought the State Department
had gone soft and given up on a military solution to the problem.
Brzezinski claimed that the crisis confronted the United States with two
fundamental questions: "(1) What was the nature of our central interest.. .and what was
truly at stake and must be protected as our first priority? And (2) how to maintain (and
encourage from outside) political stability in a traditional but...modernizing state, in
which the ruler's absolute personal power was being challenged by an escalating
revolutionary situation?"80 Brzezinski's answer to the first question was that Iran was of
central importance in safeguarding American and Western interests in the Persian Gulf.
He writes that although Vance and the State Department did not reject this view, they
were more preoccupied with the democratization of Iran and feared actions that would
bring about the opposite effect. When the crisis became acute State Department officials
became more concerned with evacuating Americans from Iran than they were with the
American position in Iran. Brzezinski had little faith in successful revolutions and saw
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no merit in asking the shah to give more concessions to the opposition.

Here was the

most glaring and obvious example of the clash within the Carter administration between
power and principle. There were conflicting voices and there was no agreement on what
to do; hence no good policy options emerged. The most pressing decision was how far to
back the shah in using force to put down the revolution or when to "disentangle
American prestige from a political corpse." There were no easy answers - in fact there
were no answers at all. Too much had happened previous to Carter taking office to be
able to really disassociate from the shah. Carter inherited an impossible situation, dating
back to 1953 and Mossadegh's removal.82
The hostage crisis proved as difficult a problem as the revolution. What began as
a "symbolic measure" lasting two days, the attack o the United States embassy became a
vehicle by which the Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated his power.

America was more

valuable to him as an enemy than as a friend. At the same time, the Carter presidency
was badly weakened, causing him to lose the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan. Although
Carter tried to build a relationship with Iran after the Shah's exit from Iran, the efforts
collapsed in November 1979 when the administration allowed the Shah into the country
for medical treatment. The decision was a difficult one - Carter had no wish to see the
shah playing tennis while his wife shopped, knowing that this would be disastrous. When
it became obvious that America was the only country with the medical skill and
equipment to treat the Shah, Carter gave the go-ahead for his entry. The embassy in
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Tehran was overrun shortly thereafter. This chapter argues that the hostage crisis was as
successful as it could have been, given the circumstances, in spite of the failure of the
rescue mission.

Iran lost at least $10 billion of its assets that were frozen in the United

States, and all hostages came out alive; the Iranian army was in disarray, there were no
spare parts being shipped, and Iraq invaded in early 1980.
CONCLUSIONS
Each president inherits a set of circumstances from his predecessors. Each
president should be evaluated on the way he handles the issues and the outcomes that
ensue. Carter is no exception. Each issue of the work will be evaluated on the immediate
outcomes, both at the regional and strategic levels, and evaluated as well on the long term
effects; that is, from the perspective of what we know now. The general framework will
be the role of power and principle in the administration, how they sometimes worked
together and sometimes clashed. No policy is one hundred percent success and the
concluding portion will evaluate the overall success/failure of the administration based on
the following criteria.
Success is a slippery and ephemeral concept, but is usually defined in terms of
favorable outcomes. Costs and benefits should be considered when evaluating success.
In every foreign policy issue, the United States must correctly identify its national
interests, and distinguish between vital and non-vital interests. Policy relevant
knowledge is essential in order to choose among the options presented. As a superpower,
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the United States should use power wisely; that is, the policy is rational, judicious, and
prudent. Force should be used as a last resort, and should be commensurate with the
goals and purpose of the policy, and its efficacy in achieving them. It is important to
estimate its usefulness accurately and in ways that facilitate comparison with nonmilitary
techniques. The effects on allies and adversaries alike, the trade-offs among competing
national interests, and the costs to both the United States and the target must all be
considered in assessing the overall success of a technique of statecraft.
Evaluating effectiveness in accomplishing goals is a necessary but not sufficient
ingredient in measuring success, and goal attainment is usually a matter of degree. The
issue areas will all be evaluated for success or failure, and the overall general goals of the
administration will also be evaluated. These four policy goals, as stated earlier are first,
the United States would no longer automatically equate its interests with the survival of
right-wing dictatorships against their domestic opponents, even those with Marxist
leanings. Second, it would be cooler to regimes that grossly violated human rights, and
would not overlook these violations just because a government claimed to be
anticommunist. Third it would establish working business relations with non-aligned
nations on the left that were willing to conduct their economic affairs in a way that was
not harmful to the West. Fourth, it would treat Third World states on their own merits, as
legitimate negotiating partners, not just as pawns in the East-West competition. Finally, a
concern for human rights was a thread that ran through all of the specific issues that
Carter tackled.

See David A. Baldwin, "Success and Failure in Foreign Policy," Annual Review of Political
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION
No observer of American foreign policy can doubt that President Jimmy Carter
was a moral man, guided by his Christian beliefs in both his private and public life.
Although commonly viewed as a failure, especially during the time he served as
president, Jimmy Carter should be re-evaluated in light of what we know now. He was
often accused of being weak and vacillating, and a micromanager, but a study of some of
his achievements as president reveals a highly principled man of surprising strength,
tenacity, and fairness; with numerous achievements. Many policy makers want to pursue
either an idealistic foreign policy or one driven by power alone, but the most successful
policies over the long term incorporate both. One of the goals of this work is to show the
difficulty that any president faces when trying to incorporate both power and principle
into his policies. This literature review attempts to examine the roots of American liberal
principles, which can be found in the notion of American exceptionalism; and also to
appraise the concept of power, which has been discussed in the political world at least
since the time of the ancient Greeks. Two competing paradigms emerge: the pursuit of
power politics versus the desire to engage in a moral, idealistic foreign policy.
During the twentieth century Wilsonian idealism was gradually displaced by the
political theory of realism. World War Two seemed to confirm that nations should never
underestimate the seamier side of human nature, and should pursue power politics above
all else; the same approach the Europeans had used for hundreds of years. Political
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realism might be defined as a school of thought that includes "international anarchy, the
dominance of state actors in international politics, and the primacy of power as the
currency and goal of their efforts."1 Many began to scoff at, then discard, Enlightenment
ideas of natural laws that supposedly operated in politics. In the scholarly literature,
realists put morality at the periphery if international relations, but the politicians
sometimes discounted it entirely. A look at the record, however, will reveal that
Wilsonian idealism did not die by the hand of the Treaty of Versailles, nor at the outbreak
of World War Two; rather these were the very principles used to rebuild Europe after the
guns fell silent in 1945. The Vietnam War, however, proved to be quicksand for the US,
and it came to be viewed as highly immoral, which tarnished the reputation of the nation.
By employing both power and principle in his policy making, Carter is credited with
bringing morality and ethics back into American foreign policy after the country lost its
way, one of the overarching goals of his administration.
America has a political landscape peppered with religion and morality, and has
commonly viewed itself as being an exceptional national state, unlike other Great
Powers. The United States created a government and a nation based on the liberal
principles of the Enlightenment, articulated by men such as John Locke, Adam Smith,
and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Religion, especially Protestantism, has helped to shape the
American character and culture. It has influenced how Americans view themselves as
God's chosen people; and how they perceive it to be their duty to spread their values
throughout the world.
Americans believe its system of self government and capitalism is better than that
of others; its history is God's will unfolding; and its people possess a humanitarian
1
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impulse. There is a genuine desire to spread freedom and democracy, and it claims little
in the way of territorial ambitions, at least in today's world; but this has not always been
the case. The United States would stand up for justice and fair play, but would also try to
avoid becoming entangled in the affairs of others, except for trade. In other words, the
nation believes it was and is exceptional, guided by God, that it is a beacon on the hill for
others. To paraphrase Herman Melville's words, America is the ark carrying the liberties
of the world. One part of this literature review will examine in some detail the roots and
philosophic foundations of American exceptionalism its connection to the JudeoChristian tradition and ethics that has often been prevalent in America's approach to
foreign policy.
Throughout its history, the United States has not always acted on its principles,
but has wielded its power in ways that have sometimes mirrored the tough, self interested
policies of the greatest of the great imperial powers. The most successful foreign policies,
however, such as the Marshall Plan, combine both power and principle. The Marshall
Plan was successfully carried out using United States power to achieve principles which
were in the interests of the nation, such as economic growth, free trade, and democracy
and human rights in Western Europe. The literature review will also examine power and
how it has been used to achieve foreign policy goals, and will identify assumptions about
principles and power and other factors that underpin American foreign policy.
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Religion has been intertwined in American society since the arrival of the
separating Puritans at Plymouth Rock and the non-separating Puritans who settled the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. American Puritan thought arose out a sense of separation
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and uniqueness after leaving England and settling in the New World, although their
emotional ties to the Old World were still strong, at least initially. They believed they
were charged with a special spiritual and political destiny: to create a church and a
society that would provide a model for all nations, even as they struggled to reform
themselves (a redeemer nation). America was the last chance offered by God to a fallen
human race. His exceptional new church offered redemption. Thus, America and
Americans are exceptional or special, charged with the mission of saving the world from
itself.2 When they completed their "errand in the wilderness" they would bring this
reformed church back to England and Scotland. As Perry Miller, a great scholar of
Puritan thought explained, the Puritan migration "was no retreat from Europe: it was a
flank attack." The "large unspoken assumption in the errand of 1630" was that success in
New England would mean a return to old England."
In early America the ultimate authority in both political and religious spheres was
God's word, and the commitments made to the community and the congregations ensured
a functional system of religious and political governance. Many were interested in
promoting freedom and equality based on religious experiences as individuals and
congregations. Since a person could be released from his covenant only by the
concurrence of the local church, this ensured a high degree of stability for New England
towns. Church and state were deeply intertwined and religion played a large role in daily
life.
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The Puritans were products of the Protestant Reformation, the upheaval that
shattered the universalism of a world governed by one church. Supposedly the state was
now to replace the church as the arbiter of morality. Hobbes' Leviathan, written at the
time of the English civil war, also influenced the ideas of the Puritans. He wrote not only
about power, but also about morality, although many readers ignore this aspect of his
work. He believed that to think philosophically is to reason; that philosophy is reasoning.
What differentiates man from beast are religion and the ability to reason.4 His moral
doctrine or moral philosophy might be summed up by this quote:
Moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good, and evil, in the
conversation, and society of mankind.... Justice, gratitude, modesty, mercy, and
the rest of the laws of nature are good; that is to say; moral virtues; and their
contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and
therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral philosophy.
(E.W., hi, p. 146.)5
Within the framework of civil society, God's kingdom added a religious character to civil
obligations. This extended to the sovereign as well as the subject, but Hobbes does not
admit that the sovereign might refuse to obey moral obligations.6 The idealists, or
Utopians as they were often called, disagreed that the ruler of the state should be the
arbiter of morality and ethics, and over time turned to the secular "law of nature" whose
source was human reason; reason could determine what the universally valid moral laws
were.7
When the Puritans embarked on their journey to the New World, they believed
that the church they created would become a model for the Anglican Church as well as
4
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for European churches. When Cromwell came to power in England after the civil war,
his toleration infused a sense a betrayal in New England, as did the restoration of the
monarchy a few years later. New Englanders began to think that perhaps they had failed
in their "errand" that God had given them. The expansion of the population, many of
whom were non-Puritan, as well as the expansion of trade and the pursuit of secular
interests, placed the spiritual mission under pressure. Eventually, America became the
burial ground for the strict and rigid Calvinism model. The new world was too vast for
their asceticism. The North American wilderness offered freedom, dissent, and
independence, not control, obedience, and self-restraint. But by the close of the
seventeenth century a particular way of thinking about New England as God's New Israel
or chosen people, selected for an exceptional destiny, had taken hold. Later this attitude
was absorbed by all of America.8
Many historians find a connection between Puritanism, capitalism, democracy,
and science. Leo F. Solt argues that since the Puritans rejected the authority of both the
Roman and the Anglican churches, this opened the door for a widespread sense of
individualism, derived from the Bible, and a true equality of the saints, based on the
priesthood of all believers. This antiauthoritarian bias, along with the notion of covenant,
led to a different kind of church organization. The idea of a covenant or contract between
God and his elect who would enter heaven, pervaded Puritan theology and social
relationships; and the concept of covenant provided a convenient way to organize
churches. Many of the Puritans organized their churches into self-sufficient and self
regulating congregations. Members had a contract with both God and each other. This
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system of interlocking covenants that bound households to each other and to their
ministers was mirrored in the organization of towns. Adult male church members could
vote. The covenant led to the social contract as well as the business contract. The
equality of believers in Christ led to the equality of men as political animals. One can
conclude, then, that Puritan thought introduced the early ideas of liberalism: freedom,
equality, democracy, and the social contract, all overlaid by a sense of morality.10 New
England, however, moved over time toward a separation between church and state; in
economics this meant freedom from state regulation; and in science it meant the freedom
of the natural world from divine intervention.
The Navigation Acts, which regulated trade between the colonies and England
and elsewhere, were passed during the era of the British Commonwealth and were much
despised by most Americans, Puritan or not. Virginia, settled by Anglicans devoted to
the king, hated these acts. For example, while religion was largely lacking in the motives
for coming to Virginia, the economic incentive was strong. Tobacco, not religion, played
a large role in how the colony developed, with the settlers anxious to throw off the yoke
of mercantilism. Under the Navigation Acts tobacco trade was heavily regulated, and
Virginians routinely turned to smuggling. The shipping communities throughout North
America united both the tobacco kings of Virginia and the River Gods of Boston in their
anger over the enforcement provisions of the acts, which granted blanket search warrants
to British customs officials and routinely tried smugglers in Admiralty Courts, without
juries, and usually with a change in venue. The society that took root in the Chesapeake
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Bay area had as much or more influence on the evolution of American society and
foreign policy as the Puritans because of their "aggressive expansionism, acquisitive
materialism, and an overarching ideology of civilization that encouraged and justified
both." The boom years that came to Virginia by the mid-seventeenth century produced
an almost lawless capitalism run amok and a system of labor that treated men and women
as things.

These issues, as well as the geographical separation of the colonials from

England, accelerated the building of a new nation; and over time this nation was born,
created by youthful men and women who came for a variety of different reasons. The
overarching motivation among all the diverse groups who came was to find a better life
that was unobtainable under the system of the Old World.13 They were aggressive
expansionists from the beginning, but never considered themselves as imperialist because
from their perspective they were simply defending themselves against the French,
Spanish, and Indians, all of whom wanted domination of North America.14 The AngloAmericans were spreading European civilization, not escaping from it. It was America's
destiny to become the "new Athens." Thucydides tells how the Corinthians described
Athens in the fifth century B.C. as a people always on the move, restless and unrelenting
in their quest for opportunity. They were "incapable of either living a quiet life
themselves or of allowing anyone else to do so." If the Athenians aimed "at something
and do not get it, they think that they have been deprived of what belonged to them

Kagan, Dangerous Nation, 10; Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The
Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1975), 129.
13
See Jon Butler, Becoming America: The Revolution before 1776 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2000.)
14
See William Appleman Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," Pacific
Historical Review 24 (November 1955): 379-95.

51
already; whereas, if their enterprise is successful, they regard that success as nothing
compared to what they will do next."

Americans felt the same way.

As the nation grew from colonials to revolutionaries to independent citizens, the
United States of America dared to experiment in the most philosophically advanced form
of government, representative democracy, a system thought to be unworkable by most.
Its ideals and principles were rooted in the ideology of liberalism and specified in the
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights, which articulated
specific rights for a nation that was to be the most free on the earth. The United States
was founded on Enlightenment ideas, its idealism was essentially individualist; and it was
exceptional.
The United States was determined not to be drawn into further European wars - it
had already fought in four of them, first as colonies, then as revolutionaries.
Unfortunately, the Europeans quarreled once more over French expansionist policy
which grew out of the French Revolution. The country was drawn into the fight twice,
the first time in 1798 against the French, the second time in 1812 against the British. But
when the warfare stopped, finally, in 1815, Europe experienced a century of peace and
America was left alone, at last, to seek its destiny. Free from the snake pit of corruption,
Europe, and eager to show that it was different, America went its own way, spreading its
principles, even as it built an empire, across the continent. Although the United States
conquered much of North America, displacing a number of Mexican and Amerindian
nations, its people denied that this was an empire. After all, they reasoned, the conquered
territories eventually became states within the United States. Empire building and
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American exceptionalism are two contradictory strains in the American psyche, and this
affects United States foreign policy to this day - power versus principle.
The tenacity of land hunger as well as pressure on all who shared the hemisphere
with the US, intimated the formation of a national characteristic which would prove to be
lasting: "the expression of a vital impulse in the name of an ideal." Over time, the
original sense of mission transformed into a sense of responsibility. Assuming the
responsibilities of power meant that the nation had to deal with moral ambiguities in the
political world, exemplified in the 1970s by the "balance of terror."16 These ambiguities
bedeviled numerous presidents and policy makers in the twentieth century.
By the mid-nineteenth century intellectuals anticipated the perfection of
democratic institutions, and the rhetoric had changed from the time of the Puritans who
had anticipated an exceptional destiny based on the perfection of ecclesiastical
institutions. America would now be the global champion of democracy and the guardian
of political values. Standing in its way of achieving its mission were numerous Indian
nations and Mexico. Taking a large portion of Mexico ran counter to the ideology of
Manifest Destiny. Prior to the revolt in Texas, the United States acquired additional
territory through negotiation (Transcontinental Treaty 1819) or purchase (Louisiana).
Texas was taken by violence and bloodshed; and instead of bringing freedom to an
oppressed people, the United States supported slavery in the new state; and instead of
uniting the country, this began to tear it apart.17 The annexation of Texas meant war with
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Mexico. Mexico's defeat led to the acquisition of Texas, California, and everything in
between. Large populations of Hispanics and Indians became a part of the United States.
John C. Calhoun, Senator from South Carolina, opposed the incorporation of
Mexican territory into the US, primarily based on the grounds of the racial intermixing
that would occur. On January 4, 1848, he compared the situation to the attitude of the
United States towards conquered Indian tribes. He argued that America never entertained
the idea of incorporating the Indians, saying that "they have either been left an
independent people amongst us, or been driven into the forests."18 Calhoun further
argued that "free popular government" is not to be found among the "colored races." He
believed that not everyone was capable of free government and to force it on an unwilling
population was a grave error. For Calhoun, America had a racial mission that superseded
its mission articulated by exceptionalism. He, in turn, was answered by Senator John A.
Dix of New York. Dix argued that the course of American empire was inevitable; and,
although he did not favor incorporating the Indian and Mexican populations into the US,
the claim to the land outweighed other considerations. He pointed to the expansion of the
population and said that there could be no doubt that it would fill up the land from the
Atlantic to the Pacific. The incorporation of Mexico had to happen in order to open up
the additional territory to satisfy the land hunger of Americans. American expansion was
driven by Manifest Destiny, and directed by divine Providence. Providence would
overcome idleness, ignorance, and barbarism, and would replace it with industry,
knowledge, and civilization.
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Defeating the Indians brought no glory to the new nation; no honor could be
found in fighting a weak and poorly equipped people. It could be found, however, in
taking responsibility for them. The very inequality of the relationship imposed certain
responsibilities, a kind of inverted Athenian logic at Melos. The United States would
bring them the "blessings of civilization," reconciling ambition with honor, power with
morality. To those forced to submit to its power, the country would also bring liberal
ideology. This did not carry through in practice, however, and over time the Americans,
and the mission to bring the "blessings of civilization" ultimately failed. Americans
looked away from the contradictions of Indian policy, which promised the Indians justice
on the one hand and the settlers their land on the other.20
The West, in general, has become mythologized by Americans. The single best
statement on this is the Turner Thesis, "The Significance of the Frontier in American
History," articulated in 1894 at an address to the annual meeting of the State Historical
Society of Wisconsin. It was the return to the primitive, constant re-births, and it meant
the fluidity of social institutions and continued development, and this came to dominate
the American national character. The Great West now best described the American
nation. The process of transformation from corrupt European to perfected American had
been central to New World mythology from its earliest days, and the Turner Thesis now
offered historical justification for a concept of the West that was now informed by the
imperialist assumptions of the ideology of Manifest Destiny.

It was a meeting of

savagery and civilization, of power and principle, and it had lasting implications for the
twentieth century. Arguments were often settled by either fists or guns, but Americans
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managed to tame the wilderness once again. There was a fundamental conflict between
the power of the gun and the principles of civilization. It was expressed by Paul Newman
in the 1972 film The Life and Times of Judge Roy Bean:
This is going to be a new place, a good place to live. I am the new judge. There
will be law. There will be order, civilization, progress and peace. Above all,
peace. I don't care who I have to kill to get it.22
The Spanish-American War was a gigantic coming out party for the United
States. By 1898 the country had tested the international waters with aggressive
encounters with Germany, Britain, Canada, and Chile. The "Popeye" archetype was in
full swing23 with the nation feeling that it had to expand or burst. Cuban unrest provided
a perfect opportunity. There is no doubt that Spain was a cruel and inept colonial master,
having been in decline since 1588, and the Cubans had revolted against its rule several
times in the nineteenth century. Spain responded by rounding up Cuban men and
incarcerating them in concentration camps (reconcentrados), causing enormous suffering.
It was a humanitarian nightmare and the island was highly unstable. Theodore Roosevelt,
the assistant secretary of the navy at the time, wanted war. President William McKinley
devised a plan to ask for $500,000 from Congress for relief of the reconcentrados. The
delivery of the supplies would require Spain to stop fighting and open the camps. If
Spain refused, McKinley would ask for Congressional authority for military action.
Under these circumstances, "his conscience and the world [would] justify" armed
intervention.

Various European countries hovered around the island, like vultures in the

minds of Americans, so the United States sent the battleship Maine to Havana harbor "to
22

Quoted in Kim Newman, Wild West Movies: How the West was Found, Won, Lost, Lied About,
Filmed and Forgotten (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), epigram.
23
See Stanley Hoffmann, "Requiem."
John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba,
1895-1898 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 136.

56
protect American lives and interests." When it exploded, killing 266 officers and men,
The country blamed Spain. This provided the perfect opportunity for war. McKinley
probably did not want war, but he was prepared to go to war to achieve what he believed
was a moral and humanitarian imperative.25 The war was highly popular because it
involved American ideals, interests, prejudices, and power. That so much suffering could
go on so close to the United States was intolerable, especially if America had the power
to do something about it. Power and principle came together for the war, but an inherent
contradiction soon showed itself in the provisions of the Teller and Piatt Amendments.
The Teller Amendment, attached to the American declaration of war, said that the United
States would not take Cuba as a colony; the Piatt Amendment, passed by Congress in
1901, laid out the provisions of the protectorate that the United States established over
the island. Men such as Henry Cabot Lodge spoke of the island's strategic location,
especially after a canal was built to join the two oceans, as well as of the American
commercial interests. Others justified the amendment on the grounds that the Cubans
were not yet capable of self government, and needed the guidance of the US. The Piatt
Amendment left very little in the way of sovereignty to Cuba. The United States wrote
the rules that wove a web entangling Cuba into a dependency relationship.

More than a

century later, the two nations are still estranged and power and principle are not
reconciled. The 1898 war reflected Americans' view of themselves as the vanguard of
civilization, standing firm against barbarism.
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World War One tested the limits of idealism and liberalism, with unimaginable
savagery becoming the norm in the trenches of France and Belgium, but when the war
ended the international community demonstrated its willingness, on the one hand, to
apply an idealistic and exceptional answer to Europe's repeated attempts at suicide. On
the other hand, it punished Germany, and tried to make it pay for the war. Although never
agreeing to Wilson's Fourteen Points, it did accept the premise of the League of Nations,
an international organization designed to settle international quarrels peacefully. The
United States, however, never embraced the League, at least not fully; but Wilsonian
principles have endured: self-determination, democratic government, collective security,
international law, and a league of nations. Wilson's vision is now accepted as
fundamental in post World War Two Europe.27 Reinhold Niebuhr, a noted theologian,
however, thought that if there was a way out of endless conflict, it would not be as easy
as the moralists had assumed.
OF POWER AND PRINCIPLE
The contradictions between power and principles have continued in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries with implications for United States foreign policy. Realists
think that power is the most important element in a successful foreign policy; idealists
believe the country must also maintain its principles. The realist view that no ethical
standards apply to the relations between states can be traced back at least to Machiavelli.
According to Stanley Hoffman two archetypes are in competition: the "Popeye"
archetype of the United States as the guardian of stability and law and order through
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military strength, and the missionary archetype that believes the richest nation on earth
should help the poor and oppressed, while bringing American values to the
underprivileged. Neither archetype fits.29
In his critique of the Utopians in 1939 E.H. Carr asserted that "No political Utopia
will achieve even the most limited success unless it grows out of political reality." His
work inspired a school of international relations inquiry in the US, and the ideology of
realism gradually displaced idealism as war once again broke out. Carr also reminds us
that both the ancient Greeks and the medieval scholars identified natural law with reason,
and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this association was revitalized in a new
form. In science, reason discovered the laws of nature through observation and deductive
thinking. An easy parallel to Newtonian principles was now applied to moral issues.
According to scientific and Enlightenment thinkers, moral laws could be scientifically
established. Rationality took the place of divine revelation and intuition. The idealists
believed that once these laws were discovered, mankind would adhere to them, just as the
universe followed the physical laws of nature. The idealist vision of the world assumed
that objective and observable laws rooted in reason must govern politics and society.
Humans, if they so desire, can make a stable, peaceful international order by applying
reason and science. War, therefore, was a dishonorable method of statecraft. However, it
was the evil side of human nature that had led to the failed peace in the interwar years,
and leaders needed to look more realistically at the realities of mankind. For many
scholars, the events of the first half of the twentieth century seemed to belie that politics
was governed by immutable laws; it was dominated by mankind's all too fallible nature.
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Although man was not totally corrupt his imperfections often dominated.30 Realists .
generally ignore Wilson's lasting ideals that were eventually put into place in Europe,
beginning with Harry Truman.
The post-war world itself seemed to reflect the dual nature of humanity, with its
divisions into two spheres of influence. The United States and the Soviet Union stared at
each other down the barrel of a gun, with each side believing that the other was the evil
empire. The United States gained the most from World War Two. It entered the war
later than any other great power, lost fewer lives in the fighting, realized greater gains
from the post-war settlement than any other country. And, under the leadership of Harry
Truman, it helped to manage the beginning of a remarkable transformation of Western
Europe. By finding the right balance of power and principle, the country began to rebuild
the western half of the Continent both economically and politically. Marshall Plan aid
helped to restore a region that was down, but not out; and with a prod (or perhaps a
shove) from the US, the western states began to build institutions together that eventually
entangled them in a web so tightly knit that there was, seemingly, no escape. Wilson's
vision came to fruition.

Meanwhile, the United States never took its eyes off of the

Soviet Union and began to take on a much more global role than it had at the end of
World War One. The mantle of power had seemingly been thrust on a reluctant nation,
turning it into a lone policeman, truly the ark that carried the freedom of the world. The
United States had enormous military power, as witnessed by the two atomic bombs
dropped on Japan in the closing days of World War Two; and it could use this as an
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implicit threat. Its mission was to use its power to promote the good of the world, which
meant, essentially, blocking Soviet expansion. It would create a Pax Americana. It
signaled its intent to protect Western Europe by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and by placing nuclear weapons on the Continent. The Truman
Doctrine and the Point Four Program enlarged the mission to include Greece, Turkey,
and lesser developed countries. The country fought in Korea under the United Nations
flag and in Vietnam under the American flag to protect the world from the spread of
monolithic communism. The fighting in Korea ended, however, where it had begun, at
the thirty-eighth parallel; not with peace but with only a truce, and the conflict in
Vietnam became like an ever growing bog of quicksand, sucking the nation's power and
principles. Massacres such as My Lai outraged Americans and drove most of a
generation of young people, those most affected by the war, to rise up against it.
America, it seemed, had lost its way. The climate of fear generated by the McCarthy era
had discouraged dissent from American foreign policy, and the result was the gradual,
inescapable, intervention in a local civil war. The failure to de-link "monolithic"
International communism from the Soviet Union led the country into the most traumatic
and tragic warfare since the American Civil War. It destroyed the social fabric of South
Vietnam, leaving one third of its population refugees and its landscape scarred by 21
million bomb craters - a country for which the United States had taken responsibility.
The enormity of the disaster traumatized the United States, and the government was
forced to change course. The 1976 election offered the voters a choice between a FordKissinger business as usual, or a new kind of candidate, one deeply steeped in the
Christian ethic - Jimmy Carter. He promised that United States power and influence
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would be based once again on American moral and ethical principles. It would be used
to create a "stable, just, and peaceful world order."32 Carter tried to use American
principles as a source of power. He falls within the Wilsonian school of foreign policy,
being both a moralist and a globalist. In some instances he was seemingly faced with an
either or situation: either power or principle; but he tried to find a middle way,
incorporating both power and principle into policy. He was the first to do this after the
debacle of Vietnam.
Christianity and American Principles
As Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, Christians come in various stripes, and
there is a great deal of difference among the evangelical, the fundamentalist, and the
liberal view of Christianity, which leads to different ideas about the role of America in
the world. Fundamentalists are pessimistic about the prospects for peace and order in the
world, and see a basic and unbridgeable divide between believers and non-believers.
Liberals, on the other hand, are much more optimistic about the future, and see little
difference between Christians and non-Christians. The evangelicals fall somewhere in
between. During much of the middle of the twentieth century, the liberal view dominated
the thinking of foreign policy elites. Leaders such as Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman,
Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower, and John Foster Dulles were steeped in this
tradition. Evidently, the problem with liberal Christianity today is that it is too liberal for
some people. These Christians tend to "evanesce into secularism: members follow the
'Protestant principle' right out the door of the church," and as a result, their
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denominations are shrinking. While these Christians may support environmental issues,
or Amnesty International, these activities take place outside of the church. It is curious
that taking Christian principles into the world and living by them would alienate many
"Christians." Indeed, Jesus' political teachings are an account of universal freedom and
equality, which must be available to all of mankind if His teachings are to be fulfilled.
The liberals, according to Mead, have also alienated Roman Catholics by their stand on
abortion and gay rights, and Jews by their decreasing support of Israel. Consumed by
internal battles over these issues as well, they are less able to influence society.
Evangelicals seem to have found the "middle way." Their core beliefs share common
roots with fundamentalism, but their ideas about the world have been heavily influenced
by traditional American optimism.34 This is the path that Carter has followed in his life.
Carter was born and raised as a Southern Baptist, and as such believed that the
words and actions of Jesus Christ are the criteria by which the Bible, in its entirety, is to
be interpreted.

Baptists were opposed to dominance over individuals by pastors or

other such powerful people, and believed that people were empowered only to serve
others, by alleviating suffering and espousing truth, forgiveness, and love. Every believer
was priest; and local pastors were the servants, not the masters, of their congregations.
As evangelicals, the Southern Baptists were committed to a strong global mission to
share the Christian faith with all other people without discrimination or prejudice. They
could fulfill this mission either directly and personally or through financial support.
During most of Carter's life it was assumed that the Baptist churches in the South would
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be members of the Southern Baptist Convention, a body which coordinated the
missionary work.
One of the strongest commitments of this association of churches was the
separation of church and state. While individuals were free to engage in political affairs,
the concept of entire congregations becoming involved was repugnant. In addition, these
Baptists believed in religious freedom, compassion for unbelievers and respect for all
persons as being equal before God. Carter defines "evangelical" as "... Christians,
especially of the late 1970s, eschewing the designation of fundamentalist but holding to a
conservative interpretation of the Bible." His mother and wife were Methodists and he
assumed that equally devout Christians could have different forms of worship and
organizational structures and still practice their faith in harmony. He finds it disturbing
to hear prominent Baptists of today, such as Pat Robertson, make statements such as,
"You say you're supposed to be nice to the Episcopalians and the Presbyterians and the
Methodists and this, that, and the other thing. Nonsense. I don't have to be nice to the
spirit of the Antichrist."36
Carter was always faithful to his beliefs as president. In his public life, he kept
church and state separate, but privately he brought his faith with him wherever he went.
For example, one story he tells concerned the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, the person
he negotiated with to normalize diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of
China and the United States. When Deng visited America the two men had a number of
wide-ranging talks about Chinese and American life. When asked what had first inspired
Carter's interest in China, Carter said that as a child he had given five cents per month to
support Christian missionaries in China. Deng was amused and reminded Carter that
36
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these activities were now forbidden in China. Carter asked if it might be possible to
change the policies, and Deng promised to permit the distribution of Bibles and to
provide for religious freedom. Within three years he kept the promises, provided that any
new church would register with the government. It is typical that Carter never tried to
take political advantage of these conversations. They were private and Carter honored
the confidentiality during the lifetimes of the foreign officials with whom he discussed
Christianity.
On all levels, Carter has actively sought to live his faith. Unlike popular
preachers of the latter nineteenth century who claimed that "it is your Christian duty to
get rich," he tried to live the precepts that Jesus taught. For example, he defines success
as follows:
I believe that anyone can be successful in life, regardless of natural talent or the
environment within which we live. This is not based on measuring success by
human competitiveness for wealth, possessions, influence, and fame, but adhering
to God's standards of truth, justice, humility, service, compassion, forgiveness,
and love.
These are some of the values that informed his presidency. Others include the protection
of life, an emphasis on peace, the restraint of violence, the preservation of religious
liberty, the safeguarding of human rights and the protection of the environment.
Recent years have seen huge changes in the balance of religious power in the US.
As mainstream Christian denominations decrease in numbers, membership in the
evangelical churches rises. The Southern Baptist Convention has gained more than seven
million members, becoming the nation's largest Protestant denomination. Carter,
however, left this association when it substituted Southern Baptist leaders for Jesus as the
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interpreters of Biblical Scripture. This change soon became mandatory on all convention
officers, employees, deans and professors of colleges and seminaries, and even
missionaries serving in foreign countries. It then combined with domination by all-male
pastors, the exclusion of traditional Baptists from convention affairs, the subservience of
women, and other elements of the new fundamentalism. Pastors would no longer be
servants. There were similar and related changes in the nation's political system, with a
parallel right-wing movement within American politics. The new political principles,
according to Carter, involve special favors for the powerful at the expense of others; the
abandonment of social justice, denigration of those who are different, a lack of
stewardship over the environment, a tendency toward unilateral diplomatic action and
away from international agreements, an excessive inclination toward conflict, and the
reliance on fear as a means of persuasion.38
Many evangelicals are becoming much more fundamentalist in their political beliefs and
activities, and are experiencing a growing influence. The rise of this movement began
during Carter's years as president.
Internationally, fundamentalism has also grown. Carter was personally affected
by this phenomenon for the first time when the Ayatollah Khomeini became the leader of
Iran and labeled the United States "The Great Satan." Khomeini whipped up fervor for
Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism to cement his hold on power by
encouraging an attack on the American embassy in Tehran, which resulted in the seizure
of embassy personnel who were held in captivity for fourteen months. This was in direct
violation of international law, and the traditional teachings of the Koran, especially
concerning the treatment of visitors or diplomats from other countries.
38
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Carter was treated to a taste of the new and radical fundamentalism at home as
well when the recently elected president of the Southern Baptist Convention visited him
in the White House. This visit was routine, especially when the president was a Baptist.
As the man and his wife were leaving he urged Carter to abandon "secular humanism."
This was shocking to Carter, who considered himself to be a traditional Baptist. Many of
his decisions as president made these right-wing ideologues angry. In the foreign policy
realm, Carter appointed too many women in high positions in government, he restored
diplomatic relations with Communist China, called for a Palestinian homeland, refused to
move the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, negotiated with the Soviet
Union on nuclear arms control, returned sovereignty over the Canal to Panama, and
encouraged majority rule in Southern Africa, to name a few. Carter, in spite of the
condemnation by such groups as Moral Majority, continued to do what was best for the
country, which was not necessarily best for his re-election prospects. He was accused of
being soft on communism, encouraging abortion and homosexuality, trying to destroy the
family because he supported the Equal Rights Amendment, and lowering America's
guard against the Soviet Union by negotiating SALT II. Jerry Falwell, leader of Moral
Majority, was one of the most dogged accusers-, being exceedingly careless with the
truth. Falwell repeatedly told huge audiences that he had met with Carter in the Oval
Office where Carter told him that he had to have homosexuals on his staff because there
were homosexuals in the country who needed to be represented in his inner circle. Carter
has said that he never met privately with Falwell, Falwell was never in the Oval Office,
and there was never any such conversation.39 Some believe that the message of
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Christianity has seemingly been garbled and tainted because of the political stakes
involved in winning public office, especially the American presidency.
Morality and Foreign Policy
Idealists tend to hold states morally accountable for their actions, just as
individuals must be accountable. John Bright said in a speech on foreign policy in 1858
that the moral law was not written for men alone in their individual character, it was
written as well for nations."40 Also, in his war message to Congress in April 1917,
Wilson said that "We are at the beginning of a new age in which it will be insisted that
the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong shall be observed among
nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized
states."41 The concept of civilization itself seems to imply the idea of certain obligations
to mankind. A state that does not conform to certain standards of behavior toward its
own citizens and foreigners as well will be branded as "uncivilized." Even Hitler refused
to conclude a pact with Lithuania because, in his view, it was a state that disregarded the
most primitive laws of human society.
During the first half of the twentieth century, almost all statesmen, as well as the
man on the street, agreed that there is an international moral code that is binding on
states. One of the most important elements in this code is the obligation not to impose
unnecessary death or suffering on other human beings. This is the foundation of many of
the rules of war. However, since the beginning of World War One, the rules of war have
faced very exacting tests, and modern conditions of warfare are breaking down a

40

John Bright, M.P and James E. Thorold Rogers, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1868), 479.
41
Woodrow Wilson, War Messages, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. Senate Document. No. 5, Serial No.
7264, (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office), 1917, 3-8,passim.

68
previously existing and effective sense of universal obligation. In addition, the role of
morality in international affairs has slowly but remorselessly been banished to the
periphery in the study of international relations, a field dominated by realism. This new
discipline was bora, at least partially, out of Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis, and those in this
discipline wanted to establish the independence of their school from all ethical and
philosophical presuppositions, and to build a value-free science "consisting of formal
models in which the preferences of the actors are treated as givens and in which attempts
are made at quantifying the multiple unponderables [sic] of international affairs."42
Realism, the dominant paradigm in the study of international relations, emphasizes the
roles of necessity and anarchy in the politics of nations. In this world of intense
competition among nations there is "little room for meaningful choice on the part of state
decision makers, and even less room for the choice of moral values that conflict with the
national interest."4 In spite of the growing lack of attention to morality in the field of
international relations, the field of applied ethics has investigated the moral choices
inherent in foreign policy, and offers prescriptions for ethical conduct. However, little in
the way of dialogue has ensued between ethical thinkers and students of international
affairs. Hans Morgenthau, an early and enduring scholar on realism, saw in early realism
the effort to build bridges between theory and practice so that state leaders could build
their foreign policies on ethically sound and realistically conceived foundations.44 This
idea has not been widely discussed in realist literature. Realism, rather, emphasizes
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power politics almost to the exclusion of ethics. It mounted a serious and growing
challenge to the liberal internationalists who emerged after World War One.
The Liberal Internationalists
The liberal internationalists believed that the postwar world could be made more
stable, more just, and more peaceful than previous epochs in history. They believed that
war was caused by patterns of state interaction that could be altered through moral
education and collective action. They denied that war was an element of human nature;
rather it was part of a political program, an alluring tool of state policy. The old order of
power politics had been at the root of almost constant European warfare for any number
of centuries; and the liberal internationalists wanted the affairs of the world to be
organized in the interests of mankind. This was both a moral and a political question, and
an affirmative answer would require both moral and political action. They believed that
there were three channels through which moral principles could be incorporated into the
relations of national states. None was foolproof, but each offered an opportunity to make
foreign policy more moral.
The first of these was domestic public opinion. Most people in the world were
committed to peaceful resolution of conflict, and domestic opinion could, at least
sometimes, hold state leaders in check. The education of the public was paramount; the
public must never again support leaders who advocated warlike or imperialist aims. The
second channel was the "courtroom of world opinion" represented by the League of
Nations. Publicity about the actions of states was a new weapon which the League
possessed, and it could possibly be the most powerful, since most nations cared about
their reputations. International condemnation carried enormous weight. The third and

final channel was the individual consciences of state leaders. The liberal internationalists
believed that leaders would, at times, follow international moral standards because in
conscience they believed such standards to be right. Woodrow Wilson was a prime
example of a politician living by moral principles in those days during and after World
War One; and Jimmy Carter was the example after the Vietnam War. The liberal
internationalists believed that the years after 1918 provided an opportunity to reshape the
character of international affairs, and Carter believed the same in the aftermath of
Vietnam and Watergate.
The Realist Challenge
The intellectual roots of realism can be traced to a theologically based conception
of mankind.

Reinhold Niebuhr's ideas harken back to Martin Luther with his stress on

the sinfulness of humanity and the human desire to deny that sinfulness. In Niebuhr's
view, men and women understand their limitations while at the same time deny them.
Although they are capable of transcending sin because of their spiritual identity, they are
also burdened by their creatureliness. As a result they are in an ambiguous position they are unwilling to accept their dependency and insecurity. From this unwillingness
flows the will to power.
Man is insecure and involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his
insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human
creatureliness. Man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind;
but he pretends that he is not limited. He assumes that he can gradually transcend
finite limitation until his mind becomes identical with the universal mind. All of
his intellectual and cultural pursuits, therefore, become infected with the sin of
pride. Man's pride and will-to-power disturb the harmony of creation.46
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So, the drive for self-transcendence that is capable of uniting humans with God is also the
cause of human sinfulness. This is the ultimate ambiguity.47
According to Niebuhr, pride and the will for power are demonstrated on three
planes. The first is the search for security, which leads mankind to want domination over
others. This search is never ending. For the wealthy and powerful, there is a fear of
losing all they have; for those less fortunate, especially those who have not attained a
modicum of wealth and power, there is a deep sense of deprivation and a desire to redress
their grievances. The search for security transforms all human interactions into relations
of power and domination.
The second plane is the intellectual plane. As Niebuhr states,
All human knowledge is tainted with an "ideological" taint. It pretends to be
more true than it is. It is finite knowledge, gained from a particular perspective;
but it pretends to be final and ultimate knowledge. Exactly analogous to the
cruder pride of power, the pride of intellect is derived on the one hand from
ignorance of the finiteness of the human mind and on the other hand from an
attempt to obscure the known conditioned character of human knowledge and the
taint of self-interest in human truth.
The most dangerous of the ideologies, in Niebuhr's view, was Marxism, because while it
correctly locates the fallacies in all competing ideologies, it then asserts that it is free
from the limitations of human understanding. As a result it is an ideology of power and
demonic force.
The moral plane is the final plane on which human pride is expressed. Human
moral standards should be seen as provisional and flawed because of the position of
ambiguity and sinfulness of man. Moral pride denies this reality, according to Niebuhr,
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leading many to declare moral absolutes. This leads to hypocrisy and distorts the human
search for self-transcendence.
Niebuhr transfers his ideas to the political sphere and accentuates the will for
power and security planes. Mankind transfers his individual need for security into a
collective drive for power. The nation state is the vehicle. Since no group acts from
purely unselfish or even mutual intent, politics is bound to be a contest of power.49 While
love can exert a restraining power on individual relations, is almost totally destroyed in
the realm of international politics because of the complexities of the situation, and "The
same intellectual analysis which the complex situation requires may actually destroy the
force of the benevolent impulse."50
Niebuhr's arguments not only challenge the idealist notion that humans are not
intrinsically warlike, but also undercut the idealist assertions that there are clear
international moral norms that, if applied consistently, could gradually change the world
into a more humane place. But Niebuhr does not abandon morality completely in the
realm of international politics. He argued that there is a residual capacity for justice that
would temper competition. "Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where
conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will
interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises."

l

For the realists,

however, the "tentative and uneasy compromises" have emerged not as real compromises
between power and principle, but as decisions in which moral values play only a
marginal role. Carter, on the other hand, tried to restore the conscience of America in the
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way he conducted foreign policy, finding a middle way between power and principle,
something that he understood had been missing.
Where Niebuhr provided the anthropology that fueled the realist critique of the
liberal internationalists, Carr provided the reflections of a veteran diplomat. He claimed
that all states do not want the same things; and that the internationalists were primarily of
the British and Americans schools who hoped that Anglo-American dominance could be
maintained, completely ignoring the aspirations of Germany and other nations. At the
time he wrote, the basic divergence was between the status quo powers and the
revisionists. This divergence of interests included colonialism, free trade and cultural
interactions. Carr pointed out that it was not possible to believe that every state would
accept the status quo in the interests of peace any more than every state would accept the
revisionist world view in the interests of peace. He thought that it was exceedingly
difficult for nations to act on the principle that the good of the whole should take
precedence over the good of the individual nation. There is no equality of nations in the
international system, and there is little willingness to remedy the disparities. The
hypothetical world community does not possess the coherence and unity that the
individual parts have. Without this coherence and unity, morality can play only a
marginal role.
Carr also disagrees with the liberal internationalists' belief that moral education of
the public will make them less susceptible to the machinations of propaganda. Carr's
vantage point was 1939, as Fascist and Nazi propaganda machines brought nationalist
fervor to new heights. However, he also talks about compromise: "The compromises,
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like solutions of other human problems, will remain uneasy and tentative. But it is an
essential part of any compromise that both factors shall be taken into account."53
Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations which was written in 1948 set the
parameters for the debate on morality and international relations for many years. Writing
at the height of United States power, Morgenthau undercut the moral foundations of
American policies by emphasizing their complexity and claiming that all politics is a
struggle for power. There is an inherent contradiction between power and ethics, and
theories that failed to grasp this would lead to policies that were ethically unsound and
diplomatically dangerous. His foundation for this can be found in Niebuhr's theological
anthropology; but as Niebuhr found that the drive for transcendence leads to both
selfishness and justice, Morgenthau concluded that it leads only to selfishness and the lust
for power. As a result, every human action is tinged with evil.54
In spite of these beliefs, Morgenthau believed that an effective international
morality had existed in Europe during the nineteenth century which had constrained the
drive for power, because it had reflected a European-wide moral and intellectual
consensus. In his mind, World War I shattered this consensus as international affairs
ceased to be the sole prerogative of the elites and became a sphere in which competing
mass-based nationalisms fought each other for supremacy. Even the restraints on total
war that had been a hallmark of European civilization for more than a thousand years
were abandoned in the search for power. Democracy and nationalism destroyed the
moral code.55 No moral consensus existed in 1918, yet he argued that morality did touch
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international affairs. Moral language can be used as a cloak in order to gain legitimacy
for a particular policy, for example. He thought that the American people had historically
allowed moral language and norms to influence foreign policy in a way different from the
usual ideological uses of morality in international affairs. He labeled this tendency
"sentimentalism," and believed that it was misguided and dangerous because the country
pursued single moral values such as democracy and liberty at the expense of its national
interests.56
The pursuit of the national interest is a central tenet of realist thought, but the
nature of this duty is seemingly confused. For example, George Kennan, a leading
spokesman for realism, argued in 1985 that there is no moral dimension at all in the
national interest, although foreign policy should not be amoral.57 In earlier works
Kennan had spoken of the moral power that the United States can exercise through its
example of freedom and democracy, a power so strong that it can even influence hostile
CO

powers.

Also, writing m 1950 about the Russian/American relationship, Kennan

pointed out that there should be no cause for complaints about "a Providence which, by
providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire
security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the
responsibilities of moral [emphasis added] and political leadership that history plainly
intended them to bear."59 If America wants to defend its mission to spread its
exceptional ideas of freedom, democracy, and capitalism to others; to create an
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international climate where government by consent can thrive, even if it is by example
only, then it is difficult to see how this differs from Wilsonian principles.60
Continental Realism
Mead points out that the country's foreign policy is not always held in high
esteem because it defies the conventional wisdom that many analysts bring to its study.
The conventional wisdom assumes that the foreign policy experience of the European
states in their prime defines what international life is; and it focuses on the nineteenth
century ideas coming from the Continent, especially Prussia, France, and Austria. It
ignores the many distinctive features of Britain in that century and America today. Some
find certain aspects of the liberal, values-driven policies of Prime Minister William
Gladstone as vulgar as United States policies in the contemporary world. Mead argues
that this approach to foreign policy is extremely influential in academic circles and is also
espoused by the ever chattering pundits. However it clings to a set of assumptions that
make it almost impossible to understand what American foreign policy is or why it
works. He believes that there are three main areas of difference between American and
Continental contexts. The first is the realm of economics. For the Americans and
British, economics is at the forefront of their policies; for nineteenth century Europe
politics was the number one concern and economics was an afterthought. It was this
emphasis on economics that brought first the British and later the Americans to global
hegemony.
A second distortion made by Continental realists is that they have been
Eurocentric; they see Europe as the main theater of world politics. The British and
60

For a realist account of Carter's foreign policy and its philosophical implications for the
possibility of a more humane world order, see Robert Alexander Kraig, "The Tragic Science: The Uses of
Jimmy Carter in Foreign Policy Realism," Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5 No. 1 (2002): 1-30.

77
Americans, separated from Europe by the English Channel or by the Atlantic Ocean,
disagreed. While the United States tried to stay aloof from Europe, the Continent was too
important to ignore. It was not the only fish in the sea, however, and Asia and Latin
America received their share of attention, especially in the days before World War I.
Both the United States and Britain have woven webs of trade and investment, covering
entire continents and island communities. Maintaining the security of that global order
has been a major goal.
Lastly, Continental realism has a set of assumptions about the processes of
foreign policy that make it difficult to think coherently. They believe that the best
foreign policies are the products of a single great master, such as Bismarck, Talleyrand,
Metternich, or Kissinger who act as if they were playing a great game of chess. The great
master is excused from the normal restraints of morality in the service of his vision. The
American political system does not create a smooth path for such people. United States
foreign policy is usually a group effort; but, unfortunately in Mead's view, the secretary
of state often plays a subordinate role. The pattern of divided authority, short tenure, and
internal rivalry in the executive branch is an old one in the US, and this is different from
the Continent where men such as Bismarck served for many years. The division of
power between the executive and legislative branches of governments creates a slow,
uncertain "often ridiculous" process of public debate. Furthermore, people considered
eccentric or even dangerous in other nations have a voice in America. In short, the
United States does not fit the Continental model of what states should look like.
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Mead believes that Continental realism peaked under Nixon and Ford.
International life was to be morals free, and they removed the moral element from the
Soviet-American equation. They pursued detente based on mutual interests and ignored
the differences in philosophy. Joan Hoff describes Nixon as "aprincipled," rather than
pragmatic. Given this worldview, the Vietnam War was not a moral crusade nor was it a
moral disaster. It was a problem to be approached in a practical way. Economic issues
were ignored as threats. For traditional American diplomats, the erosion of the Bretton
Woods system would have been seen as a greater threat than Vietnam; and they would
have worked to mitigate the consequences of its fall, or to have strengthened it. Nixon's
methods were as Continental as the substance. He believed he should work alone,
depending on the advice of Kissinger, and ignoring the pesky legislature. The
bureaucracy was ignored as well. Hoff argues that democratic principles were severed
from democratic structures. Nixon did have his successes, however; including the
opening to China and SALT I, both of which helped to stabilize the US-Soviet
relationship. Mead connects the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to a humiliating
end of the Vietnam War, causing long-term resentment and bitterness at the failure to end
it sooner, and hampering every president since. The economic chaos the collapse
engendered inflicted lasting damage on the American economy and on United States
relations with Western Europe and Japan. The waves of inflation set off by the currency
crash affected private investors and national governments alike. It led to the stagflation
of the 1970s as well as the oil shocks. Harry Johnson believed that it would lead to
another international monetary crisis before the decade was over. He was, unfortunately,
correct.62
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There have been other critics of twentieth century realism. Richard Ned Lebow,
for example, argues that realist theory failed miserably to predict the Soviet Union's
renunciation of it empire and leading role as a superpower. There is so much
disagreement among the various schools of realism that there are competing predictions
that makes it difficult to falsify an assertion. Almost any outcome can be made consistent
with some variant of the school.63
Power
One might define power as A's ability to get B to do something B would
otherwise not do; or, as George Catlin postulated, the homo politicus is one who "seeks to
bring into conformity with his own will the wills of others, so that he may the better
attain his own ends."64 Thomas Hobbes defines power as man's "means to obtain some
future apparent good."65 Joseph Nye defines power as the ability "to effect the outcomes
you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen." The
ability to obtain these outcomes demands the possession of various resources, so power
can also be defined "as possession of relatively large amounts of such elements as
population, territory, natural resources, economic strength, military force and political
stability."
Until recently, the foundations of power in the second half of the twentieth
century have moved away from an emphasis on the military. For one thing, nuclear
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power is so destructive that it is too costly to use. A second reason is that the rise of
nationalism has made it difficult for empires to rule over awakened populations. In
addition, societies have changed, especially since World War Twp and the end of the
Cold War. The use of force is acceptable to the post-industrial countries only if there is a
moral justification to ensure popular support; that is, if the threat is existential.66 This is
not to say that the United States and other similar nations will not use military power; in
fact, once Americans are aroused, they have, historically, been quite willing to use it. For
example, when America entered World War Two, the military leadership was committed
to the bombing of military and industrial targets in Germany that were tied to the Nazi
war machine. "Precision" technology was in its infancy at the time, so there were
widespread civilian casualties, but the casualty rates were relatively small compared to
those of the Dresden and Berlin raids of 1945. The willingness to engage in terror
bombing beginning in early 1945 demonstrated a shift in thinking. One reason for this
was the increasing security incentives for the United States to do so. The slowdown of the
Allied advance in the winter of 1944-45 raised the possibility that there would be a long
and bloody ground campaign that would cost thousands of American lives.67 Drastic
times called for drastic measures. At the time of the bombings, the Dresden raids
constituted the largest killing of civilians by military forces in one place at one time since
the campaigns of Genghis Khan.68
A final restraint on the use of force is that it can easily jeopardize economic
objectives. In a globalized society, dictators of lesser developed countries depend on
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foreign investment. Formerly, it was "cheaper to seize another state's territory by force
than to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit
from commercial exchange with it."69 Nonetheless, the threat of military force is
routinely used to deter threats and to ensure access to certain crucial resources, such as oil
in the Persian Gulf.
Nye differentiates between "soft" and "hard" power. Hard power can be both
military and economic and both of these facets of power can be used as either carrots or
sticks to get others to do what a nation wants. However, there is an indirect way to
achieve a nation's objectives. Others may want to follow a country because they admire
its values and want to be like it, attaining a similar level of prosperity and openness. This
soft power "rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the
preferences of others."70 Soft power arises out of values and is expressed in culture.
These are intangible and hard to measure, but are nonetheless important. The United
States can either attract or repel other nations by the example it sets.
In 2007, Nye and others talk about "smart power." Smart power is defined as a
combination of soft and hard power, used in ways that can bring about American
objectives. They contend that the country needs to revive its ability to inspire and
persuade others to follow it, rather than to depend on military might. America's standing
in the world has dwindled in the recent past, with diplomacy and public engagement of
others sorely neglected.71
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It is not always easy to integrate values and other interests, and the methods for
doing so have cut across party lines. Some say the United States should simply stay at
home. Isolationists cite John Quincy Adams who asserted that America "goes not abroad
in search of monsters to destroy," and realists focus on his advice that we should not
involve ourselves abroad "beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and
intrigue."

The use offeree to settle disputes is probably the most controversial aspect

of power. In the West from the Middle Ages onward, the most effective restraint on the
warlike tendencies of individuals has been the presence of an external threat; and the
periods least affected by state on state violence have been those which existed within an
international community that had an accepted body of law and custom to guide it. The
Congress of Vienna set up such a system after a period of twenty-three years of almost
uninterrupted warfare brought about by the French Revolution and the ambitions of
Napoleon Bonaparte. Those statesmen secured peace for two generations, and the
system, as modified by Bismarck, secured it for the rest of the century. When the system
broke down, and the historical power politics returned in the years before 1914, the
results were catastrophic. When the war was over, Wilson tried to establish a new system
of collective security, and since that time liberals have stressed the importance of the
human element in international affairs. It is ironic that the realists blamed the liberals for
the problems of the twentieth century when, in retrospect, it was the European penchant
for power politics as usual that emboldened a new Germany to twice bid for hegemony.
Humanity took one of its worst beatings in the process.
Power and Principle in Foreign Policy
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There are inherent contradictions and tensions within the global system that
Carter worked in. While the allies were content to allow the Americans to guarantee their
security as they went peacefully about business, the American-driven system of
globalization generated resentment, and thus instability, in certain regions. The disregard
of Nixon in dismantling the Bretton Woods monetary system caused inflation and
hardship for many throughout the decade of the seventies and had lasting consequences
on the United States economy. European allies as well as Japan were hurt, as were third
world countries, where social conflicts bubbled to the surface and governments were
undermined. The US' overwhelming support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War further
destabilized the world because of an oil embargo. Carter came to power at a time of flux,
inheriting economic confusion along with suspicious allies, which led to difficulties in
persuading them to agree to such things as sanctions against Iran during the hostage
crisis. It was also difficult to do this because of the economic stakes involved. No
country wanted another oil embargo. The economy was volatile; the American public
was weary of the Vietnam War, disgusted by Watergate, and unhappy with detente. He
tried a different approach, de-emphasizing the East-West equation, and shifting
America's attention to regions such as Southern Africa. Carter seemed to have a good
grasp of when to intervene, or not, in the affairs of others. The Angolan civil war is a
good example. Although urged by numerous factions to intervene with American troops,
Carter chose a more prudent course, remembering one of the principles of just war: a high
probability of good consequences.73 He also changed the approach to the Middle East
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and doggedly pursued peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The result was a
stunning accomplishment: a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.
The international system Carter operated in was fraught with danger because of
the rivalry between the USSR and the United States, which was overlaid by the threat of
nuclear annihilation. The Cold War played itself out in a series of proxy wars - indirect
confrontations in third world countries and the Middle East. There was always the
danger, however, that direct conflict was possible. A highly dangerous situation
developed during the Iranian Revolution when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Carter
was vigilant, but there was no hasty military intervention to protect American interests.
Instead the administration imposed sanctions on the SU, worked cooperatively with
Pakistan, and supplied the Afghans with arms, sometimes purchased from a corrupt
Soviet army. It also increased its presence in the Gulf region and warned the Soviets off.
The Soviets put up a good fight, but stumbled out exhausted after ten years. It soon
collapsed. Patience and negotiation is fundamental to all diplomatic procedures, from
deterrence and coercive diplomacy, to crisis management and war termination, and Carter
demonstrated extraordinary patience and resolve, one might say prudence, in trying to
settle international crises peacefully.7
Carter faced difficult issues and few good policy options were available to him on
many of these, such as the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. For
months he struggled to keep America out of a war with Iran, going against popular
opinion and no doubt damaging his reelection chances. Critics claimed that the failure to
use force was to blame for the "decline of American influence over events affecting the
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captives." Every attempt to bring the weight of the international community to bear on
the government of Iran, or to use economic sanctions, was (supposedly) doomed to
failure. The moral degradation of the regime was so great that the leaders were beyond
the reach of a reasonable response to moral and political authority. These same voices,
by the fall of 1981, began to call for sanctions against Iraq for aggression against Iran.
Carter, however, was too smart to lead the country into a needless war. He did threaten
the use of force if any of the hostages were killed or put on trial, which the Iranians
evidently understood to be a credible threat since neither of these things happened.
Carter's focus on the Greater Middle East as a looming problem, his vision in creating the
Rapid Deployment Force (the forerunner of CENTCOM), his policies to get better
interoperability of the military, his success in persuading Congress to allocate more
money for the military, were all to his credit. The role of the military was not robust
enough by 1979 to satisfy either it or the general public, and the Iranian hostage crisis
provoked a desire for a military that was center stage. Reagan is commonly viewed as
providing that. A closer look points to Carter as the initiator. Popular films that reflected
this attitude included Rambo, Top Gun, and The Hunt for Red October.75
CONCLUSIONS
Two enduring elements of a good foreign policy are patience and diplomacy, or
one might say prudence, which were Carter's most effective tools in crafting policies.
Americans believe that the ideals and institutions that have brought peace and prosperity
to them can do the same for others worldwide. All social groups contend for influence
and power, but on the international scene rivalries are less well controlled by law and
government. The task of diplomacy is to limit the struggles through legal rules or moral
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maxims and establish balances of power of rough equilibrium among rival states.
According to Harold Nicolson, a scholar of diplomacy, it is either heroic or commercial.
Heroic diplomacy, often associated with the military, always tries to maintain a
preponderance of power as a prerequisite of diplomacy. Commercial diplomacy, on the
other hand, understands that for every advantage there must be a disadvantage, so
diplomacy must entail a give and take among the parties. Power is many sided; it is not
simply military power. Estimating power other than military power is difficult, and the
intangibles must be included. Foreign policy estimates require the best-informed
judgment of capabilities and intentions, and successful foreign policies consider both.
Diplomacy can be a channel of power, as Carter demonstrated. Another
definition of power offered by Kenneth Thompson is that it is a relationship; and
diplomacy remains the "most consistently used channel through which statesmen work
their will on one another and protect their interests." Lyndon Johnson contemplated
bombing North Korea after the seizure of the USS Pueblo but changed his mind and
turned to diplomacy. After eleven months the crew was released. Carter used diplomacy
in his hostage situation as well, and all of them came home alive. In both cases, the
threat of force was always present, but in the end it was unnecessary.76 While many will
argue that Carter's administration was generally a failure, this work argues that a number
of Carter's policies, was successful, especially from the perspective of 2008 and what we
now know. Iran was his downfall. While there are legitimate criticisms of how he
handled the revolution and the hostage crisis both, this work tries to demonstrate that his
policies, as well as Iran's, led to a dramatic weakening of that country. It lost at least $10
billion of its assets frozen in the US, its economy was severely weakened by economic
76
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sanctions as well as by its own hand, and its army disintegrated, leading Iraq to attack it.
The Panama Canal operates efficiently and profitably; there has been no general war in
the Middle East since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; and, while
problems remain in Southern Africa, many live under majority rule.
Since political realism, and according to Mead, Continental realism, has
dominated the landscape of international relations for much of the last half of the
twentieth century, a study of the Carter presidency within a framework of both power and
principles, from the perspective of what we know now, should contribute to a greater
understanding of how the pursuit of both can be used to craft successful, long term
policies that are truly in the national interest. Success is not always immediately evident;
and prudence is always in for the long haul, not for quick, short, and often shortsighted,
victories. There are numerous instances in the second half of the twentieth century when
prudence proved to be the better path towards the national interest. Two examples come
to mind - Truman's response to the Berlin Blockade and Eisenhower's Camp David
response to Khrushchev's attempts to brew trouble in Berlin in 1959. It is not only what a
nation or a leader does, but how that is important. This work argues that Carter brought
the nation back to the prudence of Truman and Eisenhower, after a prolonged absence
because of the Vietnam War and Watergate. He could be either flexible or steadfast,
depending on what he perceived to be in the national interest. The current literature on
Carter does not present him in this light. That which is critical claims either that he had
no coherent world view, and was therefore inconsistent (not flexible); others say that he
had a world view, but that it was naive and ineffective; and his preoccupation with
change in the world led him to ignore the traditional relevance of power in favor of
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principle. The literature which praises him claims that his policies represented a
commitment to transnational capital, and emphasize his ties to the Trilateral Commission.
Carter generally had an optimistic view of the United States' ability to achieve its
interests, in spite of the fact that the world was no longer bi-polar and power and
leadership were devolving outward. He believed that the loss of relative power could be
mitigated by a strategy of diplomacy that emphasized the shared interests and values of
the United States and it friends and allies. Areas of interdependence could be exploited
for the good of the international system, and because of this interdependence, long-term
advantages needed to be considered more than previously when considering short term
objectives.
In spite of his achievements, Carter lost the 1980 election. Many academics and
pundits were happy to see him go. The Carter Implosion by Donald Spencer is a strong
attack on his foreign policy because of his "amateur style" of diplomacy. Spencer claims
Carter could not achieve his objectives because he did not understand the context or the
pursuit of diplomacy. Astonishingly, Spencer claims that Carter was responsible for the
Iranian Revolution, the hostage crisis, the collapse of detente with the Soviets, and other
events across the globe. The Camp David Accords and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty
are not mentioned. Phil Williams, on the other hand, claims that while Carter's policies
ultimately failed, it was not due to a misplaced idealism; but because he tried to change
the international agenda from confrontation with the Soviet Union by demoting its
importance. There were powerful domestic challengers to this notion, especially from the
Committee on the Present Danger, which totally disagreed on Carter's East-West stance
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as well as detente. Since the American public was accustomed to think in terms of
containment of the Soviets, Carter's attempt to minimize it hurt his political fortunes.77
Gabriel Kolko is critical in general of the United States policies and the Third
World. His work, Confronting the Third World, makes no distinction in Carter's interests
and achievements in human rights, but instead claims that all administrations from 1945
onward were interested only in business opportunities for Americans. This, in turn,
78

required stability. It was inevitable that all would fail.

Carter was also dubbed a failure

in the Arab world which saw the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty as a sellout of the
Palestinians. They ended up believing that the United States would support Israel no
matter what and that Carter was no different from his predecessors. No attention is paid
to the fact that the Camp David Accords actually lost Carter Jewish votes in 1980.79
Much of the negative literature centers on East-West issues, which this work did
not directly address. Not all was negative, however. Stanley Hoffman points out in
"Requiem" that Carter's reassertion of human rights was welcomed by most in 1977 and
was a very great success by most accounts. He goes on to say that by the time of the
1980 election there had been too many disappointments for people to remember that
SO

success. His greatest failure was in East-West relations.

Tom J. Farer in "Searching for

Defeat" gives Carter credit for changing the emphasis away from Cold War issues. He
claims that Carter had no real idea of how difficult it would be to change direction
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because there were so many vested interests, both at home and abroad, in the old policies
of containment.81
/ . / h i s work will examine Carter's policies concerning arms transfers, the Panama
Canal Treaties, Southern Africa, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Much of the
literature implies either that moral principles or power politics must govern. When citing
Hobbes, realists seldom mention anything but his emphasis on power, leaving out the
moral dimension he included in his analysis. While some realists, such as Carr, insist that
a moral dimension is also an essential part of international politics, many realists have
pushed morality and ethics to the periphery. This reached its apex under Nixon and
Kissinger. Carter moved away from this approach to foreign policy, and this work
demonstrates that he contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War. His
ideological opposition to communism based on their human rights violations, and a
principled opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, became an organizing
principle of his administration. He contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War in
that the United States armed the opposition to the communist based and Soviet supported
government in that country. The Soviets then invaded Afghanistan, to their peril, stayed
for approximately ten years, stumbled out and collapsed.
It is not that Carter wanted to overthrow the Soviet regime; rather, he wanted to
demonstrate the depth of American sympathy for those people who suffered from its
excesses. The Soviets eventually were led into a dialogue on human rights that ended up
undermining its legitimacy which also contributed to the end of the Cold War.82 In the
meantime, the human rights issue did in fact hurt the US-Soviet relationship.
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Nonetheless, Reagan was able to make use of this to strengthen the resolve of the
American people and its allies to play out the final act of the Cold War. It was Carter's
morality in foreign policy that allowed Reagan to call the Soviet Union the "evil empire."
He built on the base that Carter laid, but returned to a more unilateral version of
American exceptionalism and tied idealism to the military. Reagan also built on Carter's
base for more funding for the military and better interoperability among the forces. The
lack of interoperability showed up again in the Grenada invasion. The political right's
voice on Panama quieted down after the 1980 election, and was seldom heard from until
the latter part of 1999, as the Canal was readied to come under Panamanian sovereignty
and the United States was readying for another presidential election. Although Reagan
did not follow up on Carter's initiatives in southern Africa, those initiatives were not in
vain; even South Africa had a democratic election in 1994 - its first.
Power in the West was devolving outwards, towards Europe and Japan in the
years leading up to Carter's administration; and while America was still their guarantor, it
no longer had total hegemony. These were independent power centers; another reason
why American leverage was sometimes not as effective as it had been in previous times.
Carter always tried to work with America's allies, attempting to bring them along with
United States policies.

It was a slow process. From the vantage point of 2007, this

process promises much more success than unilateral action, in spite of (or perhaps
because of) a world that is trying to find its way after the end of the Cold War.83 A new
international system is still forming, with states jockeying to find their positions in it.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States with an enormous amount of
power, but it was not absolute. As Bruce Cummings asserts, because the Cold War ended
essentially by the unilateral actions of the Soviet Union, the United States was free to
continue the containment of allies and the pursuit of a global mission. It was as if "two
horses were running around the track, one broke its leg and the other kept on running."84
The terror attack on the United States on 9/11 altered the political landscape
further. Zbigniew Brzezinski argues for global leadership based on human rights, the
pursuit of multilateral agreements and alliances, and interdependence, much the same as
during the Carter years. The new reality in 2007 is that America is the only nation
capable of providing global stability through military policing, while at the same time
Of

instigating global instability through globalization.

The nation is in a historic position.

It can either move the planet forward through global leadership by shifting from
hegemony to stable international institutions and by defining and mobilizing the world in
the next phase of globalization; or it can inundate it through erroneous projections of
military might which could lead to a perpetual Orwellian insecurity.
Some scholars argue that Carter had no coherent overview and never saw the
connections among the various issues. Others argue that he wanted to promote a global
community based on a more idealistic and moral view of the international environment.
A dominant concern was with global change, and he sought to play a constructive role in
the developments that were taking place. He was the first to embrace the view of a more
interdependent world and tried to shed the myopic, overemphasis on an East-West view.
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He began his tenure with a great deal of optimism, but later began to become more
pessimistic when the Soviets became more adventurous, especially in Africa and
Afghanistan. The administration went through a period of transition, and Carter's policy
of containment became more evident in 1979 with the Iranian hostage crisis and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as (and perhaps especially because of) the
domestic challenges posed to his administration from the political right. To some, this
change meant that he had no overall vision, to others it reflects his flexibility, his ability
to react realistically to events on the ground. No one died by the sword during his tenure,
something that he was very proud of, as was Dwight Eisenhower after the conclusion of
the Korean War. In any case, Carter never abandoned his principles and he paid more
attention to Third World issues than most presidents before him, and this was to his
credit.
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CHAPTER III
CARTER AND THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult battles that Carter faced in his presidency was the effort
to transfer sovereignty of the Canal Zone to Panama. Although ultimately successful, it
cost the supporters dearly. Of the twenty senators up for reelection who voted in favor of
ratifying the first Treaty in 1978, seven were defeated; six chose not to run. The issue
continued to be highly charged, and in the election of 1980 eleven more of the senators
who had supported the Treaties were defeated, along with the president.1 This chapter
will examine the dilemmas that Carter faced, within the context of power and principle,
and discuss why this issue was so contentious, for both Panama and the US. Part of the
answer can be found in the history of the original treaties, signed in 1903, and the chapter
will therefore address the subject within its historical context, as well as the broader
context of the United States' relations with Latin America, Human rights in the region
was a concern to a number of key players and will be considered, as well as strategic
worries about the security of the Canal. Strategic matters were often cited as a reason for
the United States to maintain control; since its return might send a message to the Soviet
Union that the western hemisphere might now be open to further penetration by nonWestern nations. This unease had been magnified by the Cuban missile crisis, and the
United States had followed a policy of supporting "anti-communist" right wing
governments in the region, both politically and militarily, especially by funneling arms to
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these governments. The regional context is important because the United States thought
in those terms, making little distinction between countries.
The Regional Context
The United States considered the small strip of land known as Central America,
composed of five republics, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and
Honduras, as its backyard from the time of the Monroe Doctrine, issued in 1823. They
were assumed to be natural allies. As the country grew stronger, no leader came to
power there without its consent. Later, the countries became victims of the Cold War, and
repressive, brutal right wing dictators were favored over any reform minded left wing
leader. The geographic proximity to the isthmus and the location between two oceans
made these republics strategically important to the US.2
The post World War II era slowly brought a change from Franklin D. Roosevelt's
(FDR) "Good Neighbor Policy" of the 1930s and early 1940s. During the war America
encouraged the people of Latin America to work with communist groups, and even
encouraged Soviet commercial and political officials to travel in the region in order to
build relationships. However, by 1946 the historical fear of communism revived as the
Soviets occupied Eastern Europe, and communist parties competed for power in the
Middle East and Asia as well as Western Europe. This fear of communism, plus the
changed configuration of power in the world, distracted the country from Latin America,
as it focused primarily on Europe and Asia. Although Harry Truman, then president of
the US, maintained the Good Neighbor Policy in its broad outlines, he also experimented
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with a new policy to promote democracy and distance the nation from the dictators.3 In
1947, George Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, sent his famous cable to
Washington, arguing that the Soviets had to be contained. This became the cornerstone
of American foreign policy, in one manner or another, for the next forty years. It did not
become the dominant theme in United States-Latin American relations immediately; but
was, rather, a gradual thing. In the meantime, the program of Latin America itself
changed: it wanted subsidized loans for development. At the Bogota Conference in 1948,
which created the Organization of American States (OAS), the foreign ministers of the
region asked Secretary of State George Marshall for a "Marshall Plan for Latin America."
He explained that Europe's needs were more critical. Later, however, Truman created his
Point 4 Technical Assistance Program which funneled aid to Latin America and other
lesser developed countries (LDCs), although it was never on the scale of the Marshall
Plan aid.4
As the country neglected its neighbors to the south, regional experts and
American diplomats within Latin America became the primary functionaries of United
States policy, leading to a lack of coherence and consistency. As the Cold War escalated,
a struggle broke out in the country between those who favored the promotion of
democratic institutions and those who believed that inter-continental unity and a pledge
of nonintervention better served the nation's security interests. For example, Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Spruille Braden successfully blocked
additional arms sales to the region in 1946, because he believed it would seriously retard
3
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social progress. Braden also began to pressure President Anastasia Somoza Debayle, the
Nicaraguan dictator, to hold free elections, although the United States had supported him
throughout the Depression and World War II as an ally. When Somoza capitulated to the
pressure, his hand-picked successor won the election, but soon began to replace
Somoza's longtime cronies in the government. Conflict followed and within a few weeks
Somoza overthrew the new government and put his uncle in power. Subsequently, the
State Department withdrew aid from Nicaragua. For more than a year Washington
withheld recognition of the government, but Somoza counterattacked, claiming that his
enemies harbored communist sympathies. Ultimately he succeeded in convincing the
United States that he was a safeguard against the leftists, and in May 1948 the country
reestablished full relations. Some argue that this was the moment when security needs
triumphed over the promotion of democracy.5 Others believe that the turning point
actually came in 1954 under the Eisenhower administration, with his plan to overthrow
the regime of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala because it had communists within its
government. The CIA-engineered coup ended the ten year "spring" presided over by
Arbenz and Juan Jose Arevalo; a spring that produced the first true agrarian reform in
Central America. A half million people received land they very desperately needed.
Many believe that the CIA overthrew Arbenz because the land that he had expropriated
belonged to the United Fruit Company.6 The catalyst for this plan was the discovery of a
shipload of arms sailing to Guatemala from Eastern Europe. Although the plan failed to
accomplish this goal, it galvanized the Guatemalan military to stage a coup.7 Guatemalan
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democracy and reform died, strangled in its crib. The message was that the United States
would not tolerate leftists, even if they came to power in legitimate democratic elections,
and that it would work with right-wing dictators like Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala
and Somoza in Nicaragua. This had the unfortunate consequence of squeezing out the
more democratic elements from the political process, encouraging leftists to revolt and
rightists to suppress dissent.8 Also, if a group felt its access to power was blocked it
almost always turned to the outside for support. This meant either the United States, if it
was not already supporting the government, or the Soviet Union.9 Some believe that the
United States was an "aggressive, expansionist imperial power..." and cited news stories
that described the embargo against Cuba designed to strangle its economy, that told of
giving a billion dollars to Colombia to suppress a guerrilla movement, and relayed the
identification of a high Peruvian official, Vladimoros Montesinos who had been
implicated in corruption, torture, and death squads, as working for the CIA.10
Relations between Latin America and the United States began to change
considerably beginning in the 1960s, mainly because those countries became more
industrialized, with their economies better integrated into the world economy, leaving
them less closely tied to the US. By the time of the debates on the Panama Canal
Treaties, the days of the "banana republics" meekly following the lead of their neighbor
to the north were gone.11 The region as a whole has a history of political instability,
mainly because of the lack of economic and political reform, and by 1977 the country
could no longer ignore the simmering resentment in Panama over obsolete treaties. Carter
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made the unpopular decision of revising them and modernizing relations with Panama.
He hoped that an agreement could be reached on principles that the Panamanians as well
as the North Americans considered fair and just, thus sending a signal to other Latin
American countries that United States policy was headed in a new direction.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The question of who should control the Isthmus reaches backward in Western
history to the arrival of the Spanish 400 years ago. When Spanish rule ended in 1821, the
United States and Great Britain began to jostle for position in the region, and as
technology developed, the question became who should control a canal, not who should
simply dominate the area. As the United States expanded westward, and especially after
it gained control of California from Mexico, the question became more urgent. The
Spanish-American War of 1898 made a canal an imperative, as the Americans began to
spread across the globe and build an empire. The key to maintaining an empire,
according to the influential American Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, lay in
controlling the Caribbean and having a navy strong enough to secure United States
interests in both the Caribbean and the Pacific.12 President Theodore Roosevelt agreed
with this position. With the diplomatic agreement of the British, the United States, armed
with new technology, new medical knowledge, and renewed determination, began the
process of building a canal.
As Congress debated the several issues surrounding the venture, President
Theodore Roosevelt's impatience became apparent. He later boasted that he "took the
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Canal and let Congress debate."13 It was that very sense of urgency by Roosevelt that
almost immediately produced the germ of the counterforce that Carter would deal with in
the 1970s. In the meantime, there was plenty of debate. For one thing, the country was
considering Nicaragua as a possible route; for another, the rights to build a canal in
Panama had been purchased from Colombia by the French. In 1878, Ferdinand
deLesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, announced that he would build a sea level canal in
Panama. In a display of power, the United States sent warships in protest, but Colombia
paid no attention and the French began to dig. A sea level canal, rather than one with a
multi-tiered lock system, proved to be one of the fatal mistakes the French company
made. Another was that there was no all out war waged against malaria and yellow fever.
DeLesseps failed in his attempt, his son went to prison for fraud and bribery, and the
French Third Republic faced a serious challenge, one of several that almost caused its
collapse. In the meantime, the United States more and more favored a route across
Nicaragua, because it appeared to be easier and because the remains of the deLesseps
venture had been bought out by the New Panama Company, also French, and they were
asking $109 million for its assets and rights in Panama. Two remarkable men intervened
and turned the tide against the Nicaraguan route: William Nelson Cromwell, head of a
prestigious law firm in New York, Sullivan and Cromwell, and Philippe Bunau-Varilla of
the New Panama Company. Cromwell became the New Panama Company's agent in the
US, and through campaign contributions to leading Republicans, facilitated by Marcus
Hanna a confidant of President William McKinley, prevented a plank from being
included in the Republican party platform favoring the Nicaraguan canal. Cromwell then
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convinced Bunau-Varilla to lower his price to $40 million. Between 1896 and 1902,.
Cromwell fended off the commitment to Nicaragua entirely. Congress, after sending a
committee to Paris to assess the situation, passed legislation that authorized the canal to
be built in Panama.14
Roosevelt was happy to oblige. The only obstacle left was Colombia, which had
a tenuous claim on Panama at best. Panamanian nationalism had been born early in its
400 year history and this is an important point to any understanding of the events of the
1960s and 1970s - the most important point, according to Walter LaFeber. Secretary of
State John Hay convinced the Colombian ambassador in Washington to sign a treaty
giving the United States a 99-year lease on a strip of land six miles wide which would be
the Canal Zone. It would pay Colombia $10 million plus an annual payment of $250,000
in perpetuity. The United States Senate ratified the treaty but the Colombian parliament
rejected it unanimously. They wanted more money and knew that the French rights to
build would expire soon. Roosevelt was furious, and for several months he treated
anyone who would listen to a sampling of his rich vocabulary, calling the Colombians
everything from "inefficient bandits" to "a corrupt pithecoid [sic] community." He ranted
to his friend W.R. Thayer, "You could no more make an agreement with the Colombian
rulers than you could nail currant jelly to a wall... ,"15 His mind began to turn to the idea
of "self determination" for Panama, foreshadowing the Wilsonian idealist stance of
almost two decades later. Bunau-Varilla and Panamanian nationalists began to develop a
solution to the problem. With help from the State Department, Bunau-Varilla concocted
a scheme for a revolution in Panama. After some confusion, and with some help from the
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USS Nashville, a bit of bribery by Cromwell to buy off the Colombian army, and fast
thinking by the commander of the railway, who moved the cars to the Pacific side of the
Isthmus thus depriving the remaining loyal Colombians of their use, the revolution
succeeded. None of the belligerents was killed. The only casualties were a Chinese
citizen, a dog, and according to some reports, a donkey.16
Hay cheerfully prepared a treaty which was fundamentally the same agreement
that Colombia had rejected. However, in a remarkable move, Bunau-Varilla re-wrote it,
hoping to make it more palatable to the Senate so that it would be ratified before the
Panamanian envoys arrived in Washington. They were conveniently delayed by
Cromwell in New York. As written by Bunau-Varilla, the treaty gave the United States a
virtual protectorate over the new country and extensive powers in the Canal Zone. It
would have
"all the rights, power, and authority within the zone.. .which the United States
would possess and exercise as if it were the sovereign of the territory within
which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by
the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power and authority.17
That was the most radical change, one that caused continuous problems in USPanamanian relations for the next three-quarters of a century.18 That was not all. BunauVarilla widened the Zone from six to ten miles, surrendered Panamanian judicial power
in the Zone, and lengthened the lease from 99 years to perpetuity. Hay and BunauVarilla signed the treaty at 6:40 p.m., and three hours later the Panamanian envoys
arrived in Washington. The Panamanian government vehemently protested "the manifest
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renunciation of sovereignty'1 in the treaty, a phrase that echoed through the years. It,
however, had little choice but to sign. If it did not, the powerful colossus to the north
could abandon Panama and leave the revolutionaries to the mercies of the Colombian
army, or the Americans could simply seize the canal area without payment or
protection.19 Some critics of the later Panama Canal Treaties assert that there was never
any doubt of American sovereignty over the Canal; that Panama was happy with the
provisions of the treaty, and signed happily, "reveling in the warm glow of freedom and
self-determination."
Bunau-Varilla's personal financial stake in the outcome precluded the possibility
of equitable terms for Panama. He had put his personal stamp on all of the events leading
to ratification of the 1903 treaty. Roosevelt later argued that the seizure of the Canal was
for "the good of civilization," draping the nation's actions in the mantle of morality, but
the Frenchman had made the treaty so attractive that the United States chose power over
principle.21
Vocal objections to the 1903 treaty began almost at once. The practical result of
the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty meant that Panama had to tolerate foreign control over 550
square miles of its best real estate, its best deep water ports, and the potentially profitable
commercial opportunities in the Zone. Injured pride and humiliation might have been the
most damaging obsession, giving birth to growing agitation and anti-Americanism among
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the population. Although some minor modifications were made, real change was
difficult, if not impossible, to effect.22
The Winds of Change
A new wave of nationalism swept through Asia, Africa, and Latin America after
the end of World War II. In Latin America this nationalism was aided by numerous
economic and social discontents, who felt that capitalism was tantamount to a license to
steal, rather than a path to prosperity open to all. In Panama the middle class supported
the reformist policies of Arnolfo Arias, "El Hombre" to his followers, and three time
president of Panama. He successfully welded nationalism and reform into an attractive
program. This political landscape in Panama, reflected in the rise of middle class
nationalism, made it possible by the 1950s to demand a termination of the 1903 treaty. In
1955 some technical changes were made, but frustrations in Panama grew, erupting into
violent anti-American demonstrations and new demands to end the treaty altogether.
After the 1950s no Panamanian government ever again settled for less than some tangible
recognition of Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone.

On the other hand, others

argue that the give-away of the Canal began in the 1930s, and the changes in 1955
surrendered more rights and property, including $24 million worth of freight yards and
passenger stations of the Panama Railroad.24
By the early sixties tensions over displaying national flags, symbols of
sovereignty, led to a ban on flying either the Panamanian or American flag. When this
was violated in January 1964 by some American students, rioting broke out and was met
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with force by the US. Four Americans and twenty Panamanians died and dozens more
were injured; Panama responded by breaking diplomatic relations with the United States.
The military was gravely concerned about the security of the Canal as well as the loss of
life. President Lyndon Johnson (LB J) called the president of Panama, Roberto Chiari, to
express regret and urge a joint effort to maintain calm. President Chiari responded that
all existing treaties between the two countries must be completely revised. Johnson was
convinced. In April, 1964, after diplomatic relations were restored, both countries agreed
to renegotiate the treaties.
In June 1967 Johnson and Marco Robles, Chiari's successor, announced that
agreement had been reached on three treaties. Opposition from Congress, however, was
so intense that Johnson never submitted them to the Senate for ratification. President
Richard Nixon resumed negotiations in 1970. Four years later a set of principles were
agreed to, negotiated by Kissinger and his Panamanian counterpart, Foreign Minister
Juan Tack. The Kissinger-Tack Agreement (or Principles), as it became known, formally
renounced sovereignty and explicitly stated that security for American interests was a
function of consent, not coercion. It eliminated United States control over the Canal in
perpetuity, and for these reasons the principles were hotly opposed. The Agreement,
nonetheless, pre-figured the final outlines of the treaty that Carter would present to the
Senate in 1977. When Gerald Ford took over as president, he also continued the
negotiations. In 1976, during the presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan accused the
Ford Administration of keeping a "mouselike silence" in the face of "blackmail" from
Panama's "dictator." The public liked Reagan's rhetoric and Ford was convinced that he
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lost several primaries because of the Canal issue.25 Because of American elections, no
further progress on the issue was made at that time. This is the situation that Carter
inherited when he won the presidential election in 1976.
Carter, in general, fashioned a foreign policy tailored to the necessities and
pressures of a pluralistic world and to the moral themes that the administration hoped
would give authority to such policies. He tried to focus on a North-South axis, rather
than East-West, dealing with the Soviet Union on an ad hoc basis. This was different
from the Kissinger approach who viewed the problem of the age as the management of
the Soviet Union as an emerging superpower, with regional problems being approached
within that context. Both men faced the dilemma of trying to achieve a synthesis
between the liberal view of a policy and the structure of power politics that was
fundamentally still in place, no matter how modified it had become since 1945. This
reconciliation for Carter was more difficult because of the nuclear advances made by the
Soviet Union during the mid-seventies, and the weakening of the Western alliance,
making Americans feel more vulnerable. The public tended to view issues within the
East-West framework. The administration's efforts were complicated even further by
energy security issues, a declining dollar, and by the erosion of American preeminence in
world affairs. The dysfunction between a desired policy and world circumstances was
acute during Carter's administration. The result, some argue, was to make judgments on
a case by case basis, with no overarching framework.26 Carter's strategy was one of
adjustment and preventive diplomacy. Carter believed that the nation should work with
smaller countries on a shared agenda of the principles of human rights and development.
25

Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, 157-58; see "That Troublesome Panama Canal Treaty," Time,
Monday, October 31, 1977, for a discussion of the opposition methods that the conservatives used.
26
Moffett, The Limits of Victory, 59, 60, 61.

107
He wanted to pursue a global community based on mutual respect and multilateral
cooperation. He also understood the complexity of interdependence which in itself
called for an altered approach to foreign policy. Hopes were high that the Canal treaty
would send the same positive signal that the revocation of the Piatt Amendment in 1934
had sent, and revolutionize American foreign policy with the Third World.28
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
Carter states that before 1974 he was only vaguely aware of the argument over the
Canal, and he was surprised that during his campaign for the presidency he got frequent
questions about it. Even more striking was the intensity of emotion the subject aroused.
For many, turning the Canal over to Panama symbolized the ills of the past decade:
inflation, the energy crisis, Watergate, Vietnam, and the loss of economic and military
supremacy. In other words, it seemed that the country was faced with its declining power
to control events. However, the reality was that it was more difficult to control events in a
pluralistic, interdependent, and complex world; and the utility of military force had
declined, making other instruments of foreign policy more important. By the time the
election was over, Carter knew that the United States had to come to terms with two
facts: the need to begin negotiations immediately, and that the eventual agreement would
have to include a phasing out of absolute control over the Canal Zone, giving Panama
sovereignty. He relates that the decisions were not easy to make because by this time he
recognized a stark dilemma: the administration would face a "terrible political fight in
Congress" right at the beginning of his term. A flag-waving lobby in Congress had
27
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already opposed renegotiation of the treaty and the House had voted to withhold any.
appropriations to pay for negotiations, an unprecedented move that was possibly
unconstitutional. The administration hoped that the Senate would kill the measure,

but

in the fall of 1975, the Senate passed a resolution that directly contravened the terms that
would be offered to Panama. It opposed any new treaty and articulated strong opposition
to relinquishing sovereignty. Thirty-eight senators, four more than the one-third needed
to prevent ratification, sponsored the resolution. What's more, public opinion polls
indicated that American opinion strongly opposed relinquishing control. Carter got
endorsements for the treaty from both Kissinger and Ford, but Ronald Reagan turned him
down saying he had heard nothing that changed his mind about "giving [the] Canal
away."30 Reagan believed that American foreign policy had been in retreat over the past
years, and that "giving up Panama" would be another one, causing the country to lose
respect from the rest of the world."31 Nonetheless, Carter believed that the treaty was
essential, that the administration was certain to face a horrible political fight in the
Senate, but that the nation needed on principle to correct an injustice. By correcting this,
United States power and security would be enhanced. Furthermore, other Latin American
nations were beginning to choose sides, and they were not choosing the United States.
The issue was becoming a litmus test of how a superpower would treat a small
defenseless country that had always supported the US.
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In spite of this strong opposition from Congress and the public,33 Carter decided
to push ahead with the project. They needed to do this during the expected "honeymoon"
period of Carter's presidency, before the issue could go south. Vance and Brzezinski both
agreed on the urgency of the issue, because of the security issues surrounding the Canal,
but they also comprehended the political risks involved. Vance had been Lyndon
Johnson's personal emissary during the violent anti-American riots in 1964, and believed
that sooner or later Panama would "resort to major violence," perhaps even destroying
the Canal.

Carter appointed Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz (a Washington lawyer

and former ambassador to the Organization of American States OAS) to lead the
negotiating team. Linowitz believed that this issue could lead to a quick foreign policy
success which would in turn give Carter leverage on other issues such as the SALT talks
with the SU.35 Carter believed that a failure to act quickly would lead to increasing
resentment on the part of the Panamanians which could lead to attacks on the Canal. It
was imperative to move before the issue fell once again below the political radar screen.
Shortly after Carter's election a privately funded report was released by the
Commission on US-Latin American Relations. It warned that a new Latin American
policy must include a consistent pattern of global economic policies that would ensure a
more equitable exchange between the industrialized countries and the newly expanding
economies, many of which were in Latin America. The Commission saw Panama as a
threat to the "latent [economic] opportunities in the Hemisphere. Otherwise, there were
33
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no imminent threats to national security in the Americas. The report also characterized
the Canal as "useful," although no longer "vital," to North American interests. If the
problem could be solved, Latin America could again, as Walter LaFeber writes, "function
as the laboratory for United States policies in the developing world." It also asked for a
"firm stance" on behalf of human rights on a continent suffering "a plague of repression."
The Carter Administration thus considered the Panama crisis as a key issue to be
solved.36
A big obstacle to the treaties was the corruption and human rights abuses of the
Torrijos regime. Nonetheless, Carter thought that the Panamanian government was
strong enough to get ratification, and thus wanted to push ahead. Many Latin American
experts believe that it was fundamentally in the interests of the United States to "support
efforts to base development on individual autonomy, social equity, and civic participation
rather than on repression."37 During the early 1970s the Panamanian National Guard had
cracked down on graft, but by 1975 Guard officers themselves were accused of it. As
unemployment rose, along with prices of basic commodities, stories about corruption
increased. The Inter-American Commission on Human rights reported numerous
violations of the basic right to life as well. It compiled a list of 34 people between 1969
and 1977 whose deaths were attributed to the government of Panama. Of these, 14 cases
were considered to be of a political nature, and nine occurred as a result of confrontations
with the National Guard.38 These abuses raised questions in the Congressional hearings.
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Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Cardinal Krol,
Archbishop of Philadelphia, endorsed the need for a new treaty on behalf of the United
States Catholic Conference. Indeed, they believed that a moral imperative existed for it
because the 1903 treaty could not be reconciled with the concept of social justice. Krol
believed that the notion of limited sovereignty was repugnant, and cited the Soviet
invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as evidence of this. The
symbolic significance of the moment was no less than the substantive significance,
according to Krol. He also emphasized that an opportunity existed for the United States
and Panama to signal "a new kind of relationship between large and small, industrialized
and developing nations." Other nations in the region were watching carefully. A new
treaty would contribute to what Pope John XXIII called the common good in his
encyclical on international relations, "Peace on Earth." When questioned about
violations of human rights by John Sparkman, Chairman of the Committee, Krol said he
did not believe that violations of human rights in Panama should contribute to a rejection
of the treaty any more than Soviet violations of human rights should interfere with the
SALT discussions. He pointed out that the Catholic Conference of Bishops in Panama
had problems with human rights, but still supported ratification of the treaty. Senator
Joseph Biden of Delaware cited earlier testimony from Richard Eisenmann of the
Panamanian Committee for Human Rights, which asserted that Panamanians lived in
constant fear, with telephones tapped, mail intercepted, people arrested arbitrarily, and
other such abuses perpetrated by the government, using every imaginable resource. He
then asked if there was intimidation and control over the Catholic Church itself in
Panama, to which Krol replied that he was unaware of any heavy handed repression or
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limitation on freedom of religion. Testifying with Krol was the Reverend J. Bryan Hehir,
Director, Office of International Justice and Peace, United States Catholic Conference.
He told the story of a priest who had disappeared, then was found dead, with the cause
never being adequately explained. The Panamanian bishops had spoken out on this, as
well as on the expulsion of businessmen and the closing down of an opinion journal.
However, they had not spoken about the whole list of things that caused concern to the
Committee. In spite of it all, the Church supported the treaty because it offered a chance
for Panama to move forward on issues of justice.

International justice on the Canals

could open the way for internal justice.40
The most vociferous of the critics, however, focused on "strategic concerns."
There is no doubt that the very proximity of Latin American countries to the United
States makes it a central security concern, especially the potential incursion of a hostile
power, namely the Soviet Union in the 20th century. Although the military repeatedly
emphasized the danger of sabotage and terrorism against the Canal,41 the emerging "new
right" (neoconservative) movement turned the issue into a global strategic retrea^
language that resonated with a public still in the grip of the Cold War. Much of the
opposition came from the House of Representatives, partly because it had the
responsibility for the sale or transfer of American property in the Zone, but more so
because it was "hotbed of anti-treaty sentiment." One opponent, Representative Gene
39
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Snyder (R-KY) amended a State Department appropriations bill so that no funds could be
used for negotiating the surrender of American rights. It passed, with no committee
hearings or significant debate, 246-164 on June 26, 1975.42 The definition of
"sovereignty" became a subject of endless debate.
Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy
Following World War One, Congress became the major instrument in the crafting
of foreign policy, beginning with a rejection of the country's participation of the League
of Nations, and culminating with the Neutrality Act (which became "permanent" in
1937), tying the hands of Franklin Roosevelt in the years running up to World War II. In
hindsight, this was viewed as a disaster, and a new attitude emerged both during and after
the war. The Soviet Union, like a plague, was something that had to be contained, and
the executive branch gained vast new powers. With constant crises, the country needed a
strong leader - the president.43 A similar trend occurred in trade because of the passage
of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1931 which crippled international trade at the worst
possible time. As the president's power and prestige increased, Congress's decreased. It
also decreased because of a reluctance to use its available capabilities, and because
foreign policy had become more bi-partisan, especially by the 1950s. Congressional
influence reached its nadir in the late Johnson, early Nixon administrations. The events
of the 1960s and 1970s - especially the war in Vietnam - led some in Congress to worry
about an "imperial presidency."44 After the Vietnam War, Congress became more
42

LaFeber. The Panama Canal. 146
See Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York: Free
Press, 1990.) See his earlier work as well. Presidential Power: TJie Politics of Leadership, (New York:
Science Editions, 1960).
44
See, for example. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1973); for a discussion on Congressional action to limit tins imperial presidency, see Gordon
Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign
43

114
assertive, but ended up choosing its issues; the sale of arms to one country, or limitations
on aid to another. Carter had a sharply accelerated agenda; and many have criticized him
for trying too much too soon.45
The administration tried to work closely with Congress, especially the Senate,
because it has the constitutional responsibility to advise and consent. However,
eventually both houses held hearings on the treaties because of the intense interest
surrounding them; also, both houses would have to pass implementing legislation. This
seemed like a good place for Congress to try to be assertive, especially because electoral
risk ranks high, especially with House members, when they evaluate the pros and cons of
supporting big issues.46 Also, Congress had its own foreign affairs agenda, and generally
tried to ignore the White House from 1977 to 1980, being insistent on its prerogatives to
decide, and confident in its abilities to do so.47 It was by no means successful in this,
however, It was part of Carter's personality that he pursued consensus. He not only
wanted Congress to understand the complexities of the policies he presented, but also
members of state legislatures, governors, and the American people. At Yazoo City,
Mississippi, for example, Carter said that
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Our Nation's international policies ought also to be understood by you, debated by
you, discussed by you, argued by you, and ultimately, decided by you. We've got
a great country, and what we want, obviously, is to have the true character of the
United States of America demonstrated in every action we take, not only in our
own domestic affairs but also throughout the world.
Over time another dilemma presented itself. The attention given to the domestic
players almost eclipsed that given to Panamanian concerns and this almost derailed the
entire thing. The administration sought and got the help of former President Gerald Ford
and former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger who both endorsed the Treaties. It also
got the support of former Governor Averell Harriman of New York.

It was important

that they be seen as a combined effort by both Democrats and Republicans. One of the
major concerns about them was the protection of the Canal after the United States left
Panama. Harold Brown, secretary of defense, and General George Brown emphasized
that the Canal was anything but secure at the present time. Because of the anger
surrounding the 1903 treaty in Panama, it was a prime target for terrorism. Both
emphasized to the senators that the Treaties would provide security, not lessen it.50
Brzezinski argued that on the key question of American intervention to protect the Canal
the United States should stress what could happen if it did not intervene in response to
Soviet initiatives in the region.51 The Administration was never took the opportunity to
explain the strong case for ratification. Instead it was almost immediately on the
defensive and every speech, article, government publication urging ratification was
directed toward the reasons why the Treaties would not do what critics claimed. They

48

See, for example, his speeches at Yazoo City, Mississippi and Charleston, SC, July 21, 1977.
Letter from Landon Butler, Deputy Assistant to the President, to Averell Harriman 25 August
1977, Document number 6, available at
http://www.iimmycarterlibrarv.org/documents/panama/listofdocs.phtml. Accessed 14 October 2007.
50
Vance, Hard Choices, 148, 149.
51
Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 135.
49

116
would not increase communist influence in the Western Hemisphere, weaken American
defenses, deprive it of access to the Canal in an emergency, and impose burdensome
costs on taxpayers.52
The Constitution divides the power to formulate foreign policy. It confers certain
powers on the president, others on the Senate, and still others on Congress. Events
usually determine which of these entities have the decisive and final voice on the
direction of policy. The process is usually long and drawn out involving numerous actors
and is comprised of many individual policies towards various countries, regions, and
functional problems. Other factors such as the personalities of presidents and leading
Congressmen influence the nature and direction of policy.
There are usually several steps in treaty making, including negotiations, signing,
approval by the Senate, ratification by the president, exchange of ratifications by the
parties involved, and proclamation, after which a treaty becomes legally binding. The
president is responsible for all the steps except the "advice and consent" to ratification
stage. Since the Senate must approve treaties by a two-thirds majority, it exercises
considerable influence in their conclusion. The Senate has a number of options in its
advice and consent powers. It can (1) approve a treaty by adopting a resolution of
ratification without any conditions; (2) advise and consent to ratification while making its
own views known in a committee report; (3) include in the resolution of ratification
various "understandings" or "interpretations" with the implication that the treaty is being
clarified, not changed; (4) add "reservations" to it with the purpose of modifying the
substantive effect on the US; (5) amend it, making changes that require the agreement of
the other parties in order to be legally binding; (6) fail to act on the treaty, blocking
52
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ratification; (7) reject it outright. Since the beginning of World War II, the Senate has
seldom amended treaties and only occasionally attached reservations. It was customary
to approve the treaty outright, or at most to attach understandings or interpretations. The
Committee on Foreign Relations usually holds hearings on a proposed treaty, and then
submits a report to the Senate. A fairly cumbersome parliamentary process mandated by
Senate Rule 37 requires the Senate to act "as in the Committee of the Whole," first
considering amendments article by article and then reporting to the Senate for further
consideration, after which the resolution of ratification and any reservations are
considered. These procedures have usually been streamlined by unanimous consent since
the 1940s, but when the Panama Canal Treaties were considered, unanimous consent was
not granted and they were considered article by article in the Committee of the Whole
procedure, then reservations to the resolution of ratification were considered. A simple
majority is required for the attachment of an amendment or a reservation to the resolution
of ratification. Only the final vote to agree to the resolution as amended, or a motion to
postpone indefinitely, required a two-thirds majority. The rules are important to any
understanding of the debate. This debate lasted 38 legislative days, the second longest in
Senate history, after the debate on the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I.53
President Carter and General Omar Torrijos, president of Panama, concluded an
agreement in principle in August 1977, which was signed in Washington on September 7,
1977 in a ceremony attended by representatives from more than 26 Western Hemisphere
countries. Carter sent the Treaties to the Senate in mid-September, requesting that they
be given "early and favorable consideration," contending that they were fair to both
53
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countries and protected American interests better than the 1903 treaty,54 thus achieving a
synthesis of power and principle. The Treaties, designated Executive N, 95 Congress,
1st Session, were then referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However,
during 1977 a number of committees in both the House and Senate held hearings.
Supporters argued that the treaties adequately protected American interests, since the
United States would continue to operate the Canal until the year 2000, and after that
would have the permanent right to maintain its neutrality. It was the operation of the
Canal, not its ownership, that was the prime interest of the country; and that could best be
achieved by a new arrangement with Panama. Opponents disagreed, and claimed that
continued United States sovereignty over the area was essential to protect American
interests, especially when dealing with the Torrijos government, which was characterized
as left-leaning and pro- Castro. Strategic concerns were evident.55
The debate shifted from subject to subject as the hearings progressed, and
approval of the treaties became doubtful. For example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Separation of Powers Subcommittee argued that Congress, not the president, had the
power to make the rules regarding the territory or other property belonging to the United
States, and that the president could not transfer the Canal Zone to Panama by treaty
alone. Therefore, separate legislation would have to be passed by both houses of
Congress. The administration countered that Congress's power to dispose of property
was not exclusive under the Constitution; and that the executive branch could do so with
54

U.S. Congress. Senate. Panama Canal Treaties - Message from the President Transmitting the
Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama
Canal. Executive N. 95th Congress, 1st session, September 16, 1977. (Washington, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977), vi.
55
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, "Defense - Con: Senator Jesse Helms,
Senator Orrin Hatch, Senator John Stennis,"Se«ate Debate on the Panama Canal Treaties: A Compendium
of Major Statements, Documents, Record Votes and Relevant Events, 96th Congress, 1st sess., 1979, 177205.

119
a two-thirds approval by the Senate. The issue, however, would not go away, and over
fifty House members joined in a court suit to require a role for their chamber on it.
Several Senate members indicated that they would propose a reservation to the Treaties
that would require action by both houses. Senator Robert Dole then proposed a series of
amendments to the treaties, and against this backdrop the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee began its hearings. There were apparent conflicts in the interpretation of the
Neutrality Treaty by the American and Panamanian negotiators, which concerned the
United States rights to take whatever action was necessary to defend the Canal and to
head-of-the-line passage in emergencies. When these conflicts persisted and Senate
approval seemed doubtful, the Administration began talks with Panama to clarify the
disputed provisions. This led to the October 14, 1977 Statement of Understanding
between Carter and Torrijos. The clarification specifically said that both the United
States and Panama had responsibility for maintaining the security of the Canal, and that
this did not give the United States any right of intervention in the internal affairs of
Panama. Any American action would be directed at "insuring that the Canal will remain
open, secure and accessible, and it shall never be directed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of Panama." Also, the Neutrality Treaty provides that United
States and Panamanian war ships would be entitled to go to the head of the line to transit
the Canal in an emergency.56 Although this Statement of Understanding improved the
chances for Senate approval, Congress adjourned without taking any action, and during
the recess a number of Congressmen visited Panama. Senate Majority Leader Robert
Byrd raised the issue of human rights with Torrijos, who promised to repeal a number of
repressive laws and improve conditions. Byrd also got assurances that Torrijos fully
56

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, v. 13, October 17, 1977, p. 1547.

120
supported the October 14 Statement of Understanding.57 Two other delegations also got
assurances on the Statement, and the delegation of Senate Minority Leader Howard
Baker raised the possibility that it would need to be incorporated into the treaty as a
reservation.5
In January 1978 concern over the treaties shifted to financial issues.
Administration witnesses testified that the financial costs above and beyond the toll
revenues would be quite substantial. The costs interests, however, never managed to
coalesce, and the proceedings moved on. Additional hearings by the Foreign Relations
Committee featured historians, legal scholars, transportation experts, and businessmen,
and focused primarily on legal and financial questions. At the end of those hearings Byrd
went before the Committee to recommend a procedure for consideration of the treaties.
He said that he would actively support the treaties provided that the Neutrality Treaty was
amended to incorporate the Carter-Torrijos Statement of Understanding. Since he had
discussed this with Torrijos during his visit to Panama, as had the Baker delegation, and
Torrijos had had no objections, Byrd thought that there would be no problems with
Panama. These were subsequently incorporated into Articles IV and VI of the Neutrality
Treaty. Byrd, in consultation with Baker, then suggested that the Foreign Relations
Committee recommend certain changes to the Senate in its report, while reporting the
resolutions of ratification without amendments. This would allow a large number of
senators who were not members of the Foreign Relations Committee to cosponsor
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amendments and reservations, including the Statement of Understanding, and thus share
credit for them.59
The Senate was sharply divided over the treaties, as was the public, and the
outcome was unclear until the very end. The administration responded quickly to the
many objections. When many senators criticized the Treaties for giving only what they
termed "ambiguous" protection for American interests, the administration responded
swiftly, inviting Torrijos to the White House to work out an understanding that would
eliminate any ambiguity. When senators argued that the understanding should be
included in the Treaty, Carter acquiesced. Specific steps were part of a broader effort.
White House and State Department staffs worked hard to help supporters and to help
undecided to get on board. A major public relations effort was launched, with officials
making approximately 1500 appearances around the country.60 The debate was broadcast
live over radio stations throughout the US. Public opinion can sometimes be fickle, and
polling can sometimes mask underlying trend. The Carter Administration was
encouraged that their early efforts seemed to reverse a general distaste for a treaty giving
the Canal to Panama. Although the press believed that the public was (at least for the
present) opposed to the treaties, by October 1977, the press was at least calling for an
open and honest debate. '
The public, however, had not changed its mind. A great deal hinges on the
information communicated in the polling questions that are asked. When follow-up
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questions, clarifying rights promised in the Byrd and Baker "leadership amendment"
were tagged on to the basic question on support or rejection, opinion changed from
negative to positive. Many misread these indicators, thinking that opinion was indeed
changing from negative to positive. When all was said and done, nothing really changed.
Virtually no inroads were made in undoing the American public's "unrelenting distaste"
for the Panama Treaties.
The Senate used the Committee of the Whole procedure to consider the treaties
article by article and attached amendments to them for the first time in fifty years. There
were nearly 90 amendments or reservations considered. The final vote was 68 to 32, one
vote more than the required two-thirds. A key group of undecided Senators had serious
doubts about the Treaties but were willing to vote in favor, provided their concerns were
met. This was the group that proposed the most reasonable amendments and
reservations. Conservative opponents of the treaties, on the other hand, proposed
amendment after amendment designed to kill the chances for passage. 63 Two
reservations were especially important in convincing the undecideds. The NunnTalmadge reservation provided that nothing in the treaties prevented the United States
and Panama from negotiating arrangements for a continued American presence in
Panama after the year 2000.64 The DeConcini reservation provided that "if the Canal is
closed, or its operations are interfered with, the United States of America and the
Republic of Panama shall each independently have the right to take such steps as each
deems necessary..., including the use of military force in the Republic of Panama, to
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reopen the Canal or restore the operations of the Canal, as the case may be." 65 The
DeConcini reservation proved to be the most contentious.
Both liberals and conservatives saw the treaties debate as pivotal, presenting an
opportunity for mobilizing supporters and consolidating organizational networks in
anticipation of future battles. It was not the liberals strength that won the day, but the
surprising (to some) political abilities of Carter. The opposition mounted a huge
campaign, with a coalition of a long list of conservative organizations. Thousands of
pieces of mail poured into the senate long before the vote was even close to being
taken.66
The Carter administration, on the other hand, did not have access to as many
interest groups as the conservatives, and resorted to other means. It relied on appeals to
opinion leaders, direct Congressional lobbying, and a late television campaign for
ratification by the president himself. Last minute arm twisting and log rolling were also
necessary. For example, the administration switched positions on a government purchase
of copper, an important public works project, and on a farm bill.67 Liberal interest groups
were disorganized and failed to rally public opinion. For example, one newly set up
foreign policy lobby in the liberal camp was known as "New Directions," and while it
sent out 1.1 million mailings to liberal supporters it had a small operating budget and
soon collapsed under the weight of its direct-mail effort.

65

Condition No. 83, as modified (DeConcini, et al.), March 16, 1978 (Congressional Record, S

3817).
66

Moffett, The Limits of Victory, 171; see also Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to
Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press,
1980), 73.
67
"Carter's Panama Triumph - What it Cost," U.S. News and World Report, March 27, 1978;
"Carter Wins on Panama," Time, March 27, 1978.
Michael Hogan, The Panama Canal in American Politics: Domestic Advocacy and the
Evolution of Policy (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 120.

124
Another group, this time representing 200 major corporations accounting for 90%
of American private investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, also campaigned on
behalf of ratification. This was the Council of the Americas, and its members met with
senators and opinion leaders, and courted broader business support. It did not, however,
launch a grass roots effort because both the White House and the Council did not want it
to appear that these were treaties written by and for Wall Street.69 Besides weak interest
group support, Carter received little in the way of help from the Democratic Party
establishment. When he appealed to the Democratic National Committee for help, he
found it to be lukewarm at best, endorsing "treaty negotiations" and the ratification
process, but neglecting to endorse the treaties themselves. 70
The administration really had few to depend on except themselves. They flew
hundreds of influential local opinion leaders from around the country to the White House
for briefings, hoping that these people would convince others in their communities to
support the treaties. Carter also sent numerous cabinet members and their aides on
extensive speaking tours, intensively lobbied uncommitted senators, and made a major
television appeal shortly before the vote was to be taken. A day after A Palestinian
terrorist raid on Israel, Carter still found time to telephone 16 opposing senators on behalf
of the Treaty. One of those was Pete Domenici, a Republican from New Mexico.
Although he did not change his "no" vote, he claimed to be impressed with Carter, saying
"he was very serious, persistent, somber." As a result he got one vote to switch, which
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was all that he needed

He stressed the pragmatic benefits to the nation from the

Treaties and the safeguards written into them that would protect American interests. He
argued that the principle potential threats to the Canal came from resentful Panamanians
if the treaties were rejected. Harold Brown indicated that the United States could not
hope to protect the Canal from determined terrorists. "It is too vulnerable to a sack of
dynamite - or to a glove in the gears. 72 Brown's appeal was seconded by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who also supported the treaties.
Because of the public relations blitz, operational responsibility shifted away from
the Bunker-Linowitz office and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Bureau of
Congressional Relations. The people now involved were less sensitive to Panama and
more sensitive to the senate. While it was clear that there was some resistance in Panama
to particular reservations, two days before the vote American diplomats reported that the
DeConcini Reservation was totally unacceptable. If Panamanians ultimately had to
swallow it, this would undercut their political support for the future Canal regime. Time,
however, was running out. Carter knew that the treaties themselves provided sufficient
guarantees to protect the Canal and expedite passage of United States ships through it in
the case of war or emergency; but many senators remained concerned; and Carter gave
tacit assent to the so-called "leadership amendments" which attached the guarantees
directly to the treaty. Carter was to meet with DeConcini 30 hours before the Senate vote
and the administration knew his price. DeConcini wanted additional guaranteed written
71
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into the treaty. At least one other senator linked his vote to the DeConcini condition.
Carter endorsed DeConcini's demand, albeit reluctantly.74
According to I.M. Destler, available evidence suggested that Carter was not
briefed on the potency of Panama's objections. Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of
State, when asked by Carter how objectionable the reservation would be, replied that it
would cause problems but nothing that could not be "handled." Ultimately, they were
handled, but it took valuable time, and Carter found his policy damaged abroad and his
victory stained at home.75
The day after the vote on the Neutrality Treaty, news reports indicated that
Panamanians were fuming about the DeConcini reservation because it appeared to give
the United States the right to intervene in Panama. According to the reports, Torrijos had
written to Carter expressing his concern and to explain the problems that would be posed
for Panama if the Senate approved it. He indicated that Panama would not accept any
reservation that changed the objectives of the Treaty or that impaired Panamanian
sovereignty over all of its territory. Opposition in Panama grew rapidly, even as the
Panama Canal Treaty was being debated in the United States. The Torrijos government
circulated a letter of protest to the United Nations as well as to certain heads of state. The
Senate found a way to compromise by adopting a reservation to the Panama Canal
Treaty. It provided that any action taken by the United States would be only for the
purpose of assuring that the Canal would remain open, not for intervention in the internal
affairs of Panama.76 The vote was taken on April 18, 1978, and the Panama Canal Treaty
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was approved 68 to 32, again, one vote more than the two-thirds needed. Carter had spent
an enormous amount of political capital in the endeavor. The opposition remained loud
and vocal, citing strategic concerns, especially about the Soviet Union's intentions and
opportunities within the region. Two recall movements against DeConcini were launched
by Arizona soon after he voted to approve the treaties, but failed to succeed. It was a
huge achievement for Carter, having succeeded against extraordinarily high odds. It was
an astonishing feat considering that one of the greatest legislative leaders in American
history, Woodrow Wilson, failed to secure the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.
Carter's Success Versus Wilson's Failure
The Carter administration worked closely with Congress, especially the Senate,
because of its power to advise and consent. At the same time, the House was certainly
not ignored. It wanted to play a larger role than usual in the process of ratification
because of the amount of concern the treaties generated; furthermore, it would have to
pass implementing legislation. Carter also enlisted the help of former President Gerald
Ford and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who both endorsed the Treaties; and
he wrote personal letters to various senators. It was important that its passage be seen as
a bipartisan effort. Carter also compromised on the reservations which were attached to
77

the Treaties, while Wilson would not.

By accepting the DeConcini reservation, it

seemed as if some senators had strengthened the treaties, in spite of Carter. This gave
them cover for their "yes" vote. Carter understood and accepted this.78
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Wilson did not work closely with Congress on the Treaty of Versailles. This is
somewhat strange, considering that he was an extremely able legislative leader. Usually,
7Q

he worked with Congress, and had a high degree of success.

Some of his tactics can be

summarized as follows: lead, but do not dictate; be a good listener and work toward a
consensus; appear personally in Congress; cultivate doubtful supporters; work with
conservatives and progressives alike; and give individual attention to members of
Congress. He wrote that "Leadership and control must be lodged somewhere; the whole
art of statesmanship is the art of bringing the several parts of government into effective
co-operation for the accomplishment of particular objects - and party objects at that."80
One of the probable reasons he did not follow these tactics on the Treaty of Versailles
was that he was not well. In Paris, in April 1919, he became ill, and although he was
incapacitated for only a few days, he returned to work with some new eccentricities. For
example, he was suspicious, inconsiderate, less alert, less poised, and more emotional He
never really recovered. Back home he was stricken once again on his September tour of
the country, and returned to Washington where he was stricken again.81 Clearly, he was
in no shape to try for a third term in 1920. Wilsonian Democrats, who favored the
League of Nations, urged the president to compromise with the Republicans in the senate,
the "reservationists" led by Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Wilson refused, believing that compromise meant "nullify." Also,
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in spite of his illness, Wilson left open the possibility that he might run for a third term.
The idea of a third term, plus his illness, frustrated compromise on the Treaty of
Versailles.82 The issue of a peace agreement between Germany and the United States was
left for the next administration to handle.83
Carter, on the other hand, was never held hostage to reelection. He believed in
the justice of the Panama Canal Treaties, and pursued what he believed to be right. One
might argue that the fight over these Treaties came early in his administration and that he
had time to repair any damage to his 1980 chances for reelection. However, he
demonstrated this same kind of imperviousness to his reelection in the Iranian hostage
crisis, which took place in 1979-1980, knowing that if the hostages were not released he
would lose the election. Carter also followed Wilson's formula for success in leading a
legislative battle - something that Wilson could not or would not do when it came to the
Versailles Treaty.
Kissinger supported the Treaties, noting that "the case for ratifying the Panama
Canal Treaties.. .is not an immediate present danger in Panama but the need to forestall a
united front of all the countries of Latin America against what they consider an American
attempt to maintain inequity by force."
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fight for ratification; both on their own merits and also because of the profound
consequences of a failure to ratify that went far beyond Panama. He said that he believed
a defeat would weaken the president's international authority at the beginning of his term.
It would suggest to friends and foes around the world that the United States could not
deliver on an agreement negotiated by four presidents of both political parties over a
period of at least 13 years, that it could not perceive its own interests in Western
Hemisphere cooperation, and that shifting emotions and institutional stalemates produced
erratic behavior in the most powerful country in the world. Kissinger believed that
America was the anchor for the free world's security, and the best hope for progress. He
believed that, if every four years the basic premises of its foreign policy changed,
America itself would become an element of instability in the world.85
The Perception of the Treaties in Latin America and Elsewhere
The Treaties were recognized in Latin America as a positive major step forward
in its relationship to the US, but the plebiscite in Panama passed by a narrow margin.
The major complaint was that the United States would maintain control for too long.
Another complaint was that America would share little in the management of the
waterway, and that it retained the right to intervene in perpetuity to defend the Canal's
neutrality.86
The argument over sovereignty went on in both nations. Unlike the Panamanians
who believed that the Americans retained the right to intervention, detractors in the
United States charged that this had been given away. And, although there were
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conservatives who supported the Treaties, such as John Wayne and William F. Buckley,
the rhetoric surrounding the issue became shriller. The neoconservatives centered their
opposition on sovereignty and nationalism, and failed to capitalize on a central
vulnerability the Treaties might have had in the economic area: the increase in tolls,
estimated by the administration to be 30 percent, a figure that was consistently, but not
effectively, challenged.

Panama, in the eyes of some, got a poor deal because it was

guaranteed only $10 million per year and another $10 million from the surplus
accumulated from operating revenues. Other revenues would depend on the tolls
generated, and estimates ranged from $2.5 million to $60 million.88 It would take large
toll revenues to handle the government's debt.89
Others argued that the costs to the United States were too high. Maritime interests, in
particular, thought they were casualties of new forces that were reshaping old patterns of
commerce, but their interests never coalesced with others whose economic interests were
also challenged, such as port cities on the East Coast of the country which were being
undermined by the expansion of rail, and Midwest farmers who feared the increased
tolls. The argument over costs delayed, but did not stop, the passage of legislation
which would implement the Treaties.91

Moffitt, The Limits of Victory, 196-198; see also Jeane Kirkpatrick, "US Security & Latin
America," Commentary Magazine, January, 1981.
88
Richard Falk, "Panama Treaty Trap," Foreign Policy 30 (spring 1978): 70.
89
LaFeber, The Panama Canal, 202.
90
Moffitt, The Limits of Victory, 185.
91
The Panama Canal Act of 1979 was the implementing legislation. It created the Panama Canal
Commission When the Commission was modified in 1987, Ronald Reagan stated that he was pleased to
sign it because it would "continue to protect the national interest of the United States in the continued,
uninterrupted availability and safe, efficient operation of the Panama Canal at no cost to the ...taxpayers."
"Ronald Reagan: Statement on Signing the Panama Canal Commission Authorization Act," John Woolley
and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online], (Santa Barbara, CA: University of
California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available at www.presidencv.ucsb.edu/ws. accessed 22
December 2006.

132
Some critics argued that the debate over the Treaties was so narrow that it was a
conversation between the sentimental imperialists who did not favor ratification, and
rational imperialists who did. Much of the rhetoric was imperialistic and jingoistic, and
centered on the right to intervene in Panama to uphold American interests, including the
right to intervene in Panamanian domestic affairs. The right to intervention, according to
some, amounted to the United States stumbling into an open-ended commitment to
intervene in a "shaky Third World country, without even considering proprieties or
costs."92
The question on intervention began to become critical in the mid to late 1980s as
Panama came under both Congressional and administration scrutiny. Television
documentaries which aired in America showed drug trafficking, corruption in the military
establishment, and political manipulation by the military. There was rioting in the streets.
The country could not seem to move forward, away from a military dictatorship toward a
genuine civilian government. Congressional hearings were held in June, 1987. In his
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Ambler H.
Moss, Jr., Dean, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami, pointed
out that American interests in Panama remained safe as long as Panama remained
prosperous and stable. He also pointed out that the economy was in trouble, and this was
providing opportunities for the Soviets and other leftist governments. Scholarships for
Latin American students increased significantly at the Lumumba University in Moscow
and related institutions. Moss estimated that at least 1000 Panamanians were studying in
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communist countries at any given time. Dr. Richard I. Millett, Professor of History at
the University of Southern Illinois, urged the United States to act with extreme caution,
doing nothing to indicate that it would not uphold the 1977 Treaties. Nor should the
country tie itself, or appear to tie itself, to any particular faction. It should not "mortgage
our security and economic interests to the internal conditions in this country.. ,."94
The situation continued to deteriorate in Panama. In 1985-86 the Reagan
administration provided "Security Supporting Assistance" for the military regime under
Manuel Noriega, in the amount of $63.2 million. The rationale of this military buildup,
which further strengthened the military regime, was the Panamanian's expanding role in
defending the Canal, pursuant to the 1977 agreements. In 1987 Noriega was accused of
fixing the 1984 election and was also implicated in the death of Torrijos, who died in a
mysterious plane crash in 1981. Demonstrations broke out again, and Reagan began to
backpedal, looking for ways to get rid of him. His answer was economic sanctions. As
the Panamanian economy descended into chaos Noriega himself continued to make
money by drug trafficking and collected $40 million each month from American military
spending, $470 million annually from the Canal, and millions more from United States
corporations.95 Senator Alphonse D'Amato, R-NY, who was especially involved in
fighting drug trafficking, described Reagan's friendship with, then opposition to, Noriega
thus: "The administration set its hair on fire and tried to put it out with a hammer."96
When George H.W. Bush assumed office in 1989, he increased pressure on
Noriega, who declined to run in the Panamanian election, but chose another puppet,
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Carlos Duque. The Bush administration provided the opposition, Guillermo Endara, with
$10 million; and Carter went to Panama to monitor the election. But when Duque was
seen to be losing, Noriega seized the ballot boxes. The opposition took to the streets in
protest and the "dignity battalions" assaulted them. Endara and the vice-presidential
candidate, Guillermo Ford, were severely beaten. Noriega declared the election void,
installed another puppet, and in October 1989 survived a coup that was openly supported
by American forces. President Bush ended up humiliated. The United States launched a
full-scale attack (Operation Just Cause) with 24,000 troops on December 20, 1989. Bush
explained this by saying that Noriega had declared a "state of war with the United States
and publicly threatened the lives of Americans in Panama."

7

American casualties ran

into the hundreds and Panamanian into the thousands. Noriega sought refuge in the Papal
Nunciature, but under pressure from the Vatican, surrendered to the Vatican Embassy on
January 3, 1990. Under an agreement worked out with the American-created
government, led by Guillermo Endara, he was brought to the United States for trial and
sentenced to 40 years for cocaine trafficking, racketeering and money laundering. He
was also ordered to pay $44 million to the Panamanian government.
Secretary of State James A. Baker III justified the intervention by invoking
Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 21 of the Charter of the OAS, which entitle the
United States to act in self defense. Questions quickly arose on the validity of American
action on the basis of the stated reasons which included 1) safeguarding the lives of
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American citizens; 2) restoration of democracy; 3) integrity of the Panama Canal
Treaties; and 4) apprehending Noriega. The most pertinent issue for the purposes of this
chapter concerns the Panama Canal Treaties. The Canal Treaties provide that Panama
grants the United States the rights necessary to protect and defend the canal and describes
the rights in detail. There was no threat to the Canal in the minds of some when the
Americans invaded." On the other hand, Noriega's swaggering, arrogant; stance could
easily have escalated, putting many lives in danger, along with the Canal. Congress
seemed aloof to the invasion and never challenged it under the War Powers Resolution.
This was probably due to three intersecting things: they were in recess when the invasion
occurred; the invasion was popular with the American people as was President Bush; and
the mission was almost over by the time Congress reconvened in January.100 So ends the
controversy over the sovereignty issue - with a bang not a whimper. It seems clear that
whether sovereignty over the Canal Zone lies with Panama or with the United States, the
United States can and will intervene if and when its interests are threatened. On the other
hand, it strengthened the executive branch's assertion that the War Powers Act is
unconstitutional. Congress has failed to muster the will to demand faithful execution of
the law. Carter was the most supportive, although his position "was never fully voiced or
tested."101
After the invasion of Panama, some in the press questioned the usefulness of the
Canal. One wonders why. The Canal continues to grow in importance to the United
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States and the rest of the world. It allows the United States Navy to move all but the
largest aircraft carriers between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, without incurring the
costs, both in time and money, of the trip around Cape Horn. It is also a vital link in the
global economy, with a projection of 220 million tons of commerce moving through it by
the year 2010. This trade would cease to move if the Canal became unavailable.
The security of the Canal depends not so much on conventional military strength
as it does on American domestic and international policies that promote political stability,
economic progress, and social justice. It also depends on the quality of service that
Panama can provide to the international community. This would discourage any but the
most irrational actor from trying to make mischief. Since the 19th century, the region has
been a source of raw materials, bases, and other types of support that have contributed to
the achievements of American goals. At the same time, the United States has denied
access to these resources to others. This has not changed. What has changed is the
nature of the threats to the Canal and the region as a whole. In the past there were
conventional threats centering on European expansion; and the responses were traditional
military fortifications, such as offsetting the entrance and exit channels to the locks; and
land, sea, and air bases throughout the Caribbean Basin to the Atlantic Narrows. With
the end of the Cold War, the nature of the threats changed. The changing nature of
contemporary conflicts appears to be the greatest danger. Enemies can resort to politicalpsychological conflict at the lowest rung of the warfare ladder. Carter saw this, and acted
with courage in pushing early for a treaty with Panama. The solution to these kinds of
problems lies within Panama itself. It should continuously strengthen its domestic
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society by building up its economic bases so that society in general is not interested in
causing damage to the Canal. The public's perception of well being is essential.102
The Canal is a potentially divisive issue for Panamanians today. The proposed
expansion of the locks to allow the passage of "post-Panamax" ships, those too wide to fit
through the current locks, has generated a great deal of discussion over the costs and who
would bear them as well as the competence of the government to administer the project.
With more than 100 post-Panamax ships coming online, the Canal is outdated. Backups,
although not critical, are currently pushing some customers to seek alternate routes, and
as a result most Panamanians accept the need for expansion. The Canal is a major source
of revenue for the country, but not a major source of jobs, so many have some doubts that
the expansion will directly benefit them.
In 1999, the transfer was "heavy on symbolism, light on change," according to a
CNN report. Other than a change in stewardship, and perhaps less English being spoken,
things remained essentially the same. Conservatives complained that the Canal could
come under the influence of unfriendly governments, citing the fact that a Hong Kong
company, Hutchison Whampoa, was awarded a contract to manage two ports at either
end of it. They believed that eventually Beijing would control it. The State Department
has found no evidence that the company has ties to Beijing. Caspar Weinberger,
Reagan's defense secretary, voiced concern to Congress that there could be a disruption
in keeping the Canal open. But it is not the communists that the United States has to fear
at this time. Robert Pastor has said that it is a stretch to believe that China could take
102
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over the Canal, 10,000 miles away, when they cannot even take Taiwan, 90 miles away.
Also, "in the new century, the continued ability of the United States to lead will depend
on the partnerships we forge around the world. The best place to start is with our friends
in Panama. We will demonstrate our greatness twice if we exhibit as much pride in
transferring the canal at the end of the century as we did in building it at the beginning."
If anything, it operates more efficiently than it did under United States control. For
example, the average crossing took 33 hours in 1999; in 2004 it took less than 23. 104
CONCLUSIONS
The Treaties passed, but just barely. This was a huge achievement for the Carter
administration, but it became a pyrrhic victory. Just 15 months after his inauguration he
produced the ratification of treaties that had been in the making for at least 13 years,
under four administrations. However, instead of giving him leverage on other issues,
such as SALT, as Linowitz had anticipated, it gave potency to the neoconservative
movement. Some likened the withdrawal from Panama to the withdrawal from Vietnam.
The debate catalyzed public fears of retreat and created the environment that tended to
compromise ratification efforts. Instead of re-capturing a foreign policy consensus, the
Treaties became a lightening rod which exacerbated the divisions remaining from
Vietnam. Carter paid an enormous price for ratification, and for the remainder of his
presidency was "forced to live on borrowed time." Although Brzezinski was confident
and optimistic about the future, the reality was quite different. Congress had a growing

104

Robert A. Pastor. "A Century's Journey in Panama." Available at
http://www.cmi.com/SPECIALS/1999/pamma.caiial/. Accessed 10 February 2007; Tom Carter, "Panama
Canal Operating Smoothly, Washington Times, June 11. 2004. available at
wvvw.washingtontimcs.com/functions/. accessed 22 December 2006: Steve Nettleton. "Transfer Heavy on
Symbolism, Light on Change," CNN "Panama Canal Handover," available at
www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/paiiaina.caiial. accessed 10 February 2007.

139
animosity to Carter, on whatever he initiated. Victory hindered future hopes and plans, it
did not aid them. At the time, however, the Treaties were recognized in Latin America as
a major, positive step in enhancing the relations between the United States and its
hemispheric neighbors.10:>
The pressures to accommodate the domestic audience were acute during
ratification. Congress was far more assertive than it had been prior to the Vietnam
imbroglio, and Carter naturally turned his attention to winning over opponents at home.
When he accepted the DeConcini reservation, he immediately had to try to repair the
damage with Panama. Aids tried to soften the reservation, but DeConcini would not
"yield what he had just won." As a result Panama lost some of its confidence in the
administration and sought other avenues of influence.106 The State Department asked
William Rogers to serve as an intermediary, leading Washington to conclude that Carter
had messed up, not that he achieved ratification. Additionally, unfounded international
expectations can and did lead to domestic upsets. When Carter agreed to DeConcini,
some senators thought that this was an indication that the reservation was acceptable to
Panama. This was not the case, and caused Baker to denounce Panama for upsetting the
efforts at ratification. However, it was Carter's excellent management of Congress in this
instance, his ability to get Kissinger and Ford to stand behind him, his flexibility, and his
ability in the end to get Panama to agree to the compromises that pushed the ratification
through. Other issues of the late 1970s also played a role in the perception of failure.
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These included the lack of satisfactory progress on SALT II (for some detractors of
SALT this might mean too much progress), the decision not to develop the neutron bomb,
concern about the Soviet and Cuban activity in southern Africa, and the accusation that
the Soviets violated the code of detente.107
The international moral norm against colonialism which emerged after World
War II played a role in the passage of the Treaties. When little progress was made under
Nixon, in spite of repeated warnings that the Canal was open to sabotage and terrorist
attacks, Torrijos decided to turn the Canal issue into a Canal problem for the US. In
January 1973 he invited the UN Security Council to hold a special session in Panama.
George Bush, the Ambassador to the United Nations at the time, correctly believed that
Torrijos would make the focus of the special session Panama and the Canal. Bush tried,
without success, to sidetrack the session. Torrijos tried, with great success, to make the
Canal problem a problem for the world, making his case in the language of colonialism.
This changed the parameters of the debate from the overarching security of Latin
America to a debate over the American presence in Panama. This soon led to the
Kissinger-Tack principles which were the bases for the Treaties.108
The Treaties battle ended with a victory for the larger interests of the United
States, Latin America, and the rest of the world; and it recognized the sovereign equality
of all Western Hemisphere nations.109 The acceptance of Panama (sometimes a forgotten
partner to the treaty) was crucial, and Carter delivered on this as well. Without
Panamanian approval, the United States would have been left with its big ditch, but
would have been surrounded by hostile elements. The furor from the opposition, and all
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the rhetoric about abandoning the national interests, could have sabotaged what was trujy
in the national interests. The costs of turning over the Canal to Panama seem to be
negligible, except to the political ambitions of Carter. After passage, however, there
remained a deep fear among the population that America was surrendering part of its
primacy and the changes that would go with it. This has not been the case. After a flurry
of renewed anxiety as the hand over of the Canal approached in 1999, the issue has
receded to the vanishing point, along with much of the rest of Latin America, at least
from the vantage point of 2008. The Canal continues to be efficient, serving the
international community well, and commerce through it continues to grow.
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CHAPTER IV
DISARMING THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION
One of the promises that candidate Carter made in 1976 was to return morality to
United States foreign policy. One way that President Carter tried to do that was by
joining the issues of human rights and arms control. This chapter focuses on Carter's
attempts to limit the transfer of arms and its intersection with human rights, while trying
to act in the national interest. It examines the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT)
restraint policy and the Arms Export Control Act, under which Carter functioned. It also
examines Presidential Directive 13 (PD13), which was a set of guidelines for a new arms
export policy. (PD13 was formally rescinded on July 8,1981 by the Reagan
administration.) It argues that the administration was moderately successful in limiting
arms transfers to certain nations, and was very successful in slowing the growth in arms
sales overall, in spite of strong opposition. Crafting the policy was one thing - carrying it
out would prove more difficult, as it became clear that there were pragmatic limits to
Carter's hope for a ban on arms sales. For one thing, it was difficult to deal with the
domestic challenges of a strong military culture and the habit of intervening in the affairs
of other states, in spite of a public that was fed up with both, and which was also revolted
by the subversion of foreign governments and the United States support of corrupt
dictatorial regimes.1 A strong resurgence of the political right undercut Carter's efforts as
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well. Also, although he tried to move the nation's focus away from solely East-West
issues, those issues had not disappeared, and they needed more attention than perhaps he
might have wished. East-West tensions also made countries that were in the Western
camp more reluctant to curb arms transfers to friendly governments.
Carter also faced a more assertive Congress, eager to play a role in foreign policy
decisions, and arms transfers were one vehicle for achieving this. In 1976 Congress
passed the International Security and Arms Export Control Act, or simply the Arms
Export Control Act (AECA). This played a major role in Congressional involvement
because it set the parameters within which the executive branch could act. Another
restraint on Carter was the defense industry which, along with the Pentagon and
Congress, had formed an "iron triangle." Congress, however, was now less willing to
rubber stamp defense outlays and became a wild card, an unpredictable player. In
addition, it had already added human rights clauses to most all foreign assistance
legislation, in an effort to constrain the executive in the realm of arms transfers.4
Although the Carter administration believed strongly in human rights, other entrenched
interests, such as the Foreign Service bureaucracy, very strongly supported arms transfers
as a way to gain influence in other countries, especially those governed by right wing
dictators.5 There were also human rights clauses in the legislation which banned sales to
countries which engaged in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights." Thus, Carter was caught between the competing forces of
2
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power and principle - those advocating business as usual and those seeking to regain
some moral high ground after the Vietnam War. He believed, however, that American
foreign policy had to reflect basic American values of justice and propriety. It is in the
interests of the United States to project an image of this country as being a beacon of
hope for oppressed peoples. If it treats others in a way that is incompatible with the way
it treats its own people it lessens the impact of that example. In addition, human rights
violations are symptomatic of other ills in society, which may in turn negatively affect
American interests.6
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The international sale and transfer of military armaments is not new in history. It
does, in fact, date back to ancient times, and is usually seen as a legitimate function of
government. As early as the 1820s, the United States was interfering both diplomatically
and with arms in some Latin American countries engaged in a struggle for independence
•7

from Spain. In the 1830s arms exports supported the Texan insurgency against Mexico.
The United States became a major exporter of arms during World War One, and by 1920
exported 52.1 percent of the global transfers. Over the next decade and a half, however,
this figure declined, and by 1937 exported only 9.3 per cent. During World War Two,
America's industrial might out-produced every other nation, and it spent three or four
times as much on arms as any other belligerent. At the end of World War Two it was still
regarded as the arsenal of democracy. It was envied and admired throughout the world,
thanks to policies such as the Marshall Plan. As hostility became openly apparent
between two former Allies, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Cold War
6
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escalated, so did arms transfers.

The American commitment to democracy paled as the

country came to prefer "stable" right-wing dictatorships in the Third World over
indigenous radicalism and what it perceived to be dangerous democratic (leftist)
governments.10 Allies in NATO were the most favored recipients of arms; and Japan and
Germany also began to receive significant amounts in 1953 and 1955 respectively.
Taiwan and South Korea got substantial amounts as well. At first, most arms transfers
were in the form of grant aid, but after the oil embargo and the Yom Kippur War in 1973,
most transfers were now in the form of sales.11 Latin America received lesser, although
significant, amounts especially in places such as Guatemala where Castillo Armas
received about $8 million in 1954.
Only a small minority argues against the principle of arms transfers; indeed these
transfers are an integral part of international affairs, and are widely recognized as being
an essential element of foreign policy. Congressional concerns began to grow, however,
as arms sales worldwide grew from $3.8 billion in 1965 to more than $20 billion by the
time Carter took office, with the United States accounting for more than half of this. 13 By
this time it was obvious that not only NATO allies were receiving significant amounts of
arms from the US, but also other nations, often with unsavory reputations in the arena of
human rights. Many in Congress and the public did not believe that this country should
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be the world's leading arms merchant. Morality and ethics, a disbelief in the usefulness
of force, and a desire that resources be directed toward domestic needs or humanitarian
needs abroad all played a role in helping Carter to craft his arms restraint policy.14
There have been numerous attempts to rein in the global arms trade. The League
of Nations tried to regulate the global arms trade under the authority of Article 8 of its
covenant, which set the goal to reduce national armaments to the lowest possible point
consistent with national safety. Article 23 (d) of the Covenant gave the League the
authority to supervise the arms trade. Prior to World War One, the consensus was that
private trade was untouchable; but the war triggered an outpouring of revulsion against
the arms and the men who sold them. This presented an opportunity for arms restrictions
to be part of the negotiations in Paris in 1919; and in September of that year
representatives of the Powers met at St-Germain-en-Laye, a Paris suburb, to sign the
Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition. The League,
fundamentally, tried to carry out the provisions of the Convention. Although the United
States signed the document, it was never ratified. This was a pattern among most Great
Powers. The League ultimately was not successful in its efforts, but it was not a
complete failure either. From 1925 to 1938 it collected and documented a remarkable set
of data on the arms trade, which made later work possible. Eventually most major
producers became convinced that unfettered exports were not in their interests, and began
to institute peacetime licensing. This is a forgotten success of the much maligned League
of Nations.15
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The idea of human rights, on the other hand, is new in history. By the middle of
the twentieth century it had gained relevance and became one of the bases for the
founding of the United Nations. Today the ideas are written into international
conventions, protocols, covenants and are contained within the legal codes of numerous
countries. They began to play a significant role in the US-Soviet relationship between
1968 and 1981, and this turned the Soviet-American competition in a new direction.
Human rights speeded up the demise of detente and focused the world's attention on a
new range of humanitarian concerns; and laid the groundwork for democratic reforms in
the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation after the Soviet's abrupt collapse.16 Carter
pushed for ways to fit human rights into the foreign policy agenda of the United States by
making this a priority in his arms transfer policy, his dialogue with the Soviet Union, and
his attention to Third World issues. Few presidents have been as devoted to the goal that
American foreign policy should reflect its highest values.
Costs Versus Benefits
Governments can gain a number of benefits by transferring arms, including
political, military, and economic advantages. There are also potential risks that must be
weighed within those same categories, however. The political advantages which can
accrue to the supplier include symbolic gestures of friendship, expanded influence, and
outright leverage over the recipient. Military advantages can be direct, as when the
supplier provides arms to allies, alongside which it may have to fight, or at least support,
by reason of its own national interests. Arms have also been exchanged for basing rights
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and intelligence gathering rights, practices employed by both the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. There are also indirect military benefits such as
conventional arms transfers as a non-proliferation strategy. Again, both the Soviet Union
and the United States employed this tactic during the Cold War because they understood
that it was in their interests to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. There are also
economic benefits to supplier nations. First, they contribute to a favorable Current
Account balance and provide a source of foreign exchange. Next, they help to relieve
unemployment in regions that depend heavily on defense industries. Arms sales also help
to reduce unit costs. Finally, they can be bartered directly for a needed commodity, such
as oil.17
There are costs, however, to be paid for arms sales, and they can be numerous.
Among those costs are political, sociological, military, economic, and the unintended
transfer of technology to an enemy. There are several political costs that can be incurred.
One of those is reverse leverage - that is, the recipient can become the tail that wags the
dog. Paths of influence are two way streets, and the supplier can be held hostage if arms
are used to procure important resources. Another potential cost is that the transfer of
arms can spark a regional arms race. The infusion of large amounts of arms into an
unstable region can cause reciprocal purchases by fearful neighbors, further destabilizing
the region. There are also sociological costs. For example, large quantities of arms in a
developing region give military power to both revolutionary forces and the forces of the
status quo, often with devastating effects. Arms can also impede development in those
regions as well, because money spent on weapons is money not being spent on
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development projects. Furthermore, the supplier can often become identified with
repressive regimes. Often, as weapons become more sophisticated, arms suppliers must
also provide training to the recipient nations. Large numbers of people might go to the
recipient state, and in Third World countries this expands opportunities for hostagetaking. There is, furthermore, always the possibility that the weapons will fall into an
enemy's hands, giving it a great deal of information about the supplier's weapons
systems. On the other hand, broad outlines of the technology and the general
characteristics and capabilities of the weapons can be found in advertisements in
numerous trade journals. There is also the possibility that the recipient will simply re-sell
the weapons. Economic costs include the possibility that the arms industry could become
dependent on external markets for survival. Small and medium size powers pursue
aggressive campaigns to keep their nations competitive, and this contributes to the
diffusion of conventional arms. Military costs include the possibility that arms transfers
might involve the nation in war, or could seriously deplete the stocks of the supplier
country, leaving it vulnerable. Or, the arms may be used against the supplier in a
conflict.18
From time to time circumstances have combined with the perception of national
interest that led to an escalation of arms sales, which in turn led to dangerous East-West
confrontations. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, for example, Moscow began to escalate
deliveries of arms when hostilities broke out. The transfers continued, signaling that the
Soviets were determined to support and encourage its client states in the Middle East.
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Israeli air strikes on Syrian ports damaged Soviet merchant ships, and the Kremlin
deployed its navy along the air and sea routes between Eastern Europe and the Middle
East. When the Israelis threatened major strategic defeats for the Soviet clients, the
Russians made it clear that it was prepared to intervene with its own forces. The US, on
the other hand, delayed arms transfers because of opposition from people such as Henry
Kissinger who was Secretary of State at the time, and who saw an advantage in
maintaining distance between the United States and Israel. Eventually, however, the
country resorted to massive air lifts of arms, and in response to a perceived threat of
Soviet intervention, put its forces on the highest alert. So, in 1973 the decision to sell
arms in peacetime gradually led to a real risk of confrontation between the two
Superpowers. Problems caused by arms transfers during a crisis are inextricably linked
to peace time transfers.19
As one can see, there is truth on both sides of the argument about arms transfers,
especially those which go to repressive regimes. This helped to set the stage in the NixonFord years for tension between the executive and legislative branches of government over
the control and direction of American foreign policy, part of which was a clash between
power and principle. There was a strong reaction in Congress to the diplomatic style of
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, because it relied heavily on arms transfers as a major
incentive in negotiations. Knowledge of the deals almost always came after the fact, with
members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee often being the last to know, and
much of the arms sales were to Persian Gulf nations, potential enemies of Israel. Over
the strong objections of Gerald Ford, Congress enacted the International Security
19
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Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.20 This act is commonly known as the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA), and was the basis for the policy that Carter inherited.
The Arms Control Export Act
The AECA contained a clear policy statement on arms transfers:
It shall be the policy of the United States to exert leadership in the world
community to bring about arrangements for reducing the international trade in
implements of war and to lessen the danger of outbreak of regional conflict and
the burdens of armaments. United States programs for or procedures governing
the export, sale, and grant of defense articles and defense services to foreign
countries and international organizations shall be administered in a manner which
will carry out this policy.

The act places conditions on the use of defense articles and services it transfers to
foreign governments. Violations of these conditions can lead to a suspension of the
deliveries or defense contracts for various items. Section 3(a) of AECA sets the general
standards for eligibility to receive these goods or services. Section 3(a)2 specifically
provides that to be eligible, a
country or international organization shall have agreed not.. .to use or permit
the use of [a defense] article or related training or other defense service for
purposes other then those for which furnished, unless the consent of the President
has first been obtained....
Section 3(c) further sets out the circumstances under which a nation could lose its
•

US Foreign Military Financing;

•

loan guarantees for purchases of American defense articles and services;

•

rights to have previously purchased United States defense articles or services
delivered;
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•

rights to have previously made agreements for the sale of defense articles or
services carried implemented if

Such country uses defense articles or defense services furnished under this Act or
any predecessor Act, in substantial violation of any agreement entered into
pursuant to any such Act...by using such articles or services for a purpose not
authorized under section 4 or, if such agreement provides that such articles and
services may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized under
section 4 for a purpose not authorized under such agreement.
The purposes for which military sales by the United States were authorized (Section 4 of
the Arms Export Control Act) include
•

"Internal security"

•

"Legitimate self defense"

•

Enabling the recipient to participate in "regional or collective arrangements or
measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations."

•

Enabling the recipient to participate in "collective measures requested by the
United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and
security

•

Enabling the foreign military forces "in less developed countries to construct
public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social
development of such friendly countries."

The statute makes it clear that any sanctions that may be applied are for "substantial
violations" of an agreement with the United States pursuant to the AECA, and not for a
violation of the AECA itself or its predecessors. Also, terms such as "internal security"
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and "legitimate self defense" are not defined. The president or the Congress must define
the terms.22
AECA expanded Congressional oversight by (1) requiring that all non-NATO
military sales of $25 million or more be handled on a government to government basis,
rather than through commercial channels, thus allowing Congress to veto the transaction;
(2) calling on the President to submit to Congress a yearly justification for arms sales,
country by country, including an arms control impact statement of these transfers; and (3)
expanding reporting procedures, including data on agents fees and political contributions,
on both government to government and commercial sales of arms.
Congress also enacted a human rights policy into the AECA. Section 502B(2)
states that
(2) It is further the policy of the United States that, except under circumstances
specified in this section, no security assistance may be provided to any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
(3) In furtherance of the foregoing policy the President is directed to formulate
and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner
which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United
States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people
internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of
international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as expressed in
this section or otherwise.
The act gave further directions about the responsibilities of the Secretary of State,
with assistance of the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, for
transmitting to Congress relevant information regarding the observance of and respect for
internationally recognized human rights in each country that was proposed as a recipient
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of security assistance. It also elaborated the rights of Congress in requesting and
receiving information in a timely manner. "Gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights include torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to
life, liberty, or the security of the person."24 One thing that influenced the inclusion of a
human rights provision into AECA was that in 1976 both the International Covenant on
Economic and Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights went into force, albeit without ratification. President Carter submitted
them to the Senate, for advice and consent.23
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
Experts disagree on whether arms transfer policy was influenced more by the
"conservative, status quo oriented, resistant to change" bureaucracies, which have their
own agendas;26 or by men such as Paul Warnke, Cyrus Vance, and other "arms
controllers" who helped to at least partially implement arms restraints. However, the
unrelenting propaganda from the political right gradually was successful in convincing
both elite and mass opinion that arms restraints equated to the erosion of Western
influence, leaving the Soviets as the net winner.

The neoconservatives in general saw

detente as a one-way street, with the Soviet Union making all the gains, and argued that
authoritarian, right-wing dictatorships were capable of evolving into democratic regimes,
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while totalitarian (left wing) regimes were hostile to American interests. They were
"permanent" dictatorships that would never evolve into democracies.28
In the meantime, the NSC was unanimous in its desire to get arms sales under
control, and was determined to place tighter restraints on future commitments. This
correlated with Brzezinski's position of "deep cuts" in strategic weapons in the SALT II
negotiations with the Soviet Union.29 Vance was assigned the job of implementing the
arms transfer policy, and he told reporters that the nation was committed to the basic
principle of finding ways to reduce the sales. Ultimately, the country would have to
convince other nations to stop selling arms on a grand scale, but as the "largest seller of
arms" it had "a particular responsibility to first put our own house in order."

Vance put

Leslie Gelb, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, in
charge of developing a set of policy options for the president. Gelb started by studying
the issues raised by the tremendous growth in military sales. Most of the arms were now
going to Third World countries, especially those oil rich countries of the Middle East, but
a large portion was also going to debt-ridden countries in regions such as Latin America,
Africa, and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the arms were now much more sophisticated.
For example, Iran before 1964 had no guided missiles or supersonic aircraft, but was now
getting various types of missiles and combat airplanes. Similar systems were being sold
elsewhere as well, thus assuring that conflicts would be increasingly violent.
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In addition to selling arms, the United States was also exporting technical
expertise through "co-production" joint ventures which involved both America and
foreign businesses in the manufacture of a common item; or licensing measures in which
a foreign producer gets the blueprints to produce an American-designed weapon. Many
experts regard technology transfers such as this to be highly dangerous in the long run
because they increase the number of arms producers and make the weapons more readily
available; and also complicate negotiations on conventional arms restraints. The United
States also sells its military skills abroad, providing training and maintenance in the
weapons systems. Furthermore, there was a growing involvement of American
technicians working on military-related projects in Iran and Saudi Arabia, numbering
approximately 25,000 at that time. Arms manufacturers also engage in various activities
to promote their products, including paying enormous bribes to sales agents and foreign
countries. Other problems involve the sale of police-type equipment such as handguns,
ammunition, tear gas, grenades, and armored cars to foreign police agencies in some of
the most repressive regimes on the globe - including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Haiti,
Uruguay, Iran, Indonesia, South Korea, and the Philippines.32
At first, observers in Washington predicted that the Administration would impose
a permanent ceiling on arms exports which would be lower than the $10 billion which
was estimated for Fiscal Year (FY) 1977. They also believed that it would roll back the
export of high technology arms. As much as Carter the man might wish to disarm the
world, he was also a practical person; and as he and Vance began to discuss the issues
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with the "conservative, status-quo oriented, resistant to change"33 bureaucracies, both
inside and outside of government, they talked about taking a "balanced" approach. They
did not believe that all arms sales were intrinsically bad, and there were valid political,
military, and economic considerations. Certain regional "deputies" needed arms to carry
out the job of protecting American interests under the Nixon Doctrine; namely Third
World countries where direct military intervention was not acceptable. Also, arms sales
helped the Current Account move back towards balance and could make the manufacture
of weapons cheaper. Plus, they enriched the various American firms, which profited
enormously.34
Many were still alarmed that Carter, a president who had deliberately distanced
himself from the foreign policy machinations of the previous administrations, would
betray the national interest with any new policy on arms transfers. However, in late April
1977, Carter agreed to the sale of five AWACS radar surveillance planes to Iran. During
his first trip abroad as president two weeks later, Carter assured NATO allies that they
would be exempt from any new restrictions on military sales; and at the same time, he
affirmed that "special treatment" would continue to be given to Israeli arms requests.

35
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be binding unless "extraordinary circumstances" made a Presidential exception
necessary, or where he determined that friendly nations needed advanced weaponry in
order to offset quantitative or other disadvantages that could change a regional balance of
power. He promised that
1. The dollar volume (in constant FY 1976 dollars) of new commitments under the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Military Assistance Programs (MAP) for
weapons in FY1978 will be less than FY 1977. Services were not covered, nor
were commercial sales.
2. The United States would not be the first supplier to introduce advanced weapons
systems into a region, which would create a new or significantly higher combat
capability. In order to remove the incentive to promote foreign sales to lower unit
costs to the US, no commitment for sale or co-production of such weapons can be
made until they are operationally deployed with American forces.
3. Significant modification of advanced weapons systems solely for the purpose of
export would not be permitted
4. Co-production agreements for significant weapons, equipment, and major
components would be prohibited. A limited group of items would be considered
for these co-production arrangements, but with restrictions on Third World
countries.
5. In addition to existing requirements of the law, the United States may stipulate
that it would not entertain any requests for retransfers.
6. State Department approval would be needed for actions by agents of the United
States or private firms which might promote the sale of arms abroad. In addition,
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American embassies and military representatives abroad would not promote the
sale of arms.
Carter also promised that in formulating security assistance programs the United
States would continue to promote and advance respect for human rights in the recipient
nations. It would also assess the economic impact of arms transfers to lesser developed
countries. He recognized that to reduce the amount of arms transfers worldwide,
America needed to gain multilateral cooperation; but since the United States was the
world's leader in arms trafficking, it should set the example.
The economic impact of arms transfers to developing nations would also be
assessed. He said that henceforth the United States would view arms transfers as an
exceptional foreign policy tool, used only when it could be clearly demonstrated that such
transfers were in American national security interests. He added that the country "would
continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close
friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular
arms sale, rather than those who oppose it."36
Contrary to the criticism of the neoconservatives, Carter did not endanger the
national security by radically reducing arms exports. For FY 1976-78, the exempted
countries accounted for 35 percent of arms exports under the Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) program. Carter's proposals only applied to 56 percent of the market if other
countries the country had "major defense treaties" with (South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and
the Philippines) were included. Allies were not going to be left high and dry. Services,
which were also not included in the restraints, constituted about 40 percent of all Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) contracts, and this, plus the exclusion of commercial sales, limited
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the controls to about 35 percent of all military exports. So, any accusations that Carter
was selling out the national interests were not well founded. Plus, Carter continued to
supply high-tech weapons to Israel, and had, as stated earlier, also approved the sale of
AWACS to Iran, although he later removed this from the table. Industry sources
concluded that the purpose of that sale was to bring down unit costs on the AWACS
program since the Pentagon faced a relatively stingy Congress. He also approved the sale
of 60 McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, an airplane far more
advanced than any that were currently on the Arabian Peninsula. Co-production projects
also increased because of the exemptions. This was mainly due to Carter's desire to
standardize NATO weapons. Interoperability among the Allies was essential. The
requirement that the State Department approve weapons sales at the policy level was not
particularly intrusive, since American arms producers have routinely sought informal
approval prior to initiating serious arms transfer talks with foreign governments.
Additionally, the ban on promotional activities did not stop the Air Force from
demonstrating American airplanes at the Paris Air Show in 1977, held two weeks after
Carter's new guidelines were released.37 Many inside and outside of Congress resented
the fact that the United States was not allowed to demonstrate its technological
capabilities at these shows, and the prohibition on these types of events was later
reviewed.
On the other side of the debate, Carter was criticized for not doing enough to limit
arms transfers. What he did do was to impose a dollar ceiling. In fiscal 1978 this was
$8,551 billion - an eight percent reduction from fiscal 1977 arms sales total. The final
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year-end total of ceiling-related transfers was $8,538 billion. A further eight percent
reduction was anticipated for 1979. Critics pointed out that ceilings derived
mathematically as a percentage of past activity ignore present military requirements and
broad national security interests. A counter argument is that, at least initially, a ceiling is
needed in order to make the people managing the decision making machinery think in
different ways, reflecting the policy shift that placed the burden of persuasion from the
opposers to the proposers. Furthermore, ample attention had been paid to security
interests by exempting NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand from the ceiling. The
ceilings cannot go down indefinitely, in any case, without fundamental political change
or disarmament arrangements. The ceiling forced the arms transfer community into longrange planning. The Foreign Assistance Act required the executive branch to inform
Congress by November 15 of each year of all arms transfers it "considers eligible" for
submission to Congress during the fiscal year. Bookkeeping also had to be tightened up
- it became essential to keep track of each major sale proposal in detail. The ceiling also
acted as a filter, weeding out questionable requests at the beginning of the process.
Finally, the ceiling would provide evidence that the country was serious about arms
transfer restraints, which was a necessary, although not sufficient; condition to
demonstrate the credibility of the policy.
Qualitative elements of the policy were, arguably, more important than the
money. These controls center on what and how the nation sells and to which countries.
These involve sophisticated and often subjective judgments about specific weapons and
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countries, and they are not always widely publicized, especially if a request is turned
TO

down.
Conventional Arms Transfer Agreements
As Carter laid out his policy on arms transfers, it was agreed that other large
supplier countries would be approached and asked to reduce their own transfers, because
no unilateral policy of restraint could succeed for long without some reining in of other
major exporters. Vice President Fritz Mondale visited major European capitals to sound
out the allies, and the reaction varied from mild interest to outright skepticism. They
consistently insisted that it was essential to engage the Soviet Union in the discussions.
The administration then began to focus exclusively on the Soviet Union. When Carter
took office, the conventional wisdom was that the Soviets would never discuss restraints
on arms transfers. However, when addressing the 16 Congress of Trade Unions, Soviet
President Leonid Brezhnev observed that the problem of international trafficking in arms
merited an exchange of views. When Vance visited Moscow in March 1977 he succeeded
in setting up a bi-lateral working group on arms transfers (although his suggestions on
SALT II were rejected). Leslie Gelb led the American group and the two sides met four
times beginning in December 1977 until the collapse of the talks a year later. By the end
of the second round of talks, those involved thought that substantive progress was
possible. The United States thought that if there were to be concrete results the two sides
should also discuss transfers to specific regions as soon as possible. This would provide
a way to regulate Soviet behavior in the Third World. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) argued for concentrating on global restrictions of certain
weapons. At the third meeting a framework was agreed to for drawing up general
38
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principles of mutual restraint and for exchanging views on sales to various regions.
While preparing for the fourth round of talks which would be held in Mexico City in
December 1978, the State Department proposed that the discussions begin with two
regions: Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, neither of which received substantial
amounts of arms. The Soviets accepted the American proposal but later added their own
regions: West Asia and East Asia. Although never specified officially, the United States
believed that West Asia included Iran and East Asia included China. Previously the
Soviets had suggested that one of the principles should be to prohibit transfers to states
bordering one of the suppliers and another banning them to states that refused to engage
in disarmament talks. These two principles were aimed at Beijing and were rejected by
the United States. Agreement was reached, however, on the need for technical criteria
defining the permissible levels and types of weapons, as well as the need for legal
guidelines. Most importantly, the Soviets accepted the premise that discussions should
include arms transfers to particular regions. They even accepted the idea of interim
regional agreements, which could consist of lists of specific weapons that would not be
sold. This indicated Soviet seriousness.40
However, deep objections of the National Security Council to even talking about East
or West Asia with the Soviets emerged just before the Mexico City meeting. At a
Cabinet meeting, Gelb and Brzezinski disagreed sharply over the issue. Although Gelb
evidently did not support the idea of discussing China, he is said to have argued that it
would not hurt to hear what the Soviets had to say about Iran and South Korea.
Brzezinski attacked the CAT talks, especially the proposed discussions on East and West
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Asia._Vanca-wasJiat present atthejneeling,whLc^ allowed Brzezinski to get the upper
hand in the argument. Prior to the third round, Carter agreed to a discussion of regions,
but now he reversed course, siding with Brzezinski. Later, some people involved
believed that Brzezinski opposed the entire notion of talking with the SU, but did not
weigh in until a very late date. The American delegation to Mexico City was instructed
to walk out of the talks if the Soviets brought up arms transfer restraints to West and East
Asia. The cable traffic was heavy between the delegation and Washington, and was
"dripping with venom." At one point Gelb was ordered back to Washington, but this was
then rescinded.41
The Soviets were angry at the unwillingness of the Americans to even hear what they
had to say, and refused to limit the agenda to the American-proposed regions of Latin
America and sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviet delegation, led by Lev Mendelevich, then
suggested that the two sides talk about naval forces in the Indian Ocean, but Gelb was
instructed to listen only and not engage in substantive discussions. In another
communication Gelb was instructed not to discuss the Indian Ocean and to conclude the
session. Although the White House officials complained privately that Gelb tried to
exceed his negotiating instructions, this was strongly denied by Vance in a statement to
the Washington Post. The internal bureaucratic squabble in Washington probably
reflected a more fundamental lack of agreement on the purposes and limitations of the
CAT talks; and this, in turn, was related to a lack of consensus regarding United States
policy towards the Soviet Union, especially in the realm of the Third World. If the
European allies had not been let off the hook, so to speak, and had also engaged in the
41
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talks, the process might have been less vulnerable to Washington's bureaucratic
arguments.42 There is evidence that the Americans and Soviets can exercise mutual
restraints. Throughout the Vietnam War, for example, the two rivals avoided direct
confrontation. The United States did not interdict the military supplies to North Vietnam,
and avoided targets that would endanger Soviet nationals (until near the end of the war).
The Soviets, for their part, did not supply certain weapons to North Vietnam that might
have threatened American naval vessels operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. In East Asia as
well, neither side made certain types of military equipment available to their allies that
they had already transferred to other regions.43
Human Rights and Security Assistance
Carter directly tied security assistance with efforts to "promote and advance respect
for human rights in recipient countries."44 States have defined certain basic freedoms
under the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Covenants, the European and
Inter-American Conventions, and the Helsinki accords, and have agreed to respect these
rights of people within their jurisdiction.45 Much of the military, either in grants or sales
of arms, goes to governments viewed as repressive by the international community. This
aid helps to sustain these governments, and America is often viewed as approving of the
gross human rights violations, in spite of section 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961.
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However, Carter did much more than his predecessors to implement section 502B,
while trying to act in the national interest. Human rights got a reasonable hearing in most
of the stages of the process. Sales of new weapons to eight Latin American countries
dried up, as did military assistance.46 Withholding weapons based on human rights
records was a radical departure from the past, in spite of the fact that only a few countries
were totally cut off. So, compared to previous administrations Carter's policy was highly
successful. While doing more than his predecessors or successors, he was not radical,
nor did he shift the "entire basis of foreign policy from power to principle."47
Because it was adhered to more closely, the implementation of 502B during the
Carter years generated intense bureaucratic warfare between the career Foreign Service
which had the responsibility of day-to-day management of foreign relations, and a newly
created Department of State Bureau of Human Rights, created by Congress and staffed
(to a great degree) by outsiders. This new Assistant Secretary of State had responsibility
for participating in decisions on security assistance. The House International Relations
Committee hinted that they would closely watch the actions of the new administration in
implementing the human rights provisions of 502B.

Again, Carter was besieged by the
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Congress felt that the Carter Administration did not go far enough in its first year to
protect rights was that in 1978 Congress again strengthened 502B by deleting "it is the
policy of the United States" language from subsection (a(2), and directly stated that,
absent "extraordinary circumstances.. .no security assistance may be provided to any
country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights."49 This made section 502B(a)(2) a legally
binding requirement of security assistance.50 Many Congressmen, especially those on the
House International Relations Committee, were concerned over support and spare parts
deliveries to certain countries, such as South Korea and the Philippines, while others
were distressed over the number of exceptions for "extraordinary circumstances."51
Congress' concern was nothing new. Beginning in 1974 Congress began to legislate
against giving military aid and selling arms to certain designated countries. It named, at
different times, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, the
Philippines, South Korea, Uruguay, and Zaire. The ban was effective for only a short
time and mostly mentioned military aid. In some cases it prohibited arms sales as well,
for an indefinite duration. These bans seemed to indicate that Congress found the
executive branch derelict in applying Section 502B to governments engaged in "gross
violations" and that "extraordinary circumstances" did not apply. Congress basically put
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the executive branch on notice - apply section 502B or face further legislation.52 The
Carter administration did this more and better than its predecessors, causing a great deal
of bickering among the entrenched interests.
In spite of the support of high government officials, the State Department career
bureaucracy dragged its feet on implementation of 502B, and warfare ensued between the
Foreign Service and the newly established Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, Patricia
M. Derian, an outsider who was strongly committee to human rights and who wanted
implementation. The Foreign Service views itself as the body that maintains cordial
relations with foreign countries, and military assistance and arms sales provide a
necessary and convenient vehicle for this maintenance. If aid is refused and the other
government suspects it is because a judgment has been passed that it has mistreated its
own citizens, the relationship becomes more difficult to preserve. Keeping other
governments happy is the goal. Other countries are thought of as "clients" because the
Foreign Service identifies with their interests, rather than as states to be dealt with in
accordance with the national interests of the US. The time horizon is short for the career
bureaucrat. They typically serve in a particular location for three years and are then
transferred to another spot. Because of this, long-term disadvantages of dispensing
military aid are often not considered. The goal is immediate: please the client. The
regional bureaus consistently opposed tying military assistance to human rights both
before and during the Carter administration. They argued at first that 502B was not
legally binding; then when it became legally binding they argued that it was only one of
several factors to be considered in decisions on arms transfers. They also distorted or
52
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underreported information about human rights abuses, and exaggerated positive signs. In
1978, for example, the Bureau for the Near East reported that the Shah of Iran was
embarking on a major liberalization program, ending torture, releasing political prisoners,
and giving political authority to an elected parliament. It did not report that most Iranians
considered the whole thing a sham or that there were credible reports that torture was still
going on and that elections were rigged. Finally, the regional bureaus overstated United
States interests at stake in some cases, claiming, for example, that unless military aid to
the Philippines was tripled, the country could lose its bases there. There were few
exceptions to these practices53
Because of the "conservative, slow to change" career bureaucracy at the regional
level, implementation of 502B during the Carter administration depended heavily at first
on Patricia Derian's Bureau of Human Rights, and it began to function as a
counterweight to the clientism. It insisted that 502B had to be satisfied before military
aid could be granted, and it developed independent sources of information about human
rights in various states. When Congress elevated the Coordinator of the Bureau to an
Assistant Secretary of State, it enumerated a specific list of legislated responsibilities.
Because of 502B the human rights office projected itself into all decisions on security
assistance. When there was disagreement with the regional offices, it insisted that a
decision paper (known as an action memorandum) be sent to the Secretary of State for
resolution. During the first months of the Carter administration arms transfers were
continuously an issue between Derian and the regional offices, and were mediated
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through the action memorandum. A number of political compromises were the result,
with the administration finding a middle way between power and principle.54
Although many accuse the Carter administration of being aggressive and single
minded in the area of human rights,55 this reflects as much the rhetoric of high
government officials, including Carter, as it does the reality. However, when examining
decisions under 502B a more balanced picture emerges. Relatively few governments
were found to be engaging in gross human rights violations, and security assistance was
cut off for only a few, and the law applied to only a few.56 That is not to say that every
country not "cut off' continued to receive all the arms it wanted; and arms transfers were
reduced to various states. Carter did do much more than his predecessors to implement
section 502B. Human rights were given a hearing at nearly all stages of the process of
providing military assistance, and the Bureau on Human Rights had reasonable
opportunities to make it views known. On the other hand, the policy was never to
determine formally, even in a classified decision, that a country was engaged in gross
violations, because of the fear of leaks which would, in turn, insult the named country.
Also, once identified, public pressure would make it difficult to change the finding even
if the country improved its record. Furthermore, conservative, defense industry allies did
not want military ties cut. Administration officials repeatedly refused Congress's
requests for a list of governments suspected of engaging in gross abuses because of the
negative publicity it would generate; and finally, when making 502B legally binding,
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Congress acquiesced to the practice of not making such a list public.57 Cyrus Vance
publicly avoided detailed explanations for the decisions made on security assistance, but
simply said whether the request was approved or disapproved.5
In its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in
1978, the State Department consistently used language such as "nor is there reliable
evidence...;" "their authenticity [the rumors of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment]
has never been substantiated." Some critics of the administration accuse it of laxness
because of these phrases, but Amnesty International's reports were routinely reviewed;
and even when it reported that mass torture and executions had dropped significantly in
some countries, the United States still did not restore security assistance.59
The issue of security assistance never arose with respect to many countries that
appeared to engage in gross violations of human rights; nor was it supposed to.
Communist countries and Soviet client states were barred from receiving aid for reasons
of national security. This left about 70 countries that were seriously considered for arms
sales and other military aid. The meaning of "gross violations" was narrowly interpreted
and ultimately only about 12 of the 70 fell into the category of gross, consistent violations
of human rights. Donald Fraser, representative from Minnesota's Fifth District, the
statute's sponsor, favored a narrow interpretation of 502B, and the legislative history
supports this view. The Carter administration followed Fraser's interpretation. Some in
the government assumed a basic conflict between pursuing national self interest and
57

U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978.
Cohen, "Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices," 266.
59
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, submitted to the House
Committee on International Relations and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 February 1978, 3,
see Guatemala, 165-167.
58

172
morality - power and principle. Those who drafted section 502B obviously did not see a
conflict.

The Fraser subcommittee report stated that "consideration for human rights in

foreign policy is both morally imperative and practically necessary. Providing security
assistance was to be decided "on all the facts," in the national interest.61 Sometimes this
assistance was provided to gross violators if the administration believed that it might lead
to an improvement in a country's human rights, in spite of the fact that these exceptions
were not in the law.62
The violations were limited to arbitrary imprisonment, torture, or summary execution
of large numbers of its own people. Basic civil and political liberties were not included.
The term "gross" was usually interpreted to mean that violations had to be significant in
their impact; and "consistent pattern" was interpreted to mean that abuses had to be
significant in number and recurrent. If steps were taken to stop some of the abuses, the
Carter administration occasionally decided that the "pattern" was not "consistent" The
fourth element, that the government was responsible for the abuses, ceased to be an issue
if the other criteria were met. For example, in 1980 the State Department, now led by
Edmund Muskie, argued that the government of El Salvador did not engage in gross
abuses committed by the military, because of evidence that the government may not have
approved.
Although a specific list of gross violators was never drawn up, one can be inferred
from the decisions that Vance or, later, Edmund Muskie made. Of the 70 or so countries
60
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considered for military aid and arms sales, a significant number were functioning
democracies with good records on human rights. These included countries such as the
governments of Western Europe, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and some Third World
countries such as Botswana, Colombia, and Kenya. A second category included
authoritarian governments, such as Singapore, Morocco, and Taiwan that sometimes
engaged in abuses, but not often enough to raise concerns about a "consistent pattern."
The third category consisted of governments which consistently used torture, arbitrary
imprisonment, or summary execution on a large scale. This list would include Argentina,
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, the Philippines,
South Korea, Iran, and Zaire. Countries rotated on and off as circumstances changed.
Much of the research on the distribution of foreign assistance to Latin America has
concluded that the United States rewards dictators who were abusers of human rights and
punish those who champion them, although the literature employing statistical measures
are confusing on this point. Carter managed to begin a change in these trends; and there is
some evidence that American human rights policy was used to punish abusers, rather than
64

reward protectors.
The Carter administration always carefully considered whether other United
States interests might require continuation of military assistance. A simple desire for
"cordial relations" was not enough; however; if a substantial American interest were
cited, the "extraordinary circumstances" clause could be invoked. Carter made use of the
clause when he felt it was in the national interest to do so. Because of this, the number of
countries which had their aid cut off was only eight, all in Latin America - Argentina,
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay. None
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supplied a critical resource, acted as a surrogate defender of United States interests, or
had a border with the Soviet Union.
Latin America has been viewed as a testing ground for American arms policies,
helping policymakers to appreciate the shifts that have occurred and how effective the
policies were in achieving their goals. Latin American sales declined precipitously under
Carter, but rose again sharply under Ronald Reagan, his successor in the White House.
Carter emphasized restraint in its arms exports the region, discouraging the sale of hightech items, and Congress imposed a variety of restrictions on the sale to military
regimes.65Vance announced that no military aid would go to Ethiopia or Uruguay for FY
1978, and that Argentina's aid would decline by 50%. While the administration did
propose assistance for some governments that appeared to be engaging in gross
violations, most of the funds for the Latin American countries were not distributed.
Beginning in FY 1979 and continuing through FY 1981 essentially no military aid was
given to countries on the implied hit list. Exceptions to the rule sometimes occurred,
such as aid to Haiti for the purchase of air-sea rescue equipment. Carter did not
necessarily end all sales of defense equipment when a government engaged in gross
violations. New weapons were consistently withheld, but safety related items, such as
ambulance aircraft and air-sea rescue equipment, were almost never refused. Spare parts
and support equipment were also approved for sale in certain cases. Although these sales
are contrary to the literal interpretation of 502B, the administration argued they were
legal according to the underlying purpose of the statute - the protection of human rights.
The inducement reasoning (that is, the carrot approach as a way to encourage the
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protection of human rights) was used to justify selling small amounts of spare parts and
support items to Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay. There is no
clear evidence that this lessened the abuses, but it probably did not lead to an increase
because they involved relatively small dollar amounts. The exception was Argentina,
considered to be one of the worst non-Communist violators; and, while the dollar value
of the sales in 1978 was higher than in any previous year, the trend indicator value was
not.66 Search and rescue as well as safety equipment were no doubt still being sold, but
not necessarily new weapons.
When a substantial national interest was found to exist, the administration, as had
others before it, assumed that arms transfers would help to secure that interest.67 This
worked much of the time, but not always. The most stunning miscalculation concerned
Iran. In 1977 and 1978, while rejecting the open ended sale of arms to the shah that the
Nixon-Kissinger administration had made, the country still sold significant amounts of
sophisticated weapons. The Iranian people grew to believe that their oil wealth was being
squandered to benefit American defense companies, and this increased their antiAmericanism.
CONCLUSIONS
The Conventional Arms Transfer policy of the Carter administration slowed down
the extraordinary growth in the sale of weapons. According to Pierre, total American
arms sales, including government to government as well as commercial sales, rose from
$12.8 billion in 1977 to $17.1 billion in 1980. This is an increase of $4.3 billion. By the
end of 1979 there was a large backlog of unfilled order totaling $43.5 billion. The
66
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backlog Carter inherited was $27 billion. This was due in large part because the ceiling
on the dollar amount of arms sales imposed for FY1978, did not apply to NATO allies,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand, where much of the growth occurred. Nor did it apply
to commercial sales, which are controlled by other regulations.68 Also, arms transfers to
Iran stopped immediately after the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979,
and did not begin again until the Reagan administration took office.69 Brzezinski cites a
relatively small increase in sales to the Third World - from $6.9 billion to $7.9 billion
between 1977 and 1980. He also points out that European allies jumped into the breech,
with France, West Germany, the U.K. and Italy collectively being responsible for a 78
percent increase in transfers - from $6.9 billion to $12.3 billion in 1980. Carter's belief
that other Western nations would follow the United States example proved to be
unfounded. The Soviet Union's increase was 55 percent during the Carter years - from
$9.6 billion in 1977 to $14.9 in 1980.70 Since allies were generally exempt under the
AECA, Brzezinski's numbers might be of more interest in evaluating the policy of the
administration. The trend indicator values on actual deliveries of major conventional
weapons in the SIPRI Arms Transfers database decreased from 14,089 in 1977 to 9,752
in 1980.71 Carter also created an institutional framework which established a rigorous
review of significant proposed commercial sales before formal letters of agreement were
sent to recipient countries. He did not automatically end all military assistance when a
68
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government engaged in "gross violations," but categorized weapons into four groups:
new weapons such as tanks, artillery, fighters and bombers, and war ships; spare parts;
support equipment, unarmed ships and aircraft, radios and radars; and safety-related
items. New weapons were consistently withheld, but safety related items were routinely
granted and spare parts and support equipment were sometimes approved. Critics who
assert that only a few countries were "cut off' are, perhaps, a bit disingenuous, leading
some to believe that there were very few significant cuts at all.
The prevailing definition of "national interest" helped to prevent a massive
reduction in arms transfers. From the early days of the Cold War, the United States has
tried to avoid communist takeovers of countries bordering China and the Soviet Union
and in other strategic regions. Arms transfers are a natural outgrowth of this.72 In 1947 a
special committee composed of members from the State, Navy and War Departments,
noted that if countries could not get weapons from the United States, they would turn to
the Soviet Union, which in turn would gain political leverage. That same leverage,
possessed by the United States could "serve the interests of international peace and
security."73 Under the Nixon Doctrine, which essentially was that nations should take
over more of their own security, arms transfers became a major instrument of American
foreign policy. So, any significant effort to reduce them came into conflict with the
perceived national security doctrine - a clash of power and principle. Although Carter
promised to view national security through a more restrictive lens, not all agree that he
did this.74 He was criticized by both the political left (for not doing enough) and the
political right (for doing too much). It was not, however, business as usual. He set the
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precedent for governmental restraint, and the State Department had some real authority
for the first time in the management of arms sales. The Democratic Policy Committee in
a 1983 report suggested that Carter's efforts represented a serious attempt to limit sales
and bring the issue into the mainstream of foreign policy.
There are several assumptions that tend to frame the debate on whether it is
feasible to expect other nations to restrict their arms transfers. The first is that supplier
states would not be willing to engage in restrictive arms sales because their economies
depend on this. However, weapons exports are a small portion of total exports for most
major suppliers, and sophisticated, destabilizing weapons could be replaced by larger
numbers of less destabilizing ones being exported, with the attendant jobs, foreign
exchange earnings, and other advantages that would go along with this. Another
assumption is that some Third World nations would see all restraints as discriminatory or
as paternalism. While this is true, the nations of the South are also well aware of the
dangers associated with uncontrolled arms transfers. Most have ratified the NonProliferation Treaty because it is in their interests to do so, and common ground could be
found for further non-proliferation agreements of certain types of weapons. A third
assumption is that if the country does not sell a particular weapon, some other nation will.
This assumes that other nations would automatically fail to see that it would not be in
their own interests to sell that particular weapon. This is not necessarily the case, and
history has shown that the Soviet Union did not want a direct confrontation with the
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United States in the Middle East in 197377 or in Afghanistan or Iran in 1980. History
notwithstanding, when intimately involved in the challenges of 1979 and 1980, it is easy
to see why Carter came under even more severe constraints in his attempts to limit arms
transfers.
The trade in conventional arms continued to be one of the most difficult security
challenges in the decade of the 1980s and 1990s. Although the collapse of the Soviet
Union greatly diminished the possibility of a nuclear confrontation, it allowed the release
of ethnic and territorial rivalries that had simmered under the global security system,
especially in the Balkans and the Horn of Africa. Although Carter was successful in
slowing down the growth in arms sales during his tenure, the Reagan years saw a rise
once again in sales, especially to the Middle East and Asia. After the talks with the
USSR broke down in 1977-78, there was little effort to achieve multilateral reductions
until after the 1990 Gulf War. These talks also yielded little in the way of results.79 In
1990 the United States surpassed the Soviet Union as the biggest supplier of weapons to
the third world, the first time since 1983. American transfers were $18.5 billion, up from
$7.8 billion in 1989, most of it going to the Middle East, even as President H.W. Bush
called for measures to curb arms sales to that region. Saudi Arabia and Iraq had been the
top two third world purchasers from 1983 to 1990.
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The nature of the problem has changed once again in the twenty-first century, and
the danger of nuclear proliferation has again emerged. One of the achievements of the
Clinton administration's foreign policy was the North Korea Agreed Framework,
although revelations eventually emerged that the regime cheated on its commitments.
George W. Bush jettisoned the Framework, and there is still much disagreement on
whether this was good policy or not. Now, in 2008 the United States has once again
signed an agreement, the "Mark II" version of the framework, which unfortunately has
fewer benchmarks for the North Koreans than the Clinton administration's had. Critics
claim that the agreement is open-ended and invites endless re-negotiation. Considering
the stakes, however, it is the first positive step taken in this century towards limiting the
development of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. On the negative side North
Korea continues with its arms sales, and Washington is curiously quiet on this issue. In
addition, with Iran in hot pursuit of nuclear power, and an even more unstable Middle
East, the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons is very real. With Russia and America
on opposite tracks today, and with the stakes far larger than in the past, arms limitations
in the Persian Gulf is essential. Weapons sales have exploded since the events of
September 11, 2001. The United States is the largest exporter of arms to developing
nations and leads all countries in both arms transfer agreements and arms deliveries. The
Near East is the primary market (defined as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qater, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates and Yemen). Asia has also emerged as a major purchaser of
weaponry, primarily because of India's purchases. Some view India as a regional
counterweight to China. The United States has expanded its arms exports in exchange
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for help in the "global war on terror."81 Now, in 2008, even nuclear cooperation and aid
to India are under strong consideration. As it supplies more and more weapons and even
nuclear technology, the country is obligated to see to it that arms that are replaced by new
weapons are removed from circulation; if not, then they could easily slip into the hands of
the very groups the country is trying to thwart. Pakistan might be the riskiest of the
recipients at the moment. It has received roughly $10 billion since the events of 9/11,
with $100 million earmarked for protection of its nuclear weapons. Little concrete
evidence is available that the arsenal is secure, however, and there are few details
available about the program. The New York Times, which has known about this secret
program for three years, has notified the administration that it was re-opening its scrutiny
of it in light of the current instability in Pakistan.

Pakistani scientist, A.Q. Khan,

operated a nuclear proliferation ring, but the United States has little to say on this subject,
except that it was an internal affair.
In human rights, Carter did much more than his predecessors to implement section
502B, while trying to act in the national interest. Human rights got a reasonable hearing
in most of the stages of the process. Sales of new weapons to eight Latin American
countries dried up, as did military assistance. Withholding weapons based on human
rights records was a radical departure from the past, in spite of the fact that only a few
countries were totally cut off. So, compared to previous administrations Carter's policy
was highly successful. While doing more than his predecessors or successors, he was not
81
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radical, nor did he shift the "entire basis of foreign policy from power to principle," as
some have accused.

'

The neoconservatives especially attacked Carter's policies, claiming that they
aided and abetted the spread of leftist sentiments in the region. Jeane Kirkpatrick, a
professor at Georgetown University and later United States ambassador to the United
Nations, argued that America should assist the "traditional autocracies" that ruled most of
Latin America, rather than allow them to be replaced by "revolutionary autocracies" like
Cuba, out of a misplaced concern over human rights. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first
secretary of state said at a Trilateral Commission meeting that "human rights, we're not
going to fuss with that. That's Carter. We're going to have a different policy;" but this
was later changed when George Shultz became secretary of state. He clearly saw that
human rights were important, and Reagan built on the base that Carter laid.
Carter did not simply and idly criticize the morality of other regimes based on
human rights. He also tried to return the country itself to a more prudent, and ethical,
course of action. He tried to avoid actions that would lead to a negative moral outcome
by his preference for diplomacy and patience rather than bluster in difficult situations.
He understood the limitations of the United States in effecting outcomes in the realm of
arms transfers and human rights. He did not engage in the histrionics of moralism at the
expense of substance, but practiced the art of the possible.
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CHAPTER V
AFRICA: THE BID FOR MAJORITY RULE

INTRODUCTION
Africa today is the most neglected continent, but it was not always so. After
World War II, when the process of decolonization began, Africa took center stage, at
least for a time. Although some argued against speedy independence,1 by 1960 fifteen
African states celebrated their independence, and 1960 itself was called the Year of
Africa. The years 1960, 1961, and 1962 stand out as the high points of African influence,
and the United States and the Soviet Union soon began to compete for power in the new
states. The forces of change in the developing world in general at that time were
volatile, but were not always evident. The 1973 oil embargo helped to bring this issue
into focus. Another signal that the southern half of the globe needed more attention was
the Indian nuclear test in 1974. In addition, there was a rising danger of conflict in
Southern Africa with the radicalization of black Africa, along with a mounting Soviet
influence. There were, for example, still a number of European colonies on the continent
that wanted to be free from white rule. As the United States and the Soviet Union
emerged from the bi-polar world of the 1950s and early 1960s into a more interdependent
planet, it became increasingly obvious that the lesser developed regions needed attention.
Modifying perceptions, however, is not always easy, and the United States continued to
view most problems through the lens of East-West.3
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This chapter will examine the Carter administration's policies toward Southern
Africa. It will focus primarily on Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, but
other countries in the neighborhood will necessarily part of the discussion. It was Henry
Kissinger who first tried to shift the emphasis away from an exclusively East-West
framework toward policies that considered Third World problems on their own terms. It
was difficult, and the attempt came at the end of his tenure in office. For one thing, the
Nixon administration's previous emphasis on East-West issues tended to obscure the
importance of problems in the southern half of the globe. For another, by 1975 the
administration was in the throes of the Watergate crisis which weakened the executive
branch of government and strengthened Congress. Congress began to pass numerous
bills that limited the president's freedom of action in foreign affairs. When the Carter
administration took office, it became its job to continue to toughen the processes for
managing the on-going East-West rivalry and to develop progressive policies for dealing
with the Third World.4 It paid more attention to relationships with black Africa than any
previous administration, believing that this was the right thing to do on principle and was
also in the interests of the United States. Sometimes it succeeded in treating African
issues on their own terms, not as things to be manipulated in order to gain against the
Soviet Union. Sometimes it did not.5 Africa was the perfect place to demonstrate a
commitment to human rights, and Carter's appointment of Andrew Young to be the
United States ambassador to the United Nations, the first black to hold such a high
position, sent a strong signal to Africans as well as to Carter's domestic constituencies
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that human rights was a principle to be taken seriously - because it was in the country's
interests to do so.6
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The history of Africa and the West has not always been a pleasant one. The
Atlantic slave trade which began in the 16th century temporarily enriched some Africans,
but the wealth was spent primarily on luxury goods and was not well distributed among
the African people. Another effect was to encourage slavery, long after the Europeans
began to have serious misgivings about the institution. Since the slave trade was a
black/white partnership, Europeans did not go into the interior of the continent very
much. At the beginning of the 19 century most Europeans knew little about Africa.
Colonization of much of sub-Saharan Africa began in the 1870s and reached its peak in
the 1880s, after the invention of the machine gun and modern medicine made it
economically feasible, and Social Darwinism made it ideologically attractive. Rivalries
in Europe began to affect Africa directly, and in an effort to dampen down the tensions,
Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany, convened the Berlin Congress in late 1884
to early 1885 at which European powers divided much of the continent among
themselves, and wrote the rules for colonial claims. In Southern Africa, however, the
Europeans and Africans began their relationship much earlier, with the arrival of the
Dutch in the 17th century. The Afrikaners, as the Dutch became known, set about
displacing the natives from their lands, but they in turn were pushed northward by the
arrival of the English. The Anglo-Boer war, occurring late in the 19 century, divided
Americans. Many defended the Boer republic against British imperialism; but, while the
United States remained officially neutral, American commerce plainly favored the
6
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British. By the end of the 19 century, Cecil Rhodes, British Foreign Secretary, had
dreams of white colonization throughout the entire continent. The white population
pursued a policy of racial discrimination wherever it spread, which affected most of the
region. Apartheid became institutionalized, with grave consequences for the 20th
century.
Until the mid-twentieth century the country had no African policy apart from the
white colonial powers. However, the United Nations offered a forum for calling attention
to apartheid. The nation was divided between those who thought that this was a matter of
domestic jurisdiction and those who thought it was a moral issue. Dean Acheson,
secretary of state during the Truman administration, thought that the United States
"should not intervene for what are called moral reasons in the internal affairs of another
country. Moral reasons for interfering are merely a cover for self-indulgent hypocrisy."
Beginning in the late 1950s the process of decolonization began to take on increasing
speed, and within a short time almost all of central Africa was free. However, there were
four large predominantly black areas not independent by 1970, where blacks did not
govern. These were Mozambique and Angola, Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia, a British
colony, and the Republic of South Africa, including its unlawful dependency of Southwest Africa (Namibia).9
Strategic Concerns - United States-Soviet Competition
77

[Rockefeller] Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, South

Africa: Time Running Out (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 342-343.

(Hereinafter cited as Study Commission on Southern Africa.); William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen, eds.,
Arms and the African (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 17; see also Hodder and Harris, Africa in
Transition.
8
Quoted in Study Commission on Southern Africa, 344.
9
Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 136-37; for a review of United .States policy towards
Namibia in the 1950s and 1960s see William Minter, "With All Deliberate Delay: National Security Action
Memorandum 295 and U.S. Policy toward South West Africa," African Studies Review 27 (September
1984): 93-110.

187
Africa's identity in the minds of others has traditionally been defined by their own
perceptions of the continent, rather than by any necessarily objective reality. It has been
viewed as an obstacle or a place to get around; a strategic neighborhood for other regions;
a launching pad for the disruption of the interests of the maritime powers; a strategic area
in its own right; and surrogate terrain.10 The rise of modern African nationalism after
World War II occurred at first during a time of unchallenged American superiority.
Southern Africa presented complicated territory for great power relations with the rise of
Black Nationalism. Western, including United States, hesitance in backing majoritarian
nationalist groups opened up opportunities for the Soviet Union to gain influence by
supplying arms to the black groups. At first, East-West rivalry was played out without
the commitment of much in the way of resources by either side.11 But the focus on EastWest and communism eclipsed the potent rise of Black Nationalism.
There were some strategic interests that the United States wished to protect,
however. Uranium was the first African mineral that was critical to Western security and
South Africa became a major source during World War II. The Onset of the space race
after 1945 greatly increased the need for a few minerals which are concentrated in Africa
south of the equator and within the Soviet sphere of influence. Among those that have no
alternative source of supply or no known substitute are chromium (found in Zimbabwe
and South Africa) cobalt (found in what was then Zaire and Zambia), and manganese
(found in Gabon and South Africa). The strategic interest for the West lies in having
continued access to those minerals (as opposed to any specific corporation's interests),
10
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and to the preservation of stable conditions of production so that prices are not volatile.
What could threaten this would be a general collapse of the social order in the producing
regions which could lead to the widespread destruction of the production facilities. This
could be caused by an outbreak of military hostilities leading to extended wars of
attrition. This "would reflect gross political mismanagement on the part of those nations
interested in continued access to Southern Africa's minerals." Since the Soviet Union
had its own source of supply, it was unlikely that it would try to significantly disrupt
Western access to the minerals. It would be costly and would draw resources away from
the protection of its own borders.1 Another strategic concern is the sea routes along
Africa. Most of the attention during the Carter administration was focused on
maintenance of the petroleum routes. Up to 65 percent of Western European and 28
percent of American oil imports utilized the Cape route. The country has a "very serious
interest" in the route, and there is "no debate that the security of the Cape route is by far
the most important Western interest in the African region." Disruption would be
difficult and expensive and would require massive deployment of naval resources as well
as air power. Strategic bases in or adjacent to Africa would be of greater benefit to the
Soviet Union than to the Western powers, so it is in the interests of the United States to
prevent this from happening, which would be done by ensuring that no African nation felt
inclined to welcome a major Soviet base on its territory.14 Although the level of threat
was not dire, in the absence of cooperation with African countries, the United States
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would have to be prepared to maintain "alternative means of keeping that route secure in
the event of certain conflict." Also, access to South African intelligence, by way of the
British, was "a high utility and low cost arrangement.. .giving United States.. .a very
high-quality product."15
On the other hand, there are many policy makers as well as scholars who deny the
importance of South Africa's strategic importance. Of these, one orientation is the "no
policy" approach, a term used by Helen Kitchen in a study compiled for the American
Enterprise Institute. It draws support from a diverse body. Some oppose all American
activity on the continent because they believe it to be counterrevolutionary. Others
suggest that Africa is so weak it is impossible for the country to influence the direction of
its future; and because of this weakness the United States does not need to worry about
which government is in power because it can get what it needs regardless.16 Another
orientation is that while the United States has interests in South Africa, there is no threat;
the Soviet Union had not significantly advanced its worldwide interests since 1945, nor
has the country suffered devastating losses.17 A third orientation also holds that the
United States has interests, but cozying up to the apartheid government of South Africa is
too costly and would inflict damage to the nation especially in Third World countries.18
It seems clear that Carter, with his commitment to human rights, would need to tread
carefully in order to protect the strategic interests of the country while at the same time
advancing the moral principle of majority rule. He needed to strike a balance between
power and principle.
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The Nixon Kissinger Policy - the "Tar Baby" Option19
The Nixon years began with the assumption that the white regimes in Rhodesia,
the Portuguese colonies, and South Africa could stay in place indefinitely, and that the
administration should work with them to prevent violence. This was a shift away from
the mildly liberal policies begun under the Kennedy administration and continued by
Lyndon Johnson. A policy review of the region began in 1969 when Nixon took office.
National Security Study Memorandum 39, (NSSM 39) prepared at the direction of
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, laid out the basic strategy of the United
States towards Southern Africa. It concluded that non-confrontational dialogue could
persuade the white regimes to reform and thus prevent interference by the Soviets and
Chinese. This represented a shift "away from outside liberal constituencies and State
Department primacy within the government and a shift toward an outside business
constituency and Defense and Commerce Department primacy." In addition, just as
Kennedy's and Johnson's opposition to South Africa appealed to black civil rights
leaders, Nixon's "Southern strategy of courting racial conservatives made rapprochement
with South Africa attractive." This was symbolized by appointing "John Hurd,
conservative businessman..." from Texas to be the "ambassador to Pretoria."20 Black
Nationalism was almost ignored. The administration chose what is often called the "Tar
Baby Option," because it left the country stuck, like Br'er Rabbit to the white minority
governments.
The response to NSSM 39 was prepared by the Interdepartmental Group (IG) for
Africa and was chaired by David Newsom, the Assistant Secretary of State for African
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Affairs. Two conflicting views emerged from the debate. The first, held by the
Africanists in the State Department opposed any shift in policy. This was based on their
suspicion that a new policy would probably lead to the normalization of relations
between the United States and the white minority regimes. The second view was held by
those representing the NSC and the Pentagon. They argued for more communication
with the white regimes. One of the reasons for their view was that they believed it was
wrong to penalize American businessmen in the name of a "non-working policy;" another
was that they thought the new policy could do more to promote peaceful change. By
early 1970 Nixon had decided to emphasize "communication" with the white regimes.
This change in policy did not immediately become public. They saw no strategic interests
in Southern Africa, which was astounding, but there was a danger of embarrassment to
the administration, both at home and abroad.21
While the British had been successful in moving most of their colonies to
majority rule and independence, Rhodesia proved difficult. In 1965 when the British
insisted on independence with majority rule, Ian Smith, the leader of the white minority
government, declared its independence. As it became clear close to the end of February
1970 that Smith would declare Rhodesia a republic at the beginning of March, the Labour
government in London began to pressure the United States to close its consulate there.
The Opposition Tories sent a conflicting signal. Edward Heath, Leader of the
Opposition, sent an explicit message to the administration that when the Conservatives
won the general election in June their policy would be to re-establish a residual mission

21

Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option, 123-126. See also Edgar Lockwood "National Security Study
Memorandum 39 and the Future of United States Policy Toward Southern Africa," A Quarterly Journal of
Africanist Opinion IV, (fall 1974): 1-9. See Also Alex Thomson, Incomplete Engagement (Brookfield VT:
Avebury, 1996.)

192
in Rhodesia. The message was not widely known about in the State Department. As
expected, Smith formally declared "Rhodesia" at midnight March 1-2, 1970. American
policy did not change - at least not at first. The British position was that the Smith
regime was illegitimate, and most Americans agreed. The UN Security Council
condemned the action and placed an embargo on imports from Rhodesia, which the
United States supported. On March 5, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Michael
Steward told the American ambassador to Britain that if the United States did not close
the consulate in Rhodesia shortly, the British would consider withdrawing the exequatur.
Nixon gave in. Ironically, on March 17, the very day that the American Consul left
Salisbury the United States cast its first veto at the United Nations, on a resolution
concerning Rhodesia. The resolution, which was supported by the Africans and their
Asian allies, included the mandatory withdrawal of foreign consulates, condemned the
British for not using force to crush the rebellion, extended sanctions to Portugal and
South Africa, and called for breaking all communications and transportation ties with the
outside world. The British then introduced their own resolution, which urged all countries
not to recognize the regime or give it any aid. After much dithering over whether to cast
its first UN veto, the United States joined the British in vetoing the African resolution. In
1971, however, Congress passed an amendment sponsored by Senator Harry F. Byrd,
Democrat of Virginia, prohibiting the president from barring the importation of strategic
minerals from a non-communist country. The Nixon administration chose to comply
with the Byrd Amendment and defy the UN resolution. This encouraged the Smith
regime.22 In 1973 the United States vetoed another resolution concerning Rhodesia,
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again acting with the British. The resolution would have increased the sanctions and
extended them to South Africa and the Portuguese territories.
All the same, a revolution in Portugal undercut the policy and forced change. In
April 1974 the repressive Portuguese regime collapsed. The new government had no
desire to continue the wars against the blacks of their colonial possessions, brutal wars
fought with the approval of the Nixon administration. The Portuguese withdrew and left
the United States without white regimes to support, which weakened the assumptions of
NSSM 39. Mozambique and Angola both gained independence in 1975, but Angola then
turned to civil war involving three factions. The strongest faction was the MPLA
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), led by Agostinho Neto and supported
by the Soviet Union; the faction had seized power in 1975. The FNLS (National Front for
the Liberation of Angola) was attached to the pro-Western President Mobutu of Zaire,
and was led by Holden Roberto, and the third faction was UNITA (National Union for
the Total Independence of Angola), headed by Jonas Savimbi. Because the MPLA was
supported by the Soviet Union, this turned the Angolan civil war, in the eyes of
Kissinger, into an East-West contest for influence. Kissinger secretly ordered aid through
the CIA for FNLA and later UNITA.24 Castro recognized the potency of Black
Nationalism as well as an opportunity to spread Cuba's revolution outside of Latin
America. It sent military advisers and combat soldiers to aid the MPLA, claiming that it
had been invited to do so by the legitimate government of Angola. The secret
manipulations of Kissinger soon became public knowledge, which aroused opposition
from senators and congressmen determined to prevent the Vietnam War from re23
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occurring. This, in turn, led to the passage of the Clark Amendment in January 1976.
This barred spending for the war in Angola without specific Congressional approval.25
The issues and the region were interrelated. In Rhodesia, the situation became ugly when
the Portuguese left Mozambique and Angola because it led to more intense guerrilla
warfare there. A heavily armed white minority fought to retain control of the country
against the black population which numbered more than 90%.
The collapse of the Portuguese empire prodded Kissinger to take a new look at
American policy towards Rhodesia. He concluded that the Smith regime would not last,
and that it would be in the best interests of South Africa to encourage majority rule in
Rhodesia or possibly face a race war itself. Kissinger insisted on majority rule in
Rhodesia prior to its legitimate independence, condemned apartheid, and insisted that
South Africa develop a definite schedule for the self-determination of Namibia.26 But
this was an election year, and policy did not follow words. As Senator Dick Clark
pointed out in November 1976, the policy announced by Kissinger in April 1976 could
not undo the squandered credibility of seven and a half years of unwise policy. He
looked forward to a reassessment of what the country had done in the past and what it
97

should do in the future.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
When Carter took office in January 1977 he also encouraged a broad review of
trends affecting American foreign policy. He faced a changing world in many ways.
25

Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 137, 138; "Countering the Communists," Time
January 5, 1978.
26
U.S. Department of State Bulletin 31 May 1976. See also Stockwell, Incomplete Engagement,
40-46.
27
Dick Clark, "American Policy toward Southern Africa under a New Administration," A Journal
of Opinion 7 (spring 1977): 1. See also, Lockwood, "The Future of the Carter Policy toward Southern
Africa," 11-15.

195
One of the trends was the increasing connection between domestic affairs and foreign
policy. Domestic ideological positions more and more influenced attitudes towards
foreign affairs, and domestic concerns were increasingly projected on to the international
scene. Another trend was a more active Congress in making and enforcing foreign policy
decisions. And, finally, the increased numbers of middle and senior management level
blacks who played a role in both the public and private sector, made human rights a
domestic issue as well as a foreign policy issue. "Doing something about southern
Africa" had deep personal meaning for Carter, who regretted his own slowness in
embracing black civil rights in the United States. New assistant secretaries and bureau
directors were critical of the previous administration, especially because of what they saw
as its disregard for human rights. The State Department's Bureau of African Affairs
played a prominent role. The new assistant secretary for African affairs, Richard Moose,
got the pleasant task of leading a bureaucracy in the direction it already wanted to go.
They believed that Black Nationalism was the driving historical force, not communist
imperialism. Nationalism would be the best and cheapest defense against Soviet
influence.

Moose was proud that "for the first time in many years, the United States has

an Africa policy," which included a strong commitment for a peaceful resolution of intraAfrica disputes, and a respect for African nationalism.29 Moose had a long record of
service to the United States, having served in Mexico and Cameroon, had been a member
of the NSC, staff associate for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, arid Deputy
Undersecretary of State for Management. He was well versed in African affairs and
brought a significant level of expertise to the administration.
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According to Edgar Lockwood, Executive Director of the Washington Office on
Africa from 1972-1980 and longtime activist on behalf of human rights for Africans,
Carter pursued American ideals and principles, United Statesing ideology and
salesmanship to protect the nation's economic and political interests. There were three
themes that emerged: 1) "the promotion of capitalism and non-violence as more than
revolution and socialism; 2) building a moderate Zimbabwe and Namibia: disarming the
militants; and 3)the protection and preservation of a private enterprise economy in order
to expand the interests of international capital in Zimbabwe and Namibia."30 In other
words, Carter balanced power and principle.
Young, Vance, and Brzezinski
The Carter administration took early steps to signal that things had changed. One
of the most brilliant choices was the selection of Andrew Young to be the Ambassador to
the United Nations. Young was charismatic and eloquent, and was a living testament that
non-violent political activism can get results in the struggle for civil rights. Third World
nations could trust him as one of their own. He was confident that the economic boycott,
in particular, was an effective tool in fighting racism because it brought in the
multinational corporations. Capitalism, to him, was so fundamental that it was almost
inevitable, and it was also beneficial.31 He disparaged the Soviet threat in Africa, and
believed that the continuation of white minority rule was the Soviet's greatest advantage.
If those regimes were ended there would no longer be a need for Soviet weapons or
Cuban troops. Young also emphasized United States economic interests in developing
the African market, something that would have resonated with American dreamers about
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the Chinese market at the turn of the 20 century.

In a statement to South African

businessmen in Johannesburg, for example, he said that "the places where I see the naked
being clothed, the places where I see the sick being healed are in places where there
happens to be a free market system.

Young, emphasizing the interdependence of the

United States and the world, including Africa, pointed out that the country consistently
ran a trade deficit with the continent, and called for more government investment. He
also noted that the aid that was going to Africa was largely charity, which was fine, but
he believed that charity alone was not in the self interest of the United States.34 While
Secretary of State Vance downplayed Africa's economic importance, he agreed with
Young that the nation should not be consumed with Soviet threats alone, either real or
imagined. Speaking to the Annual Convention of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1977, Vance said that America "must
recognize the unique identity of Africa;" and that "the success or failure of the search for
racial justice and peace in Southern Africa will have profound effects among the
American people." He went on to say that policies should not be negative or reactive,
looking only for ways to counter Soviet or Cuban involvement, but should be positive
and affirmative, planning for the long term. He also emphasized that policies should
reflect American values - human rights in the political, economic, and social realms.
Carter and Vance both accepted the idea of approaching Southern Africa as a region, and
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the "regionalists" within the administration rejected the East-West dichotomy, and they
believed that majority rule was the way to prevent Soviet mischief.36
National Security Adviser Brzezinski, while supporting the notion of human
rights, took a harsher view of Soviet activity in the region, viewing his primary function
as "making certain that we did not ignore the Soviet-Cuban military presence.. .to the
point where the conservative whites in South Africa would be fearful of accepting any
compromise solution [to majority rule]." Brzezinski also feared that ignoring the EastWest connection would bring about domestic opposition to majority rule. What's more,
he felt that the United States had seriously underestimated the influence of the "Eastern
bloc" in the region "and that Andy and Cy, along with most of those at State, took an
excessively benign view of the Soviet and Cuban penetration... underestimating its
strategic implications."

This marked a potentially harmful divide between the NSC and

the State Department.
An additional factor influenced the Carter administration's stance toward majority
rule: oil. At this time about 40 percent of the nation's imports of crude came from
Africa, and half of this from Nigeria. The Nigerian government was a vocal critic of
apartheid and of any country supporting it. This provided additional impetus for Carter
to move on racial justice.
Zimbabwe Born
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While Britain had the major responsibility for the transition to majority rule in
Rhodesia, the key problem for the United States was how to support a gradual transfer of
power to a leadership favorable to western economic interests while avoiding any
outward show of meddling in a revolutionary process.

The United States became an

equal partner with Britain, at least in the early years, in the endeavor to find a peaceful
resolution to the problem. Young, Carter's point man, developed a close working
relationship with David Owen, Foreign Secretary for the Labour government. Together,
they proposed a plan calling for 1) an interim British administration with a UN
peacekeeping force; 2) a constitution providing for universal adult suffrage; 3)guerrilla
units to be incorporated into the Rhodesian army; 4) a Rhodesia Development Fund of at
least $1 billion; and 5) independence under majority rule in 1978.40 The most radical
suggestion was the incorporation of the guerrilla fighters into the regular army. Carter,
for his part, moved quickly to get the Byrd Amendment repealed by Congress. This
legislation, passed under the Nixon administration, permitted the United States to import
chrome and other minerals from Rhodesia in open contravention of the UN sanctions of
1966 and 1968 for which the U.S. had voted. Nixon and Kissinger asserted that the
strategic minerals found in Southern Africa were vital to the military-industrial survival
of the United States and its allies. Carter tried to change the direction of American
policy, and speaking before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on February 10, 1977, Vance said that the administration fully
supported the Rhodesian Sanctions Bill which would bring the country into conformity
with the UN Charter. Vance also noted the administration's commitment to human rights
39
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and said that this would guide the nation in its policy toward Southern Africa. This
required the "firm and clear opposition to racial injustice wherever it exists." Black
unrest in Southern Africa was bubbling everywhere, but the Rhodesian state of affairs
was "of greatest urgency... for there the extent of armed conflict is broadest and the threat
of escalation most immediate." Vance pointed out that he had recently stated that under
no conditions could the Rhodesian authorities count on any form of American assistance
in preventing majority rule. He believed that the key to peace was in the hands of Ian
Smith, the ruler of Rhodesia, and "repeal of the Byrd Amendment would do far more to
persuade him to use it." He characterized the amendment as a symbol of ambivalence
toward Rhodesia and international law.41 Young, at his confirmation hearings as
Ambassador to the UN, said that he believed that the repeal of the amendment placed
short term self interest over long term moral considerations.42 In March, Congress
repealed the amendment, a substantial victory for the administration and a clarion signal
to Rhodesia.43 The repeal of the amendment was part of a broad strategy to develop
better ties to African leaders and to come to an understanding on shared interests. Carter
was the first president to visit the continent where he emphasized "African solutions to
African problems." 44
In the meantime, a savage murder of seven white priests and nuns by black
guerrillas in the Rhodesian village of Musami (about 40 miles north of Salisbury)
shocked the international community. The most prominent guerrilla group, the Patriotic
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Front headed by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe denied responsibility despite the
widespread belief that the blood was on their hands.45 This organization was a shaky
alliance of two rivals which was supported by the Organization of African Unity and the
important Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia).46
Both Britain and the United States, along with most African states, seemed convinced
that the Front should be directly involved in the creation of any transitional government.
This was the most controversial element in the plan. The massacre, though, cast doubt on
it as a responsible force, and strengthened the hand of Smith. Smith proceeded to work
on an "internal" solution, meaning that he was prepared to form some sort of multiracial
transitional government with moderate black groups.47 The plan called for Rhodesian
whites and moderate blacks to negotiate a settlement without the British and without the
guerrillas. This would split the black nationalists. Smith hoped to broker a settlement
with those he considered most agreeable to a solution acceptable to the whites. He
especially hoped to entice Bishop Abel Muzorewa, head of the African National Council
(ANC), Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of a wing of the ANC, and Joshua Nkomo, leader of
the Zimbabwe-Africa Political Union (ZAPU) guerrilla faction into a union, excluding
Zimbabwe-Africa National Union (ZANU) leader Robert Mugabe.48 Vance agreed with
British Foreign Secretary David Owen that this "internal solution" was bogus and would
leave power in the hands of the white minority. But Carter was interested. Muzorewa
was popular with Congress and was untainted by communist backing, unlike Smith's
strongest nemesis, Mugabe. Brzezinski, afraid that the country was tied too closely to the
45
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British, also was drawn to Smith's plan. Carter played with the idea of a secret deal with
Muzorewa or Nkomo, but Richard Moose and Anthony Lake, head of the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff, both predicted that any attempt at a secret deal
would lead to calamity. Vance agreed, and managed to convince Carter that the plan was
a bad one.49
Throughout 1977 and 1978, however, movement toward an internal settlement
gained speed. Some in the Senate were interested in the idea, and Brzezinski continued
to voice his dissatisfaction with the highly visible Anglo-American approach, believing
that no real progress was being made. He favored turning the issue over to the UN or the
British if the United States could not get a moderate solution, because it could become a
serious domestic issue. Brzezinski informed the President that the country did not have a
clear view of where it was going, and the chance of keeping sanctions was not good.
Carter responded that British Prime Minister James (Jim) Callahan had called and wanted
to "move on his own, with some U.S. involvement."

Two crises on the continent

helped the Smith regime - the Soviet intervention in Ethiopia and the Katangan invasion
of the Shaba province of Zaire. The former threatened American interests in the Persian
Gulf, the second threatened to deny access to Shaba's cobalt. As the political right
challenged Carter on the strategic situation in Africa, the mid-term elections saw six
influential liberal senators punished, including Dick Clark, chairman of the Senate
African subcommittee.
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While Brzezinski urged that the country lower its profile, he knew that this was difficult
because of increasing polarization in Congress. The extent of this was obvious when, in
the spring of 1979, Ian Smith announced that he would hold elections under the "internal
constitution." The Senate voted to send election observers, but the House defeated the
measure. Elections were held in April, and Bishop Muzorewa was sworn in as Prime
Minister at the end of May. Both the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
human rights group Freedom House observed the elections and both concluded they were
as free and fair as any ever held. Both of those organizations favored lifting the
sanctions. Although the United States did not recognize the legitimacy of the elections,
Muzorewa subsequently met with the President at Camp David, a meeting set up by
Brzezinski, intending to mute Senator Jesse Helms, the leader of right-wing
congressional support for Ian Smith.

The administration was clearly navigating in

difficult waters, between power and principle.
On June 1, 1979, Ian Smith stepped down, in accordance with a 1976 agreement
between himself and Kissinger, and Muzorewa became "Zimbabwe Rhodesia's" first
(and last) black premier. All key Cabinet portfolios were held by Smith colleagues.
Parliament was set up to reflect a constitution which had a blocking mechanism that
included a second chamber Senate, designed to embed white power indefinitely.
Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF), police and all other security components remained in
the hands of whites. Not more than twenty black Africans were commissioned army
officers out of about 100,000."
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In May 1979 the Labour government was replaced by the Tories, led by Margaret
Thatcher. She supported the internal solution and insisted that Britain play the primary
role in settling the dispute; but the new foreign secretary, Peter Carrington, soon
convinced her to abandon the internal solution. In September all parties, including
Muzorewa, Smith, Nkomo, and Mugabe, assembled at Lancaster House in London under
the auspices of the British government. The Americans had been relegated to the
sidelines. Also, by the fall of 1979 many changes had occurred in the United States.
Young was no longer in the administration, dismissed in July because of a mistake in a
meeting with a representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Vance
was losing influence quickly, and the Iranian hostage crisis began in November, which
consumed most of the President's time. Britain, in the meantime, made a gigantic effort
to arrange a settlement on Rhodesia. Carter was under pressure, especially from the
Senate, to lift sanctions at once, but he insisted that the independence process had to be
firmly in place before doing this. After three months of talks, agreement was reached on a
temporary restoration of British rule, free elections, and independence for Zimbabwe,
which the country would be called, based on majority rule. Carter contributed to the
solution by offering the possibility of financial aid to Zimbabwe to compensate whites for
land that would be resettled and redistributed under majority rule. On December 12, the
British governor arrived in Salisbury and the United Kingdom ended sanctions at
midnight, Carter ended American sanctions on December 15, and the UN ended its
embargo that same week, followed by the Front Line States. In April 1980, Robert
Mugabe became Prime Minister, and went on to govern much more moderately than had
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been foreseen by those who were certain he was a communist. In August 1980 Carter
received Mugabe in the White House and, as was fitting, Andrew Young attended.54
South Africa
The system known as apartheid came into existence in South Africa after World
War II, although it was rooted in the much earlier racism of the Afrikaners. The United
States welcomed South Africa's declaration of anticommunism in the early days of the
Cold War and gave little thought to apartheid. It abstained on the first UN resolution
condemning it in 1952. This set the tone and direction of policy through the Eisenhower
years. The country formed a close military relationship with South Africa, making United
Statese of the strategic bases in Cape Town, sought precious minerals, and maintained
relationships that might be labeled "sensitive." The CIA, for example, routinely had
contact with South African security officials, and the United States furnished a significant
amount of atomic information and technical expertise.55 South Africa needed American
attention. The history of the country plus the racial makeup of its population demanded
it. Although President John Kennedy believed that new policies were necessary to entice
Africans to the American side in the Cold War, radical change in his policies toward
South Africa was never the primary focus. South Africa was considered too strategically
important.
South-West Africa (Namibia) had a way of sneaking into the equation. Many
began to question South Africa's domination of the territory. After World War I the
League of Nations gave South Africa a mandate over the former German colony. This
was withdrawn by the United Nations after World War II, but South Africa refused to
54
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recognize this. In 1960 Ethiopia and Liberia brought a suit before the International Court
of Justice, trying to force South Africa to relinquish its control. Contrary to expectations
the Court, voting eight to seven, dismissed it on technical grounds in 1966. The American
Ambassador to the UN, Arthur Goldberg, took a leading role in drafting a resolution
condemning South Africa and demanding that it take measures leading to self
determination in the area. But the resolution had many loopholes and therefore no one
was forced to take any immediate action. The American grand strategy for the region
ultimately depended on South Africa's cooperation.57
Portugal's colonial collapse caused a re-shuffling of the deck in the entire region.
South Africa saw its outer defensive perimeter as being the white minority governments
of Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. All of these states were also entangled in the
activities of South Africa. After Angola and Mozambique received their independence,
Rhodesia was lain dangerously open to attack. The British protectorates of Lesotho,
Botswana, and Swaziland were also now independent, and South Africa seriously
considered extending a "pax Pretoriana" over the region, giving aid to new and insecure
rulers against their rivals and in return getting their assurances that their lands would not
be United Statesed as staging grounds for guerrilla attacks against South Africa. In 1974
Balthazar Johannes Vorster, South Africa's prime minister and president from 1966 to
1978, began to pursue a detente in the region. He wanted friendly regimes in postPortuguese central Africa that were not Soviet aligned.3 When internal conflict in
Angola escalated, South Africa intervened, fairly effectively at first, in support of UNITA
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and FNLA and against the pro-Marxist MPLA. While the United States probably did not
specifically encourage this action it seems clear that it was not discouraged either. The
intervention effectively resulted in a massive Cuban troop buildup in Angola, justified as
a defensive move on the part of the MPLA government in the eyes of black Africa and
most of the world also. Nigeria, at first supporting UNITA and FNLA dropped its
support overnight and brought Zambia along. Congress, concerned about CIA dirty
tricks and another Vietnam-style venture, ordered a halt in CIA activities. South Africa
withdrew its troops from Angola in February 1976.59 Some refugees from FNLA formed
the basis of South African Special Forces 32 Battalion, which operated routinely in
Namibia and southern Angola. Others were absorbed into UNITA.
When Carter came to office it seemed obvious that Black Nationalism was going
to win over any white minority rule, and he supported this. The South African
government was well aware that it was in for difficulty. Vorster somberly announced
that he was convinced that if South Africa was the victim of a communist onslaught it
would have to face it alone, and that certain countries that claimed to be anti-communist
would probably not even sell arms to them. Andrew Young characterized the South
African government as being "illegitimate," and in spite of a State Department retraction,
the South Africans thought its relationship with the United States was at an all time low.60
Vice President Walter "Fritz" Mondale met with Vorster at Vienna in May 1977.
He pointed out that since 1945 there had been a transformation in America that not only
affected the country domestically, but also its foreign policy. He claims to have made it
clear that, without obvious progress towards full political participation and an end to
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discrimination, including in Rhodesia and Namibia, the United States would not support
South Africa.

Mondale conveyed to the prime minister that there was a need for

progress on all three projects, and unless it addressed the political injustices the United
States would change its position of opposing mandatory sanctions.62 Vorster responded
by focusing on South Africa's internal problems. He screamed bloody murder and
accused Mondale of demanding a one man one vote solution immediately, which was not
the case. Despite reassurances from Mondale that the Americans understood that racial
tensions could not be solved overnight, the meeting ended on a bitter note with Vorster
interpreting the United States position as an attempt to meddle in the internal affairs of
South Africa. Vorster's position was clear on "citizenship." No African had the vote and
no foreign power could give it to him. On Namibia, some argue that Vorster and
Mondale set in motion a method of determining its independence which, according to
some observers, left real control to South Africa.63 Others claim that Mondale strongly
rejected any solution on Namibia based on ethnic representation based on the Turnhalle
initiative, a device that would have left real power in the hands of whites. The initiative
emerged from a conference held in the Turnhalle, a former German gymnasium, in
Windhoek, the capital of Namibia; and was composed of Namibian internal factions and
organized by South Africa.
Soon after, Young visited Pretoria and Johannesburg and further aggravated the
South Africans by the warm reception he received in Soweto where he talked about the
effectiveness of an economic boycott as a non-violent way of achieving one's goals,
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much like the American civil rights movement.64 The relationship with South Africa
deteriorated rapidly.
On August 6, 1977, the Soviet Union alerted the United States and shortly
thereafter France, Britain, and West Germany, that they had detected installations for
detonating an atomic explosion in the Kalahari Desert. The United States re-aligned its
satellite cameras and confirmed the information. It then issued a stern warning, along
with the Allies, not to proceed. South Africa categorically denied the idea of any
explosion and was publicly indignant about its treatment by the United States.
Nonetheless, President Carter informed the public on August 23 that South Africa had
assured the Americans that "in response to our own direct inquiry and that of other
nations, South Africa has informed United States that they do not have and do not intend
to develop nuclear explosive devices for any purpose, either peaceful or as a weapon, that
the Kalahari test site which has been in question is not designed for United Statese to test
nuclear explosives, and that no nuclear explosive test will be taken in South Africa now
or in the future."65 For years the United States had supplied atomic technology to South
Africa for peaceful purposes, and this presented a dilemma to the Carter administration.
If all nuclear cooperation ceased, the nation could lose an ally in the fight against
communism; but if South Africa United Statesed the technology to build weapons, the
country was contributing to nuclear proliferation, something it was bound not to do under
the nonproliferation treaty. For Carter, the country was also morally and ethically bound
not to spread nuclear technology that could be used for making war. And yet, the United
States insisted that it needed to retain a nuclear relationship in order to have influence to
64
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pressure South Africa to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.66 The administration
was clearly caught between power and principle.
The South African government was probably shocked and distressed that the
Americans and the Russians had found common ground for cooperation against it, and in
September Vorster announced new parliamentary elections, almost a year early because
he wanted a strong mandate to deal with "outside interference" in their internal affairs.
The issue of nuclear weapons continued to haunt the Carter administration. It was
divided in its approach, and while South Africa stated that it had no intention of
developing nuclear weapons, it nonetheless did not sign the nonproliferation treaty.
Experts disagree as to whether or not they actually conducted a nuclear test in 1979, and
when Reagan took office in 1981 the issue was still undecided.68
The murder of Steve Biko by the South African police provided a huge amount of
ammunition to South Africa's critics. In 1969, Biko, a medical student, was the first
president of the South African Students' Organization (SASO) which was a part of the
black consciousness movement. He was "banned" in 1973. Banning restricted him from
talking to more than one person at a time, but he continued to speak at various gatherings
and to publish his underground newspaper "Frank Talk." He was arrested on August 18,
1977, evidently for giving evidence on behalf of nine leaders of the Black People's
Convention (BPC), an umbrella body for the different organizations advocating and
teaching black consciousness, who were put on trial and sentenced to five and six year
sentences late in 1976. Detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, Biko's arrest in

66
67

Lockwood, "The Future of the Carter Policy toward Southern Africa," 14.
Study Commission on Southern Africa, 358, and the President's News Conference August 23,

1977."
68

Study Commission on Southern Africa, 361.

211
August 1977 was the beginning of the end of his life. He was held for 24 days during
which time he was routinely starved, interrogated, and beaten. His interrogation began
on September 6, and by 7:00 a.m. he had suffered a brain injury, the consequence of at
least three blows to his head, according to a neurological pathologist. He was moved 750
miles to Pretoria, naked on the floor of a police van. He died on September 12. The
deputy American ambassador to the UN broke off his participation in negotiations on
Namibia to attend his funeral. Representatives from other Western countries also came.
In all, more than 15,000 people attended his funeral, and Desmond Tutu, now a
prominent South African Anglican Bishop was one of the speakers. In addition, the
government began a crackdown on dissident blacks in October, arresting or banning
black leaders. Biko's death focused international attention on the racial oppression in
South Africa and fueled the unrest that began in 1976. The South African government
outlawed twenty black consciousness organizations and supporting groups, including
SASO and the BPC, detaining most of the leadership. The major black newspaper, The
World, and its editor was banned, as were white sympathizers. Moose gave strong
support to a House "resolution of concern" over the situation which passed
overwhelmingly. More concretely, the United States voted in the UN for mandatory
sanctions on arms transfers to South Africa in November 1977. UN Security Council
Resolution 418 declared arms trade with South Africa (but not apartheid per se) a "threat
to peace" under Article 39. In February 1978 the administration denied by Executive
Order export or re-export of any item to South Africa or Namibia if the exporter knew
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that the item would be sold to or used by the military or police. In addition, no major
weapons systems were transferred to South Africa under the Carter Administration at all,
unlike the Nixon/Ford years.71 Carter said that "what [had] precipitated the deepest
possible concern... was an almost complete abolition of any voices of dissent in South
Africa...."72
America had condemned the policy of apartheid for years in the United Nations,
but it was the Carter Administration that was able to effectively communicate the fact
that the United States actually meant what it said. Some in the State Department claimed
that country's policies were guided by political interests in the region, not strategic, and a
significant component of that interest pertained to human rights, not economic
concerns. Brzezinski would probably not have agreed with this assessment. The
relationship with South Africa was bound to deteriorate because of the message, and it
did. Not only did the message register with the international community, but the style of
the American delegation to South Africa changed as well. Carter had two ambassadors
over the course of his administration, William Bowdler and William Edmondson, both
career diplomats. The embassy sent observers to political trials on a regular basis, and
Bowdler attended the funerals of both Steve Biko and Robert Sobukwe, another activist
who was imprisoned for an indefinite amount of time for protesting the pass laws and
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who eventually, after gaining his freedom, died of cancer.74 The naval attache was
withdrawn, which also sent a strong signal of dissatisfaction, because the navy was
historically the closest service to its counterpart. After the October 19 crackdown, both
Bowdler and the commercial attache were recalled for "consultation." Communications
under Carter were not always welcome in South Africa. Statements such as "full political
participation" or "elimination of discrimination" were not clearly defined in the minds of
the South Africans, and this increased their frustration because it seemed as if the
Americans issued open-ended demands that nothing would satisfy except ceding political
power to the blacks. Over the long term this was probably true, but Mondale denied that
the United States expected immediate compliance. Because the administration tried to
avoid the accusation of meddling in South African internal affairs while simultaneously
nudging it down the path to majority rule, it was accused of sending contradictory
signals. Mondale, for example, spoke of the South Africans as "good friends," and
Brzezinski's statements about the communist menace in the region were confusing.
Brzezinski was convinced that the administration was not doing enough to satisfy the
blacks, while at the same time was doing so much that the whites were frightened into
intransigence. He also believed that the State Department did not appreciate the Soviet
threat in the region.75
Another source of confusion, one present in democracies especially, was the
diverse set of voices besides that of the government that spoke out about apartheid. The
American business community was one of those voices that were viewed as very
important by the South Africans. For example, Vorster went from his meeting with
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Mondale to speak to the Young Presidents' Organization, an international but mostly
American business group, where he got a standing ovation. And a month after the
October 19 crackdown, the United States Chamber of Commerce opened offices in
Johannesburg. The head of the Chamber's international division's opening speech
asserted that Washington could not ignore the stakes of American business in South
Africa, or the long historical association with it. He also declared that business could
differ with the politicians in Washington and trade with whomever it chose. Visiting
American politicians also muddied the waters. Barry Goldwater, for example, told an
audience in South Africa that he was "ashamed" of American policy in the region.76
Indeed, American business and their overseas affiliates had routinely violated the
arms embargo under previous administrations. Vast quantities of American arms were
supplied to both South Africa and Rhodesia in violation of the UN embargos of 1963 and
1966 through a variety of illicit and licit channels and were United Statesed to support the
white minority governments. Arms transfers can have a destabilizing effect on some
African countries because money spent on arms is not spent of education, health, and the
like. They can also be used to secure the loyalty of the military to a particular regime.
When Carter subscribed to a more rigorous embargo on South Africa (UNSCR 418) it
became important to close the loopholes that undermined the previous embargoes or risk
being seen as in complicity with the minority governments and the maintenance of the
racist status quo. Much of the materials were aircraft and support equipment, but large
quantities of arms were also shipped. Most egregious was the illicit export of substantial
supplies of advanced design 155-millimeter artillery shells that had a range that
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outmatched the Soviet-made artillery that had harassed the South African troops in
Angola. American officials said privately that enforcement resources were scarce and
jurisdiction was so fragmented that it was impossible to make the embargo air tight. But
by 1980, the State Department had taken steps to tighten up enforcement and the
president of the Space Research Corporation, the company illegally supplying the
artillery, had been convicted of violating the law and his company was in bankruptcy.
Another example is the Olin Company which was convicted in 1978 of selling 3200
firearms produced by its Winchester Division to South Africa by way of transshipment
points in Mozambique, Austria, Greece, and the Canary Islands.77 Because corporations
are usually driven by a profit motive, rather than sympathy for the white minority
governments, the burden for enforcement had to fall on the government. Carter, during
his tenure, tightened the enforcement procedures significantly.78
From the beginning, the administration supported the Sullivan Principles and
urged American businesses in South Africa to adopt them. They were devised by
Reverend Leon Sullivan, a director of General Motors.
The Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility is a voluntary
code of conduct built on a vision of aspiration and inclusion. The Principles are
inclusive in that they embrace businesses' existing codes of conduct and work in
conjunction with them. The aspiration of the Principles is to have companies and
organizations of all sizes, in widely disparate industries and cultures, working
toward the common goals of human rights, social justice and economic
opportunity. These Principles are truly unique; they apply to all workers, in all
industries, in all countries.79
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Moose observed that the principles came from the private, corporate world and
that they brought together voluntarily American companies pursuing common objectives,
and could be expected to survive a change in administrations. Richard Moose articulated
United States interests in South Africa as "Preserving our national consensus on foreign
policy goals relating to human rights and human dignity; assuring long-term access to
strategic minerals in South Africa and surrounding countries for our own and our allies'
economies and defense; and foreclosing opportunities for expanded Soviet influence that
come with protracted violent conflict."
American officials also quietly asked stockholders to pressure corporations, and
did not discourage or belittle private actions to reduce investments in South Africa, unlike
previous administrations. The administration emphasized that enlightened capitalism
could be a positive force for change. Young also subscribed to the Oppenheimer thesis,
the argument advanced by Harry Oppenheimer of the Anglo-American Company and
others that economic gains for South African blacks would lead to political and social
gains. Building a black middle class was the substitute for a redistribution of wealth or
American disengagement. Furthermore, Ambassador Edmondson encouraged South
African business leaders to express their apprehension about political policies that could
lead to a destabilization in the region. And the United States, along with Britain and
France, vetoed a motion to impose general economic sanctions on South Africa, a motion
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that came on the heels of the arms embargo resolution.81 There is strong disagreement on
whether sanctions are effective, and if they are, under what conditions.82
There is a compelling economic reason that suggests that the country needed to
maintain some degree of friendly ties to South Africa: the importance of oil. Throughout
the 1970s the Western world recognized how important oil was to its economic health.
Coupled with an increased destabilization in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, the
protection of the Cape route gained renewed interest. Although it would make more
sense for Soviet-inspired oil problems to occur at the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of the
Suez Canal in 1967 made the Cape route once again attractive and essential. After Suez
re-opened, large super tankers still needed to use the Cape route.
By the time that Carter left office in January 1981, South Africa was under assault
by the international community for its apartheid practices. Its economy had slowed, it
had to invest massively in its own arms industry because of the embargo, and it paid
more for oil because the Organization of Petroleum Exporting States (OPEC) had
embargoed it. Foreign investment dwindled because of the atmosphere of uncertainty
created by massive crackdowns on black activist groups. The regime was living on
borrowed time, which it got during the Reagan years. Desmond Tutu berated the United
States and its support of new constitutional proposals in 1982 and 1983 that were
designed to ensure that Colored and Indians could never outvote whites, in spite of their
being touted as a "reform" program. Bishop Tutu was not shy in his criticism, saying that
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the Reagan administration was "an unmitigated disaster for United States blacks."
country finally moved toward majority rule in 1990.

The

The first non-racial elections were

held in April 1994, and Nelson Mandela became president.
Namibia
The Carter administration had little time to stage its initiatives on Namibia. By
January 1977 Vorster's government in South Africa was taking steps in Namibia to
implement an internal settlement based on ethnically divided representation that would
give control to whites and the black minority groups that were dependent on them.
Ovambo, the ethnic group that constitutes about half the population and provides the
ethnic base for the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) liberation
movement would be at a severe disadvantage. This was contrary to UNSCR 385, passed
unanimously in January 1976, which demanded free elections under UN supervision,
recognition of the nation of Namibia, respect for human rights, the release of all political
prisoners, and an end to South African illegal domination of the country.85 The black
African states, frustrated at the South African lack of respect for previous UN resolutions
began to push for mandatory sanctions. While the Western nations could always veto any
such resolution, a veto would cause embarrassment and would have undone any attempt
to generate the goodwill among the African states necessary for the success of the
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Rhodesian negotiations. Vance signaled a change in United States policies in the region.
The United States organized the five Western members of the Security Council, West
Germany, the United States, Canada, Britain, and France to try and find a solution that
would fully satisfy the requirements of Resolution 385. Because of the personal
diplomacy of Andrew Young, the African states suspiciously assented. The Contact
Group, as it became known, began to create procedures for setting up elections under the
UN, and claimed that it favored no particular Namibian faction unlike Kissinger and the
CIA who had originally favored Clemens Kapuuo, Chief of the Herero tribe. The group
was successful in getting the South African government to put its plan for an interim
solution on hold. A year later the Contact Group presented its plan to both sides and
received "provisional acceptance." The key element was adopted by the Security
Council in July 1978, which gave the Soviet Union a chance to veto the plan. In the end,
the SU, in the face of pressure from the Front Line States, abstained.86
When the time came to move on the plan, South Africa balked. It objected to the
1973 UN General Assembly Resolution that declared SWAPO to be the sole
representative of the people.87 South Africa believed this to be a sign that the UN
intended to impose a SWAPO government, and stated that no negotiations within the UN
framework were possible. While international capital believed that SWAPO would
probably win genuinely free elections, it would prefer a SWAPO government via the
ballot box, and not via the barrel of a gun. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, agreed
that foreign investments were necessary, and its program called for a 51 per cent share in
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mining ventures. However, the Contact Group insisted that its effort was under aegis of
the Security Council, not the General Assembly, and it had not given SWAPO any
particular status, but was neutral. Negotiations were extremely complicated. Both sides,
SWAPO and South Africa, appeared to draw out the negotiations while searching for
ways to gain a favorable outcome. South Africa raided Angola almost at will, as well as
Zambia, and established new political structures inside Namibia in an effort to achieve an
internal solution. In early 1981, SWAPO reiterated its acceptance of the arrangements
made by the Contact Group, but negotiations in Geneva broke down. South Africa,
playing for time, refused to sign a cease-fire agreement, while Nujoma, readily agreed.
Although the plan seemed to be in limbo when Carter left office, the administration was
successful in moving South Africa a surprising distance towards withdrawing its forces
from Namibia.

Vance, who conducted the negotiations year after year, said that putting

the framework into place to negotiate Namibian independence and the progress that was
made, along with the Zimbabwe settlement were essential ingredients in undoing the
damage to Western relations with Southern Africa over prior years. The Carter
administration, by distinguishing between communism and nationalism, established the
process for improving the country's relations in the region and blocking the spread of
Soviet and Cuban influences.
Chester Crocker, assistant secretary of state for African affairs under Reagan as
well as the latter period of the Carter administration, pushed for a solution in Namibia,
believing that it would give the South African government room to move faster with its
own reforms. A settlement still hinged on persuading Pretoria to implement the plan
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adopted in 1978 by UNSCR 435 and agreed to by all parties, but which seemed
unachievable in 1982. Then the Reagan administration handed out two carrots: 1) a more
positive and reciprocal relationship if South Africa would agree to withdraw from
Namibia, and 2) the promise of a "parallel" withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as
part of an overall internationally-recognized settlement of the Namibian dispute.90 To
achieve this, Reagan began to have a closer relationship with South Africa, which seemed
to extend sympathy to the regime and thus contributing to an extension of its shaky
existence, much to the dismay of many. Nonetheless, South Africa finally agreed to
withdraw in 1988; Namibia gained its independence in 1990; and has been governed by
SWAPO ever since.91
Angola
Angola's post liberation history was a disaster even worse than the guerrilla war
with Portugal. During the last twenty years or so of Portuguese rule, there was genuine
economic progress. It grew most of its own food, was the fourth-largest producer of
coffee, and the export of diamonds, oil, and iron made significant contributions to its
national income. However, the civil war and its aftermath caused an economic
collapse.92 The early policy of accommodation with the white minority governments,
especially in the Portuguese colonies, forced it to face some unpleasant long-term
consequences after the Portuguese coup. As a NATO member, Portugal had expected its
allies to tolerate its policies, and the United States respected this in exchange for naval
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and air bases in the Azores. The Azores were a critical transit point for re-supplying
Israel during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Thus, the country was poorly placed
to be effective after Portuguese rule collapsed in influencing the actions of black leaders
whom they did not even know, let alone had helped. When it wanted to act in Angola, it
was forced to do so indirectly through the South African and Zairian regimes. This
opened opportunities to the Soviet Union.
The major obstacle to diplomatic recognition of the MP LA government by the
Carter administration was the presence of Cuban troops in the country. Young and
Vance accepted the MPLA, thinking that it was unlikely that it would be overthrown, and
viewed the Cuban troops as being a defensive weapon on Angola's behalf against armed
opposition from South Africa. The reason for the Cuban intervention in the first place
was to defend the MPLA. Vance and Young thought that a settlement could be negotiated
as part of the resolution of the Namibian question. But Brzezinski saw the Cubans as part
of an East-West problem, serving as Soviet proxies. His position prevailed. There was to
be no normalization of relations as long as the Cubans remained.94 Cuba was, no doubt,
willing to support revolutionary movements outside of Latin America with money,
political support, and training to guerrillas; but Cubans going abroad to fight usually did
so as individuals. In the case of Angola, however, Cuba gave support to a government
after it had seized power and was facing foreign invasion. At the time the Cubans first
arrived, Portugal still had some authority over the region, was negotiating with the
MPLA, and did not oppose the Cubans.95 Brzezinski's outlook was a continuation of the
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Nixon-Ford East-West view and his influence was unfortunate at this time because it
opened the door to the South African military action against Angola in May 1978. It was
nationalism, however, not communism, that was virulently on the loose in Africa - not
that the Soviets were not active. When asked what the United States could do about the
incursion into Angola, Carter responded that it would not send American troops into the
country, and that the United States wanted peace. 6 In June, the president was questioned
about the stark contrast between what Vance had said about wanting to negotiate with the
Neto government, and the CIA's request from the Senate for back-door weapons to the
rebel forces, which were also probably being supplied by South Africa. Carter
emphasized that there was no plan to send weapons, which would have been against
American law (Clark Amendment) and that no responsible person in his administration
would violate this. He said that negotiations or consultations had continued since the
beginning of his administration. He thought that
This is important, first of all, because we want to have peace in Southern Africa.
And Mr. Neto, who is the leader of the Angolan Government, (emphasis added)
has some influence on other African leaders, particularly the leaders of S WAPO,
where we want an agreement in Namibia. Also, we have wanted to hold the
Angolan leaders responsible for any future possible invasions into the Shaba
Province in Zaire.97
It seems clear that, while Angola had no official recognition, it had some de facto
recognition. Although Carter added that the country had no plans to normalize its
relationship with Angola, its foreign minister had met with Vance in New York a few
weeks earlier. Additionally, Carter said that he had no knowledge that the CIA Director
(Turner) had talked with Senator Clark until it broke in the news, but that he did not
96

AFP, "Reply by the President (Carter) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, May 4, 1978
(Excerpt)," Document 678.
91
AFP, "Replies by the President (Carter) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, June 26,
1978 (Excerpt)," Document 679.

224

intend to send weapons to Angola, either directly or indirectly.98 Once again, many
voices were speaking for the administration, and Carter was caught between power and
principle.
Angola's relationship with Zaire complicated the situation. There was a
rebellious faction in Zaire that fought for years against the regime of President Mobutu
Sese Seko (born Joseph Desire Mobutu) from the province of Katanga (subsequently
renamed Shaba). This was where the mineral wealth of the country was located.
Meanwhile Mobutu supported raids by the FNLA based in Zaire against the MPLA in
Angola. In turn, in a tit-for-tat move, in April 1977 and May 1978 rebellious forces
against Mobutu invaded Shaba from Angola. The country kept a low profile. At a press
conference, Carter reminded everyone of Vietnam and its effects on foreign policy. He
said that "we are suffering, or benefiting, from the experience that we had in Vietnam. It
would not be possible for the American people to support an invasion force.. .into the
Shaba region...." He said that "European or African nations, because of close political or
historical ties to Mobutu.. .are inclined to be more active in their help for him,
we... would certainly approve of that...." He went on to say that the country did not
intend to become militarily involved in the affairs of others unless its own security was
directly threatened, but that the United States appreciated the action that the French,
Moroccans, and Egyptians had taken. The country had already, under previous
administrations, sent aid to Mobutu, including C-130s, ammunition, fuel, medical
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supplies, parachutes, and so forth. One more CI30 was due to be delivered, along with
99

spare parts.
The second Shaba invasion in 1978 was more vicious. The United States, with
the backing of Congress, supported a rescue effort by the French and Belgians by
supplying transport in order to prevent a humanitarian tragedy. Carter asserted that the
government of Angola must shoulder a heavy burden of blame, along with their Cuban
military guests. He went on to call into question some of the restrictions placed on the
executive branch that kept it from acting promptly, and he told Vance to review the
restrictions.100
Testifying before Congress in March 1979, Moose laid out both economic and
humanitarian reasons for supporting Zaire. When the price of copper dropped on the
international market, Zaire's economy went south. This was exacerbated by
mismanagement and corruption. In addition, the two Shaba incursions across the
Angolan border succeeded in capturing the center of the copper and cobalt production. In
both instances, foreign forces pushed back the invaders. In addition to the economic
decline, natural disasters such as cholera, drought followed by heavy rains, and a crop
failure resulted in famine conditions for more than 400,000 people, and "seriously
affected an additional million in that region alone." Moose pointed out that the Zairian
government had constructed a framework for comprehensive reform, but it needed to be
implemented. American policy had already shifted away from balance of payments
support to projects and humanitarian assistance that would make a real difference to the
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people. The United States was stressing basic human needs, such as agriculture and
related infrastructure necessary for food production, and aid to refugees and the victims
of the natural disasters. Military assistance emphasized basics: communications,
transportation, and training - not sophisticated programs. Moose felt strongly that the
United States programs supported United States interests, both economic and political
stability and humanitarian concerns. American assistance was linked to Zaire's progress.
If progress stopped, then the country should review its policies.101
In 1980 Moose testified before Congress in support of Angola. Moose thought
that the presence of Cuban troops could be prolonged so long as the UNITA insurgency
continued, and this led some to think of Africa in East-West terms, which was not in
Africa's interests. He also believed that the lack of formal diplomatic relations
constrained American interests. He testified to Congress in 1980 that the nation could
not have expected a more cooperative and constructive relationship with any other
Angolan government. The United States absence ironically gave the Soviets greater
flexibility, and hampered American efforts to get a peaceful settlement between MP LA
and UNITA. It also impaired trade.102
But 1980 was an election year, and a strong challenge was being mounted from
the political right, which stressed that the United States should reassert its power in the
world. Carter, out of office in 1981, was unable to solve the Angola question and civil
war continued. It became a proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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The Reagan administration began its tenure first by alienating the left by its disposition to
favor South Africa as an anti-communist friend. Jeane Kirkpatrick received top South
Africans officials in her capacity as American Ambassador to the UN. The State
Department labeled SWAPO a terrorist organization, supported by Moscow. Later, it
was the right's turn to be aggravated, as the administration shifted closer to Carter's
policy of keeping South Africa at a distance. It seemed it was difficult to separate the
good guys from the bad. The region was so interconnected that it was like a Rubik's
Cube: move something on one side, and it dislocates something else on the other side.
Reagan and his advisors were most upset by the introduction of Cuban troops, viewing it
the start of increased Soviet activity in the Third World.103
With the diminishing of the cold war and the withdrawal of Cuban troops in 1989
the MPLA took fledgling steps toward a multiparty democracy. Free elections were held
in 1992 with the MPLA winning the UN-certified election over UNITA.104 The civil war
continued, however.105 On February 22, 2002, government troops killed Savimbi, and
April 4 rebel leaders signed a cease fire with the government, ending 30 years of civil
war.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Carter administration was moderately successful in Southern Africa. It tried
to work with, not against, the forces of change in the region. The American public had
little interest in the issues for their own sake, but was interested in re-gaining some moral
footing in the world. The administration's emphasis on human rights gave that back to
the public. The most obvious success was in Rhodesia where Carter was able to help the
British win majority rule. Carter's approach was regionalist, and the interest groups in
the country advocating majority rule helped him to maintain that perspective, at least
until the Soviet Union became very predatory during the last two years of his presidency.
The National Bar Association, the United Nations Association, Transafrica, and many
other organizations lobbied tirelessly to make sure that the administration did not lift the
sanctions on South Africa. They believed, as did Carter, that promoting civil rights at
home and majority rule abroad was the correct way to go. These groups allied with
Andrew Young, Richard Moose, and Anthony Lake, and the combined forces convinced
Carter that their moral argument was in the national interest.106 Carter also opposed
armed struggle as a means for transition. The repeal of the Byrd Amendment signaled
Rhodesia that the United States was losing patience. It cost nothing in the way of
strategic materials, since they would simply be re-routed through other countries. To
help ensure white minority support in the country, Carter got Congressional support for
the multilateral Zimbabwe Development Fund. He also secured $135 million for security
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support assistance for Southern Africa in order to influence the moderates in the Front
Line states.
A framework was laid out for Namibian independence during Carter's years,
although it did not come to fruition until later. Namibian independence depended on what
happened on South Africa, and Reagan's "constructive engagement" (a disingenuous
support for apartheid) delayed independence for Namibia.107 This policy was commonly
viewed as a failure, but some critics point out that when this became obvious, Reagan
changed direction, adopting an anti-Pretoria position, including sanctions. Reagan, in
this respect, was able to build on Carter's efforts in the region. Namibia became its first
priority. There were symbolic changes and a fair amount of noise; but what actually
changed was tactics, not goals in Southern Africa. The efforts centered on implementing
UN Security Council Resolution 435 which was the plan for Namibian independence
adopted in 1978 by all parties concerned, including South Africa, a plan that was very
much the work of the United States and the Carter administration.108
In Angola, Carter was able to avoid official recognition of the MPLA in order not
to attach itself to any particular liberation group until the civil war was over, a policy not
followed in the past, at great cost.109 It would have been impossible to involve itself
directly into the civil war, both politically and economically. The American public was
in no mood to put troops into the region because it would have been a replica of the
situation in Vietnam. It also would have been too costly. Congress had consistently cut
military funding during the Nixon/Ford years, and Carter already had to work
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exceedingly hard to convince Congress to increase funding. It began to do this in 1978,
but the real buildup came in 1979. Congress would not have countenanced spending in
this manner.
Although East-West concerns were evident, especially in Angola, this did not
totally define the administration's stance - nor should it have. Carter's emphasis on
human rights in its overall African strategy signaled a commitment to the non-aligned
states of Africa, and was bad news to the white south. Carter's strategy was logical since
the country could not expect to compete in the military field, but was well-placed to
compete economically.
Cuban troops were of some concern, but the Cubans were not the only foreign
troops in the region. American Allies, such as the French, Belgians, Egyptians, and
Moroccans were in Zaire, Angola's neighbor and enemy. The Cuban presence, along
with Soviet aid, is not too difficult to explain. The disastrous South African attack on
Angola in 1975-76, with American support, opened the door for Angola to seek help.
The crisis also allowed the Soviets to counter a growing Chinese influence in Africa.
Because of the disarray in American foreign policy following Vietnam, the Soviets
probably thought that there was little risk of American intervention. South Africa's
invasion legitimized the Cuban presence. Andrew Young saw them as an element of
stability in Angola, pointing out in Congressional hearings in 1976 that the troops had
been invited into the country by the legitimate government as a necessary response to the
South African invasion. Because African nations valued their non-aligned status, he was
certain that Angola would not allow itself to fall under Soviet domination. The Cuban
presence was the result of previous policy mistakes. Young also revealed that he had
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been asked by the MPLA representatives shortly before Angolan independence to arrange
appointments for them with members of Congress. They did not want to be forced into
the Marxist camp. Furthermore, Gulf Oil was surpassing its pre-war output of oil, in
large part because the operations were guarded by Cuban troops against attacks by the
Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC).110
For South Africa, Carter represented a nightmare because part of his strategy of
strengthening the non-aligned, majority rule states would lead to the eventual end of
white rule in South Africa. It no longer had an interest in working with the United States
to bring about a transition to majority rule in Rhodesia or Namibia. While Namibia did
not become independent on the Carter administration's watch, independence was
delayed, not thwarted, and the forces at work in the region were also slowly undermining
the white regime in South Africa.
Carter also protected United States strategic interests quite well. For example,
the Cape route continued to be safe from predators, and the super tankers continued to
transport oil to the West. The South African press began to talk about its regional role as
a "bulwark of stability and of Western economic interests," 1 '' This appealed to a rapidly
rising right. Those who expected immediate gratification, with the white "dominoes"
falling quickly, were doomed to disappointment. But South Africa's perception of the
right's criticism of Carter's policies encouraged the South African government, and its
course of action sustained the Cuban presence in Angola by its support of UNITA. Their
goal was to use UNITA against SWAPO in Namibia. In carrying out this policy, it went
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to great lengths to keep the relationship between Zaire and Angola hostile. This
strengthened the Soviet's hand in the region.112
Some have accused Carter and Young of perceiving the problems of Southern
Africa in the same light as the struggle for black civil rights in the American South,
expecting that increased corporate penetration would lift the standard of living for all,
while chipping away at apartheid.

Whether he equated the black struggle in Africa to

the American civil rights movement or not, Carter's policies were successful, although
the work was not finished when he left office. Probably the most important thing that led
to the eventual fall of the minority governments was getting the issue on the international
agenda. By signaling that his administration meant it when it condemned apartheid,
Carter set in motion a train of events that, in the end, proved impossible to derail. There
was a better relationship between many of the states of Africa and the United States in
1981 than before Carter took office that was good for everyone concerned. Apartheid's
days were numbered, American interests were secure, and Carter's policies were
responsible for this - an outstanding example of his ability to balance power and
principle.
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CHAPTER VI
SUCCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of history, the Middle East has been a rich mixture of
different cultures, religions, and peoples. It has also been the crossroads of exchanges
between East and West because of the trade flowing along its rivers and over its deserts.
Ideas about morality and justice that have been of significant influence on Western
civilization also developed here. The children of Abraham, patriarch of the Jews, began
their lives in a way that has become symbolic of the modern Middle East. First born
Ishmael, son of the slave woman Hager, was cast into the wilderness with his mother
when his brother Isaac was born; the privileged son, heir to his father's name and wealth,
son of Sarah. From this unhappy circumstance there arose a mythology which has
become the story of a never ending series of crises in the region during the twentieth
century and beyond. This chapter examines the successful efforts of the Carter
administration to broker a peace between Israel and Egypt. It argues that the success
came because of the vast amount of work and attention that Carter himself devoted to the
issue, as well as the tireless work of his foreign policy team led by Cyrus Vance and
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Patience, negotiation, and prudence won the day. Carter, the
idealist as well as the engineer, had a vision of a comprehensive peace for the Middle
East, and a clear understanding that this would be in the national interests of the United
States. His ideals stemmed from his deep religious faith and a strong sense of the
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inseparability of personal and governmental morality1. He believed that peace would
clearly help to avoid another oil embargo, and dampen down acts of terror perpetrated by
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). While his vision for a comprehensive
peace ultimately failed, he succeeded in brokering a peace between Israel and Egypt that
has held until today. This effectively removed the Egyptian army from further ArabIsraeli confrontations, but it did not mean there would be no more wars. The Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 put an end to that hope. Carter also convinced the Israelis to
allow the Palestinians to participate in the negotiations about their future and has
recognized their basic rights. Carter got little praise from the press, a hostile and abusive
press for him, for his efforts that led to peace between Egypt and an independent Israel
for the first time in 2000 years.
The Setting
The Six Day War in 1967 was another of many turning points in the politics of the
Middle East, especially in the struggle for territory, which Israel believed would enhance
its security. During this war, Israel took control of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the
West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel now faced three major problems. First, they now
controlled a vast amount of territory, acquiring it almost overnight. Second, a million
hostile Arabs now lived under Israeli rule. There would be no peace - the political
confrontation began "even before the guns fell silent."2 Ironically, a war that Israel
overwhelmingly won has resulted in almost endless warfare, with countless acts of
terrorism and brutality endured by both the Palestinians and Israelis. In 1967 the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 242, which represented the consensus of the
1
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international community that lasting peace could come in the region only through a
bargain between Israel and its Arab neighbors - land for peace. There were different
interpretations of 242, however, with Israel believing that it would withdraw from some
land, but not all occupied territories. The problem festered. Between 1967 and the 1973
Yom Kippur War, the United Nations, with American support, tried unsuccessfully to
bring the parties together. War broke the stalemate. The Egyptian-Syrian attack on Yom
Kippur, plus the oil embargo of that year, changed the landscape. Although defeated, the
Arabs made decent military gains and recovered their self respect. The oil producers also
began to recognize their economic power over the West. It was a wake-up call for the
United States, which realized it could no longer leave the problem to someone else,
thinking that others would solve it. To be effective in its diplomatic initiatives with the
Arabs, it needed to show some sensitivity to the Palestinian problem. Furthermore, there
was an intensifying influence of the SU in the region, which was unacceptable. The US
began to be an active intermediary between the two sides. When Carter took office he
reviewed the policies of his predecessors, and he, Vance, and Brzezinski agreed that a
more comprehensive approach was needed, rather than the piecemeal process pursued by
Kissinger. Any effort would have to give serious attention to both sides. Because of the
historic close US ties to Israel and the massive amount of military aid extended in the
October War, there was a danger that many could interpret Carter's ideas as a signal that
the US was moving toward the Arab side and pressuring Israel to make dangerous
concessions. But Carter always believed in Israel's right to exist. The danger was in the
perception that the US might be abandoning it. The plight of the Palestinians was the
foremost human rights problem in the region. A solution to it almost certainly meant a
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Palestinian homeland and some sort of self determination. Carter, because of his
fundamental commitment to human rights, was the first to think about what this would
mean in a concrete way. It was an ambitious agenda, and the situation was fraught with
danger.3 But Carter, like Truman before him, did not flinch from the task He would use
the power of the US to achieve what he believed was a high moral principle and
something that was in the strategic interests of the United States.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The unrest in the modern Middle East bubbled to the surface during and after
World War I with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. British and French policies in the
region led to conflicting claims about who would rule the area after the war. The Balfour
Declaration of 1917 muddied the waters even further, with the promise of a homeland for
the Jews to be located in Palestine. Although the British had no particular interest in
ruling Palestine, the League of Nations mandate to do so fell to them. There were
problems from the beginning and terrorist activity on all sides.4 The problems escalated
after World War II, and intensified further with the establishment of Israel in 1948. The
American public, stirred by the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis on the Jews during the
war were highly favorable to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Harry Truman,
president of the US in 1948, was driven primarily by humanitarian concerns in his
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support of the Jews, although politics undoubtedly was a factor in that election year.
When reminded of the critical need for Saudi oil in the event of war, Truman responded
that he would base his decision on justice, not oil. There was no doubt, however, that
Truman faced enormous pressure from both the State Department and the Joint Chiefs to
maintain good relations with the oil-rich Middle East.5 As the debate on the United
Nations Special Committee on Palestine proposals moved forward in the General
Assembly, the resolution creating Israel seemed doomed to failure. The Truman
administration put incredible pressure on heads of states and their representatives,
cajoling Senators and Congressmen and even Supreme Court Justices to send telegrams
urging them to support the resolution. On November 29, 1947, the UN General
Assembly voted 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions, to partition Palestine. Even the Soviet
Union voted to approve. This gave legitimacy to the Jewish claim to self rule, and the
State of Israel was declared on May 14, 1948. Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, would later accuse the British of giving away in the Balfour
Declaration that which "was not hers to give," and the General Assembly of "partitioning
what it had no right to divide - an indivisible homeland... ."6 War with the Arabs in 1948
gave Israel an uneasy victory.7
Every succeeding president has tried hard to deal with the challenges and
complexities of the Middle East. For years the Arab-Israeli conflict had seemed frozen in
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time. But in the Six Day War in 1967, Israel defeated Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and
gained military superiority. The US was reluctant to get too deeply involved (the
Vietnam War seemed more demanding) but did reach some fundamental conclusions that
became the basis for the peace "process" that has continued into the present. The US
believed that Israel was entitled to more secure borders than the 1948 armistice line, and
that some sort of binding end to the war should be put into place. If the Arabs agreed,
they would get back most of the land lost in 1967. This became the basis for UN
Security Council Resolution 242.8 After the Six Day War, there was a period of favoring
Israel almost exclusively, something that any number of presidents has referred to as "the
special relationship."
Strategic Concerns and the Nixon Administration
Both Nixon and Kissinger were troubled by Soviet power and decided to
challenge it in strategically important areas whenever possible. They were also prepared
to offer the Soviets a closer relationship if they would stop their hostile behavior.
William Rogers, Secretary of State, thought that cooperation with the SU in the Middle
East in bringing the two sides to the bargaining table had merit. Kissinger disagreed. He
wanted to postpone negotiations until the SU could be squeezed out of any influential
role in the region.10 There were three competing national interests in the region. First
was the containment of the SU; second, oil - its prices and stability of supply; and third
the US special commitment to Israel. The combination of interests confounded most
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policymakers.11 In December 1969 Rogers offered a comprehensive settlement to the
Arab-Israeli issue, which became known as the Rogers Plan. It was rejected outright by
the Israelis. It was the last comprehensive plan offered. Anwar Sadat, president of
Egypt, was anxious to get the Israelis out of Sinai, but his pleas for help from the US fell
on deaf ears. He said that no one "paid any attention to the February 1971 offer of a
peace agreement with Israel where Israel could withdraw in stages.. ,."12 He booted the
Russians out of Egypt.13 US presidential elections were held.in 1972, Israeli elections in
1973, and then the Watergate scandal began to creep up on Nixon. So, again, nothing
happened. Golda Meir, prime minister of Israel, was content with the status quo, as was
Kissinger, and did not think that Kissinger wanted to invest his time in the negotiating
effort. Sadat prepared a Plan B, which was a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel.14
The unfinished business of the Six Day War needed to be settled, and if it took an attack
on Israel to get the United States' attention, then so be it. The Egyptians were convinced
that no one was listening to them. It seems obvious that Nixon and Kissinger missed a
key opportunity to move forward on Middle East issues. Kissinger blamed the State
Department,15 a convenient whipping boy.
The attack on Yom Kippur initially resulted in stunning victories for both Syria
and Egypt. Meanwhile, Sadat convinced Saudi King Faisal to embargo oil against the US
and other Western countries. Arab oil producers announced a 17% increase in the price
of oil, and that oil exports to countries "unfriendly" to the Arab cause "would be reduced
11
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by 5% each month until Israel evacuated the territories it took in the 1967 war." In
December OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) raised the price of oil
again, making it 387% higher than it had been before the October War. By some
estimates, it cost the US 500,000 jobs, more than $10 billion in national production, and
caused rapid inflation. Long lines formed at gasoline stations and the self serve pump
was invented. Nixon gave a nationwide radio address in which he said that Americans
were not going to have to pay $1.00 a gallon for gasoline or $1.00 for a loaf of bread.
These were simply scare tactics devised by his enemies. A national truckers' strike,
consumer prices going through the roof, a severe decline in the Dow Jones average, and
an obsession with Nixon't unpaid taxes, brought more woe to the president on top of the
Watergate crisis.16 The rising price of oil resulted in the largest peacetime transfer of
wealth in history. Unstable and reactionary regimes were now awash in petrodollars,
with long term consequences which contributed to the rise of transnational terrorism.
There were long term negative consequences for the oil producing states as well.
Because the embargo caused worldwide inflation, it drove up the prices of finished goods
that they imported from the West. They also lost the trust of people worldwide.17
The lack of consultation on the war also soured Transatlantic Alliance relations,
especially when the Nixon administration put the US military on the highest alert
possible, without informing either friends or foes, shocking and upsetting all. And
recently released British documents reveal that the US was prepared to invade the oil-
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producing areas of the Middle East, if necessary.

The administration also released a

massive amount of arms to the Israelis that it had been withholding in order to force
Israel to accept the October 12 cease-fire; and the US announced a $2.2 billion aid
appropriation for Israel on October 19. After the war was over Kissinger engaged in his
famous "shuttle diplomacy" which produced two withdrawal agreements between Egypt
and Israel (1974, 1975) and one between Israel and Syria (1974). These initial successes
led Faisal of Saudi Arabia to lift the oil embargo, and alleviated tensions between the US
and its European allies and Japan. However, Kissinger by-passed the UN as well as the
Russians in his diplomacy and promised different things to different factions. For
example, he told the Israelis that if they gave up a little, pressure would ease on them
from the international community and on the US as well, lessening the need for further
concessions. He told the Arabs the opposite: that if they accepted the small offering that
Israel made, it would lead to further concessions.19 Kissinger's basic premise after the
October war was that the US need not choose between Arab and Israel. Because of the
US-Israeli special relationship the Arabs were compelled to deal with Washington, not
Moscow. A credible alternative to war needed to be offered to the Arabs, and their
interests would compel them to deal with the US. Kissinger was a good negotiator, and
he developed specific techniques to produce the limited agreements. He further showed
that power and diplomacy go hand in hand. But he mostly acted in secret, something that
came to be looked on as untrustworthy. He did not, however, deal with the Palestinian
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issue, although he knew that it would have to be addressed at some point. That would be
left for the Carter administration to try to tackle.

243

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
New faces came to power in both the US and Israel in 1977. Carter became
president of the US in January and Menachem Begin, the new prime minister of Israel,
took office in June. By this time it was clear that US policy vis-vis the Middle East had
evolved from an exclusive relationship with Israel into dual track diplomacy.20 Within a
few days of taking office, the Carter team began talking about Middle East policy. This
year seemed like an opportune moment to construct a peace because the Arab states most
directly involved seemed ready for serious negotiations. Saudi Arabia had played a key
role in encouraging the Arabs in 1976. Although Carter faced no crisis, Lebanon was still
unstable and one American ambassador had been murdered and another had to be
recalled. The oil situation seemed constant, although another embargo was always
possible, a fact that was never far from the minds of those in Washington.21 Egypt and
Saudi Arabia both urged the US to take advantage of the lull. Israel also seemed ready,
although not necessarily as eager, understanding that Resolution 242 could produce
special challenges. The Middle East is one of the riskiest regions to tackle for a president
because there is always the very substantial risk of failure. Carter clearly understood this
when he chose to become so personally involved in trying to secure and Israeli-Egyptian
peace. The official framework under which the administration was to work was the socalled Geneva Conference which had been set up by the UN under the Nixon
administration. If and when it convened, it was to be headed jointly by the US and the
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SU. The Israelis and their Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, were all to
participate. The framework itself was problematic.22
Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel when Carter took office, was under
serious attack as he faced re-election in March. However, the Israeli Labor Party had
ruled the country from its birth, and it did not seem likely that this would change. They
would be tough negotiators, but were willing to compromise. Labor was a known
element. A sense of urgency surrounded the entire situation, because negotiations had
stalemated, the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis were only three years in the past,
along with the dangerous US-Soviet near confrontation and the high alert.
Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, the major decision makers, all agreed on the
fundamental outlines of what peace would look like; all agreed it was in the national
interest to pursue this; and all settled on the fundamental approach. The basic shell was
outlined in a study conducted under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, with
Brzezinski, Vance, and William B. Quandt, a well known expert on Middle Eastern
affairs and a member of the National Security Council, all playing major roles in its
drafting, and to which Brzezinski had been a signatory.23 Everyone concurred that an
international peace conference, with all parties present seeking a full peace agreement,
was preferable to the piecemeal process pursued by Kissinger. Carter was willing to
invite the PLO to the conference provided they accepted Resolution 242. This
administration believed security for Israel would come in the form of treaties rather than
territory, so Carter believed that Israel would make serious territorial concessions in order
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to get a treaty with the Arabs granting it diplomatic recognition, thinking that Israeli
settlement policies in the occupied territories were not productive. Carter's ideas were
thus aligned more with Sadat than with either Rabin or Begin.24
It was decided that Vance should visit the Middle East to begin discussions on
procedures and substance.

There was no rush to set up a conference at Geneva at this

point; rather the US should seek a concurrence of the parties based on broad principles
which could then be put into place incrementally. The Soviets would be kept informed of
what was going on, but should not be directly involved at this point. However, there
emerged a shade of difference between some who were skeptical of a Geneva conference
as well as of Soviet involvement, and those who believed in these ideas. Vance left for
the region in February 1977, visiting the leaders, sounding them out, and making sure
they understood that the US had some ideas of its own. Sadat, Rabin, King Hussein of
Jordan, and Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia all were invited to Washington to meet
Carter, and Vance also raised the possibility of a meeting between Carter and Asad,
president of Syria. Vance reported to the NSC that all parties he had consulted with said
they were ready for a peace agreement, were willing to go to Geneva, and were ready for
preliminary discussions before the convention. The thorny issue at this point was how to
include the Palestinians. One idea was for the Arabs to send a single delegation, with the
PLO as part of it; Sadat suggested that they could be represented, perhaps, through the
Arab League. The Israeli foreign minister, Yigal Allon, told Vance that no Israeli
government would agree to talk to the PLO as long as it was committed to the destruction
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of Israel. Vance asked if they would be willing provided the PLO accepted Resolution
242, and the minister said yes. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to use their influence
to convince the PLO to do this, and Egypt even said it would urge the group to change its
covenant which called for Israel's destruction. For his part, Carter had little sympathy for
the Arab's refusal to make peace - some of them even refused to use the word - and he
also believed that Israel would have to come to terms in some way with the Palestinians
as well as the PLO.26
Vance also informed Rabin that the US would not honor President Ford's promise
of high-percussion cluster bombs to Israel. This was probably because the Carter
administration was in the process of reviewing its arms transfer policies in general.
Vance, unlike Kissinger, was not secretive and he would not camouflage the
disagreements he had with the Israelis. Rabin was dumbfounded. Already, the US had
irritated the Israelis by forbidding the sale of Israeli-manufactured Kfir fighter bombers to
Ecuador because they were equipped with US-made engines. The administration did not
realize that for the Israelis security rested on military and strategic concerns, not peace
negotiations or political matters.27 Later, in May 1977, Vance assured Israel that the
arms transfer policy which the administration had been working on would not hurt Israel.
"We have made it very clear that we have a special relationship with Israel. We are
committed to the security of Israel; and, as we have in the past, we will in the future make
sure that Israel has the defense articles necessary to preserve that security, including the
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advanced technology which will be required. I want to make that very, very, clear."28
On the other hand, Sadat repeatedly called for the US to use its leverage in this area to get
Israel to make concessions.
Geneva Conference or Separate Peace
Washington knew that Sadat might object to a conference with a comprehensive
approach to peace. His agenda, according to some, was to get a separate peace with
Israel, in order to get economic aid from the US. This, in turn, would give him more
influence with the US and help to stabilize Egypt as well as his own regime. There had
been serious unrest in the country in January 1977 when the government raised prices for
staples in order to reduce its subsidies on the goods. Israel, for its part, was determined to
keep the Golan Heights and the West Bank and had no intention of including the PLO in
the talks. The most Rabin or Begin would tolerate was a separate peace with Egypt, and
neither really favored a comprehensive settlement. Syria favored an international
conference that included the Soviet Union, and although it accepted Resolution 242, it
was not particularly interested in a conference unless the Arabs presented a united front.
Carter thought that successful negotiations on a comprehensive plan were possible and
saw no need for an agreement on principles up front. Sadat, however, worried that the
negotiations could bog down without pre-negotiations. Sadat wanted a comprehensive
peace plan as well as a conference, and also wanted to remain America's primary Arab
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friend.

This made him and Carter very compatible, with both favoring a comprehensive

plan, both favoring a re-convened Geneva Conference, Carter's desire to solve the
problem, and Sadat's wish to have the remainder of Sinai returned to Egypt sooner rather
than later. Neither was opposed to Soviet involvement, at least to some degree.
The next phase of the administration's efforts focused on trying to break the
impasse on several substantive issues. Carter was willing to speak out publicly as well as
discuss the issues privately. This was different from Kissinger's approach, which was to
negotiate in secret, and much more like Woodrow Wilson who believed in "open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at... ."31 In spite of his openness, or perhaps because
of it, the press did not warm up to Carter, probably preferring to continue their
"investigative" reporting of their imaginations. This willingness to be so public vexed
both Arabs and Israelis, and contributed to Rabin's suspicions of the US. On March 7-8,
1977 Rabin visited Carter for serious discussions on substantive issues. The meeting did
not go smoothly possibly because he had low expectations to begin with.
Rabin Meets Carter — The Second Phase Begins
Rabin was born in Jerusalem in 1922 and was indoctrinated into the violence in
Palestine at an early age. In 1936 there was an Arab general strike, along with bloody
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riots, and the pupils in his school served as messengers in the conflict, then were trained
to use arms. He was 14. After his graduation he was recruited by the Haganah, the
underground military arm of the Jewish Agency in Palestine. In 1941, the organization
decided to cooperate with the British against the Axis powers. He was convinced that
when the war was over the Jews would have to fight for their lives in Palestine, and to do
this effectively, there needed to be an independent Jewish force. He participated in raids
to free illegal Jewish immigrants from Europe and later fought in the war for
independence. This was not a man to take Israeli security for granted.34
According to Vance, the chemistry was poor between Carter and Rabin, and
Israeli elections were breathing down Rabin's neck. He was also afraid, because of
Carter's principle of openness, that anything he said in the White House would make its
way to the media. Carter could be embarrassingly public. Rabin seemed less flexible than
when Vance and he had met in Jerusalem. Rabin argued that the US and Israel should
present a united front to the Arabs and extract concessions. Carter pointed out that the
Israelis needed to consider going to a conference with a single unified Arab delegation.
This could be disastrous in the eyes of the Israelis, because it would leave out the
possibility of exploiting the traditional parochial differences among the Arab states.
Carter also warned that Israeli recalcitrance in the peace process would be repudiated by
the American public, and cautioned that it would be a blow to US support for Israel if it
refused to participate in the Geneva talks if the PLO was included. Carter said that he
was unpleasantly surprised at the first meeting by Rabin's reticence on exploring new
ideas. When Carter asked Rabin to articulate Israel's "real or fallback" position, Rabin
felt trapped. Rabin preferred the Kissinger way; and felt threatened by Carter. Kenneth
34
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Stein, a Middle East expert, argues that Carter took the Brookings Report, a consensus
document without Israeli input, and "forced" it on Rabin, believing its conclusions to be
fair and equitable. Carter later told him in a personal interview that he "was looking
forward to meeting with Rabin as kind of a peg on which I could hang my whole Mideast
peace ambitions. And Rabin was absolutely and totally uninterested, very timid, very
stubborn, and somewhat ill-at-ease. The fact was he had no interest at all in talking about
negotiations. It was just like talking to a dead fish."35 Publicly, Carter repeatedly
emphasized that solutions to the problems in the Middle East had to come from the Arabs
and Israelis, not the United States.
The principles involved in the process had little good to say of any substantive
progress in the talks between Carter and Rabin, but subsequent examination of the record
reveals that both Carter and Rabin contributed thoughtful ideas to what might be possible
in future negotiations. However, a misunderstanding broke out shortly after the talks
were concluded, on the issue of borders and security. Rabin said publicly that Carter had
supported the idea of "defensible borders" for Israel. Carter, for his part, did not want to
appear to be giving Rabin a blank check, so the White House clarified the US position.
Carter further explained the American position in a press conference on March 9 in which
he distinguished between internationally recognized borders and "defense lines."36 This
incident led some to believe that a crisis was developing in US-Israeli relations, and some
speculate that this could have contributed to the Labor Party's defeat in the March
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elections.37 It was as if any move toward a balanced approach to the problem contributed
to the perception that the United States was going over to the Arab side; and it proved
difficult for Carter to give Israel the assurances it needed while trying to approach the
problem in a more even-handed way. However, it was not Carter's public style that drove
the Labor Party from power - it was domestic issues of scandal, improprieties, the
residue of the Yom Kippur War, and Rabin's inability to exert strong internal party
leadership, among other things.38 Besides, the Egyptians and Israelis both engaged in
public rhetoric about the negotiations when it served their purpose, which usually meant
that the White House had to clarify the US position.
The Ideas Begin to Crystallize
Very shortly after his meeting with Rabin, Carter articulated his ideas about what
steps were necessary for peace in the Middle East. First of all, Israel's neighbors needed
to recognize its right to exist. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors needed
to be open to trade, tourism, travel, and cultural exchange so that the people themselves
could form mutual understandings which could ensure peace, no matter who the leaders
were at any given time. Second, permanent borders needed to be established for Israel
that would satisfy the security needs for all parties. That was a matter to be negotiated.
Third, the Palestinian issue had to be addressed, from both a political and a humanitarian
perspective. They, also, needed to recognize Israel's right to exist; and there had to be a
Palestinian homeland created.
37
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Arabs were generally encouraged." This even surprised some in the administration,
because it was not in any briefing book; and infuriated others, inside and outside of
government, because they believed Carter had given the PLO a very great gift when he
spoke of a homeland for the Palestinians. Carter had two basic assumptions. First, the
plan needed to have a comprehensive framework; and this meant that it must build on
previous agreements on basic principles. Second, he believed that genuine security for
Israel was more a function of its political relationships with the Arabs than of its military
might. This could only be possible within the 1967 borders, with minor modifications,
since no Arab state was willing to make peace unless most of the territory captured in the
Six Day War was returned. His final assessment was that Egypt, the country most
willing to make peace, would be willing to do so only if some broader peace process was
underway. Sadat himself strongly argued this point.40
Sadat Meets Carter - The Second Phase Continues
Sadat is described by one of his biographers as a practical visionary, an "Arab
prophet, who was determined to see an end to the Arab-Israeli bloodshed. He was
contemptuous of those Arabs who still preached the end of Israel. He was a peasant by
origin, believed in honesty, loyalty, dependability, and common sense, all attributes, in
his mind, of the peasant. He met Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1938 while they were both
members of the Egyptian army stationed in the Sudan. Together with other army officers
they formed the Free Officers revolutionary organization which was anti British and anti
monarchy. Sadat had a fairly checkered past. Not only did he work to get the British out
of Egypt, having no qualms about shooting British soldiers, he also had no qualms about
attacking and murdering Egyptian politicians whom he thought were traitors to Egyptian
40
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ideals. During World War II the British threw him in jail, but he escaped. In 1952 the
Revolutionary Officers succeeded in seizing power. Sadat became vice president in
1964, and president in 1970 after Nasser died. He was constantly trying to comprehend
what his role was in transforming Egypt into a modern, peaceful, and prosperous state.41
He found part of his identity and role in a peace accord with Israel.
Carter describes his first meeting with Sadat as a "shining light" that burst on the
scene for him; "a man who would change history and whom I would come to admire
more than any other leader." Carter found him to be a courageous leader who would not
shrink from the idea of having to make bold and difficult decisions. They grew to be
friends and trusted each other.42 Vance has similar observations about Sadat. He also
felt that he had a broad strategic perspective of the world and a strong sense of his role.
Vance also observed that because Sadat trusted Carter, he consistently took steps that
Carter said were essential, and because Carter trusted Sadat, he repeatedly took political
risks to keep the negotiating process going.

Brzezinski seemed to have a more

jaundiced view of the Sadat-Carter relationship, believing that Sadat was a shrewd
manipulator and remarking that "he played Carter like a violin." Brzezinski also related
that Carter had told him that Sadat was like a brother. Because of this trust on both sides,
Sadat depended on Carter to represent and uphold Egyptian interests, reserving, of
course, some of this responsibility for himself. As a result, Sinai grew in importance,
while the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and Jerusalem diminished somewhat. Carter
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had no comparable relationship with any other player. This made Israel even more
44

nervous.
Carter's meeting with Assad of Syria in Geneva also seemed problematic to the
Israelis. Assad was less open to direct negotiations with Israel. Because of the perceived
close ties to the SU, Syria was not consulted on much of anything except the Golan
Heights. Assad was open, however, to an international conference because this would
allow Syria to try to thwart a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. The Syrian
foreign minister who was in on the meeting said that "Carter left a comfortable
impression, an impression that showed he wanted to obtain a solution on a moral basis."
To some, this meant "the Israelis giving and the Arabs taking." Later, Asad turned cold
to the entire process and soon sabotaged the Geneva talks by refusing to attend, and later
still, he tried to prevent the Camp David agreement from being implemented.45
Sadat proved willing to accept the fact that peace with Israel entailed the
exchange of diplomats and full recognition; and the Israelis seemed willing to withdraw
from the West Bank, at least in private, although were adamantly opposed to an
independent Palestinian state there. They also were open to the idea that security did not
necessarily require significant territory beyond the 1967 borders. All talked about the
need to solve the Palestinian problem if there was to be peace in the region, and the Arabs
confidently predicted that the PLO would soften its stance towards Israel. So, by mid
1977, in spite of Carter's feelings of frustrations, his peace initiative was well underway.
44
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Then, on June 21, 1977 Menachem Begin became prime minister of Israel after his Likud
Party won elections in May. He was somewhat unknown in Washington, but the
administration was aware that he opposed any territorial compromise with Jordan
regarding the West Bank and the Palestinians. He was also committed to settlements in
the occupied territories. There would be no warm relationship with Begin as there was
with Sadat. No mutual support for risks taken.46
Carter Searches for Support
Brzezinski was confident that Carter could get substantial support from a large
segment of the American Jewish community for his efforts, which he needed, precisely
because Begin was so extreme. The Jewish community, however, went in a different
direction. The administration realized that it needed to actively pursue American Jewish
leaders and get them on board with the peace process. Although Carter did not have ties
to the Jewish community in the US, his vice president, Mondale, did. Oil always was the
silent partner in the room, however, which of course, gave the Arabs, especially the oil
producing states, clout in Washington. Carter subsequently met with Arthur Goldberg,
former Supreme Court justice and ambassador to the United Nations under Lyndon
Johnson. Brzezinski suggested that he become an unofficial emissary to the Middle East,
but Vance objected, or as Brzezinski said, "Cy did not relish sharing the Middle East with
him."47 This points once again to the intense rivalry between the NSC and the State
Department. Carter writes that he faced similar problems with both the Arabs and the
American Jews. Privately both said they supported the peace process, publicly this was
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not so.

The "homeland for the Palestinians" remark was of special concern to the

Israelis as well as their American counterparts, because the situation was enormously
complicated. Where would it be? In territories Israel gained from other countries in the
1967 war?49 Carter understood that he needed more support for his ideas from those in
his own party, but not everyone was willing to speak up because of the power of the
Israeli lobby.50 Carter turned to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who was a friend Israel knew
it could count on. Humphrey, in their initial meeting gave Carter full support, and
returned the next week with other legislative leaders. There were additional meetings
including one with Tip O'Neill, Speaker of the House, as Carter lined up needed support
for his ideas, especially in light of the imminent meeting with Begin. Most congressional
leaders, although not all, were supportive. He also met with American Jewish leaders to
explain his ideas, and believed that their concerns were at least partially addressed51.
Begin Meets Carter
Begin had pushed for Israel to claim the entire region called Palestine in World
War One, namely both banks of the Jordan River, including present day Jordan. Begin
was a Pole who joined the army to fight the Nazis during World War Two. He landed in
Palestine in 1942 and, after his discharge in 1943, stayed in Palestine and took over the
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leadership of the Urgun Zvai Leumi, a guerrilla organization that wanted to get the
British out of the region. He was forced to go into hiding to avoid capture by the British
for what some called his terrorist methods.

He was branded Public Enemy No. 1 by the

British and had a $30,000 price tag on his head.53 When he took power in 1977 it
provoked an outrage, especially in Britain, as if it were still 1948. '"Israel's founding
father reaps the rewards of terrorism," wrote Louis Heron in the London Times,."' CBS
branded him an ex-terrorist, but then had to apologize.54 He talked incessantly about
Israel's claim to the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria as he called it.
"Kind.. .Honest.. .Dangerous" was how Time Magazine described him. 55 The Israelis
knew they had elected their first ideological prime minister. Israel, he said, would not
ask any nation for recognition, saying, "We were granted our right to exist by the God of
our fathers, at the glimmer of the dawn of human civilization nearly four thousand years
ago." He sought a different "recognition," one that was "required between ourselves and
our neighbors: recognition of sovereignty and of the common need for a life of peace and
understanding. It is this mutual recognition that we look forward to. For it we shall
make every possible effort."56
Carter and his advisors thought his initial meeting with Rabin went badly, and the
administration girded itself for the meeting with Begin, which could have been a
nightmare. Carter, however, took the proper approach, and it ended up a far more cordial
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encounter than the meeting with Rabin. Begin was considered by some to be a political
outsider, and had been criticized by David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister for
his prior activities in Urgun. Begin, therefore, craved acceptance, both from his fellow
countrymen and the American president. This might make him susceptible to flattery.
Different people in the administration had different advice for how to treat him: His
thinking was that if the US gave Begin support, he would seem to be a strong leader,
different from Rabin.57 Honey attracts more than vinegar; that was the plan.
Carter had expected that Begin would be tenacious, but he was also quite
stubborn. For example, when Carter asked for flexibility on the West Bank issue, Begin
unrolled a national security map of the region, explaining that it would be foolish to allow
Arab artillery back into the area, and linked his reasons back to the Nazi Holocaust.
When Carter advised him not to go through with the huge settlement he planned for the
West Bank and the other occupied territories, Begin gave him a prepared list of how
many American cities with Biblical names there were in the US, and asked him what he
would say if the governors of those states said no Jews were allowed in those cities.
Israeli embassy officials accompanying Begin understood that this could not be the last
word. When they returned to Blair House, the presidential guest house, they asked him
what he was going to do. Begin responded that "he would build the settlements as
planned. The Americans, he predicted, would turn cold for six months, then they would
CO

revert to normal."

Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, Sadat's foreign minister thought that any

comprehensive peace Sadat pursued had to include a solution to the Palestinian problem.
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This was vital.59 In the end there was no solution for the Palestinians, and there has been
trouble and terrorism ever since.
The issue of how the negotiations should proceed went smoother. Begin was far
more flexible on this. There is some disagreement on whether or not Begin was also
interested in discussing substance. According to some, Begin thought the US should not
involve itself in the substance of the differences between Israel and the Arabs, but should
limit its role to facilitating the meeting. He suggested "proximity talks" in which there
would be direct negotiations between the parties, facilitated by a mediator if necessary.
This was a mechanism proposed by the US in 1972 to get the parties to begin talking.
Previous Israeli governments wanted the US directly involved; but Begin seemed the
opposite, possibly because he suspected that the US was now closer to the Arab position
than in previous times. Unfortunately for Begin, the US was very far along in developing
its own ideas as to what was necessary for a settlement. Five principles had been
developed by July when Begin visited, and these were discussed at the meeting. First, the
peace should be comprehensive. Second, Resolutions 242 and 338 (which fundamentally
said that 242 should be implemented) were to be the bases of negotiation. Third, the goal
of peace was to be normal relations, not just the end of belligerency. The fourth goal
dealt with borders and withdrawal from territories in stages; and the fifth concerned
Palestinians and their rights, including a means "to permit self-determination by the
Palestinians in deciding on their future status." Begin rejected outright the fifth point on
the Palestinians; and insisted that the US not discuss the issue of borders, either publicly
or privately, or the fact that it favored withdrawal to the 1967 lines, with minor
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modifications.

During the evening session when Carter and Begin were alone, Carter

agreed not to mention the borders issue publicly, if Begin would show restraints on
settlements. This compromise was necessary in order to calm things down before the
Geneva meeting. It probably also reflected a subtle shift in thinking on Washington's
part, namely accepting the fact that little progress could be made until the parties
concerned talked with each other, given the wide gap between Begin's attitude and that
of even the most moderate Arab leaders. Begin was adamant about the West Bank
settlements. The disagreement over this was fully evident by the end of the Camp David
negotiations, and this tended to poison US-Israeli relations until Carter left office. The
first meeting, however, ended on a positive note, with both Begin and Carter avoiding a
mutual confrontation. Brzezinski took a more negative view of the meeting, saying it
"did little to advance the prospects for peace" because Carter was too soft on Begin.
Nonetheless, there was a growing consensus that emerged from the meeting: the idea
that another Egyptian-Israeli agreement was possible. '
The PLO and Representation
Vance began to focus on the issue of PLO representation at Geneva. He began to
lean towards the idea of a single Arab delegation, which would include Palestinians.
Israel was adamant in its refusal to deal with the PLO as a separate delegation. The PLO
is an organization that grew out of the Palestinian resistance movement that opposed the
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massive growth in immigration of the Jews to Palestine during the 1930s and in the
aftermath of World War II, as well as the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This
resistance movement was disorganized and spoke with many voices, all of whom had the
common goal of driving out the occupiers of Palestine. But in 1964 the Palestine
Liberation Organization was formed in the Jordanian portion of Jerusalem, and the
resistance movement became more united in both its deeds and its thoughts. The PLO
became the most authentic voice of the Palestinian people. In 1968 Yasir Arafat of the
Fatah movement became its leader and in 1974 the United Nations recognized the
organization as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. It has taken "military
action" against both Israelis and other people, civilian and military, and is well hated by
the Israelis. The ideology of the PLO developed slowly, but moved from the idea of total
destruction of Israel to de facto acceptance of it. It did not, however, accept Resolution
242 until 1988, although there is some disagreement on this.62 This was problematic for
the Israelis.
The Israelis were willing to deal with the Palestinians if they were part of the
Jordanian delegation, but Jordan had no intention of representing them. It agreed with
the Syrian position that a common Arab front was the best idea, primarily as a way to
prevent unilateral moves by Egypt. Egypt, for its part, was flexible, but did favor a PLO
delegation. This was an important difference between Egypt and its Arab neighbors. In
August 1977, Vance left on an important trip to the Middle East. He took a revised five
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principles with him, taking into consideration Begin's comments. The principles still
included the idea of a "Palestinian entity" which Begin had rejected. Just prior to
leaving, Simcha Dinitz, the Israeli ambassador to the US went to see Vance on Begin's
instructions. Begin had not meant that Resolution 242 required withdrawal on all fronts
- that was not what he had meant by "withdrawal from occupied territories." Begin
planned to pursue a solution that would not include withdrawal from the West Bank.
Vance was furious at the "backsliding from an agreement we had reached." Dinitz also
said that unless the US changed its position on Palestinian representation to specify that
they could only be represented as part of the Jordanian delegation, and drop all reference
to the PLO, then Israel would agree to none of the principles. Vance held his ground,
saying that the US would present the principles as they were and inform the Arabs of the
Israeli position. He also would inform the Arabs that the US did not accept the Israeli
position as the only way the Palestinians could be represented. Vance reported this to
Carter, but almost immediately Dinitz returned and said that Begin asked that Vance not
tell the Arabs the Israeli views on the question of borders. Although the US position was
clear, Carter had promised that there would be no more public statements, but Vance said
the US would continue to state its views privately. Carter was committed to principle of
evenhandedness - the US would not join Israel in ganging up on the Arabs.63

The

Americans began to increase pressure on the Israelis. Vance proceeded to the Middle East
and called on leaders in Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, and
offered suggestions on how the Palestinians could be represented at Geneva, as well as a
new idea of some form of trusteeship for the West Bank and Gaza.

Vance, Hard Choices, 185, 186.

Sadat was concerned about the turn from substance to procedures prior to Geneva.
Sadat presented Vance with a secret draft of a peace treaty Egypt was willing to sign. He
asked Vance to get the Israelis to draft their own treaty, and then the US could broker a
compromise. Sadat made handwritten notes on further concessions in the margins,
.perhaps to convince Vance that he was serious and flexible, except on land and
sovereignty. He used this tactic repeatedly. Vance was encouraged to believe that the
PLO was ready to change its position on Resolution 242. He recommended that Carter
publicly repeat that the US would negotiate directly with the PLO if it did this, even with
reservations. Carter did this a few days later. By the time Vance got to Israel, his
reception was less than warm.64 Begin was highly critical of the US, both publicly and
privately, for offering any deal to the PLO; and suggested that Vance's offer to talk to
their representatives if the organization accepted Resolution 242 was comparable to
Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler. Under no circumstances would Israel talk
with the PLO if they were at Geneva. If there were Palestinian Arabs in the Jordanian
delegation, so be it; but if they were from the PLO then Israel could not accept this. He
also ruled out the idea of a single Arab delegation at Geneva. Begin did, however, tell
Vance his idea about offering "our Arab neighbors in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza full
cultural autonomy" and choice of Israeli citizenship with full voting rights. The Israelis
did agree to draft a treaty as well, and further meetings were scheduled in New York in
conjunction with the UN General Assembly.65
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The Russians Are Coming
In September 1977 US policy evolved further as the administration pursued four
parallel goals that were potentially conflicting. The first strand was to get the parties to
write draft treaties. Israel wrote a treaty, but left the questions of settlements in Sinai and
borders obscure. Jordan and Syria eventually submitted a set of principles that they
thought should govern any peace settlement. A significant aspect of this exercise was
that it forced the players to think in concrete terms. The second thread was the effort to
find a solution to the Palestinian representation issue. At one point the PLO seemed on
the verge of accepting Resolution 242, with reservations, but Arafat could not deliver and
it fell through. In early October Sadat informed Carter that the PLO agreed to be
represented by a Palestinian who was not a member of the PLO. By then, everyone had
accepted the idea of a single Arab delegation, so this point seemed to be resolved. The
third center of attention was the effort to develop some sort of understanding among the
parties involved about the procedures of the Geneva talks. Sadat was still committed to
the notion of prior preparations in order to avoid a hopeless stalemate. He was afraid that
if there were no prior understandings the other Arabs could hamper his ability to
maneuver, and that the US would be subject to the omnipresent pro-Israeli pressures of
US public opinion and Congress. Moshe Dayan, Israeli foreign secretary, however,
thought that a unified Arab delegation was a formula for stalemate. The American
position was to get everyone to accept a unified Arab delegation, and thus get the
Palestinians to the table. After the opening session at Geneva, at which time the Arabs
would appear to be a single delegation, the participants would break up into essentially
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bilateral groups, except for the discussions of the West Bank and Gaza. Both Egypt and
Jordan would discuss those areas with the Israelis. The main problem seemed to be to get
the Israelis to agree that the Palestinians should be at the talks in their own right, not just
as part of the Jordanian or Egyptian delegations. The fourth area concerned the SU. As
the conference became more concrete the US had to figure out the role of its co-chair.
Some procedures had been crafted in December 1973 when the conference first met, but
it was clear that the Soviets now wanted a larger role. In September 1977 they presented
a draft of a joint statement to Vance, a document using the language of Resolution 242,
while not specifically mentioning it by name. The only difference between it and the US
position was that the Soviets referred to Palestinian "rights" whereas the US referred to
Palestinian "interests." A document was soon crafted to the satisfaction of both sides,
and the only question seemed to be how and when to release this joint statement. They
believed that a strong joint statement might pressure the PLO and Syria to stop haggling
over procedural details and enter negotiations based on an invitation from the two
superpowers. Little thought was given to Israeli reaction. They were given a draft in
September and Dayan's initial reaction was "restrained."66
The Israeli concerns centered on several potentially troublesome elements. First,
the SU would co-chair the convention; and they were clearly pro-Arab; second,
Resolution 242 had not been specifically named in the communique; third, the
convention was to meet before the end of the year; and fourth, it spoke of Palestinian
rights. Unfortunately, the administration did not pick up any warning signals from

66

Interview with Farouq Qaddoumi ('Abu Lutf), Head of the PLO's Political Department
[Excerpts] in "[Documents and Source Material] Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict," 175. The PLO reaction was the statement "contained positive indications" regarding a solution;
Quandt, Peace Process, 187-188.

Dayan, so when the communique was released on October 1, no one expected the
explosion that followed, both from Israel and its American supporters. The Israelis and
American Jews were "apoplectic," accusing the administration of "betraying their basic
commitments." Neither Carter nor Vance had covered their political flanks on the issue not having fully briefed Congress or the press, or having consulted with the American
Jewish leadership. With Dayan having been given a draft on September 29, Israel had
the time to inform their friends as to what was coming. The most controversial thing was
not what the document said, but the fact that the Soviets had been brought on board so
prominently. Neoconservatives, both Democrats and Republicans, who were both pro
Israel and anti Soviet, took the opportunity to attack the administration. Liberals also
attacked the statement because they believed it pressed the Israelis too hard on the
Palestinian issue. From the perspective of several years, one questions what the hoopla
was all about, but in October 1977 Carter was under extreme pressure from the Israelis
and their American friends.67 The neoconservative hype was just that - hype. According
to David Korn, a member of the policy planning staff at the State Department, "The
Russians caved in on just about everything we wanted because they were concerned that
Sadat was going to leave them out." Besides, Sadat was angry with Moscow. Carter
understood full well that there would be some political fallout in issuing the
communique, because it advocated legitimate Palestinian rights, and this was a step
towards a Palestinian homeland. Carter acted on his principles. Believing this was in the
US national interest, he saw no need for permission from either Israel or Egypt. Carter
could take consolation, however, in the fact that not just the Israelis were squirming, but
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Syria as well. Sadat, according to some reports, termed it a "brilliant maneuver." By this
time he had set up a secret channel to communicate with the Israelis, and he did not want
the Syrians to thwart his plan to deal bi-laterally with the Israelis if necessary. He did not
want to appear to be abandoning the Palestinians, however, so he was pleased that the
communique referred to their rights as well as a call for them to be involved in the
Geneva conference.

Palestinian representation at the conference was a primary concern

for him. He wanted them to take some responsibility for their future and relieve Egypt
from the charge of making a separate peace with Israel. Privately, Sadat sent a verbal
message to Carter informing him that Arafat had agreed that the head of the Palestinian
delegation in the unified Arab delegation to the conference would be Edward Said, an
American professor at Columbia University of Palestinian origin69
Carter, however, backed away from the communique under pressure from the
Israelis. As scheduled, he addressed the UN General Assembly and took the occasion to
reassure Israel that there was no change in basic policy. He then met with Dayan for
several hours. This was October 4, and it marks a turning point for the evolution of US
policy. Domestic politics came to the front burner with unforeseen consequences. The
UN speech reaffirmed the US commitment to Israeli security, saying it was
"unquestionable," with "borders that are recognized and secure," and defined Palestinian
"rights" within the broad context of his commitment to human rights. Furthermore, it
was up to the parties to decide how these were to be defined.70
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In the meantime, Egypt and Israel already were talking directly. Dayan met with
an aide to Sadat, Hassan Tuhamy, in Morocco in mid-September, at Sadat's initiative.
They agreed that the US would be the prime mediator of Geneva, with the SU playing a
subordinate role. Although the US was unaware of this, it added a further jolt when the
US-Soviet Communique came out. The talks were nothing new, Israelis and Arabs had
made similar contact with each other over the years. So, when the US found out, no red
flag went up. Later, it seems obvious that Sadat was beginning to hedge his bets, fearing
that Syria and Geneva would put him in a straightjacket. The US consistently
underestimated the amount of distrust between Egypt and Syria. With so many strategies
going on it was inevitable that something would go awry. The US-Soviet Communique
was the fuse that lit the bomb. All the pent-up anxiety now exploded, fed by the
neoconservative, pro-Israeli, anti-Soviet circles. What was perhaps a minor political
error mushroomed into something of vast significance - something that would reestablish
the SU as a major player in the Middle East. The Israelis played Carter's discomfort with
amazing skill; and it resulted in an extraordinary public fight.71
The Road to Jerusalem
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Some say that Sadat's decision to go to Jerusalem in November 1977 evolved
directly out of the communique. The evidence on this is not overwhelming, however.72
Sadat was still leery of a Geneva Conference at which actual negotiations would take
place without a prearranged framework. By opening his direct channel with the Israelis
he prevented the Geneva conference from becoming a Soviet-Arab trap. He seemed
assured that if he signed a separate treaty with Israel, Egypt would recover most of Sinai.
After Carter's speech at the UN, Sadat seemed to believe he could nothing more than this
with US help, so he went out on his own. If this is correct, then the crucial turning point
in his thinking was not the communique, but the meeting between Carter and Dayan on
October 4. Dayan had termed the communique as totally unacceptable, but said that
Israel would go to Geneva anyway, on the basis of Resolution 242. Carter replied that
Israel did not have to accept the communique. Dayan then asked Carter to reaffirm
publicly all past US commitments to Israel, and said that if he did not then Israel might
feel compelled to publish them. He also wanted a statement that the US would not
pressure Israel to accept a Palestinian state. Carter did not want to make any such
statements, but said that the US would not pressure Israel. Dayan then stated that he
would have to say that he had asked and Carter had refused - a thinly disguised threat.
The next day Dayan and Vance worked out a formula for Palestinian representation, with
Dayan probably moving further to the US position than he had been authorized. Dayan
also wanted to announce an agreement on Geneva between the US and Israel. This
would quiet down the uproar, both in the US and Israel. Vance was nervous about this,
and in the end the two sides presented a joint "working paper." Begin cabled two
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reservations to the agreement the next morning, which was "particularly annoying" to
Dayan. The Arabs interpreted it as a retreat in the face of the power of Israel and its
American lobby.73
Later in October, with his patience running thin, Carter sent a handwritten note to
Sadat, urging him to act boldly. The time had come because of the impasse between
Egypt and Syria over forming a joint Arab delegation. Sadat responded within the week.
His idea was to convene a super-Geneva conference in Jerusalem, and the attendees
would the heads of state of the permanent members of the Security Council, as well as
the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, and the PLO. Carter was cool to the
flamboyant venture. Sadat began planning a solo plan about Jerusalem, and this time he
did not tell Carter. He sought the advice of several foreign leaders, including President
Ceausescu of Rumania, the Shah of Iran, and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. He confided
to Ceausescu that he wanted to test Israeli intentions directly. When his intention to visit
Jerusalem was publicly revealed on November 9, Washington was again caught off
guard, and once again it had to adjust its policy because events in the Middle East were
beyond its control. Sadat had revolutionized Middle East diplomacy. Official
Washington admired Sadat for his courage, but wondered what his next step would be,
given Begin's intransigence on the Palestinian issue and the negative Arab reaction.
Begin's first reaction was disbelief, but Sadat reiterated his commitment in an interview
with Walter Cronkite of CBS. He soon got a formal invitation. When he addressed the
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Israeli Knesset on November 19, it was broadcast to an audience of millions. He and
Begin granted joint interviews to the American press, he was seen shaking hands with
Israel's leaders, exchanging gifts with Golda Meir, and visiting Israel's memorial to the
Holocaust victims. Meir characterized his visit "as if the Messiah had almost arrived." He
most certainly had extended an olive branch to Israel. Carter praised both men, saying
that "If any two leaders on earth have the strength and the determination and the courage
to make progress toward peace in the most difficult region that I have ever known, it is
Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat."74
Towards a Separate Egyptian-Israeli Peace
By December, a consensus had formed in the administration that it should
strongly support Sadat and his efforts, but also that the US should continue to push for as
broad a peace as possible. Its policy would focus on some sort of West Bank, Gaza
accord and would fundamentally ignore Syria for the most part and the PLO as well.
Vance went to the Middle East, visiting various leaders and trying to redefine American
strategy. He told Begin that Egypt would sign a separate peace with Israel as long as it
was accompanied by a "declaration of principles" on the Palestinian problem and defined
an approach to negotiations with other Arab states. This was the hypothetical basis for
Camp David.75
Shortly after Vance's return, Begin invited himself to Washington to see Carter.
Vance had just seen him a few days before, and no new ideas were presented, but Begin
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said he had proposals to discuss with the president before he met with Sadat in Ismailia
on Christmas day. Some in the administration thought Begin's purpose was to try to get
a US endorsement of his ideas prior to sharing them with Sadat. This was exactly the
case, and it shows the amount of power the US still had over the peace process. Carter
told him that the Sinai suggestion looked promising, but added the reservation that there
could be parts he did not fully understand. This became a source of friction because the
Israelis said that Carter had approved the proposal even though it stipulated that Israeli
settlements would not be removed. Begin also proposed that the people in the West Bank
and Gaza establish "administrative autonomy," hold their own council elections, and
choose between Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. The issue of sovereignty would be left
open. Begin was strongly encouraged by the administration to modify his plan. There
were several problems. First, the proposal was intended to be permanent and this meant
that those territories would not revert to Arab rule. Second, the plan contained a level of
detail that would annoy Sadat. Begin did not want to alter his plan, but he was eager to
win US approval. In spite of saying he did not need US approval on how to negotiate
with Sadat, he did imply that he would consult with his cabinet and make modifications.
However, he promptly and publicly made a statement that came very close to saying the
US had approved of his ideas, which required a clarification on the part of the US. 76
There were both positive and negative elements in Begin's proposals. One of the
positives was the willingness to set aside Israel's claim of sovereignty over the West
Bank and Gaza for five years; the idea that a special administrative regime could be put
into place in those territories; and his suggestions on equal rights and responsibilities for
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Arabs and Israelis. However, some of the most positive points were dropped prior to his
meeting with Sadat. The two men gave different accounts of that meeting. According to
the Israeli story, Sadat was ready to accept the proposals and issue a common declaration
of principles, but was stopped by hard-liners in his Foreign Ministry. Sadat, for his part,
said Begin had not grasped the importance of his trip to Jerusalem, and was haggling over
sovereignty. His caustic tone indicated there was little else to talk about. The two men
decided to convene a military committee in Cairo and a political committee in Jerusalem
to move the talks forward.77 Carter and Vance believed that there needed to be on-going
negotiations for the US to use its influence and if there was to be progress. A meeting of
the political committee, at the foreign minister level, was set for January. Sadat's new
foreign minister was Mohamad Ibrahim Kamel, and he made his first trip to Jerusalem.
The objective as stated by the US was a formula calling for "the right of the Palestinians
to participate in the determination of their own future." But Sadat, abruptly called his
delegation home, perhaps because of Kamel's anger at a toast given by Begin at dinner
on the first night, but this is not altogether clear. Vance went home to try to forge a new
approach.78 Sadat and Begin would not meet again until Camp David.
Immediately after the meeting at Ismailia with Sadat, Begin allowed new
settlements in the territories, so the US decided that it was critical to get him to agree to a
freeze. Carter and his advisers cooked up a scheme, along with Sadat, to do this. The
administration developed a nine-point document which outlined a series of general
principles that, hopefully, the Egyptians and Israelis could agree on as a foundation for
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negotiations. Sadat was to prepare a hard proposal of his own, present it to Begin (who
was sure to reject it), then Carter could step in with the nine-point plan. That way, he
could argue with both sides, which would protect his flank at home. Sadat was to
moderate his stance first and accept the American proposals, which would put Begin on
the spot. Sadat loved it.
The Best Laid Plans
The plan went awry, however. The calendar, which aimed for an American
proposal by mid year, was thrown off by the battle in Congress of selling advanced
aircraft to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The sale of the F15s for Saudi Arabia proved
to be exceedingly controversial, and Carter and his team spent an enormous amount of
political capital and time to get it through. As expected, the Israeli lobby objected
strenuously. Since the Kissinger initiative toward Egypt in the mid-seventies, the US had
a growing security stake there, and the economic importance of Saudi Arabia to the US
commanded close security ties. Both Saudi and Egyptian pressure induced the
administration in mid-February to announce the sale. Brzezinski relates that there was
some indication that if the US would not make the planes available, the Saudis would
turn to the French for the equipment, at the expense of the US. The proposed sale was
presented as one package, and the administration made it known that it would not allow
the omission of any one country by a congressional veto. This was designed to paralyze
the Israeli lobby, which put enormous pressure on the administration as well as on
Congress. Brzezinski tells that he urged the president not to give more planes to the
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Saudis and Egyptians together than to the Israelis, but Carter decided to increase the
number of planes to Egypt to 50. This was probably because of his irritation with
Begin's position on the settlements in the occupied territories as well as his relationship
with Sadat. The administration worked hard to get Congress on board and was
moderately successful, except for Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. In any case, the sale went through in May, albeit by a small
margin of votes. The entire issue delayed progress on other fronts, including the ArabIsraeli situation.80
In mid-March, in the meantime, there were major developments in the Middle
East which affected the diplomacy. Following a civil war, Lebanon found the southern
part of the country trapped in a web of rival Palestinian groups, Israeli proxies, and Israel
itself which often acted in concert with Maronite politicians and paramilitary groups. In
mid-March, 1978 Israel invaded south Lebanon because of increased PLO terrorist
attacks emanating, according to some, from the region. Begin sent Carter a letter
informing him that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) were moving into southern Lebanon
to destroy PLO bases and that his arrival in Washington would be delayed. The Israeli
attack was a massive one that brought most of Lebanon south of the Litani River under
temporary Israeli control. It gave Israel the chance to establish a buffer zone held by
Christian militiamen under the command of Major Saad Haddad along their border. This,
however, did not solve the problem of the PLO in Lebanon, which became more and
more tied to Palestinian sentiment on the West Bank. This bolstered the prestige of Yasir
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Arafat; he seemed to be the only one who understood the frustration of the Palestinian
people.81 Israel technically withdrew after intense efforts on the part of the UN Security
Council, although it continued to support the Christian militia. Then, in April, in
response to congressional inquiries, Vance sent a letter to Congress informing it that
Israel's use of American military equipment in its invasion of Lebanon may have violated
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). This act stipulates that arms transfers from the
US may be used only for defensive purposes. If the letter said that the violation had
occurred, the President could have suspended all military assistance to Israel. The US did
protest Israel's "use of cluster bombs... in violation of its agreement with the United
States to use this antipersonnel weapon only when attacked and only against military
targets" Israel's Defense Minister, Ezer Weizman, admitted that this had been a mistake.
The administration was very careful and conservative in its accusation, not wanting to
provoke a counter-crisis, especially since Israel seemed to be withdrawing from Lebanon.
Later, in June, the US received information that it had left behind, with Haddad, some
armored personnel carriers and artillery pieces. If this were true, it would be a blatant
violation of the AECA. The Israelis flatly denied this, but it seems to be true
nonetheless.82
A few pieces of US military equipment might be a small thing, but the principle
involved was huge. Carter sent a "terse, blunt message to Begin" telling him that if the
equipment were not removed at once, he would inform congress immediately that Israel
had violated the AECA. The letter went to Begin, not the Israeli government, so that he
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could act quietly, if he wished to do so. This was certainly an attempt to allow Begin to
reconsider without embarrassment, a favor which was not returned. Begin removed the
equipment immediately.83 Carter was very effective in using US power to uphold a basic
principle.
The PLO attack against Israel changed the atmosphere of the peace talks. It
strengthened Begin's position and refocused the American Israeli lobby on security rather
than the peace process. Begin visited Washington on March 21-22 and the discussions
were confrontational. Vance relates that Carter was frustrated over the "semantics"
engaged in by both sides. Talks ended on the first day when Carter bluntly said that, "in
his opinion, the obstacle for peace was Israel's obvious intention to retain perpetual
control over the West Bank." Carter felt that the opportunity for peace was slipping
away. Dayan had accompanied Begin and had spent time talking with Vance, and
presented the same hard line. Carter decided it was time to either fish or cut bait. Unless
Begin changed his position he was becoming an "insurmountable obstacle to further
progress." Carter began to inform congressional leaders of the status of the talks, and
some of them subsequently met with Begin and confirmed what had been labeled Israel's
"six no's." No withdrawal from the West Bank; no stopping new settlements or the
expansion of existing ones; no withdrawal of Israeli settlers from Sinai, no
acknowledgement that Resolution 242 applied to the West-Bank-Gaza areas, and no
willingness to grant the Palestinian Arabs real authority.
Next, Sadat was shaky in carrying out his part of the plan. In his public
statements he made it seem that the US was more pro-Arab than it was. His proposal,
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when it same, was too general to be of much use. By mid-June the administration had
devised an alternate set of proposals. In July, however, Fritz Mondale, on returning from
the Middle East, began to question the very public diplomacy of the administration.
According to Brzezinski, he proposed a return to the Kissinger style of shuttle diplomacy
and even suggested Kissinger be appointed to negotiate the issues. Brzezinski discussed
this with Vance who told him that he "would resign if the President even considered it."8"
By midsummer no one felt that the plan would work, but Carter and Vance
remained committed to the idea of a US proposal. As the Americans gradually moved
away from the US-Egyptian strategy, Sadat seemed to be trying to foment the crisis into
which Carter could step with the US proposal. The summer wore on with endless
meetings and no real progress. Then, in July American, Egyptian, and Israeli foreign
ministers met at Leeds Castle in Kent, England, which helped to lay the groundwork for
the meeting at Camp David two months later. A highly secret plan was developed under
the direction of Vance. Carter subsequently proposed a summit at Camp David. His
advisors were leery at first of the idea, but once the leaders committed themselves, they
could not afford to fail. Neither could they afford to let the negotiations deadlock, which
could possibly lead to another war and another oil embargo. Camp David was secluded
from both the press and the everyday business of governing.86 Carter had spent
enormous political capital on both the arms transfer legislation and the Panama Canal
Treaties, two successful policies that were perceived negatively by much of the
electorate. An agreement on the Middle East would strengthen his standing. And the
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outer limits of that agreement would be defined by what Begin was willing to accept. He
knew that both- Sadat and Begin wanted an agreement on Sinai, and Carter wanted to
facilitate it. This could possibly help to mitigate the negative domestic political climate.
If he failed, it would be a disaster. An agreement, however, was worth the risk.87 Vance
was dispatched to the Middle East to invite the two men to Camp David in September.
Both accepted.
The Camp David Summit
Carter did not believe that the gap was too wide to bridge between Egypt and
Israel. He thought that if the two men could meet in a quiet setting and get to know each
other, they would find a common interest in peace. Carter was undoubtedly influenced by
the biblical history of the Middle East, seeing Abraham as the common father of three
great monotheistic religions. This, plus his strong beliefs about the rights as well as the
ties of humanity itself most likely convinced him that peace had a chance.
Carter's basic intent was in achieving an Egyptian-Israeli accord and the summit
would be a crucial test of whether Carter could persuade Begin to make some
concessions. Carter read Sadat correctly, believing that his top priority was regaining
Egyptian land, and would not be insistent on very much for the Palestinians. His advisors
did not see it that way, however. In any case, Sadat still wanted the US as an arbiter and,
at the least, to present its own plan.. That is, he and Carter would coordinate their
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positions and he would help Carter manage Begin. Sadat, evidently, told the Americans
that he wanted a US-Egyptian agreement more than an Israeli-Egyptian agreement.88
Begin came to the talks politically stronger than either Sadat or Carter. His
militant supporters would back him no matter if there was success or failure. Not so with
Carter and Sadat. Begin's only fear was that Carter would blame him publicly for any
failure and turn American public opinion against him. Carter, however, repeatedly
assured him that he would never threaten to cut military or economic aid to Israel as a
way to pressure it, and he also assured the parties involved that the Americans would not
impose their own plan. Everyone brought their own world view, a personal style, a
gaggle of advisors and a strategy. The key players were a Jew, a Muslim, and a
Christian, all devout in their beliefs. Both Sadat and Begin wanted Carter to side with
them, so this put Carter into a pivotal position.89
Vance and his subordinates concluded that there would be an inevitable clash
between Sadat and Begin over territory, and thus the success or failure of the meeting
would hinge on how this was handled. Sinai did not seem to be an insurmountable issue,
although they underestimated just how tenaciously Begin would try to hold on to Israeli
settlements there. The three most complicated issues would be the West Bank, Gaza, and
the Palestinians. The working group believed that Sadat would try to exchange major
Egyptian political and security concessions for Begin's commitment to withdrawal from
occupied territories. Sadat was sensitive to the charge of selling out the Palestinians and
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the Arab cause, and was therefore eager to link any bi-lateral agreement with Egypt to the
Palestinian issue. He backed away from this when he found little American support. He
and Carter were worn down by Begin's intransigence on Israel's claim to the West Bank.
With no linkage to the Palestinians Sadat could refuse to negotiate, or if a bilateral
agreement was reached, he could find himself isolated in the Arab world which would
slow the peace process for years to come. Complete linkage, however, could stalemate
the talks, as they had done in the fall of 1977. Somewhere in between there might be a
middle ground. The American team thought in terms of seeking an agreement on general
principles, but Carter wanted more. He wanted to work out the details of a peace treaty,
including security arrangements. This became his primary project, and he was less
concerned with linkage than the rest of the team. He ended up being correct in that the
best approach lay in getting a detailed understanding between Begin and Sadat on a peace
treaty; but he was mistaken when he thought the talks could be finished quickly and that
the three men could work well together. After two sessions with both Begin and Sadat in
the room, Carter concluded it would be better to separate them. The crucial day was
Saturday, September 16, for addressing the vital issues of the West Bank and Gaza. Until
then, all the US drafts contained the language of Resolution 242, including withdrawal;
and a paragraph on freezing settlements was also always included. That morning Dayan
and Aharon Barak, the Israeli Attorney General, met with Vance and told him why Begin
would not accept the language of Resolution 242. Barak said he was sure a solution
could be found, but only if they were all willing to negotiate another week.90 Otherwise,
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in order to reach an agreement that day they would be papering over issues that would
become major problems later. No one except Barak and a few others could tolerate the
stifling atmosphere at Camp David for another week, and that day the American draft
fundamentally changed. The draft made it clear that the negotiations, but not necessarily
the results, would be based on the principles of Resolution 242. Two issues emerged:
one was that Israel would pursue a peace treaty with Jordan; the second was concerned
negotiations the West Bank and Gaza. Both concerned the PLO. Begin was successful in
claiming that Resolution 242 did not pertain to negotiations over the West Bank's future.
Later, Carter insisted that Begin agree to freeze settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
while negotiating over autonomy. Carter agreed to accept a letter from Begin to this
effect. He clearly thought that Begin had made a commitment not to build new
settlements during the negotiations over autonomy. The draft of the letter came to Carter
the next day, and it linked the freeze to the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, or three months,
not to the autonomy talks. Carter sent the letter back, and he and Vance acted as if it
were merely a misunderstanding that would soon be cleared up. Carter believed their
verbal agreement would be honored. But the final letter arrived after the accords had
been signed, and Begin kept to the three-month timetable. Carter felt that Begin had
betrayed him, and this led to deep mutual distrust. This was of great importance to the
Arab audience waiting to see what the Palestinians would get, which was little indeed.91
The document contained two agreements and was signed on September 17, 1978
by Sadat and Begin and was witnessed by Carter. The preamble mentioned Resolution
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242 by name but did not say that it applied to all fronts. The first agreement stated
general principles and outlined a process for dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. The
second, tied loosely to the general principles in the first, set out a detailed formula for an
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Each party felt they had achieved something for their
efforts, in spite of the vagueness of much of them. The framework for subsequent
92

negotiations was now set.
Carter's role in the agreements was central. With his bedrock belief in human
rights and the ability of mankind to act rationally, he believed that an agreement could be
reached, in spite of naysayers and in spite of Begin and Sadat. The Accords were signed
by Sadat and Begin and officially ratified by their respective governments. In addition to
an agreement on Sinai, they reconfirmed a commitment to honor UN Resolution 242 and
338, prescribed full autonomy for occupants of the occupied territories, withdrawal of
Israeli military and civilian forces from the West Bank and Gaza, and recognized the
Palestinians as a separate political entity with a right to determine their own future. The
Accords specify that the Palestinians are to participate as equals in further negotiations,
and the final status of the West Bank and Gaza are to be submitted "to a vote by the
elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Both Begin and
Sadat agreed that these overwhelming problems would be overcome. The agreement was
not perfect, but it was a huge step towards peace in the region. In any event, it was Carter
who judged, finally, what to accept and what to let go, and it was Carter who used his
influence on Sadat to get him to sign an agreement that both knew was flawed. Because
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of his faith that an agreement could be reached, and his determination to facilitate it, the
Accords were signed. Camp David, however, was not the end of the road.93
The Aftermath
To keep the momentum going, Carter needed to get a signed treaty soon,
especially in light of the mid-term elections coming in November 1978. Arab opposition
was strong, and might grow even stronger if there was a significant delay. Begin and
Sadat, however, faced formidable political problems, and Begin saw that in was in his
interests to slow the process down so that less pressure would be placed on Israel. He
was particularly intransigent on the issue of settlements in the territories. Early peace
meant that the Palestinian issue would move to the front burner. As a result, he almost
immediately began to publicly backpedal on the settlements issue. Fundamentally, he
turned what the US thought was a major concession into a minor gesture. It was
weakened further when Israel announced it would "thicken" existing settlements prior to
the fmalization of the peace treaty. It was a harbinger of things to come. Begin also
understood that the linkage between the peace treaty and a self governing Palestinian
authority would resurface. "Full autonomy" also gave Begin trouble because many
thought this implied the eventual creation of a Palestinian state.94
Sadat was not nearly concerned about his domestic constituency, but was very
worried about Arab opinion. While he could not be criticized for regaining Sinai, he
knew he could be accused of selling out the Palestinians. Even the freeze on settlements
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seemed to vanish within days of Camp David. His foreign minister resigned in protest
and others within the ministry refused to attend the signing ceremony at the White House.
He could not however, allow the talks to break down because Israel was still in Sinai and
could stay put. Plus, his desire for American aid would fall through the cracks if he were
seen as an obstructionist. Sadat was also determined that his pursuit of the Egyptian
interests would go along with progress towards Palestinian self-determination.
Unfortunately, some interpret the Accords as leaving out the Palestinians entirely.95
In the meantime, the Israeli Knesset was to vote on the accords within two weeks,
but Carter was not satisfied just to sit and wait. There was still a piece of unfinished
business. On Monday, September 18,1978 Begin had sent the letter on the settlements in
the West Bank and Gaza. It was unchanged from the day before. Carter refused to
accept it. After reviewing his notes, he wrote down what he thought had been agreed to
and sent Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders to deliver his version to the
Israelis, along with the original of Begin's letter. Begin insisted that he had not promised
a freeze on settlements, only that he would consider it. Neither Carter nor Begin budged,
and Carter believed that a trust had been betrayed. In the eyes of the Arabs, this round
went to Begin, and when Vance went to the Middle East to drum up Jordanian and Saudi
support, he was received with chilly formality. Making matters worse, Sadat had no
interest in talking with either the Saudis or Jordanians. In spite of this, Carter remained
optimistic, while Vance became pessimistic. King Hussein of Jordan had raised several
questions and The PLO also made inquiries. The administration hoped that they would
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interpret the framework favorably in spite of Begin's public remarks. In the meantime,
the Knesset approved of the accords. When Carter telephoned Begin to congratulate him
he also mentioned that he hoped the disagreement over settlements could be resolved
quickly. He then ended the public debate on the issue for fear that it would endanger the
Sinai agreement, which Sadat needed badly. Dwelling on it would simply keep
reminding the Arabs of the flaws in the agreement. In the meantime, there was still the
three month freeze. On the same day as the telephone conversations, September 28, he
authorized Harold Brown, defense secretary, to sign a letter to the Israeli defense
minister, Ezer Weizman, supporting Israel in building two airfields in the Negev.96
The Next Phase — Blair House Talks
The American team drew up a draft of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, hoping to
capitalize again on the process used so successfully at Camp David. Each side would
comment on it, but changes would be made only by the Americans after consulting with
the others. Carter review the draft on October 9, and his only comment was that Israel
should withdraw from Sinai within two years, not three. It was a fairly simple document
which called for Israel to withdraw to the international boundary in accordance with
details to be worked out by the two parties. That boundary was defined as the former
border between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Normal peaceful relations were to be
established, again with the details to be worked out. Security on the border as well as in
Sinai would be worked out, and freedom of navigation was addressed. When an interim
phase of the withdrawal was complete, diplomatic relations would be established.97
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There were several contentious issues that the US recognized from the beginning.
For Israel it would be the Sinai withdrawal and the exchange of ambassadors. If they
withdrew prior to an agreement on peaceful relations, it would seem that Israel was
making all the concessions. Israel insisted on diplomatic relations prior to the full return
of Sinai. This, in turn, presented a problem for Egypt. Sadat wanted to delay the treaty
until the Camp David Accords were carried out. This meant that elections for the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza should establish their self governing authority.
This was the linkage issue and it now boiled down to when Egypt would post an
ambassador in Israel. This was very important to Begin, and thus it became very
important to Sadat. Another issue confounding the treaty was that Israel wanted Egypt to
forego its other agreements with the Arabs, especially the mutual defense treaties. Sadat
found it repugnant that he would have to say publicly that commitments to Israel counted
for more than those to fellow Arabs. This was the so-called "priority of obligations."
These issues had very high symbolic value and demonstrated the level of distrust still
present between the two men, which was perhaps the most contentious thing in the
negotiations. The Palestinian issue was probably the thorniest. How were the two
countries to express their commitment to further negotiations to solve the problem?
Begin preferred vagueness, while Sadat wanted deadlines and details in order to assure
the Arab world that he had not abandoned the Palestinians and signed a separate peace.
Also, Israel wanted continued access to Sinai oil and some form of a US guarantee of that
if Egypt reneged Vance was designated the principle negotiator this time because Carter
had to turn his attention to the normalization of relations with China and the proposed
SALT II treaty with the Soviets The delegations met in Washington officially October 12.
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In preliminary talks with the Egyptians on October 11, the issue of linkage arose once
again. The Palestinians needed attention now, because after the treaty was signed there
would be no incentive on Israeli's part to deal with the issue. Besides, if that were not
addressed Sadat would be isolated in the Arab world. Carter repeated that he was eager
to find a solution to the West Bank and Gaza, but he did not want the treaty to be derailed
because of problems with either Jordan or the Palestinians. 98
The talks made little progress on the political issues at first, but did move ahead
on the technical annexes to the treaty. Then Dayan announced with Israel would be
willing to accelerate its withdrawal from Sinai to the interim line as identified by the
Camp David Accords. Al-Arish could be returned to Egypt within two months instead of
the nine months envisioned in the framework. Carter informed the Egyptians about this
and urged the Egyptians to agree to the exchange of Ambassadors sooner rather than
later. He was now back in the thick of the negotiations. A draft treaty was hammered out,
but the West Bank and Gaza continued to befuddle everyone. Israel wanted a treaty that
would be operative regardless of what happened in the West Bank and Gaza. Sadat
wanted a parallel letter to be signed by Egypt and Israel dealing with the two areas.
Egypt also wanted a "Gaza first" option. That is, self government would be established
there first. The West Bank would come later, after Hussein joined the negotiations. The
draft of the treaty went to Sadat and Begin in spite of the problems. It got considerable
support in Israel, but this is when Begin said that Israel would "thicken" settlements in
the West Bank. Carter was furious, and told Begin that "taking this step at this time will
have the most serious consequences for our relationship." The next day both Sadat and
Begin both were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, an ironic twist to say the least, since
98
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peace seemed more fleeting. In the meantime the Americans also became aware that
"autonomy" for the Palestinians was to be very narrowly defined. Dayan said that Israel
did not want to negotiate 'powers and responsibilities" because this could take years. He
wanted to negotiate only how the elections were to be carried out. The Egyptians
disagreed. To Carter, it seemed as if the Israelis were backsliding Consulting with his top
advisors, the administration decided to slow down the negotiations, review the Israeli
commitments in the accords, and develop steps to pressure Begin. For example, arms
transfers to Israel could be slowed down." Carter's patience with the entire thing seemed
bottomless.
The next day Vance met with Begin in New York. Begin did not want any
definite date for the elections because if something went wrong outside of Egypt's or
Israel's control the entire treaty could be called into question. He did agree that the
"powers and responsibilities" could be defined in advance of the elections. Begin then
told Vance he would need $3.37 billion in aid for the withdrawal from Sinai and the
dismantlement of the settlements. The cabinet's approval of the treaty depended on it.
In addition to this tension between Israel and the US, Egypt was coming under
increasing pressure from the Arabs to withdraw from the treaty negotiations. A meeting
was convened in Baghdad on November 5 to this effect, but Sadat said he would have
none of it. Within days, however, the Egyptian position seemed to harden, with Sadat
telling Carter that a definitive agreement on the West Bank and Gaza had to take place.
The administration constructed another draft treaty with annexes and a letter on the West
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Bank and Gaza. Begin refused to accept a target date and accelerated withdrawal. Then
he demanded that the aid he had requested be in the form of a grant, not a loan.100
Sadat Holds Firm
Carter asked Sadat to accept the draft, but Sadat was adamant that the Baghdad
"rejectionists" should not get the upper hand; that he must show that he had gotten
something for the Palestinians, even if was just Gaza. Carter then called Begin in New
York and said the possibility of an agreement was remote. Begin reacted by saying that
Israel had broken no promises by refusing to accelerate the withdrawal, and that
Weizman never should have agreed to such a thing. Several days later Begin telephoned
to say that the cabinet had accepted the treaty, but had rejected the idea of a target date at
the end of 1979 (the date the letter had asked for) for the elections. And there were other
problems as well, he continued. The grant was one and assurances on oil were another,
especially in light of the turmoil in Iran at the time, the place where Israel usually got its
oil. Sadat had numerous objections to the whole thing by now, including priority of
obligations. Carter suggested interpretative notes be added on that point, rather than
revising the treaty. Carter was convinced that Sadat would insist on some link between
the Sinai agreement and the elections in the occupied territories. Brzezinski told the
president that if the peace initiative failed, it could open the Middle East to Soviet
penetration. He urged a strong stance. Carter sent Vance to the region and told him to
lean hard on the Israelis, even if this might end up costing him the election and Jewish
support.101 Carter seemed willing to risk his political future in the cause of peace.
Vance Travels Again
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Vance set out for the Middle East once again, and he had one new idea originated by Carter. The Camp David Accords said that after the interim withdrawal
from Sinai, diplomatic relations would be established; it did not specify when
ambassadors would be exchanged. Carter thought that Sadat would be justified if he
would establish diplomatic relations, not exchange ambassadors until the self governing
authority in the territories had been established. Sadat, as anticipated, was pleased. He
also showed some flexibility about accepting a target date instead of a fixed date for the
elections. More details were worked out and Sadat said that he would make no more
concessions. Begin, also as anticipated, was angry, and did little to hide it. He did not
like anything - no target date, no interpretative notes, no delay on the exchange of
ambassadors, no special role for Egypt in Gaza. Although privately Dayan tried to
smooth things over, he clearly was not speaking for Begin. Vance had to leave for
Washington earlier than anticipated because the normalization of relations with China
was soon to be announced, and Carter wanted him home for the occasion. He had only
time for a quick stop in Cairo to tell Sadat about Begin's angry reaction. Sadat was
happy. On his way home Vance received the news that the Israeli cabinet had issued the
following statement: The Government of Israel rejects the attitude and the interpretations
of the US government with regard to the Egyptian proposals." Now Vance was angry,
and he told the press that "it was the government of Israel that had prevented us from
meeting the December 17 deadline."

These were very strong words in light of the

strength of the Israeli lobby in the United States.
Return to Camp David

Vance, Hard Choices, 242; Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 278; Quandt, Peace Process, 222

292
By the end of 1978 the prospects for peace in the Middle East seemed remote.
Iran was now in turmoil and no one seemed to know what to do about it.103 The strategic
balance of power was changing in the Middle East, and the positions in the EgyptianIsraeli negotiations seemed to be hardening. Oil became a major issue for Israel in light
of Iran, and Begin insisted that the treaty had to be independent of any commitments
involving the Palestinians. Egypt's role as a stabilizing influence increased as Iran's
decreased. The domestic political clock and Iran shaped the role of the US in the final
stages of the negotiations. As US elections drew nearer US leverage over Israel declined.
Carter then invited Dayan, Mustafa Khalil, a relatively new Egyptian prime minister, to
meet with Vance at Camp David. It seemed obvious though that eventually Carter would
have to meet with Begin and Sadat. Brzezinski told the president that Israel seemed to
want a separate peace but did not want to see Carter reelected. Carter needed the treaty
because this was going to be his only foreign policy success as the elections drew near.
Carter and Begin met once again on March 2,1979. Begin argued that the US should
help Israel because that was the only thing blocking a Soviet takeover of the Middle East!
He even offered the US an airbase in Sinai (which he had already promised to return to
Egypt) to help prevent a communist takeover of Saudi Arabia. Carter paid little attention.
Begin presented the usual no's and the session was not effective. The president decided
that he wanted to go to the Middle East himself, in a dramatic make or break gesture.
Sadat, however, threatened to steal the show. He sent a message that he was planning on
coming to Washington to denounce Begin's intransigence. This gave some impetus to
solve some of the outstanding problems.
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Begin agreed to minor changes in the wording of article 6, the priority of
obligations clause, and also said that the cabinet would consider the target date for
concluding the negotiations on autonomy. The two problems of oil and the timing on the
exchange of ambassadors remained, but Carter assured Begin that he would deal with
Sadat to find an answer. It seems that the minor changes satisfied Begin enough to
overcome his suspicions of the US. It was time to make the deal with Egypt. On March
5 the Israeli cabinet approved all the changes. The time also seemed ripe for Carter to
visit the Middle East himself. He contacted Sadat and asked him to make no further
public pronouncements and also not to come to Washington - Carter planned on coming
to the Middle East. Carter sent Brzezinski to Cairo for a broad strategic review with
Sadat and, according to Brzezinski, to tell Sadat that the president's domestic political
position was becoming more precarious and that Begin might even want to see him
defeated. Carter denies ever saying any such thing. °
Carter arrived in Cairo on March 7,1979. He seemingly got assurances from
Sadat that he would do everything to make the trip a success. By the time Carter left for
Israel he was sure he had Sadat's proxy in hand. Carter arrived in Jerusalem for a private
dinner with Begin on March 10. Begin informed him that there was no chance for the
treaty to be signed while Carter was in the Middle East. Carter was furious. The talks
again centered on article 6 and the letter on Gaza and the West Bank, and Begin even
objected to the language of "West Bank," giving the president yet another geography
lesson. Eventually the dispute over the language in article 6 was resolved, but only after
the president assured Begin that Israel and the US were partners, and that Israel was a
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tremendous to the US. It became clear to Carter that Begin did not want an agreement at
this time. He wanted to return to Washington immediately, but the logistics of getting the
presidential party out of Jerusalem that night proved too difficult. After they reconvened
at the King David Hotel, one of Dayan's associates called and suggested they meet with
Dayan. As it turned out, Begin's obstinacy was causing trouble within his cabinet.
Weizman was even threatening to resign. Dayan said the cabinet would accept the US
guarantees on Israel's oil supply and the accelerated Israeli withdrawal to an interim line
in Sinai. Gaza, however, should not be a special case. He strongly encouraged Carter to
meet with Begin again and present the ideas as American. Although Begin held back
from a complete commitment, Carter finally knew he had an agreement in hand. Sadat
did not quibble over the wording; he had promised the president a success and he
delivered. Carter called Begin from the airport and told him that an agreement had been
reached. Then he and Sadat walked out on the tarmac and told the waiting press corps.105
CONCLUSIONS
Carter's efforts at trying to create a "comprehensive" peace did not bear fruit, but
he successfully brokered a bi-lateral peace between Egypt and Israel, which has remained
intact. - battered, but intact. This was a stunning achievement. There were few accolades
for him at the time, in spite of the Herculean effort he put forth. Carter says that his polls
actually dropped in March 1979. The press was hostile. Positive stories could not match
the negative "Can Carter Cope" stories.1 6 The president faced harsh charges from some
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American Jews that he was no friend of Israel.

A misunderstanding over the wording

of UN Resolution 465 on the situation in the occupied territories caused him grief. The
US voted in favor of the resolution, which was critical of Israel, with the understanding
that "all references to Jerusalem would be deleted. The failure to communicate this
1 OR

clearly resulted in a vote in favor of the resolution rather than abstention."

Carter's

fortunes also suffered when Andrew Young, US ambassador to the UN, met with the UN
observer for the PLO, something that seemed to some to be in violation of the US
promise not to negotiate or recognize the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist in
peace. Although he probably should not have, Carter succumbed to the Israeli lobby's
pressure and fired Young.
From the vantage point of 2008 Carter was one of the best friends Israel could
have had because he gave them excellent advice. Some heed should have been paid to
his warnings that a lasting peace had to include a solution to the Palestinian problem, and
Resolution 242 had to be carried out. It became, however, a dead letter. It has been forty
years since the Six Day War, and there is no end in sight to the Palestinian plight. Israel
has been subjected to countless acts of terrorism, and the Palestinian people have suffered
extraordinary cruelties under both the Israelis and their own authorities. Carter, the
human rights president, could not countenance this. His position on human rights brought
him into confrontation with both Israel and Iran, which is by no means an indictment of
his stance. The summer 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon "showed the increasing
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mediocrity of the [Israeli] military and the political leadership"

because it is now an

army of occupation, still trying to control the occupied territories. Gaza is in civil war,
which prevents any recovery, and could endanger the fragile idea of a Palestinian state.
This could soon spread to the West Bank. It is as clear today as it was during Carter's
time in office that answers need to be found for the debacle of the occupied territories.
The PLO claimed that Camp David was a plan to liquidate the Palestinians
politically, according to Hani al-Hassan, political advisor to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.
Hassan also warned that those who supported Sadat would have to confront the PLO, and
this would include Saudi Arabia, a country that was promised that the peace would be
comprehensive. Additionally, he claimed that the Arab countries in the region would see
the socialist bloc nations as their friends.110 This criticism helped to fuel anti-Carter
condemnation in the US because Carter de-emphasized the conflict with the Soviet
Union, at least up until this point in his presidency. This enabled him to approach
governments that the US had previously not considered friendly. And he saw the SU as
an ally in the Middle East peace process, as co-chairs on the Geneva meeting, and this
also caused alarm.
In another facet of the issue, most in the administration saw that the key to oil
stability rested with a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.111 Carter understood that oil
was a foreign policy issue and that the US was too dependent on it, and he tried to
convince the country to break its addiction through conservation and a search for
alternative fuels. Many of the American public, as well as Congress, refused to believe
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this. Congress, instead of helping Carter in his "moral equivalent of war" obstructed the
legislation he wanted. The oil exporting countries had excessive amounts of money and
contributed to the funding of a rising tide of high profile terrorism.' l2 One of the flash
points of this terrorism is the Palestinian-Israeli confrontations in the occupied territories.
Islamic terrorism was on the rise and would soon surface in Iran.113
Sadat was shunned by much of the Arab community, but this could not last
forever. He also faced increasing domestic pressures. On October 6,. 1981 he was
murdered by Islamic extremists, and one of the many charges they made against him was
the Camp David Accords. His successor was less than enthusiastic about peace with
Israel, but the peace has withstood this test as well.
Begin's dream of a powerful Israel in control of Gaza and the West Bank and
Jerusalem proved fleeting. The Lebanon war of 1982 created a great deal of controversy
in Israel, and questions arose about his leadership as well as his vision. Casualties were
high, and the war badly hurt the Israeli economy. Begin's health was poor; his wife died;
and late in 1983 he resigned as prime minister.114
Carter, the chief facilitator of the accords, still lost the 1980 election, amid a
barrage of criticism, especially from the antagonistic and arrogant press which gave the
neoconservatives a perfect opportunity. He also ended up receiving fewer Jewish votes
than his Republican and independent rivals. Overseas, the reaction was much the same in
both the Arab and Israeli world. The Arabs repudiated him, the only American president
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to call for a homeland for the Palestinians; and the Israelis resented being pushed into
implementing Resolution 242. Both sides seem to be locked into old policies. The treaty
itself, although denounced by some Arab sources, is proof that diplomacy can work.
Currently, he United States has neglected this crucial issue, except for a hastily called
meeting in Annapolis in the fall of 2007. This issue requires an enormous amount of
effort and patience if solutions are to be found; and there are lessons that can be learned
from Carter's endeavors. One of those lessons is that the US must be steadily and
intimately involved in the process.
Carter describes two interrelated obstacles to peace today.
1.

2.

Some Israelis believe they have the right to confiscate and colonize
Palestinian land and try to justify the sustained subjugation and
persecution of increasingly hopeless and aggravated Palestinians; and
Some Palestinians react by honoring suicide bombers as martyrs to be
rewarded in heaven and consider the killing of Israelis as victories.115

For a president often described as weak and indecisive, he took the boldest steps
yet in his Middle East diplomacy.116 No other president has pursued peace so doggedly.
Finally, a New York Times poll in February 1985 found that the Camp David negotiations
were viewed as the "most successful American foreign policy initiative in recent years.
Both Democrats and Republicans gave Camp David a high rating."117
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CHAPTER VII
THE UNTHINKABLE REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION
Iran, once known as Persia, was a place most Americans had little interest in, at
least at one time; there seemed to be a fog of ignorance about the modern Iran of the 20th
century This ignorance changed slowly and by degrees over the course of 1978 and early
1979, as the Iranian revolution gained traction. The revolution and subsequent hostage
crisis is commonly viewed as Carter's greatest failure. This and the following chapter tell
that story and argues that the seeds for the dissatisfaction were sewn in the early 1950s
when the United States actively participated in overthrowing the government of
Mohammad Mossadegh and reinstating Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as shah of Iran. The
United Statesbegan to be looked upon as a meddler in Iranian affairs, not as an honest
broker, to the chagrin and anger of its people. A second revolution, whether violent or
peaceful, was likely, if not inevitable, and it came during the Carter administration. At
that particular time an energized and vigorous shah might have held back the floodtide,
but no such man existed. Instead, the shah toyed with various schemes and acted
incoherently. In the end, even his "last ride" was a tumultuous one, causing grief to any
number of governments, including and perhaps especially, the United States. This was a
serious setback for the Carter administration. His top advisers disagreed on a course of
action and the CIA acted incompetently, resulting in two bad options for Carter: abandon
the shah or support a bloodbath. Carter chose neither. His diplomatic skills and patience
were tested severely as he guided the country through the land mine that had become
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Iran. These two chapters also argue that Carter's policies were successful, insofar as
success was possible, given the nature of the regime that emerged. Although it was never
again business as usual, all hostages came out alive; Iran was severely weakened
financially; The Soviet Union was ensconced in Afghanistan facing its Vietnam War, and
Iran endured a bloody eight year war with Iraq, all as a result of its own actions and
Carter's prudence. Twenty-seven years later, in spite of the vigorous attacks on Carter's
policies, no other United States government has done any better.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Persia was not unknown to the West in modern times. In the 19th and early 20th
centuries it was dominated by the imperial rivalry between Great Britain and Russia.
Britain wanted to slow down Russian expansion and protect its sea and land routes to
India, while Russia wanted to reach the Indian Ocean through Iran. Both received
concessions from the Qajar monarchs who repeatedly sold off the country's resources for
small sums of money that could satisfy their immediate financial needs. The people of
the country were increasingly dissatisfied with the incompetence of their government as
well as foreign political and economic control, and demanded a constitution. This was
signed in December 1906. By this time the Russians controlled the northern tier and
Britain the southern tier of Iran. Only the center remained at least nominally independent,
but not for long.1 The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was formed in 1909 and the
construction of a pipeline and refinery soon followed.
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By World War I Persia had become a pawn in the battles of other nations. In
1919 Britain occupied the northern part of Persia to enforce the Turkish armistice
conditions and to contain any Bolshevik poison. The Iranians suffered grievously, both
from the disruptions and disorders, famine, and the flu pandemic. The government
exercised little control. Britain also took tighter control of the increasingly lucrative oil
fields. In 1925 Reza Shah Pahlavi seized power and established the Pahlavi dynasty, the
last dynasty before the Islamic revolution in 1979. He proceeded to modernize Iran,
much the same as Ataturk was modernizing Turkey. He built railroads and roads and
ended the lucrative agreements between his country and the European states. He changed
the regulations on foreign oil companies to gain more of the revenues for Iranians. He
also reduced the influence of religion and strengthened secular state courts. Iranian men
had to wear western style clothing and the women had to remove their veils. When
Hitler took power in Germany, the Shah cultivated close ties with him, in an effort to
decrease the influence of the British. Iran declared itself neutral at the start of World War
II, but the British and Soviets invaded and occupied the country anyway, in order to
lessen German dominance in the area and to allow supplies to reach the Soviet Union. Oil
access was also a factor. They deposed Reza Shah on September 16, 1941 and installed
his son Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. He was twenty-two. He was also much weaker
than his father and used foreign aid to stay in power. He was obsessed with all things
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military from the beginning. This was different from his father who had worked for more
Iranian independence.
American diplomats, soldiers, and leaders got their first experience with Iran
during World War II. When President Franklin Roosevelt traveled to Tehran to meet
with Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill, the United States took the lead in proposing a
formal joint statement by all three powers for Iran's independence and territorial integrity
after the war was over. The purpose was clear: to prevent the Soviet Union from
changing its military occupation into political hegemony. By this time, 1943, United
Statessoldiers were also in the country. In spite of the agreement not to, all three
occupying countries meddled in Iranian affairs. When the war was over, the United
States and Britain withdrew within the six-month period stipulated by the agreement.
The Soviets, however, lingered, waging a campaign of intimidation and manipulation,
trying to establish a puppet state. In 1946 the Tehran government overthrew the
communist regime in its northern province of Azerbaijan. Strong United States support
for Iran in the United Nations and elsewhere convinced the Russians to pull out. Some
call this one of the opening shots of the Cold War.4 The shah was shaken by the crisis, as
he would be by others that loomed on the horizon.
In April 1951 the Iranian parliament, the Majles, voted to nationalize the
concessions and installations of the Anglo-Iranian (some say Anglo-Persian) Oil
3
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Company, The British had been the majority stockholders since 1914 and had
dominated the production and sale of Iranian oil. From this position Britain also
influenced Iranian economic policy and politics. This was a genuine nationalist revolt
against foreign intervention, and the shah responded by appointing Mohammad
Mossadegh as prime minister. When negotiations between the British and Iranians broke
down, the British initiated a de facto boycott on Iranian oil. The United Statestried to
mediate the argument, but little came of it. Mossadegh was intensely popular in Iran, and
he began to take more and more power for himself, undermining the shah. However,
when he demanded control of the armed forces, the shah dismissed him, only to be forced
to reinstate him because of his popularity. He was a charismatic leader able to cut across
class lines. Several months later Mossadegh dismissed the Majles. The British, along
with American oilmen, told President Eisenhower that Mossadegh was a communist.
When his popularity began to wane, he pulled closer to the Tudeh party, which was procommunist, stoking more fears of a communist coup. British Foreign Secretary Anthony
Eden came to the United States and proposed a joint venture to overthrow Mossadegh.
Ike was receptive, and this created the cause of the long-term tension between Iran and
the United States. He intended to use the CIA much more and in different ways than his
predecessor, Truman, because he believed that "nuclear war was unimaginable, limited
conventional war was unwinnable, and stalemate unacceptable." Iran furnished the
opportunity for the CIA to shine. Code Ajax, as the coup was called was planned in early
summer 1953. They would overthrow Mossadegh and reinstate the shah, by means of out
and out bribery, through a street mob hired by the US, and through the Iranian army
5
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which arrested him. By this time opposition to Mossadegh had crystallized, making
things easier.6 Eisenhower did not participate in planning the coup, and was careful to
leave no documents implicating him in this sort of deed. Foster Dulles, the secretary of
state, kept him informed over cocktails.
The coup was a great success - that is, for the United States. Eisenhower bought
the nation twenty-six years of stability in the oil rich Persian Gulf region. On the other
hand, the shah was restored with even more power, but lost legitimacy, and he made a
deal to give American oil giants 40 percent of Iran's oil. The lack of legitimacy and the
generous concessions to the Americans were problematic for the remainder of his rein
and became a major factor in the revolution. The general contradiction in the situation
concerned power and principle. The United States had genuine economic and political
interests, plus a commitment to democratic principles. Beginning in the 1940s, while the
United States talked about the latter, it based its policies on the former. Eisenhower
announced an $85 million package of economic aid for Iran and everyone lived happily
ever after; except, of course, for the Iranian people and the British oil tycoons, who lost
their monopoly. But a dangerous precedent had been set. The CIA was going to do the
president's bidding. He did not have to deal with Congress, his cabinet, or the press and
public.7 Also, an ominous revolutionary "cause" and a grievance against the United
States were created in Iran. Mossadegh became a national icon. Although the shah was
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regaining some popular support at home, the myth developed that the United States had
imposed a harsh tyrant on them. Kermit Roosevelt, who participated in the coup, later
wrote that the shah had told him that he owed his "throne to God, my people, my army and to you!" Roosevelt agreed that it was a rekindling of popular support for the shah
that allowed the plan to succeed.8 Ironically, Roosevelt's account came out in 1979, the
year the shah was deposed. Unfortunately, Washington has a short memory, and by 1978
the events of twenty-five years earlier had little relevance. Prior to 1953 the United
States acted as the honest broker for Iran, keeping both the British and the Soviets at bay,
but it would never be seen in that light again.9 American intervention in Iran ensured that
there would be no communist takeover in Iran, but it also alienated the liberal, moderate
nationalists as well as Iranian patriots of all classes. It paved the way for the birth of
extremism across the political spectrum.10
The vice president at the time of the coup was Richard Nixon, and he paid a visit
to the shah in 1953. He found a shah ready and eager to cooperate with the United States
against any Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf. Nixon was pleased, even enthusiastic. This
relationship endured, even when Nixon was out of power. During the Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations, a good deal of foreign aid and military assistance went to Iran,
although it was always less than the shah wanted. The United States constantly urged the
shah to pay attention to nation building, but he was fixated on all things military. He
routinely wrote to Ike telling him of the dire security threats he faced, requesting the most
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advanced weapons systems. Eisenhower dampened down the rhetoric and responded in
tones that were "blunt and authoritative." Coming from the man who had been the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, the shah had little else to say. However, the two
crises the Shah had faced in his life up to that time - foreign occupation during World
War II and Mossadegh in 1953 - taught him that a strong and well equipped Iranian army
was essential to deter foreign intervention. A second lesson was that it was dangerous to
allow a charismatic or independent rival get close to the seat of power. The first lesson
meant that the relationship with the United States was dominated almost from the
beginning by military desires. The shah's obsession with this grew stronger with time.
The second lesson meant that he would try to accumulate all power within his own hands
and would surround himself with compliant ministers who would do his bidding. This
was obvious from 1953 on.11 In 1978, however, he seems to have forgotten the second
lesson, allowing his arch enemy, the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, to return to Iran.
During the Kennedy administration, United States officials came to believe that
the shah needed to pay more attention to political liberalization and less to attention to the
military. With this in mind, they gravitated towards Dr. Ali Amini, a former ambassador
to the United States, as a man who might be able to carry out political and economic
reforms. Kennedy and his advisors made no secret of this. This put a great deal of
pressure on the shah, and he appointed Amini prime minister in May 1961. It was a
pyrrhic victory for Washington; he was tagged as "Washington's Man." The shah
recognized him as a potential threat to his own power, and dismissed him after only
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fifteen months. He then created his own "White Revolution" of land reform and
modernization.12
In 1963 a third crisis erupted - this time it was with the clergy and was led by a
mujtahid, or religious authority named Ruholla Khomeini. The uprising concerned the
economic and political program of the shah. Khomeini had opposed the shah's father in
the 1940s, but had largely been silent during the 1950s. In 1963 he emerged on the
political scene once more with a denunciation of the "Westoxication" — the indiscriminate
copying of things Western - of the shah and his regime. The SAVAK, the acronym for
the shah's secret security forces, cracked down savagely. He was arrested several times,
but always returned to his vocal opposition activities. In 1964 the Majlis approved a
measure that exempted United States military personnel from Iranian law. They were not
to be held accountable, a measure that clearly assaulted Iranian sovereignty. This came
to be known in the United States as the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) and in Iran as
the Capitulations Agreement. The response was swift in Iran, and Iranian nationalists,
regardless of their political leanings, expressed outrage. Shortly thereafter, the
parliament authorized the Iranian government to accept a loan provided by private
American banks and guaranteed by the United States government. It clearly was a payoff
for the passage of SOFA. The United States then attempted to broaden the diplomatic
immunity of its military. The Iranians capitulated in 1964. The Iranians had a great
sensitivity to this issue who considered their country a victim of both the British and the

12

Sick, All Fall Down, 10. See also Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, (New York:
Stein and Day, 1980); See Bill and Leiden Politics in the Middle East, 202. The revolution was aimed at
the peasantry, the class that completely supports the traditional system and the patrimonial leader at the
center of the system. See also Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 131-153 for a detailed account of the Kennedy
administration, which mixed reform with repression. This was, in their view, the best way to counter
communism.

308
Russians from 1828 to 1928. The agreement with the Americans was rejected by both
the secular and religious intelligentsia of Iran and gave fodder to Ayatollah Khomeini
n

who never forgave the United States for it.

. . .

To Khomeini it smacked of the

extraterritorial privileges of Iran's colonial past. This time he was exiled to Turkey for
his activities. From there he went to Iraq, and did not return to Iran for fourteen years.
The episode had many parallels with the 1978 revolution, but was little publicized in the
United States. The government and media focused on the shah's reform program, not his
harsh tactics. These were unpleasant, yes, but were needed in order to contain the
reactionary elements in Iranian society. The shah also viewed things in this light. This
was a tragic mistake because it failed to see how deep the resentment was to the
Westernization of Iran. Journalists virtually ignored the voice of Iranian dissidents their focus was on the Soviet Union's dissidents. The difference in coverage between the
Soviet Union and Iran is striking.14 The Iranian people were mostly, at that time,
illiterate, impoverished, and traditional in their outlook. The economic prosperity that
Iran was now enjoying glossed over the discontent; but if it should falter, the frustrations
would re-emerge with a vengeance. No one seemed to understand this - not the shah and
not Western observers. The shah was convinced that it was all a plot concocted by a little
known individual who dealt secretly with foreign agents and who owed his title of
ayatollah to radio stations run by atheist emigres who were part of the Tudeh Party.15
The failure to understand the significance of the events of 1963 was a costly error.
When the rebellion began again in 1978, few Americans were familiar with Khomeini or
13
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his seemingly pathological hatred of the US. The shah, however, cemented in his mind a
lesson learned earlier from his father: the power of the mullahs could be contained only
by force. Neither father nor son could stomach what they believed to be a reactionary
group, opposed to modernization and progress. There were many in the professional and
modernizing middle class who agreed with this position, even if they did not always
agree with the methods that were used in dealing with them. After the riots of 1963 had
been subdued, it seemed to most that the shah had definitively broken the power of the
mullahs. But the shah found it difficult to balance the promotion of Iranian nationalism
with his seeming dependence on the US. After the riots, Iran experienced strong
economic growth and modernization, fueled by an increase in oil revenues, which grew
from $555 million in 1963 to $5 billion in 1973. The benefits, however, were not well
distributed, and there were still many grindingly poor people in the country. By 1973 oil
revenues were about $20 billion, and throughout the period the government consistently
had a hard time deciding how the country should absorb it. It decided to spend it mostly
on the military. But, in 1971 the shah decided to have a party to celebrate 2500 years of
Iranian history. It was one of the most lavish displays of wealth, and brought into sharp
focus the disparity between the enormous wealth of the court and the abject poverty of
many of the subjects. Many who took part in the 1978 revolution mark this as a turning
point for them.16 Most of the preparations for the celebration were the responsibility of
foreigners. The gowns, costumes, and military uniforms were made in France. Much of
the food and wine was also French - prepared in France and flown to Iran, and this
provoked Iranian nationalism, but it was directed against the shah. A few months before
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the grand affair, guerrilla terrorists struck. It seemed obvious that the celebration would
provide wide opportunities for them to strike again. SAVAK went into high gear and the
Iranian people were subjected to extraordinary security measures.17
The Nixon-Kissinger Years
The great celebration did raise the international stature of the shah. While Nixon
did not attend, but sent the vice president, Spiro Agnew; and Nixon and Kissinger visited
Tehran in May 1972. By 1972 the shah was at the peak of his power and Iran seemed
ready to join the developed world. Richard Nixon was also at the peak of his power. He
had forged an opening with China, secured an arms limitations treaty from Moscow as
well as an agreement on "Basic Principles of Relations," and it was from Moscow that he
flew to Tehran. The United States was already supplying an enormous amount of arms to
Iran, fueling its imperialist ambitions. Nixon approved the shah's request to buy
advanced American jet fighters; and, astonishingly, ordered that all future requests for
non-nuclear weapons systems be approved without "second-guessing his requests,"18 an
example of the Nixon Doctrine in action, which stated that United States allies would
have to shoulder the responsibility for their own defense in non-nuclear cases of
aggression. This doctrine grew out of the relative weakness of the country during the
latter years of the Vietnam War. The United States appointed proxies to act in its behalf.
Appointing Iran as a proxy demonstrated Nixon's and Kissinger's concern for the two
traditional interests in Iran: oil and the containment of the Soviet Union. In addition, the
United States agreed to increase the number of advisers and technicians in Iran, and
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would join it in supporting the Kurdish nationalist insurgency against Iraq.

The deal

radically restructured US-Iranian relations. It was a personal triumph for the shah who,
for years, had been kept on a short leash by American presidents. To be recognized by
Henry Kissinger as a great strategic thinker was an accomplishment indeed. He had
arrived. The American arsenal was open, and he had the oil revenues to purchase almost
anything he wanted. Earlier, in March 1971, the British had announced their intention to
withdraw their forces from the Persian Gulf (east of Suez); the United States was still
bogged down in Vietnam; and a new geopolitical structure had been assembled at the
Moscow and Peking summits. It seemed right for the shah to play a security role in the
region.20 Iran became one of the "twin pillars" of security in the Gulf region. The other
was Saudi Arabia, albeit a junior twin.
The Department of Defense initially sent up a howl of protest at the open ended
gift to the shah. Year after year defense officials had been required to analyze and assess
Iran's military capabilities. Year after year they had concluded that Iran could best
address the threats to its northern and western borders by the steady, systematic
development and training of its military forces, rather than by the massive introduction of
high tech equipment. There was never any question that the United States should provide
Iran with military assistance. The real question centered on whether the shah's obsession
with weaponry should supersede the best professional judgment of the Pentagon as to
whether the purchases actually strengthened Iran or not. Kissinger wanted to cut off the
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argument. He issued a memorandum that served notice that in the future, decisions on
Iranian purchases of weapons would be left in the hands of the government of Iran. In
the first four years after the Nixon-Kissinger visit in 1972, Iran bought more than $9
billion worth of the most sophisticated military equipment the United States had in its
arsenal. It was a "stampede," and a scandal. Both American salesmen and Iranian
officials underestimated the amount of training and technical support Iran would need to
maintain the expensive systems. This led to frustration on the part of the Iranians and
tensions between the two countries. By the 1978-79 revolution, the Iranian people were
convinced that the Americans had defrauded them. The Ayatollah Khomeini asserted that
the Americans had grabbed Iranian oil revenues and left them with useless hardware. The
events of 1973, however, namely the Yom Kippur War and subsequent Saudi oil
embargo, convinced Nixon and Kissinger that they were justified in their actions. The
shah needed to be in the American camp because of the oil. He knew it and knew that it
gave him leverage. In 1970 the United States had become a net oil importer; by 1976, 42
percent of United States consumption came from overseas, and 38 percent of imports
were from the Persian Gulf.21
Two different secretaries of state sent personal representatives to Tehran to try to
impose some sort of order on the affair. In addition, James Schlesinger, now secretary of
defense, was greatly troubled that the United States would push sophisticated weapons on
unsophisticated nations which could not absorb them, and would thus erode confidence in
the United States as a reliable partner. The accelerated arms sales meant more technicians
and advisers. By July 1976 there were 24,000 Americans working in Iran. The relatively
higher living standard of the Americans and the belief that they were taking jobs away
21
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from Iranians fueled anti-American feelings. Also, Iran couldn't keep up: villagers who
were often not even familiar with cars became mechanics for armored personnel carriers.
Schlesinger had several meetings with the shah trying to convince him that his most
pressing problem was the lack of trained manpower to use the weapons. However, if the
shah insisted on buying a particular weapon, Schlesinger deferred to his wishes. As a
result of the discussions the shah did ask for more support and technical advice.
Subsequently Schlesinger sent a retired Army colonel, Richard Hallock, to Tehran to do
an assessment. He was to act as an independent set of eyes and ears. Schlesinger became
increasingly uneasy and asked his staff to prepare a candid evaluation of the security
relationship with Iran. The report concluded that whatever the shah wanted, he evidently
could have. It was a presidential order. Schlesinger did not take that as the final word
and appointed a personal representative, Glenn Blitgen, to conduct an in depth analysis of
the military supply relationship. One area was off limits - Hallock's very complex
mission to Iran. He had his own consulting firm, was on retainer by the Iranian
government, and was to report directly to the secretary of defense. It was an unorthodox
arrangement. Schlesinger's cautionary concerns began to have influence, after Nixon's
resignation in August 1974, which was when he asked Blitgen to do the study. Kissinger
was now secretary of state as well as national security adviser, and there was a running
competition between him and Schlesinger. With Blitgen's report in hand, he approached
President Gerald Ford with his misgivings. Kissinger was crafty, however, and he had
resources. He controlled the NSC staff, which managed the paper flow to the White
House on foreign affairs. By November 1975 there was still no response, and
Schlesinger was replaced by Donald Rumsfeld. A response came in the spring of 1976, in
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the form of a directive to conduct an interagency study, not confined to Iran. The topic
was so broad and the divisions within the government were so deep that it was doomed to
failure. It was shredded in the memory hole of interagency bickering. Consumed with
East-West relations, Washington remained ignorant of Iran's domestic difficulties.
Scholars tried to draw attention to the coming storm, but it fell on deaf ears. The shah
became hopelessly identified as "Washington's Man." It did not help that Nixon had
appointed Richard Helms, former CIA director, to be the American ambassador to
Tehran. This fueled suspicions that the United States was again trying to secure its
interests in the region through the CIA. Much of Iranian policy got caught up in the
argument between Congress and the executive over control of foreign policy, an
argument that dominated the mid-1970s. There were critics, however, who advocated a
more limited and cautious approach. They pointed to the brutality of SAVAK in the
repression of freedom, as well as the poor distribution of wealth as being of major
concern.22 Defenders of the twin pillar policy carried the day. The administration pinned
its entire Persian Gulf policy on the stability and strength of Iran. The report ended up
with Carter, to be incorporated into his review of the United States arms transfer policies
in the spring of 1977.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
Carter, driven to a very great extent by morality, campaigned on (among other
things) the two themes of human rights and arms sales reduction - bad news for the shah,
22
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who preferred Republicans to Democrats in general because he could chisel more out of
them. Carter inherited an Iran thatseemedon the surface to be stable. The NixonKissinger policy of putting United States security interests in the Persian Gulf in the
hands of the shah had been fully absorbed by the Washington bureaucracy. Yes, there
were concerns among some people about his authoritarianism, but the only real concern
was that he might be doing too much too fast. The inspector general of the Foreign
Service reported eighteen months before the revolution that there were no effective
internal challenges to the shah. Unbeknown to the new administration, United States
security in the Gulf was hostage to the shah's economic and social experiment.
According to some, Carter had little choice but to continue the relationship because
policy "bridges had been burned years before." The shah, of course, had no viable
alternative to Washington either.24
A very large problem for the Carter administration was the shah's abuse of human
rights. Repeated reports by Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists began to draw some public attention. Slowly, the American media began to tell
some of the stories of assassinations and torture which had become commonplace in the
1970s. SAVAK conducted unlimited warfare against several urban guerrilla
organizations that violently opposed the shah. During and immediately after the
American elections the shah reduced the use of torture and the number of political
prisoners. He also introduced some limited reforms. Carter's election inspired this. His
efforts at institution building, however, were hesitant, tentative, and in the end,
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unconvincing. Although he claimed that his order to cease torture was not related to
events in the US, the people in Washington welcomed the reforms, such as they were,
and were lulled into believing they were a good sign of progress to come. The Carter
team decided to continue supporting the shah, but made important demands that he rein
in SAVAK, and they put forth a concerted effort to find out more about the shah's
opposition. This was different from the Nixon-Ford administrations, when American
diplomats were routinely advised to accommodate the shah's wishes that no contact be
made with the dissenters.
The administration also believed in Iran's strategic centrality in the Gulf, and
continued arms sales into 1978, but at a diminished level. The trend indicators used by
SIPRI show a decrease in actual deliveries of major conventional weapons from 5185 in
1977 to 1925 in 1978. The indicator is 240 in 1979.26 This appears to be a rather definite
reduction, but Brzezinski's account leaves a somewhat different feeling. He says that the
United States decided to continue approving "major sales of arms to Iran in the course of
1978...," which was true. But there was still a noticeable reduction of actual transfers.
The administration tried to encourage the shah to tie his modernization efforts to progress
toward constitutional rule. In the long run internal stability in Iran would suffer if
progress was not made along these lines. The shah indicated that he had plans for this,
and he did create positive changes in the status of women, the rights of small peasants,
and more widespread education.

But this enraged the traditionalists in the country who

thought that women voting were probably the handiwork of the devil. The administration
also knew that United States ties to Iran would suffer if the American public saw flagrant
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violations of human rights, and Carter prudently tried to maintain a balance between the
United States support of the shah and an insistence on addressing human rights - a
balance between power and principle. The shah vacillated, also caught, not between
power and principle, but by a kind of ennui, perhaps believing that if the unthinkable
happened, the United States would again rescue him. This, however, was not 1953.
Carter voiced support for the shah but also recognized that the United States
ultimately had no control over the decisions made by the Iranian people.

He was pulled

in different directions because the State Department and the National Security Council
did not agree on a course of action. More than on any other issue that this work
addresses, the divisions, especially the public ones on Iranian policy, caused damage to
the Carter presidency. There were no forces in Washington that could have prevented the
crisis in Iran, but a different grouping might have seen the signs sooner, and acted better,
and with more success with the successor Islamic government. This split prevented it
from presenting a viable course of action.
Brzezinski and Vance
Brzezinski was an expert on East-west issues, and he brought this expertise with
him to the White House. He was also concerned about the Middle East, the United
States-China relationship, and the Iranian debacle; but this concern was always overlaid
by a suspicion that the Soviets were up to mischief, and the United States needed to be
mindful of that. He relished confrontation with the Soviets, unlike Vance who was deeply
committed to finding common ground with them. Vance was an "establishment"
28
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professional who had managed numerous crises during the Johnson administration, most
notably in Cyprus and Detroit. From his experiences in government and his observations
of the Kissinger years, there emerged a belief that the United States should maintain
detente with the Soviet Union.30
Indigenous nationalism was another issue that divided the two men. Vance
believed that nationalism would override ideology, and therefore the United States did
not have to be fearful of every radical movement around the world. Brzezinski, on the
other hand, believed that this nationalism worked to the advantage of the Soviets. He
was also more prepared to use force wherever he believed the national interest was
endangered, whereas Vance opted for quiet, patient diplomacy. Brzezinski believed that
the nerve center in foreign policy making should be the National Security Council, which
is located in the White House; and he was fairly successful in making it so during his
tenure, much to the chagrin of Vance. This was bound to affect their relationship with
each other in negative ways, as well as their relationship to the president.
Brzezinski tended to think in overarching global terms and grand, sometimes
Machiavellian, schemes, while Vance was the detail man, a career diplomat who
understood the limits of American power and who disliked abstractions. Vance tended to
push human rights more than Brzezinski, stubbornly refusing to discard them when the
going got rough. The most profound example of this was his refusal to endorse a military
crackdown, known as the Iron Fist option, against the protesters and demonstrators in
Iran in 1978, whereas Brzezinski held onto that option until the end.
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The differences between the two men became acute during the Iranian revolution
and later hostage crisis. They were so profound that no viable policy for the United
States emerged. Brzezinski recalls that he was focused primarily on the strategic
importance of Iran to the West, and that it was important to protect the oil interests. He
believed that Vance was more preoccupied with promoting democracy, and feared
actions that might have negative effects. Further, when the crisis became acute, the State
Department was more interested in getting Americans out of Iran than what the American
position was inside it. He states that the United States should have pressed the shah
harder and earlier to take a more assertive and tougher line, and then move towards
reform afterwards.

The problem was that the shah should have acted earlier, and the

administration's inability to see how far advanced the problem had become was a serious
failure. Vance describes the shah's policy as "repression and concession" and it had not
worked. The United States approach was a traditional carrot and stick one, not
"concession and conciliation" as Brzezinski describes it.32 The whole thing was a
dangerous brew of interdepartmental rivalry, basic differences on the nature of the threats
the nation faced, and an ad hoc process not codified into either law or custom. The
administration, of course, understood that Iran was exceedingly important, but was
unable to definitively identify the threats to the shah and by extension the threats to the
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United States position in the Gulf. Knowing what the threat is, is the first step in crafting
a successful policy. Also, they might have placed too much importance on the person
rather than on Iran itself.
Arms Transfers
The shah wanted AWACS and Carter, accepting Iran's need for a strong air
defense system, approved of the sale, although he reduced the number of aircraft
requested. There was intense public debate. By now Congress had passed a law that it
could veto any arms sale by a vote of disapproval in both the House and Senate. This
was largely in response to the Nixon-Kissinger era policies. Congress no longer wanted
to be seen as a rubber stamp, but at the same time was reluctant to reverse the president
on an important foreign policy initiative. The result, in general, was the worst of two
worlds. The administration often got what it wanted in arms sales, but only after
acrimonious political debate leaving the recipient nation acutely embarrassed and the
United States forfeiting most, if not all, of any goals it wanted to achieve through the sale
of the arms. This is what happened to Iran, which might have muddied the waters in how
the shah perceived America's true intentions. Also, since Carter had stated his intent to
have the White House review and approve/disapprove arms sales, this ensured that he
would be personally tied to any requests. At first the House Foreign Affairs Committee
vetoed the sale of AWACS. It took several months of negotiations with Iran and intense
lobbying efforts in Congress to get the sale through. Carter also approved the sale of
training and spare parts to keep previously sold equipment in good working order. This
should have sent a strong signal that the United States remained committed to the shah,
which might have given him the stamina to stave off the revolution. But the message got
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blurred by the intense criticism Congress had of the shah's authoritarian regime,33 with
the story sloppily reported by the press. This was in spite of the fact that Carter held
more news conferences and was more accessible to the press than any other president.
The press did not help to convey Carter's message to the people at all. The fact was, and
is, that after the press broke the Watergate story, an enormous achievement, everybody
became an instant investigative reporter, snooping into closets to find whatever scandals
they might.34
The Shah Visits Washington
Vance extended Carter's invitation to the shah to visit the United States in
November 1977. Carter also appointed William Sullivan as ambassador to Iran. The
post had been vacant since Richard Helms, former CIA director, occupied it during the
Ford Administration. The choice was viewed symbolically as another in a long line of
ambassadors who saw their role as supporting the shah unequivocally, and Sullivan
proved to be a mistake, at least in the eyes of Carter.35 By some accounts, the shah
clearly knew that something had gone terribly wrong between him and his people, and he
needed to know what the president thought about him.36 By the time of the shah's arrival
United States policy had been set. He spent five hours in direct talks with the president,
and the policy should have been clear to him by that time. In the week before his arrival
demonstrators from about 60,000 Iranian students in the United States began arriving in
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Washington. Each day they assembled at Lafayette Park across from the White House,
masked to avoid identification by SAVAK, shouting anti shah epithets. The Iranian
embassy organized counter demonstrations. The noise level was excruciating and
incessant, so much so that some employees of the White House became ill. At the
welcoming ceremony, they were so unruly, engaging in physical combat with each other,
that the police broke up the crowds with tear gas. Analysts later point to this as an early
sign of the revolution. The next day the newspaper showed Carter wiping tears from his
eyes as the shah spoke. That night Carter eased everyone's embarrassment with his toast
to the shah, saying among other things that the shah certainly knew how to draw a crowd.
Meanwhile, in Iran, it was widely believed that only Carter could have organized such
demonstrations, and many believed that this signaled his abandonment of the shah. Their
own demonstrations and protests soon followed. This was a symptom of the reciprocal
errors in perception that plagued both Iran and the United States in the days to come.37
Carter Visits Tehran
On December 31 and January 1, 1978, Carter paid a brief visit to the shah. About
a month before, the leftist and liberal opposition to the shah wrote the UN SecretaryGeneral, Kurt Waldheim, a letter asking that the rule of law be restored in Iran. Prior to
its publication on December 22, the group sent the statement and a partial list of the
signatories to the Carter administration. There is no mention of this letter by Americans
involved in Iran at the time, and this suggests that those who were aware of the letter
gave it no significance.38 Carter's visit was part of a whirlwind tour of three continents.
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The visit provided the opportunity for the two men to work out a non-proliferation
agreement that would accompany the sale of United States nuclear plants to Iran as well
as a discussion of Carter's list of Iran's military needs over the next five years. They also
discussed the Arab-Israeli question. Iran had been helpful in the past and Carter thought
that the shah might again play an important role. The most memorable event was the
state dinner and Carter's toast to the shah. The poignant words on human rights written
by the Persian poet Saadi were not remembered and little noticed by the press, but
Carter's opening words, that Iran was "an island of stability in a turbulent corner of the
world" came back to haunt him

Although this had been the United States impression of

Iran for decades, they came back to trouble Carter, mainly because they described an Iran
that would soon be past, and were a disastrous misreading of its future. Less than a
month later riots broke out in the holy city of Qom, and a year later the shah was
preparing for his "last ride." Carter was aware of the opposition to the shah, but no one
foresaw how rapidly the "island of stability" would crumble.40
The Opposition to the Shah
At the shah's request, there had been little contact between Americans in Iran and
the opposition groups. This behavior predated the Carter administration — in fact was
institutionalized by the time he came to office. Because everyone thought that the shah
was really in control, opposition groups were viewed as nuisance material. The CIA
routinely characterized the events as an "irritant," and saw no threat to the shah and the
stability of Iran for several years ahead. Hence, there was little information about those

39

Vance, Hard Choices, 314-323; Richard A. Falk, "Khomeini's Promise, Foreign Policy 34
(spring, 1979): 28-34.
40
Bill and Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, 204-205; Vance, Hard Choices, 323; Jimmy Carter,
Keeping Faith, 445-446.

324

groups as the revolution began. Brzezinski believed the opposition consisted of
communists on the left and a few reactionary mullahs on the right. His major
understanding of Iran came from his friend Ardeshir Zahedi, Iranian Ambassador to the
US. According to James Bill, Brzezinski and Zahedi "spent the last half of 1978
reinforcing one another's opinions on the situation in Iran."

Carter relied on what

Sullivan reported from the embassy, tending to discount some of the sensational reporting
by the press. The shah, on the other hand, paid scrupulous attention to the press, looking
for evidence that the West was weakening toward him. The nature of the opposition
changed after Carter's election. From 1970-1977 it was characterized by violent acts
directed against United States employees in Iran. A new pattern emerged after Carter
took office. There was increased pressure on the regime through peaceful means.
Lawyers and writers signed declarations protesting censorship and potentially harmful
changes to the judiciary. An unsigned copy of one of these was sent to the United States
embassy for the first time. Meanwhile students opposed to the regime intensified their
opposition at various Iranian universities. They threatened female students at the
University of Tehran with death if they continued to eat with male students in the same
cafeteria. Students also began to skip classes, and this became so severe that eventually
some universities cancelled them altogether. Washington seemed lukewarm to the shah,
but he launched a program of "political liberalization" which his opponents perceived as
a response to the shah's concern with either real or anticipated pressures from Carter. At
the same time, however, he denounced all dissidents as terrorists or communists.4
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The media generally played down what had become a persistent pattern of violent
acts of bombing, assassination, and surveillance that was directed towards both Iranian
and American officials. Although these facts were known worldwide, when they were
reported in the United States, they were accompanied by such caveats as "it would be a
mistake to assume that dissent is widespread."
Finally, adding to the misperceptions was the Iranian penchant for conspiracy
theories. Simple explanations were never adequate. Iranians were convinced that
external forces caused their internal problems. It was all part of a grand scheme, quite
understandable to Iranians who had been manipulated repeatedly throughout their history.
But to a pragmatic and practical engineer, far removed from any experience of this, they
were anathema. This meant that the two men approached problems in different ways.
Carter, the engineer, dealt with problems on their own merits, disassembling them into
their component parts in order to analyze them. The shah tried to find out what the
conspiracy was - and who was behind the plot. So when in April, a pro-Communist
faction in overthrew the government in an unexpected and surprising coup, the shah
asked Nelson Rockefeller if this meant the United States and the Soviets were dividing
the world between them. This was not really an idle question, but reflected the different
perceptions and world views of the two sides.
Sporadic demonstrations grew in January of 1978, and it seems clear from what
we know now that this was the beginning of the revolution. The government-controlled
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press savaged the Ayatollah Khomeini on January 7, one week after Carter's famous
toast. Two days later a religious demonstration and march was held in Qom, and the
police opened fire, killing a number of students participating in a peaceful demonstration.
The ayatollah of Qom denounced the shah as anti-Islamic. Several other demonstrations
followed in rapid succession, with the shah's army again firing on unarmed
demonstrators. In Shi'i tradition a religious ceremony is held forty days after a death.
This set off a series of demonstrations at forty-day intervals throughout much of the year.
The rhythm soon became obvious to observers, but the initial violence in Qom was
overlooked by embassy and other official reporting until later. Sullivan claims that most
people seemed to think they were merely the growing pains of a society that was trying to
modernize.45 Excessive force by the shah played into the mullahs' hands, which began
demanding the return of Khomeini from exile. Demonstrations escalated and took on an
anti-Western and anti-Semitic character. The stronger the repression, the more power it
gave the mullahs to provoke new riots. The shah announced more reforms. He hoped
that the program would draw off support of the urban middle class from the more
traditionalists elements composed of the fundamentalists and radical leftists. This did not
happen. The opposition camp included the secular nationalists as well as the religious
traditionalists. Sullivan reported to Vance that the shah should be able to weather the
storm until the Iranian economy improved and his liberal reforms began to attract some
of the opposition into his camp. Relative calm returned during the summer. The
intelligence community was still fairly confident that the shah was not substantially
45
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threatened. A CIA assessment in August 1978 said that Iran "is not in a revolutionary or
even a pre-revolutionary situation."46 Although the Human Rights Bureau objected, the
State Department approved the shipment of crowd-control equipment, in spite of the fact
that in the judgment of the ambassador and the experts in the State Department, the CIA
and other agencies, as well as foreign governments, the shah was not in serious danger.
Some believed that the pro-nationalist sentiment was stronger than the pro-Khomeini
loyalty, but in the end it was Khomeini who ruled. 47
The Revolution Takes Hold
Since there did not seem to be a very great threat to the shah on the horizon,
Carter and his advisers focused on several other major policy initiatives - Camp David
peace talks, SALT negotiations, and the normalization of relations with China. Rapid
progress on these issues strained the decision-making resources. Undivided attention
could not be given to any one issue. Besides, no one really believed that the shah could
not handle the problem. Thus, no plans were made.48 Some sources claim that the CIA
depended on SAVAK for its intelligence information, and the American embassy had
become cautious long before about its intelligence gathering operations among opposition
forces, in deference to the shah's displeasure.49 Since no one believed the shah was in
trouble, no one sounded the alarm. In late summer when the embassy reported that a
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recent clash had visibly shaken the shah; and when several hundred people were machine
gunned by the police, Brzezinski began to smell a rat. He relates that Dr.Gary Sick, a
very knowledgeable man and his principal assistant for the Iranian crisis, had sent up
warning flares several times during 1978, but it had not been a top priority. For example,
Sick wrote in April that although the actual threat level to the regime was not clear, there
did seem to be a widespread conservative opposition; and that "cracks in the facade of
Iranian social stability are becoming difficult to ignore."

Brzezinski now asked for

better and more information from various sources, as well as options, but the
administration did not step back and take a comprehensive look at the situation.51
To make the situation even murkier, conflicting reports about how the shah was
personally handling the crisis came in from various visitors as well as the embassy. The
assessments varied, and there were few clues as to the reason. One day the shah would be
ebullient and confident, the next depressed with no confidence. The shaky situation in
Afghanistan preyed on his mind and he believed that the United States was abandoning
him and his country to the Soviets, or at least to "a neutral sphere of influence;" and
blamed Carter's human rights policy for aiding his opponents. At the time, no one knew
that he was sick with lymphoma, and the treatments he received could possibly account
for the mood swings. It would have made a difference in the kinds of assessments made
and the policies formulated.52
The Carter policy, in the face of the bloody demonstrations, seems unrealistic.
The administration pursued a two-pronged approach. It aimed at political liberalization
50
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by the shah, and continued support for him. This was its initial policy after Carter first
took office, and it did not change. The fundamental assumption must have been that the
shah would be willing and able to compromise at least with the more moderate elements
in the opposition. But throughout the crisis, the shah found compromise "unacceptable,
and as late as September 1978, according to the Washington Post, the CIA's assessment
in secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee remained
optimistic."53
The United States Begins to Wake Up—A Nasty October "Surprise "
Several things began to cluster together in October, 1978. The shah told Sullivan
on October 10, 1978 that he was thinking about inviting Khomeini to return to Iran.
Sullivan responded that it would be folly to do so without conditions. By September it
had become obvious that Khomeini was not only inspiring opposition, he was organizing
it. The shah prevailed on the Iraqis to clamp down on him, and in late September they
surrounded his residence and limited his freedom of movement. During the first week in
October Khomeini fled to Paris. The French government permitted the party to enter
after consulting with Iran. Incredibly, the Iranians thought that distance alone would
defuse him, because there would no longer be streams of pilgrims traveling to the holy
city of Najaf, returning with cassettes of his fiery sermons. This, they believed, would
severely curtail his ability to influence events. They underestimated the power of the
telephone and the Western press, of which Khomeini became the immediate sweetheart.
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They also underestimated Khomeini's charisma and political savvy. This proved to be a
fatal mistake.54
Problems in the military also began to surface in October. The generals wanted
the shah to crack down hard on the opposition before it spread to the troops. At about that
same time, the first instance of military sabotage occurred when a helicopter mysteriously
exploded. On October 24, 1978 the State Department produced its first comprehensive
analysis of the situation for the president. It painted a grim picture. They believed that it
was essential for the shah to establish an effective government within a few weeks, or
else the military would almost certainly intervene. The analysis was cabled to Sullivan
and proposed three basic tracks of United States policy. 1) Firm support for the shah as
the key element to transition Iran to a broader based, stable government; 2) strong
support for the shah's liberalization effort, including a more active advisory role for the
US, along with economic assistance to Iran; 3) opposition to a military regime. It left
open the possibility that more contact should be made with Khomeini and the opposition,
as well as sending a special envoy to Iran to demonstrate United States support. The
paper was explicit in that it stressed the limited ability of the United States to influence
events, and the shah's position could ultimately deteriorate in spite of, or even because
of, American efforts. The report also expressed concern for the 41,000 Americans in Iran
but did not recommend any immediate emergency activities.55
Coincidentally, on that same day, Sullivan met with the shah, along with Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Charles Duncan. The shah ignored Duncan, cut the meeting short
54
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with him, and then he and Sullivan were joined by the British ambassador, Sir Anthony
Parsons. One option the shah was considering was a military government, but he felt
they were too inept. Another was a coalition government, but he had no confidence that
it would succeed. He then asked for the views of his guests. The two ambassadors
disagreed with the dark picture the shah painted. For most of the country, it was life as
usual. They also disagreed with his two proposals. They suggested bringing some of the
opposition politicians into the government. The shah said that he would meet with them
again in a few days.
Sullivan replied to the State Department's memorandum on October 27. He
agreed that military intervention would be a "delayed disaster" but continued
deterioration of the situation between then and the following June when elections were
scheduled would make the intervention "inevitable." He believed that now was the time
for quiet diplomacy, not high level statements of support or a special envoy, and rejected
the idea that the United States provide training in crowd control to Iran's military. This
could give the military the idea that if they took over they could retain power bloodlessly.
Sullivan also rejected any contact with Khomeini. He should be "firmly quarantined.
Our destiny is to work with the shah."57 Sick wrote that any seasoned observer could see
what Sullivan was up to. He had his own game plan, and did not need the meddling of
Washington. The State Department seemed to accept this, and shelved the report unfortunately. Not everyone in Washington was in agreement on the issue of a military
government, and the paper should have been debated. Just as the State Department began
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to lobby more forcefully against a military government, Zbigniew Brzezinski began to
argue just the opposite. Vance writes that Brzezinski thought the State Department had
given up on the shah and was "soft" on the military option. The situation was quite
different from the Camp David issue where there was very close cooperation. Ten months
after the disturbances began in Iran, there still had not been a major policy discussion on
the subject. This was because of the intense negotiations at Camp David, beginning in
September and culminating in March with the peace agreement — precisely the timeframe
of the climax of the Iranian revolution. The two sides in the American political divide on
Iran never confronted each other.
There is considerable criticism about Brzezinski's reluctance to raise the issue
with the president. He was afraid that it would lead to an American response to the crisis
that would undermine the shah. The major evidence for this is the October 24 State
Department memorandum. It should have become the basis for a debate, but Brzezinski
played the message down, failing to give all the reasonable options a fair hearing. He
also failed to bring the very substantial disagreements to the president when there still
might have been time to formulate a strong and reasonable policy with some hope of
59

success.
Unexpectedly, Sullivan dropped a bombshell that jump started the decision
making process in earnest. On November 2, he sent a cable to Washington asking for
instructions within 48 hours. It said that the shah was thinking of stepping down and
forming a civilian coalition or military government. He wanted to know what the United
States wanted him to do. By this time his options were narrowing. If he wanted to revive
58
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the old National Front by splitting the secular leadership from the religious, he would
have to concede some power to the secular forces to lure them away from Khomeini.
This was coming very late in the day.

Several National Front leaders had already gone

to Paris with a proposal to Khomeini along these lines, suggesting a return to the 1906
constitution which had placed limits on the monarchy. Khomeini would have none of it.
The shah had to go. After briefing Carter, Brzezinski called a Special Coordination
Committee (SCC) meeting. Brzezinski also consulted with Sullivan, Ardeshir Zahedi,
the Iranian ambassador, and Jean Brancois-Poncet, his opposite in Paris. He also got a
call from Nelson Rockefeller who concluded that it was urgent to bolster the shah.
Because conventional channels were scarce and not necessarily reliable, most offices
dealing with Iran developed their own channels of communication, which led to secrecy
and distrust. Brzezinski then called Vance just prior to the meeting to get his concurrence
on the line that he wanted to adopt. Vance was busy with the Middle East negotiations
and could not attend. ° This set an unfortunate pattern.
The November 2 SCC Meeting
Those attending the meeting besides Brzezinski were Warren Christopher (deputy
secretary of state), Harold Brown, (secretary of defense), General David Jones (chairman
Joint Chiefs of staff, General George Brown's successor), Stansfield Turner (director
CIA), David Aaron (deputy director NSC), and Gary Sick. Brzezinski had prepared a
draft message stating that the United States should send a strong message of support to
the shah, urging him to stay on. Second, he should curtail further liberalization efforts
until "decisive action to restore order" was accomplished. The United States also hoped
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that he would resume liberalization policies after order had been restored. Brzezinski
disagreed that a civilian government under the shah would be effective, and added that
Zahedi agreed with this. However, he said that the United States should support the shah
in whatever choice he made. Christopher, supported by Turner, said that Zahedi could
not be trusted in this situation to give an objective assessment because he was too close to
the shah. Christopher did agree that the United States should indicate strong support for
the shah, and that Vance supported this position. He thought that the shah could enhance
his position by further reforms, even a civilian coalition government under him. Brown
said that if the shah opted for a military government, the United States should urge him to
form one under him, not without him. After additional discussion, Brzezinski left the
room to telephone the president who approved the general thrust of the message. He also
asked Brzezinski to telephone the shah the next day. The message was transmitted to
Tehran that night from Brzezinski to Sullivan with only minor changes. It stated that
Secretary Vance concurred with the contents. This was given emphasis the following day
when Vance, at a press conference, gave a strong statement of the shah's efforts to restore
order before moving on to elections or further reforms.61 So, in the end, few good policy
options were forthcoming. There was little reliable information so no one really knew
what the shah's chances of surviving were. Also, if he collapsed what should or could
the United States do? Still smarting from Vietnam, the country had no wish to become
heavily involved in another internal rebellion in a Third World country. Vietnam weighed
heavily on American foreign policy. Richard Nixon had said that it "grotesquely
61
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distorted it." Many in Washington political circles were hostile to the shah, despising his
SAVAK and his human rights abuses. The president's own views on human rights and
the abuse of power, as well as his personal morality, set outer limits on the range of
realistic policy options. It was simply not morally or politically viable, in other words it
was not prudent, to actively support bloody repression of the opposition. The sense of
paralysis was not limited to the US. The British, French, and Israeli governments neither
changed their policies nor offered new initiatives until it was too late. 62
The White House and the State Department
The erosion of mutual confidence between the White House and the State
Department hampered effective policy formulation. Henry Precht, the country director
for Iranian affairs in the State Department was one of the first to conclude that the shah
was unlikely to survive the revolution. He also believed that the moderate
constitutionalists of the National Front, long the voices for democracy and human rights,
would replace him. With these two assessments, he concluded that United States
continued support for the shah was wrong. The policy would alienate the very people
who would replace the shah. He was convinced that Brzezinski was the "malevolent force
thwarting him at every turn."

The NSC, of course, had the opposite view. This tended

to choke off effective discussion between the two entities at the staff level. Brzezinski
took a very hard line toward the opposition, assuring the shah of full United States
support. Vance was more ambiguous, but he was absent for much of the time. A pattern
was set by his absence at the November 2 meeting; although he communicated regularly
62
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with the president and Brzezmski, he never attended policy meetings, usually delegating
his authority to Warren Christopher. Vance was deeply engaged with several initiatives
and had a very full plate. Sick points out that the rivalry between Vance and Brzezinski
was still muted in the second year of Carter's presidency, and when Vance chose to assert
himself he enjoyed a great deal of influence.64 On Iran, at first his and Brzezinski's
positions were not terribly far apart, but as time wore on they split apart radically. This
seems inevitable because of their divergent views on East-West issues, something that
was bound to come into the equation sooner or later with the Soviet's meddling in
Afghanistan and its adventurism on the Horn of Africa. In the meantime, Vance's and
Brzezinski's image of the Soviet threat still seemed to converge.65 The emerging
differences in views were not evident because Vance simply removed himself from the
day-to-day discussions. Vance disassociated himself with those at the State Department
who asserted that the shah was finished. In his memoirs he said that "an estrangement
grew up between the White House and my key advisers."66 Henry Precht and those who
agreed with his position were continuously frustrated. Without Vance's strong support
they could not argue their case at the highest levels. And Vance's absence from the dayto-day policy making automatically left the playing field to Brzezinski. Brzezinski never
shrunk from controversy; in fact he thrived on it. So it did not disturb him at all that he
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became an object of personal animosity by some.67 George Ball was horrified by
Brzezinski's "bureaucratic imperialism." He consistently bested Vance, and never
accepted defeat as final or a policy as it was decided if it did not please him. He hired a
press secretary to promote himself as the spokesman for United States foreign policy.68
The Message to the Shah
Brzezinski believed that the message of November 2 to the shah was weak and
ambiguous. It was, in part because of his own maneuvering. Then he began
implementing policy. With Carter's permission he telephoned the shah the next day and
tried subtly to tilt American support toward military action to squelch the unrest. He
promised the shah that the United States would back him to the hilt, in whatever action he
chose. This compromised Brzezinski. When the national security adviser tries to
personally run various agencies or transmit the president's wishes, it poisons the process.
He can no longer be counted on to convey information in an evenhanded way. The
entire thing left the shah confused and baffled. He couldn't see what the president could
do in tangible terms; and he felt that public statements of support for him by Washington
were becoming counter-productive. Obviously, he was referring to Vance's press
conference. The statement, Brzezinski's telephone call, and the formal message were
intended to show that the United States government spoke with one voice, and that the
policy message of November 2 had the full authority of the United States government
behind it. The shah continued with his uncoordinated efforts at liberalization and
67
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crackdowns. The Prime Minister, Sharif-Emami, sent a message to Sullivan telling him
bluntly that the shah was incapable of making any decisions and appealed for advice. By
November 5 the prime minister had concluded that the establishment of a military
government was essential. The shah's contacts with the National Front leadership had
convinced him that this was the only solution. On November 6 the shah appointed a
military government, half of whose membership were civilians. It announced more
reforms, released political prisoners, and arrested the head of SAVAK. This sent the
message to the revolutionaries that the shah was "on the run" and sent the message to his
high ranking officials that it was every man for himself. The shah's announcement of the
changes was conciliatory. This surprised those in Washington who were advocates for a
military government. The announcement did not bode well for a strong crackdown, but
not many saw that; neither did Washington see that a moderate coalition government was
possible. Zahedi, Iran's ambassador, edited out those parts of the speech that the
hardliners did not want to hear. The remainder of November settled into an uneasy and
partial calm. However, much of December was the Shiite holy month and many feared
that this could bring more unrest. When it became obvious that there would be no strong
military crackdown, the opposition gathered their strength for another round. The
religious leaders would play a "central and pivotal role," putting together an organization
that was viable from one end of the country to the other.70
Unintelligent Intelligence
On November 6 a policy Review Committee meeting (PRC) was held to review
the situation in Iran. It was the only one to be chaired by Vance. He said that the
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president wanted more and better information, and Brzezinski agreed. Turner pointed out
that intelligence gathering was difficult in Iran for fear of upsetting the shah if he
discovered it.71 Brzezinski believed that the purpose of the meeting was to reassert State's
control over the Iranian issue. The State Department focused on the evacuation of
Americans from the country. That, Brzezinski believed, would be a fatal signal from the
US. Charles Duncan, deputy secretary of defense, who had recently returned from Iran,
suggested again that the United States provide crowd control equipment to the Iranian
military. Brzezinski claims that "Vance put him off," and this made matters worse. Sick,
on the other hand, says that Vance replied that the United States was already providing tear
gas and other non-lethal equipment, that there were statutory restrictions in place on
sending these sorts of things, and that the British were filling the gap. Duncan was not
satisfied and asked that the State Department question Sullivan on it.
A barometer of the political health in Iran was the amount of oil production. It
had fallen badly, and there was a shortfall of four million barrels per day at that time
because of striking oil workers. If the government did not reverse this, it would not
survive. Dissatisfied, Brzezinski sent his own emissary to Iran to assess the situation.
(He informed the State Department of this.) Then he spoke with Carter, informing him of
the deplorable state of United States intelligence. Subsequently Carter sent a note to
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Brzezinski, Vance, and Turner, asking for better information./J It was the chaos in the oil
industry that contributed substantially to the shah's fall.74
While the American embassy had reported surface facts on the day to day
situation in Iran, there was little digging beneath the surface. Non-official news reports
and rumors were explained away as distortions. The House of Representatives Select
Committee on Intelligence initiated a comprehensive investigation in November 1978
and produced a public report in January 1979. The study concluded that intelligence was
weak; that there were no challenges to the confidence that policymakers had placed in the
shah; and that this skewed the United States perception of the situation.

The CIA's

batting average was zero. On November 22 the CIA circulated a report that claimed that
the shah was "not paralyzed with indecision," and was in "accurate touch with reality."
His vacillation was his attempt to deal with a situation that had no clear solution. So, the
shah was coping as long as he failed to make up his mind!
"Thinking the Unthinkable "
Washington received a cable from Sullivan on November 9 titled "Thinking the
Unthinkable." In it, Sullivan speculated on what might happen if the shah should leave.
He then set forth a series of propositions and assertions that might influence
accommodations in the future if this indeed was the case. These became a starting point.
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•

The military was anti-Communist, and many younger officers had a Western tilt.
It would need to maintain its integrity.

•

Despite noises that the West was stealing Iranian oil, in order for Iran's economy
to survive it had to continue the relationship.

•

The clerics would find the military useful because there were no Islamic
instruments to maintain law and order.

•

If that were the case and there was a military-clerical accommodation then
Khomeini would return to Iran and hold a "Ghandi-like" position.

•

Khomeini would have to choose a political leader that was acceptable to the
military.

Thus, there was a chance that non-communist, moderate political figures would emerge
that could call for elections to a constituent assembly which would draw up a moderate
Islamic constitution that could be pro-Western and would maintain Iran's general
international tilt. Sullivan thought that the relationship could be a satisfactory one. But
he cautioned that in order for this to work, every step along the way had to turn out well.
He then went on to say that the existing United States policy of supporting the shah,
along with the military, believing that he could face down the threats, was "obviously the
only safe course to pursue at this juncture." He cautioned that "if it should fail and if the
shah should abdicate, we need to think the unthinkable at this time in order to give our
thoughts some precision should the unthinkable contingency arise." These events would
be required to achieve an outcome that would be compatible with United States national
interest on the one hand and its democratic values on the other - power and principle.
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Brzezinski believed that the cable strengthened the State Department's position.

In any

event, in the months that followed, none of these assumptions proved true. It seemed that
no one could match the fervor of Khomeini's religious movement. Comparing him to
Ghandi was simply wishful thinking. Any steps to ease the shah and his senior military
command out of the way would have been spotted for what they were, in Tehran as well
as Washington. This was not a shift the United States wanted to make, and Sullivan
made no strong case for doing it. The United States still assumed that the shah could act
vigorously and with authority, another straw of wishful thinking. Further,Sullivan's
assertion that every intermediate step had to work put a damper on the whole idea. Few
things are perfect. The cable did not stir things up in Washington; it was simply
considered to be a veiled attack on United States policy, and, according to some, further
eroded Sullivan's credibility. Sullivan, however, says that the cable did cause some
consternation in Washington, mainly because it was the first report to Carter that the shah
might not survive. Carter made some notations and sent the cable on to Vance,
Brzezinski, Brown, and Turner wanting to know why he had not been informed. The
cable, along with the notes, was leaked to the press, and bureaucrats scrambled to deflect
any blame from themselves.78 Again, bureaucratic infighting prevented any coherent
policy for emerging. Sullivan made contact with the opposition and began to negotiate
70

with them, in direct contradiction of United States policy.
.This might have been the time when strong action in bringing this cable into the
conversations could have saved the day. At the time, Carter was closer to the Vance's
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view of the situation than to Brzezinski's, yet he wanted the shah to survive. He was
faced with a difficult set of contradictions. Being responsible for a probable bloodbath in
Iran, which was essentially was what Brzezinski advocated, at least in the short run, was
repugnant to Carter. Vance opposed such use of force on principle as well, and many on
on

his staff agreed.

Carter was deeply and personally involved in Camp David talks at the

time (his heart was in the Holy Land), so the debates over the contradictions did not take
place. But the failure to seriously discuss Iran falls, according to some critics, mainly
(not completely) to his advisers, especially the national security adviser for not pressuring
the president to face the issue more squarely.
On November 18, the United States received a message from the Soviet leader,
Leonid I. Brezhnev, warning the United States to stay out of the internal affairs of Iran.
The tenor of the reply became the subject of a bitter argument between Brzezinski and
Vance. By now their disagreements had reached a bitter level and would dominate
American foreign policy for more than a year. The note itself signaled a shift in the
Soviet position. It had previously been extremely cautious, and had developed a good
relationship with the shah. Now, it appeared that they were shifting and beginning to
support the revolutionaries.
The Situation Worsens
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Religious celebrations of Moharram, a holy time for shi'a, began on December 1,
and both Washington and Tehran began preparing for what most believed would be the
final showdown between the military government and the religious forces - a kind of
Armageddon. By this time contact had increased with some of the opposition. They
were nervous about the possibility of a bloodbath during Moharram. In meetings at the
United States embassy they proposed to form a Regency Council, composed of nationally
respected leaders, have the shah step back - perhaps go on a vacation - and then the
council would appoint a coalition government on a temporary basis until elections could
be held. The US, however, said that only the shah could agree to this. The effort came to
naught anyway because Khomeini refused to support it. Instead, he incited more trouble,
saying that the month of Moharram would be the time when "blood will triumph over the
sword, the month of the strength of right, the month the oppressors will be judged and the
satanic government will be abolished."

Massive riots and a general strike ensued. The

moderates distanced themselves from any notion of a coalition government. The shah
arrested several of their leaders, then backed away and released them as their
incarceration sparked more riots.

Sullivan complained that there was no guidance from

either the State Department or Washington in general.85
New Ideas or Same Old Thing?
At the end of November, Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal, visited
Tehran and reported that the shah looked overwhelmed and anxious and needed
American help. Brzezinski subsequently agreed that an outside observer should be called
in. The man for the job was George Ball, a senior official at the State Department during
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the Kennedy years. Gary Sick was to work with him full time. It quickly became clear to
Sick that Ball would provide fresh insights, but they would not be what Brzezinski
wanted to hear. An unfortunate piece of journalism appeared at an inopportune time.
Robert Moss, a British journalist wrote a widely read and widely believed article that the
Russians were behind the trouble in Iran. Many people thought the mullahs were too
obtuse to organize the demonstrations and unrest. The article reached the status of a
major document in United States policy, and played into Brzezinski's hands. Also,
concern was growing about the large contingent of Americans in Iran. United States
companies began to quietly send dependents home, but the official United States
community stayed put lest they begin a stampede and a panic. A chance letter to the
editor of the Washington Star brought matters to a head. Written by the wife of an
American military official in Tehran, she complained that dependents were hostage to
United States policy because they could leave Iran only at their own expense. Ball used
the letter to argue for the reduction of the American presence. Ball found a great deal of
support for this throughout the various agencies, but Sullivan and Brzezinski both
opposed it. A policy developed that allowed official dependents the option of quietly
coming home on a paid holiday.
Although he was sympathetic to the shah, Ball was aware that the regime was
almost certainly doomed. He thought that it was time to establish some sort of transition
mechanism that would favor the moderates. Ball did not believe that the shah should
form a new government; it would not be credible. Instead, his idea was that the United
States should compile a list of individuals who were respected but not extremist. Then,
with the list in hand, the United States could ask the shah to convene a Council of
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Notables who would choose a government. The shah would necessarily have to back
away and relinquish some power, but would be a constitutional monarch. Sullivan
thought this was unrealistic; and he also still opposed a more active United States
intervention.

At about this time, Vance learned that Brzezinski had opened up private

channels of communication with Tehran and was talking with Ardeshir Zahedi, the
Iranian ambassador without anyone in the State Department knowing about it (although
Carter had approved it). He believed that this contributed to the confusion of the shah on
where he stood; and it widened the breech between Vance and Brzezinski. Vance went to
see him to have it out. When confronted with the accusation, Brzezinski denied it.
Vance wanted Brzezinski to go to the president with him. The three met and Carter
asked if this were true. Brzezinski again denied it. That was the last Vance heard of the
matter, but the back-channel communication seemed to stop.
The Press
Also in the meantime, the president made a costly mistake. In a breakfast meeting
with reporters his desire for openness and candor opened a hole before him which he
walked into. In response to a question, Carter gave an accurate assessment of the
situation in Iran, and said that he hoped that the "shah maintain a major role in the
government, but that is a decision for the Iranian people to make." This was the wrong
time; it was interpreted to mean that the United States was abandoning the shah.88
Further meetings put into sharp relief the split between Ball's position and Brzezinski's.
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Ball believed in a council of notables, a constitutional monarchy, with a shah who would
not use military means to consolidate his position. Vance agreed. Brzezinski argued for
a military government and a severe crackdown on the opposition. Brown took a middle
position, only arguing that the military was fast becoming the most important factor in
the equation. Brzezinski prepared a memorandum for Carter, outlining the proposals. He
was now sorry he had ever invited Ball. Carter liked Ball's proposal, but was reluctant to
support anything that might indicate he did not support the shah. Brzezinski thought that
he or Schlesinger should go to Iran in person, something that Ball strongly disagreed
with. Ball thought that this was the worst idea he had ever heard, and was able to
convince Carter that a visit by such a high level American at this juncture would signal
American interference. He also informed Vance that Brzezinski, through Zahedi, who by
this time had returned to Iran to advise the shah, was pressuring the shah for a
crackdown. He pushed Vance to become more involved in the decision making process
because Brzezinski had an overly optimistic view of the shah's survivability. He thought
that Brzezinski was not giving several advocates in the State Department a fair hearing.
The Collapse
The shah was not enthused about any Council of Notables. Neither was Sullivan,
who discussed it with him. The shah suggested that he might form a civilian government
composed of members of the National Front, while he himself would maintain control of
the military. Although he had made overtures to the National Front, they were by this
time in touch with Khomeini in Paris, who refused all overtures. All of this was overlaid
by a massive strike in a variety of state offices, including the oil fields and banks.
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Meanwhile, the shah asked, what did the United States want him to do? 90 One thing was
certain, a repressive government with nothing in the way of fundamental reform was not
going to work. But subordinates who defied Brzezinski could land in hot water.
Meanwhile, and coincidentally, Henry Precht proposed his option to Brzezinski.
He believed that there was no longer any but a marginal chance that the shah was going
to survive and laid out a series of steps that the United States could take to protect its
interests. He knew nothing about the Council of Notables that the Ball report suggested;
but he, also, thought that a committee of notables to work out a solution was desirable.
The United States could play the role of midwife. Precht sent his ideas to Sullivan as
well, and did not know that Sullivan was reluctant to embrace it. But no one really knew
Sullivan's real position and attitude toward the shah. Staff level people were not given
critical information at the critical time. Nothing circulated below the level of assistant
secretary. Support for the shah was so ingrained that even a modest suggestion of doubt
was tantamount to treason in the inner circles. Nothing changed. The two
recommendations were simply ignored. Brzezinski later denied that there was any overt
call for the abandonment of the shah; and Henry Precht was subsequently barred from
SCC meetings.91 Brzezinski later denied that there was any overt call for the
abandonment of the shah; and Henry Precht was subsequently barred from SCC
meetings.
The shah had some proposals of his own, which mirrored the split in Washington
on the best path to take. One was a coalition government with the National Front,
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another was to follow Ball's proposal, the third was the Iron Fist - a severe crackdown.
He wanted United States backing on that one, however.92 No new ideas, no movement,
just more discussion. A meeting on December 28 among Vance, Brzezinski, Brown,
Turner, and Schlesinger yielded no progress. There was still the basic split - support the
shah at all costs, no communication with the opposition, give the shah the freedom to
decide his own course, including the Iron Fist (the name for a harsh crackdown). The
other side said no Iron Fist, yes to a coalition government. They believed that the
military would probably disintegrate if it tried to enforce a crackdown. Since Carter was
at Camp David, they decided once again on a compromise message to Sullivan. Once
again Brzezinski tried to subtly tilt it toward the Iron Fist solution. The message said that
the United States preferred a coalition government, but if there was any doubt as to its
underlying orientation or its ability to govern, or if the army was in danger of
fragmentation, "then a firm military government under the shah may be unavoidable."93
Vance then took the message to Carter at Camp David. This time, Vance did an end-run
around Brzezinski. He and Carter changed the part of the message after reference to the
danger of the military's disintegration to read ".. .then the Shah should choose without
delay a firm military government which would end the disorder, violence and bloodshed.
If in his judgment the Shah believed these alternatives to be infeasible, then a regency
council supervising the military government might be considered by him." Vance relates
that the shah had to see that the United States would support a military government to end
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the bloodshed, but not to increase it with the Iron Fist just to save his throne.94 The shah
failed to see that the message provided him with any guidance. He asked Sullivan again
if he should leave. Sullivan said he had no instructions on that, but he was sure the shah
would be welcome in the US. The same day, December 29, the shah asked a National
Front Leader, Shatour Bakhtiar to form a civilian government. He also said that he might
leave Iran for a "vacation." Bakhtiar insisted on this. The shah still agonized over the
Iron Fist solution. It was now clear that it was in the United States interests for the shah
to leave the country, but Brzezinski still hedged.

3

When Bakhtiar accepted the shah's offer on January 2, 1979, other National Front
leaders broke with him and joined the Khomeini camp. Khomeini attacked Bakhtiar as
vigorously as he had the shah, so there were more riots, demonstrations, and strikes. The
shah began to waffle. He toyed with the idea of keeping significant power for himself.
Sullivan cabled Washington to this effect. He concluded that the Bakhtiar government
probably would not succeed and the United States should open direct contact with
Khomeini and try to secure some sort of deal that would salvage United States influence
in the future. Brzezinski remained firm in his belief in the shah's staying power; and
Sullivan remained frustrated with Brzezinski's failure to ease out the shah.96
At a meeting on January 3 of the full NSC, including Carter, Vance "predictably"
leaned in favor of asking the shah to step aside. Brzezinski suggested that if the United
States asked him to do this it could cause problems in the future, perhaps civil war. By
now Carter had decided. He believed that the Bakhtiar government had a better chance
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of surviving if the shah left. He said the United States would phrase the request as if the
shah had already made the decision, and Washington was simply playing the supporting
role. He also felt that there was a chance that Khomeini's and Bakhtiar's relationship
might improve.97 The administration's support of the Bakhtiar government was probably
premature. Khomeini was offering good relations with the United States at the same
time; but there were two conditions attached. First, the United States had to withdraw
support from the shah, and second, noninterference in Iran's internal affairs. The latter
meant withdrawing support from Bakhtiar.
Since the integrity of the military was still a key element, the administration
decided to send a top military official to Tehran to provide support for it. General Robert
Huyser (deputy to Alexander Haig, American NATO commander) would g o . " But there
were still differences within the administration that hampered their efforts to manage the
crisis. Vance and Brzezinski disagreed on whether the United States should make contact
with Khomeini, something Sullivan advocated - Vance yes, Brzezinski no. Carter
originally sided with Brzezinski, but then in the middle of January told the United States
embassy in Paris to make contact with Khomeini. The talks never led to any agreement,
and then Sullivan criticized Carter's decision, saying it was insane100. It was reported in
Washington that Sullivan had already contacted Khomeini's assistants. What, exactly,
was Sullivan about? Carter lost faith in him and considered firing him; and he probably
should have. His reports were full of inaccuracies, which Carter later discovered and he
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seemed obsessed with getting the shah out of Iran immediately. Sullivan also reported
that Brzezinski was trying to get Huyser to push the military into an attempted coup.
Vance warned him not to follow any "unauthorized communications." Brzezinski and
Schlesinger thought the time had come to implement Huyser's third instruction: to restore
order by military force. Carter would have none of it. Just as his faith eroded in
Sullivan, it eroded also in Brzezinski.101 Huyser's mission set up another independent line
of communication, he with Harold Brown, Sullivan with Vance. There were conflicting
reports, further hamstringing Carter. The decision-making process was in shambles.102
And by this time, the personal relations between Vance and Brzezinski were so bad that
they distorted the entire process.
The shah was scheduled to leave Iran on January 16. Instead of coming directly
to the US, he decided to spend a few days at Aswan in response to an invitation from
Anwar Sadat. This change of plans disrupted the complex arrangements already made
for his arrival in America. The last minute equivocation complicated the problem of
giving the shah and his entourage safe haven. The problem was not limited to the United
States; he became a political liability on several governments, and finally entered the
United States under quite different circumstances. This triggered the second great crisis
in United States Iranian relations. Shortly before noon on January 16 the shah boarded an
airplane at Mehrabad Airport and began his "last ride." A regency council took over his
duties.
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In The Aftermath of the Shah
By the end of January events further outstripped the administration's ability to
influence them. There was a real possibility of a military coup, which could have led to
disastrous results. Warren Zimmerman met with a Khomeini official, Ibrahim Yazdi,
who strongly emphasized this. Speaking for Khomeini he urged the United States to do
everything possible to prevent this. The Iranian people would never accept that the
United States was not behind it, which would radicalize the situation and lead to more
violence against Americans. Carter believed, and Sullivan concurred, that the threat of a
military coup would be the most effective tool in buying time for the Bakhtiar
government. Zimmerman and Yazdi met again and Yazdi outlined a future policy of
nonalignment and no military buildup. He stressed that future relations with the United
States could be cordial provided the United States stopped interfering in Iranian affairs.
The Islamic revolution would restore stability, revitalize agriculture with possible help
from the US, and would sell oil to whoever wanted to buy it, except Israel and South
Africa. There was no plan to spread the revolution. A deceptive calm descended on
Tehran.104
Differences of opinion still haunted American policymakers. Sullivan had burned
his bridges, and was open in his contempt of Bakhtiar and thought the military was a
paper tiger. Senior level diplomats at the State Department, including Vance, believed the
Iranian government had a chance. Every official pronouncement by the administration
was immediately followed by leaks from "informed sources." Whatever opportunity
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there was to work out a deal with Khomeini eroded by the day. The military situation
continued to deteriorate.105.
Khomeini Returns
Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1 and set up an alternative government.
Bakhtiar had to go because he had received his mandate from the shah. The showdown
lasted until February 11 when the army ordered its troops back into the barracks and
Bakhtiar fled the country. Military action was subsequently dropped by the United States
as a viable option. Carter publicly supported the Bakhtiar government until February 5.
After that, the Americans concentrated on protecting the embassy and getting their own
out of the country, The American embassy in Tehran sent a long message on February
11 summarizing the events. The concluding sentence was 'Army surrenders; Khomeini
wins. Destroying all classified." The revolution was complete.106 The worst was yet to
come.
CONCLUSIONS
The shah must a great deal of blame in the collapse of the Iranian government and
his subsequent flight. Indecisive from the beginning, he became a pathetic, paralyzed
shell of a leader, interested only in himself. He never trusted Carter, and was
disappointed when he was elected. Carter's policies of upholding human rights, coupled
with a prudent arms sales program, made the shah suspicious that the United States
wanted to drop him. Conspiracy suspicions played a significant role in Iran - they
believed that any important event in the country was probably inspired by foreigners.
The brutal debate in Congress over the sale of AWACS to Iran further eroded his
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confidence in the Carter administration. Although the shah had legitimacy in his own
eyes, as king,107 he was viewed as just another ruthless dictator by others. In the end he
failed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of his people. By December 1978 he was enclosed in
a dreamlike cocoon, incapable of even making a clean getaway. His White Revolution
never delivered on democracy at any level, leaving a gap in expectations which caused
1 OR

political decay.
The shah's response to his opposition was inconsistent. He alternated between
severe and lethal repression on the one hand and conciliation on the other. He alienated
many different groups representing much of the Iranian population. One segment hated
the fact that he seemed to be in the pocket of the United States. Religious enthusiasts
abhorred the secular reforms. Those benefiting from those reforms wanted more political
participation, but did not get it.
Although the signs were clear in hindsight that there was trouble brewing, the
United States entered the revolutionary scene almost nine to ten months after the riots
began in Qom and Tabriz. The shah's reaction to the events signaled a business as usual
attitude. This was a tragic mistake. United States policy was two pronged ~ supporting
the shah and promoting the liberalization efforts; and the administration failed to see that
they contradicted each other. A central problem for Carter was the incoherence within his
own government. No one in the Carter administration foresaw the dire picture. No one
thought the shah's fall was inevitable. It failed to understand the opposition and bet on
the wrong faction among the political forces. It also placed too much stock on the norms
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of give and take, and the ability to negotiate and compromise in Iranian culture.

109

Nevertheless, even when the administration saw that Iran was slipping, all it could do was
to look at the options. There were only two that surfaced, both of them bad. The first
option, supported by Vance and others, was to encourage the shah to make political
reforms and liberalize the regime. When the reforms failed to quash the protests, a
proposal for a civilian government with or without the shah was offered. The Council of
Notables was another variation on that theme. The second option, supported at first only
by Brzezinski, but later by Schlesinger, Hamilton Jordan, and Jody Powell, suggested a
violent military crackdown to stop the revolt. Reforms were to be put on hold. Harold
Brown became sympathetic to this option, but had little faith in the Iranian military and
its ability to stop the unrest. Carter, Vance, and Mondale never supported this Iron Fist
approach. Carter never accepted fully the first option either. He wanted reforms but did
not want to undermine the shah.110 Also, he hesitated to come right out and tell the shah
what to do. He really did not want to meddle in the internal affairs of Iran. This
complicated his position, but he never knew that the shah was incapable of logical
decision making by 1978. The shah's sickness was still a secret. Also, Washington did
not read the shah well, and vice versa. It had rescued him in 1953, and the shah might
have expected this again; but it was no longer 1953. A third option was put forth towards
the end of the crisis by Henry Precht and Ambassador Sullivan: unload the shah and form
a relationship with Khomeini. Dropping the shah was as difficult for Carter as approving
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the Iron Fist; and Carter can and should be criticized for supporting the man too much.
The effort by the state department to meet with Khomeini in Paris was opposed by
Brzezinski. Partly because of this the option never received a full airing at the SCC
meetings. Also, Brzezinski undoubtedly urged Carter to reject this idea, and that
weakened it further. The United States in effect preferred the National Front to
Khomeini, and failed to read the situation correctly. No one in the upper levels of
government pushed the president forcefully to drop the shah; but men such as Henry
Precht as well as numerous academics were openly opposed to him Vance and his camp
clung to the shah, thinking that reforms could still be useful; Brzezinski held on to him
believing in the Iron Fist option. No coherent policy emerged. m With so many voices in
such total disagreement, it is no wonder that no clear picture emerged.
Could the military have even carried out the Iron Fist option? About half of its
numbers were volunteers, not conscripts, and it was fiercely loyal to the shah. In fact, the
shah took such an active, personal, role in things military that it could not function
without him. But by the end of 1978, or earlier, the shah himself was not functioning
effectively. The army was well equipped, but trained to fight foreign wars. A number of
observers believe that the army could have put down the revolt up to about October 1978
without much bloodshed, and up to December with considerable bloodshed.
Precht's option was predicated on the notion that Khomeini was a moderate and
would become a figurehead. Sick states that Khomeini's assistants, especially Ibrahim
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Yazdi, deliberately misled the United State son his intentions. Nonetheless, this option
might have worked earlier in the crisis. But Brzezinski refused to give it a fair hearing.
The huge amount of anti-Americanism after the fall of the shah makes one question
whether dialogue was indeed a possibility. Others argue that the United States could still
build a healthy relationship with Iran, even as Khomeini's dream of an Islamic republic
was becoming a reality. Such a republic need not be necessarily anti-American, "let
alone a fanatical theocracy." Carter was advised to study the Shi'ite doctrine generally,
which was different from the "harsher" Sunni variety currently prevailing in Saudi
Arabia, Libya, and Pakistan. "The Entourage around Khomeini, in fact, has had
considerable involvement in human rights.113
The administration was extraordinarily hampered by the intelligence coming out
of Iran as well as the confusion in the academic literature. This made it impossible to
accurately assess the seriousness of the situation and the strength of the Shiite opposition.
The Shiite forces were consistently underestimated throughout the crisis. Lastly, no one
knew the shah had terminal cancer.
Towards the end, events outran the United States' ability to influence them.
Although many in Iran saw the United States support for the shah's departure as a good
sign, sending General Huyser to Iran wiped out any benefit. Was this the new
"Washington's Man?" Also, Vance and Brzezinski both had flaws. Vance would not
consider the Iron Fist, no matter what the arguments were in favor of it. Brzezinski, for
his part, refused to believe that the revolution was not reversible, and this reversal could
be accomplished by the Iron Fist. He advocated this until the end, in spite of Carter's
refusal to endorse it. He was co-opted by it and failed to give Carter other choices.
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Stalemate resulted. Brzezinski's role in trying to implement policy further muddied the
waters for the shah, who complained that he "could never get the same story from the
White House and the State Department; the one kept assuring him that the United States
was solidly behind him, while the other kept reminding him that force was not
acceptable."114 Ledeen and Lewis are highly critical of Carter, especially his insistence
on human rights. They favored the iron fist option and allege that neither Carter nor the
shah had the clarity of purpose to unleash the military.
The lack of policy in some ways reflected the contradictions that were present
from 1953 onward, as well as the conflict between power and principle. The shah was
"Washington's man" in order to protect Iran from the communists; he offered stability.
Nevertheless, he was repressive, something the United States claims to be against; yet
SAVAK itself was at least partially trained by the US. There was agitation in Iran that
re-emerged in the 1960s; and although it was buried beneath the surface, it was there
throughout the 1970s. The shah was living on borrowed time, never achieving the
legitimacy he needed in the eyes of the Iranian people. Change, however, might bring
revolution and instability.115 In the end, no one was able to stop the fall of the shah.
An earlier realization that the shah was in deep trouble might have allowed for
effective contingency plans to be developed; or, maybe not. The same division in
thinking within the administration almost certainly would have been there. There were
two bad options: abandon the shah or repress the revolution so he can hold on. Holding
on would simply delay the day of reckoning. What then? In any case, it is difficult, if not
114
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impossible, to answer "what i f questions. If keeping the shah was a bedrock principle,
honest and forthright planning for contingencies may not have occurred. Loyalty to one's
friends is good on principle, but the constant carping on this by former government
officials, such as Kissinger, was counterproductive. So, the United States failed to
choose between two bad options.116 The events in Iran have parallels to those in China
in 1948-49. The news had been bad all of 1949, with the Nationalist regime of Chiang
Kai-shek crumbling rapidly. The American military adviser to Chiang, General David
Barr, reported that only active help from United States troops could save Chiang, and that
the Nationalist "debacles.. .can all be attributed to the world's worst leadership.. .the
widespread corruption and dishonesty through the [Nationalist] armed forces...." By the
spring of 1949 the complete fall of China to Mao Tse-tung (Zedong) had become a
foregone conclusion. The alarm was sounded, and angry, vindictive voices of the so
called "China Lobby" accused Truman of losing China, just as Carter would be accused
of losing Iran thirty years later. Truman's effort to calm the nation by trying to clarify
what was about to happen before it happened backfired. In August he released a huge
report from the State Department, United States Relations with China: With Special
Reference to the Period 1944-1949, which was an overview of United States policy from
the 1840s forward. Dean Acheson, secretary of state, had written in the preface that the
United States had poured more than $2 billion into support for Chiang since V-J Day. It
was not enough, nor could there ever be enough because of the internal decay of the
Nationalists. The United States was powerless to influence the outcome.

So it was

with Iran in 1978-79. Also, the press was no kinder to Carter than it had been to Truman.
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Time was one of both Truman's and Carter's harshest critics.118 The New York Times
also was critical, as were the conservatives or neoconservatives of the day.119 The United
Stateswas compromised in its relations with China because of the hype of the Red Scare,
and for twenty-three years had little contact. Carter did not compromise the United
Statesrelations with Iran for his successor; his inability to choose between the shah and a
bloodbath, or abandonment, left Reagan with the ability to start anew. The United States
should unload the shah, allow a decent interval to pass, then open up again to Iran.
Unfortunately, Reagan's idea of a relationship with Iran was guided by an ideology of
unilateralism linked to American ideals and military power, along with an unhealthy
skepticism on accommodation with other countries unless it clearly and immediately
achieves America's goals.

It embroiled the United States in a sordid arms for hostages

swap, a deal that would never work over the long term, with the profits diverted illegally
to the Contras in Nicaragua; shot down a passenger airplane killing 290 people, and
refused to see any positive aspects to building a better relationship with the country. In
the meantime, it was the end of an era in Iran. The most important of the absolute
monarchs in the Middle East collapsed for good.121 For the United States, the worst was
yet to come.
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CHAPTER VIII
IRAN: THE BITTER HOSTAGE CRISIS

INTRODUCTION
The events in Iran in late 1978 and early 1979 were traumatic for all concerned.
Little did the Carter administration know that the worst was yet to come. The American
press was curiously disinterested in Iran for most of 1978 but this changed as 1979 wore
on and the Iranian people became more anti American, whipped up by the radical
Ayatollah Khomeini. On November 4, 1979, 400 student militants seized the United
States embassy in Tehran, taking sixty-six American diplomats hostage, and causing a
crisis that staggered the Carter presidency. This chapter tells the story of the hostage
crisis, and argues that Carter's policies saved the lives of the men and women involved,
punished Iran by controlling much of its assets, alarmed it by its rhetoric regarding the
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and stood aside as Iraq waged war on the regime.
The idea that military hardware ensures a regime's viability is an old one, albeit a
faulty one. Carter inherited a string of policies that left the United States strategically
dependent on Iran and its ruler, with few other options. When the central power in Iran
began to unravel, no foreign government with extensive interests in Iran, not even the
Iranians themselves, could keep up with it, nor did they comprehend how the revolution
would turn Iran into one of the most savage states on the issue of human rights. Also, no
one thought it was possible to revert to a medieval model, but revert it did. As in most
revolutions, they occur not when things are at their worst; they happen, rather, when
rising expectations outstrip the pace of change, especially when there is weakness at the
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top. The time for swift and strong action to quell an uprising must be judged with care, as
any student of the French Revolution knows. The shah, like Louis XVI before him,
vacillated until it was too late.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES
The shah left Iran on January 16, 1979 and went first to Egypt, then to Morocco,
leaving behind a shaky government under Shahpur Bakhtiar's leadership, confused and
uncertain military commanders, and a population that was becoming increasingly antiAmerican, aroused by Khomeini's tape recorded speeches that had been covertly brought
into the country. Carter was satisfied with the shah's decision not to come to the US, but
Brzezinski was disturbed, thinking that his presence here would demonstrate to the world
that the United States was not abandoning its old ally. The United States approached
Khomeini through his aide, IbrahimYazdi, on January 23. Zimmerman, the American
envoy, told Yazdi that the United States was urging the military and the government to
reach an agreement with Khomeini's representatives, and Khomeini's return to Iran prior
to an agreement would spell disaster for the country. Khomeini responded that if
Bakhtiar or the army tried to stop him it would hurt American interests. On the other
hand, if they did not interfere, he would quiet things down. He went on to say that the
provisional government he intended to name would allay United States fears. He also
stressed that Iran's future would be decided by Iranians. Americans in Iran who had
contact with Khomeini's National Front supporters indicated that Khomeini had hinted
that he would set up a moderate, secular government, with the Islamic clergy remaining

1

Ramazani, the United States and Iran, 127,133; Sick, All Fall Down, 173; William J.
Daugherty, In the Shadow of the Ayatollah, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), Chapter 7; see
also, for example, Crane Brinton, Anatomy of a Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); Ledeen and
Lewis, Debacle, 196; Zonis, Majestic Failure, 267.

364
in the background. At that time the National Front believed that it would play a major
role in the new government. They stressed that the United States should disassociate
itself from Bakhtiar because he was going to disappear very quickly. Only later did it
become clear that Khomeini had no intention of being a "moderate."
The United States efforts to arrange a face to face meeting between Bakhtiar and
Khomeini were impeded by Brzezinski's opposition (according to Vance), despite the
fact that Bakhtiar and the military wanted this. Brzezinski also impeded this by his
insistence to Carter that the United States advise the Iranian military to seize power.
Vance thought the United States was lying to itself that Bakhtiar could survive.2 Bakhtiar
considered arresting Khomeini if he returned to Iran, but in an effort to avoid bloodshed,
changed his mind. He decided to fly to Paris instead. Khomeini's aides agreed to this,
and then Bakhtiar approved of the Ayatollah's return to Iran, hoping against hope that
this would quell the disorders. Typically, Khomeini reversed himself and refused to see
Bakhtiar. He then flew to Iran on February 1, welcomed by thousands of supporters.
General Robert "Dutch" Huyser was recalled to the United States, both on
Carter's authority and Sullivan's recommendation, and by his own request. His mission
had been to rally the Iranian army against the Ayatollah, but by the time he arrived in
Iran, it was too late. Brzezinski was the only advisor to object to his recall. On February
5, Huyser reported to the president, and as a result of the meeting Carter gave a strong
statement of support for Bakhtiar. He was quite disturbed by Huyser's report of what
2
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Sullivan had been doing. There were also several news stories that indicated the State
Department was not carrying out the president's orders. Carter was furious, and met with
middle echelon officials of State and castigated them for excessive leaks and disloyalty.
The State Department blamed Brzezinski for this, but he says the meeting was suggested
by Hamilton Jordan, a close advisor to the president who became involved in foreign
policy in January 1978.
By February 9, the Iranian military was in crisis with various units defecting to
Khomeini. On February 11, Bakhtiar resigned and went into hiding, and Mehdi Bazargan,
a moderate, took over the reins of government, having been chosen by Khomeini on
February 5. Bakhtiar's flight signaled the end of the liberal, moderate, Westernized
professionals. Many still believed that a noncommunist Islamic republic, supported by
the clear majority of the Iranian people, would probably be a stabilizing element, both in
the region and the Third World in general.4 It did not seem so at the time in Iran,
however.
Sullivan can be thanked for his cool head when the United States embassy was
attacked on February 14, referred to as the St. Valentine's Day Open House, and the
Fedayeen mob seized the ambassador and his staff. Sullivan ordered the Marine guard
not to resist, thwarting the Fedayeen's hope for a bloodbath. Fortunately, the government
forces arrived in time and no lives were lost. Coincidentally, the United States
ambassador to Afghanistan was kidnapped by rebel forces, but his fate was death. The
Iranians also attacked a United States military observation post in northeast Iran, then
they captured twenty Air Force employees at an intelligence monitoring.station, releasing
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them after several frightening days 5 Clearly, American security in the country was
becoming more fragile. Sullivan cabled that there was no longer a military establishment
integrated and responsive to United States influence; and those who had guns were antiAmerican, because the United States had encouraged resistance rather than collaboration.
A signal to this effect was the telephone call Carter made to the shah after Black Friday
when the Iranian military had fired into unarmed crowds at Jalah Square, killing and
wounding hundreds of men, women, and children on September 8. On September 10,
Carter telephoned the shah from Camp David during his Middle East talks to tell him that
he had the support and friendship of the US. As demonstrated in the preceding chapter,
no coherent policy emerged on what to do about the revolution, and Carter decided to
work with the new Iranian government rather than turn away from it. Supporting Bakhtiar
as long as he did was probably a mistake, because the Bakhtiar government was tied so
tightly to the shah, whom the United States government had also supported for far too
long. Sullivan further said that for those concerned with the safety of American
diplomats, the chancery in Tehran was in shambles and "dependent on a group trained to
assassinate us." He was referring to the Mujahidin, the group that had attacked the
embassy on February 14, and who continued to roam the compound, looting the
commissary and offices. Sullivan was understandably annoyed because of a telephone
call from David Newsom, undersecretary of state for political affairs, on behalf of
Brzezinski, asking if "Option C", a military coup, was viable. It came at the very
moment that General Philip Gast (chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Tehran
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1977-79) was in a bunker dodging fire between the cadets and the Imperial Guard. The
call overrode a reply to Sullivan's request for help from the Iranian government.
The United States announced that it would maintain normal diplomatic relations
with the new regime on February 16, as bands of young men roamed the streets meting
out "revolutionary justice," with anti-Americanism rising and civil war threatening. A
power struggle was obviously going on. Sullivan met with Bazargan and assured him
(and through him Khomeini) that the United States accepted the revolution and that the
United States would not interfere with internal Iranian affairs. Sullivan also told him that
the United States was prepared to continue an arms supply relationship. He also protested
the human rights violations that were occurring.7 This was an effort to strengthen this
moderate government, but clearly it was in deep difficulty. There were, however, some
encouraging signs as well. For example, Khomeini sent his personal representative to
meet with Vance to pledge more cooperation and friendship, and to make certain that the
United States was supporting the new government. The early contacts, however, soon
dried up; and so, by default, the United States continued to emphasize the moderates.
The State Department, which had foreseen the shah's collapse before the NSC, depended
on reputable scholars in the US, who also thought that the moderates would probably
carry the day. This time, they were wrong, and when the American overtures towards the
moderates were returned in kind, many Iranians became sullen.8
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In Iran, the original objective was not to overthrow the shah and replace him with
an Islamic government, or so everyone thought. Even Khomeini's closest supporters who
risked their lives to organize the demonstrations had little desire for rule by the clerics.
The opposition wanted fundamentally to return to the constitution of 1906. It was
Khomeini who insisted on revolutionary change - the total dissolution of the system and
the creation of a new order based on the will of the masses, as shown by their presence on
the streets. Khomeini (not unlike Hitler in the 1920s) harnessed the disparate forces of
the shah's opposition and shaped them into a body with form and purpose, infused with
his own ideology; an ideology that baffled and mystified not only Westerners, but also
Iranians themselves - the ideology of a man who craved power at any cost. The Iran they
created was unlike any in its history, and it disillusioned many. One reason that no one
could see it coming was that in the Western experience revolutions have led to the
secularization of society; that is, church and state became separate; but in Iran the
opposite occurred.9
In Washington, the Carter administration had to try to fashion a new Iranian
policy in a world inhabited by powerful Pahlavi supporters. They were shrill in their
blame of Carter, and were preoccupied with ideas of counterrevolution. Many tied the
new regime to communists and the KGB as well as the PLO.
Meanwhile, the United States had begun bringing Americans home because of the
increasing anti-Americanism. By the time Khomeini returned, about 25,000 had been
evacuated, but 10,000 still remained. Vance ordered Sullivan to send all military and
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civilian personnel home who were not absolutely essential to the American mission. All
dependents were to leave as well. He was also to advise the American business
community still present to accelerate its departure. David Newsom coordinated the
process at the Washington end, and by March 45,000 had been evacuated with no loss of
life.11
An Invitation Retracted
On March 1, Vance recommended to Carter that the United States retract its
invitation to the shah to come to the United States. If he had come immediately after he
left Iran on January 16, there might have been little adverse reaction there, provided he
kept a low profile. But his procrastination presented the United States with a serious
problem where none should have existed. By now Khomeini was demanding the shah's
return in order to face revolutionary justice. Also, after the St. Valentine's Day attack on
the embassy, many were reconsidering the wisdom of his coming. This, and in light of
the United States interests in forging a relationship with the new government, as well as
the safety of Americans still in Iran, dictated that the shah not be allowed to enter the
country. The shah was informed of this on March 17. He took the news calmly, merely
asking for help in finding a safe haven. The United States contacted numerous countries
and eventually found a temporary place for him in the Bahamas, then in Mexico. Carter
was under considerable pressure from the shah's friends in the United States to allow him
entry. These included John McCloy, David Rockefeller, and Henry Kissinger. They had
an ally in Brzezinski, but were unable to convince either Vance or Carter.12 Brzezinski
never wavered in support of the shah coming to the US. For him, it was a matter of
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principle as well as tactics. At stake was the United States historical commitment to
asylum, plus loyalty to an old friend. To compromise those principles would taint the
image of the United States in the eyes of the world and lower its own self esteem - for
little benefit. He believed that the principles involved were central to the United States
system, and this should be presented to the world in strong terms. He relates that
Mondale also thought along these lines.13
By mid-April the Charge d'Affairs in Iran, Charles Naas,14 (Sullivan had left on
April 6) reported that Khomeini was stepping up his attacks on the US, and that most of
the irregular security forces had been withdrawn from the embassy. Several thousand
Americans remained in Iran, and allowing the shah into the United States at this time
would have endangered everyone. Later, when the revolution subsided, it might be
possible. The United States did allow the shah's children to attend school in the US, after
clearing it with Bazargan. The shah's wife could come for medical treatment, but not to
live with their children. Humanitarian concerns dictated that the United States do what it
could for the family, but allowing the empress into the country came dangerously close to
confirming to the Iranians that the United States still supported the shah. Henry
Kissinger, busy as usual, hinted to Brzezinski that he was willing to support the
administration on the SALT negotiations, if it gave the shah asylum. Carter resented this,
and at a foreign policy breakfast he said he did not want the shah here playing tennis
while Americans in Tehran were being kidnapped. He had a pretty good instinct for what
could happen. In May, another problem cropped up. The Khomeini regime was treating
former officials of Iran and religious and ethnic minorities, in brutal ways. The United
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States officially protested, and Congress passed a resolution condemning Khomeini's
actions. His reaction was to increase attacks on the American. Journalists, members of
congress, national and international business leaders were reminded by Kissinger daily
that Carter would not let the shah come to America.15 Obviously, the shah's life and
comfort was more important to Kissinger than the safety of the diplomats in Iran. The
Senate resolution caused nation wide anti-American riots in Iran and convinced the
Iranians of American hostility towards the revolution; some even claiming it was a major
event leading to the takeover of the embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis.
Spring and Summer: After This the Deluge
Carter relates that over the spring and summer the situation improved, at least in
some ways. The United States had limited aims: maintain access to Iranian oil and
gradually develop better relations. Yazdi, now foreign minister, made a major speech
outlining several Iranian policies. These included complete commitment to the
Palestinian cause, improved relations with the US, and a noncommittal attitude toward
the Soviet Union. In August the United States agreed to resume the transfer of a limited
supply of spare parts for their military, and exchanged a limited amount of intelligence
with the Bazargan government. Relations became more businesslike.
After a series of disagreements between Khomeini and Bazargan, they evidently
decided to go their own way and avoid each other. Bazargan, Yazdi, and a few others
were allowed to run the government, but the Ayatollah had the final authority, a man who
was irrational and irresponsible and who kept Iran in constant upheaval. The revolution
was far from over; the bloodbath was continuous, causing some of Khomeini's allies to
15
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leave him and others to be murdered. As his problems mounted, he lashed out more and
more against the United States, telling his followers in the street that it was the source of
their problems, even as the government officials tried to restore normal relations. There
were two broad categories of people who wanted power: those who wanted to build a
secular, modern Iran, and the clerics who wanted to get rid of Western corruption and
establish an Islamic state. There were many fissures within these two wings. Finally, the
mobs began to turn against Khomeini, rebellion broke out, and some provinces demanded
autonomy. Khomeini was no weak minded shah; he was determined to save his
revolution by any means necessary. He cracked down on the press, outlawed playing
music on Iranian radio and television programs, stating that it was the equivalent of
opium and was corrupting the youth. Bazargan began to doubt that he could deal with
the economic and social breakdown of the nation under Khomeini's leadership, and asked
to be relieved of his duties; instead, he reshuffled his cabinet and stayed.
A serious mistake was placing too much confidence in the Iranian government
and its ability to actually govern. Throughout the summer of 1979 small, incremental
steps were taken to help stabilize the relationship under the direction of Henry Precht of
the State Department, who had enormous confidence in the moderates' ability to get
power once the shah was gone. He wrote an assessment of the situation three weeks after
the Bakhtiar government collapsed and devoted most of the discussion to the "elements
of strength" that he perceived. It was sent out without any coordination outside the State
Department and was purported to be official United States policy. It received a scathing
reply from Sullivan, saying these elements did not exist. Things were getting worse, not
better. This did not deter Precht. He had influence because he had the ear of Assistant
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Secretary Harold Saunders. It was this philosophy that shaped the small but very
important decisions about manning and operating the embassy. Brzezinski was convinced
that Bazargan was succeeding as well, and disliked the thought of doing anything that
might suggest a lessening of United States support.17
The high level contacts that the United States had made over the summer
reassured those involved that the Bazargan government would survive, and this might
have led to unrealistic expectations. The question of "who lost Iran?" began to be asked,
and the issue was heating up as a major policy debate in the upcoming presidential
1 R

election.

Accounts differed on the health and strength of the regime. It was obviously

still revolutionary, and the pendulum swung back and forth throughout the spring and
summer as to whether it would turn out to be moderate or fanatical. The administration
tried hard to convince the Iranians that it recognized Khomeini, that it understood the
revolution, and that the United States and Iran still had common economic and security
interests.19 However, it had no direct contact with Khomeini. There was a promising start
to a potential meeting, but the Congressional outcry against the human rights abuses
thwarted this. Some argue that the United States was deliberately isolating itself from the
revolution so as not to antagonize the moderates, and the Iranians claim that the United
States never recognized the revolution.
The Rapid Deployment Force: The Germ of the Idea
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There were numerous Special Coordinating Committee meetings throughout this
time as the United States began to try to find ways to bolster security in the region.
Harold Brown, defense secretary, Brzezinski, and Vance agreed that the United States
should bolster its defense ties and military capabilities in the Gulf. Brzezinski had the
most sweeping, far reaching ideas. One of these ideas proposed to the president was that
the United States should develop the ability to rapidly deploy ground, air, and naval
forces into the area; to conduct joint military exercises and security consultations with
friends and allies; and permanently deploy the navy in the Indian Ocean.
While the RDF was a good idea, ideas alone do not produce results. Shortly after
the signing of SALT II in Vienna in June 1979 Brzezinski asked the Defense Department
what progress had been made. The Pentagon essentially replied, "Not much." When
Brzezinski expressed impatience, General David Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) initiated planning at the "joint" level among the services, and modest
planning began, but no major shift of resources was made.21 The military continued to
plan almost exclusively for an East-West confrontation. However, the United States
began to get access to local friendly ports and airfields during a crisis, and expanded air
and naval facilities on British Diego Garcia as well as pre-position combat equipment for
ground support of United States troops. All of this preceded the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan. The invasion and the hostage crisis accelerated the actions already under
way. Vance was quite clear on this.
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There is some criticism of these activities. Some scholars see parallels between
the military show of force in 1957-58 in the Middle East in response to a real or imagined
Soviet threat and the events of 1979-80. Also, the move towards securing bases in the
region when the Iranian revolution was spewing a contagious anti-Americanism might
have been counterproductive, according to some. However, contrary to popular belief, the
United States was reacting in 1979 to regional events, not to a perceived Soviet threat.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan probably gave the United States some leverage over
Iran; it was still fearful of the Russians. The United States actions were a response to the
Iranian revolution. The same might be said for Eisenhower in 1957-1958. His actions
were in response to Nasserism, not to the Soviets.23 Both presidents wanted to gain or
keep the friendship of countries in the region. However, as the United States sought to
gain the cooperation that would give it the capacity to support its friends in the region,
those friends became less certain about the benefits to them.24
The Shah and his Illness
The shah and his illness interjected itself back into the situation in October 1979
when Carter heard about his cancer. Vance noted that David Rockefeller, who had
informed David Newsom about the matter, had sent his own doctor to Mexico, and the
shah was seriously ill. He might ask the administration to admit him to the United States
for treatment. The United States was also worried that the shah's time in Mexico was
running out. Vance met Yazdi at the UN on October 3, and Yazdi asked if the United
States was going to admit the shah. Vance did not rule it out, but said not at the time. On
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October 18 Rockefeller's staff told the State Department that the shah's condition was
getting worse and that it could not be properly diagnosed and treated in Mexico. Several
days later the story came out: he had suffered for several years from malignant lymphoma
which was no longer responding to chemotherapy. Rockefeller wanted to bring him to
Sloan-Kettering Hospital in New York for treatment. The State Department's medical
director who had also gone to Mexico concurred in the diagnosis.25
The Carter administration was faced with a terrible decision - as usual, it was
presented as a choice between power and principle. Should the United States allow the
shah into the country for medical treatment, which a basic sense of humanity demanded,
when this could put Americans in Tehran in danger? Vance now favored allowing the
shah in, but Carter remained the lone holdout, asking what United States policy should be
if Americans in Tehran were kidnapped. He and his senior advisers were unanimous that
the United States should try to help the shah if Iran could and would protect the embassy.
Henry Precht was in Tehran at the time and he and Laingen were instructed to inform
Bazargan and Yazdi of the situation and seek their assistance. They did this, and while
warned that there would be a sharp reaction in Iran, they guaranteed the protection.
Warren Christopher, on Vance's orders, suggested to Carter that he should
•

Notify Bazargan of the shah's condition and the humanitarian need for
treatment in the United States;

•

Unless the Iranian government's reaction was very negative, inform the
shah that the United States is willing to have him come to New York for
treatment arranged by David Rockefeller, but ask that his household in
Mexico be kept intact;
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•

Prepare a press release that the shah was being admitted to the United
States for evaluation and diagnostics on humanitarian grounds, but that no
commitment has been made as to how long he can remain.

The recommendations were intended to minimize, as much as possible, the danger to the
diplomats in Iran. Carter decided on a middle path; to allow the shah to go to New York
for diagnostics and evaluation, but there would be no asylum. He told Vance to inform
Iran, but not to ask permission. The Iranian government's reaction was moderate, but
they made it clear that it was unwelcome news. They preferred that he be treated outside
of the country, and if that were not possible somewhere other than New York. The
United States said that neither he nor his wife would engage in political activity.
Based on Laingen and Precht's report of their discussions Carter gave the order
on October 21 to admit the shah. He came on October 22. The option of another location
was considered and then rejected because it would delay treatment, which appeared to be
urgent. Perhaps he could have been treated in Mexico, but the equipment was not all in
one place and the doctors believed that he was on the verge of death. There was
speculation in the press that Carter made the decision on the basis of political expediency.
However, it seems clear that this was a humanitarian decision. David Newsom recounts
that he and "Gary Sick concluded in September that the president of the United States
could not be responsible for refusing to admit someone if there was a dire and
demonstrable medical need." Carter agreed only reluctantly and had said bluntly that he
was not willing to jeopardize Americans in Tehran so that the shah could play tennis or
26
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his wife could go shopping. So, Carter and his advisors were not unaware of the risks
involved. Perhaps they placed too much confidence in the moderates in the Iranian
government. However, had the administration refused the medical treatment it would be
seen as a rejection of the humanitarian traditions of the American nation.
Carter understood that hospitality is biblical; it comes under Mosaic Law.
Proverbs say that even enemies must be given the necessities of survival. In Christianity
Jesus had to depend on the hospitality of strangers during his ministry, and used the
opportunity of a meal to teach. He also used the language of hospitality to describe God
and His kingdom.

The theme of the precarious, yet necessary, relationship between

guest and host was well known in the ancient world, and it is not surprising that Carter's
Judeo-Christian principles demanded that the shah be given medical treatment. The
Koran also demands hospitality, but the Iranians did not see things this way.
The initial arrival of the shah caused no radical reaction, either from the Iranian
government or the people. But lingering suspicions of the United States association with
the shah and the recollection of the events of 1953 proved too strong to overcome. Carter
writes that the United States monitored the situation carefully and received a series of
reports through the State Department which stated that the Tehran press was restrained
and that there had been no editorial comment. In response to a United States request, the
security forces guarding the embassy had been strengthened. Several large scale
demonstrations were held, but were peaceful.
On November 1, Brzezinski found himself at a celebration dinner in Algiers with
Bazargan, Yazdi, and Mustapha Ali Chamran, the Iranian defense minister. When
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Laingen had learned of the dinner a few days earlier, he had urged Brzezinski to meet
with the Iranians, believing that the more contact the better. He also mentioned the
possibility to Bazargan. A private meeting subsequently took place in which Yazdi
emphasized that the shah's presence in the United States disturbed them and made the
people believe that the United States was involved with his political supporters.
Brzezinski, angry, said the discussion was humiliating and pointed out that it was Iranian
tradition to welcome refugees and grant asylum. "The man is sick, and we will not act
contrary to our principles." Bazargan then suggested that Iranian doctors be allowed to
examine him so that they could be assured that he really was sick. On the subject of
frozen Iranian assets in the US, Brzezinski said that the United States court doors were
open and Iran could sue for them any time they wanted. Brzezinski, for his part, talked in
general terms of the strategic interests that Iran and the United States had in common and
talked of the possibilities for cooperation, aid, and military support. Brzezinski came
away from the meeting convinced that the men were intelligent and sensible; they had a
seriousness of purpose as well as a realistic assessment of the problems they faced. But
the situation changed radically. The secret meeting, coupled with the admittance of the
shah to the US, made the students misapply the analogy of the situation to the 1953 coup.
They were convinced this would be repeated, and Brzezinski, hardly a marginal player
did advocate a coup.

There is disagreement over United States policies, with some scholars insisting that the
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This meeting that swayed the harshest United States critic of the revolution
became the excuse in Iran to diminish the power of Bazargan and Yazdi a few days later.
On Sunday, November 4, 1979, a date that Carter will never forget, the American
embassy in Tehran was overrun by about three thousand militants. About fifty or sixty of
the American staff had been captured. Although seriously disturbed, the administration
was confident that the Iranian government would soon rout the militants and release the
captured Americans. Many nations had faced similar situations, but no host government,
so far as anyone knew, had ever refused to try to protect threatened diplomats. Iran had
made a firm commitment to do that, and in the past few weeks even some of Khomeini's
forces had helped to disburse crowds of demonstrators. Brzezinski's meeting with
Bazargan and Yazdi tainted them and they were now powerless to help.29
Bazargan tried to remove the militants, but after a few hours passed without
forceful action, the United States grew more and more worried. The mob wanted
Khomeini to see that the embassy had been taken over by his young, pious followers,
thus making it difficult for him to allow the government to send help. The United States
contacted any officials it knew in both the Bazargan Cabinet and the Revolutionary
Council, where government and religious leaders made the basic decisions on policy.
The militant extremists had become overnight heroes, however, and Khomeini praised
them. He knew that he could use them to strengthen the revolution and gain complete
power. That made the United States more valuable to him as an enemy than a friend, and
after that, no government official would risk confronting him. This was when Bazargan
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and Yazdi resigned in disgust. It was not clear what the militants wanted. Carter
believes that they had not originally intended to remain in the embassy or to hold the
Americans captive more than a few hours, but when they received the adoring praise of
many of their comrades, they decided to stay. The only thing they demanded was the
return of the shah and his money to Iran. Later, some of the students said to the hostages
that it was to weaken the secular government and breathe new life into the revolution;
and they thought that it would last only a few days.

The students served Khomeini well

- it was through this event that he was able to cement his power over the tone and
direction of the revolution.
The administration began to review its options. It had begun to consider ways to
deal with the growing chaos in Iran in late 1978, but there was little consensus on what to
do. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown ordered the Pentagon to begin contingency
planning to replace the guardian role played by the shah. The planning focused on a wide
range of intraregional issues. In February 1979 Brown also articulated the United States
commitment to defend its vital interests in the Gulf region. This later became the Carter
Doctrine. Although many thought the doctrine was in response to the Soviet invasion
Afghanistan, it was incorporated into United States policy more than ten months earlier
as a response to the revolution in Iran. Instead of focusing on the chaos in Iran, the
Pentagon focused on a US-Soviet confrontation, because the chaos in Iran might invite
Soviet intervention. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan confirmed the bias. So when the
militants captured the United States embassy and took the diplomats hostage, the
Pentagon had nothing to offer Carter. The Iranians hated and feared the Soviet expansion
southward and the absurdity of the hostage crisis was even more apparent to the
30
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administration. The Iranian foreign minister, not a reliable source, thought the crisis
could be solved in a reasonable amount of time.31
There were still 570 Americans in Iran. The companies that employed them were
notified to get their people out. The United States asked the Algerians, Syrians, Turks,
Pakistanis, Libyans, PLO and others to intercede. Carter recognized that it is almost
impossible to deal rationally with an irrational person by Western standards, but he also
believed that the world of Islam would be damaged badly if a person such as Khomeini
committed murder in the name of religion against 60 innocent people. He had no
intention of releasing the shah to them. When asked whether the United States would be
willing to apologize to Iran for the 1953 coup; Carter snapped that "1953 is ancient
history." However, it was no such thing to the Iranians. A working group was formed
at the State Department, headed by Precht. It operated twenty-four hours a day until the
crisis was over. Brzezinski convened an SCC which met several times a week throughout
the crisis. In addition, he also presided over a highly secret small group, involving only
Harold Brown, General Jones (Chair, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and Stansfield Turner, which
focused on military options. No one knew it would take fourteen months to resolve the
issue - four hundred and forty-four days.
Early Mistakes That Compounded the Crisis
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In the limited sense of protecting the embassy's physical security, nothing was
left undone. A survey was taken after the February attack and a number of steps were
taken. The entrances to the chancery building - believed to be the most probable target
of an attack - were equipped with heavy steel doors, backed up by alarm and surveillance
systems and remote control tear gas devices. Bulletproof glass went into the window
frames. Contingency plans were developed for a staged withdrawal in case of an attack.
Defenses were designed to allow the embassy to hold off an attack for two or three hours
until help could arrive. The plan worked exactly as designed, except no help came.24
Another problem was the bureaucratic "creep" of the embassy. Between the two
attacks, each office had tried to rebuild itself back to normal working levels, in spite of a
bare bones policy that had been formally approved. By the time of the November attack
the number of people at the embassy had grown significantly beyond what had originally
been approved. The proliferation of files, a third problem complicating the crisis, is
difficult to explain. Sullivan had ordered all reference files to be shipped to the United
States prior to February, retaining only a small working file in each office. These were
destroyed in mid- February as the situation deteriorated. But when the embassy was
reconstituted after the February attack, the various agencies shipped back many boxes of
files that Sullivan had sent home, a fact not known by the White House. When the crisis
began to mount in October, the embassy found itself drowning in paper that needed to be
protected. It failed to take advantage of the time between when the shah entered the
United States and the attack to get rid of this paper. The embassy in Tehran was able to
destroy some classified documents and the visa stamps in order to keep unsavory people
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from gaining access to the US; but not all the documents.35 Some that were shredded
were later pieced together and published by the Iranians. When the attack came, a very
large amount of classified information fell into the hands of the militants. Although he
acted with courage and dignity during the crisis, the Charge had failed to take this
elementary precaution. The documents, dating back to the 1950s, were subsequently
published in Tehran. Every person who had any contact with the embassy was now also a
hostage in the sense that he or she could be blackmailed or prosecuted on the assumption
that he was working for the United States. A number were harassed and threatened. The
spy hysteria had a devastating effect in the factional political wars. It seemed like proof
that the United States had managed Iranian affairs for years, with very long term
consequences for the US, in spite of the fact that there was nothing sensational to be
found. The sheer quantity of the material made it difficult to know what had been lost
and what had been destroyed, complicating the work of the crisis team.
A final question that might be asked is why the embassy was not evacuated when
the shah came to the US. It was not even discussed, either in Washington or Tehran.
Several factors should be considered. First, the United States had the assurances of the
Iranian government that it would protect the embassy, and had indeed done so on
November 1 when an attack was expected. A second factor was the overwhelming
importance of Iran to the Gulf region. Vital United States interests were at stake. A total
withdrawal would signal that the United States was washing its hands of the revolution,
and probably would have destroyed the tenuous links within the country that it had made.
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Third, the people serving in the embassy were old hands; many could speak the language
and they liked the people. They believed in the work they were doing. Although many
disagreed with the decision to allow the shah into the US, and were well aware of the
danger to themselves, they resisted the impulse to run away. Many lived to regret this
decision.
When the attackers breeched the compound the security drill for those in the
chancery, the dominant building, was to go to the third floor. The chancery had been
"hardened" in various ways, and the third floor was protected by a heavy-gauge steel
door that blocked the entry to the floor. It was paneled to look like wood. Thus
protected, they were to wait for the Iranian police or military. Phil Gast, head of the
MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) spoke by telephone to Bruce Laingen who
happened to be in the foreign ministry at the time. Laingen urged the group to hang on
while officials at the ministry tried to get the police to come. Earlier, a security guard
had gone out to "reason" with the mob; and there was little doubt that he would suffer the
same fate as those captured in the other two buildings. The guard now demanded that the
door be opened. If those inside did not comply, he would be shot. The information was
relayed to Laingen who then told the group to surrender. Bert Moore, the administrative
counselor said "Let the record show that the embassy surrendered at twelve twenty."38
The United States Reacts
Early on, any military option was put on hold until the situation became less fluid.
The United States was constrained by the fact that if it launched an attack the hostages
would almost certainly be murdered. The idea of a rescue operation was dropped after
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receiving a pessimistic assessment, to say the least, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff: zero
chance of success. Contingency planning proceeded, however. The biggest problem was
the inaccessibility of the embassy. It was more than six hundred miles from the nearest
operating aircraft carriers in the middle of densely populated Tehran.
On November 20 another aircraft carrier was sent to the Indian Ocean. Satellite
pictures were taken to determine where Iran's airplanes and other forces were located.
Everyone was concerned about the remaining Americans in Iran, and was also incensed
by the violent demonstrations in the United States that were put on by pro-Khomeini
Iranian students. On November 11, President Carter sent a note to Brzezinski that said,
"When we get Americans out of Iran, I want all Iranian 'students' who are not enrolled
full-time in college to be expelled. Tell Ben [Civiletti, the Attorney General] to prepare
optimum implementation of this enforcement of United States law."39 Carter also
ordered that no Iranian demonstrations were to be held on federal property, and was
"incensed" when his legal advisers and some staff leaders came back over and over to
argue that this order might infringe on free speech. Carter thought that the anger and
frustration of Americans could cause any such demonstration to turn into a bloody riot,
endangering the hostages in Iran. There were more arguments about it and the issue went
to court, but the court upheld his decision as a proper use of presidential power. The
Ayatollah mocked Carter, saying "The Americans don't simply want to free these spies,
all this crisis is to help Carter get reelected... .He doesn't attach any importance human
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beings....This 'humanitarian' thinks he can mobilize the whole world into starving
40

us....
Hopes that the crisis would be short lived began to evaporate. All recognized the
growing danger to the lives of the hostages. Everyone knew that Khomeini had the real
power, and on November 5 Carter's senior advisers recommended that the United States
send a personal emissary to see him. Ramsey Clark, former attorney general who had
contacts among the religious leaders, including Khomeini, and William Miller, an exForeign Service officer who had served in Tehran and spoke Farsi, were recommended.
Khomeini agreed, then in his usual fashion changed his mind and would not allow them
to enter Iran. Vance speculates that this might have been the last chance to get the
hostages out before they became pawns in the internal power struggle. It began to sink in
that this crisis would go on for a long time.41
Carter decided that the United States would pursue two objectives: protection of
the nation's honor and interests, and the safe release of the hostages. The United States
would not return the shah, would offer no apology for any previous actions or policies, or
permit the hostages to go on trial. The strategy would be two tracked. First, the United
States would use all channels of communication to ascertain the condition of the hostages
and give them the assurances that the country was pursuing their release as strongly as it
could; determine the Iranians' motives in holding them; and negotiate their freedom.
Second, the United States would try to build intense pressure on Iran through the UN and
other international bodies, increase Iran's isolation, and make its leaders see the costs to
the revolution of holding the hostages. The Security Council unanimously condemned the
40
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Iranian seizure of hostages and demanded their immediate return. The revolution became
even more violent. In December the International Court of Justice ruled that Iran had
violated international law. Virtually all governments now soundly condemned Iran. This
still did not mean they were on board with any punitive sanctions, however.42
The PLO helped to persuade Khomeini to order the release of thirteen women and
black hostages. They arrived in the United States on November 17 and were able to
provide important information on what was happening in Tehran and the barbaric
treatment of some of the hostages. The bad publicity this generated for Iran did lead to
some improvement in the treatment of the captives. It was the United Nations that
provided the first significant opportunity for diplomatic action. Vance met secretly with
Kurt Waldheim, the secretary general, and his aide Rafeeuddin Ahmed. By then the
United States knew that there were divisions in Iran between moderates in the
Revolutionary Council such as Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr and religious pragmatists on
the one hand, and the extremists on the other. The moderates wanted to get through the
crisis before it could damage the revolution. Unfortunately, the Revolutionary Council
had no control over the captors. They answered to Khomeini. Vance presented four
points which, although modified somewhat over the next months, remained the American
position for the duration. The United States
•

Demanded the release of all personnel held in Tehran;

•

Suggested the establishment of an international commission to investigate
allegations of human rights abuses by Iran;
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•

Indicated that United States courts were available to hear Iranian claims on the
assets it thought had been illegally taken from the country;

•

Proposed an affirmation by the governments of Iran and the United States of their
intention to abide by the Declaration of Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, and by the provisions of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Iranian position had not changed. They wanted the shah, an apology for United
States' past "crimes" against Iran, a return of the shah's assets, and an end to alleged
United States interference in Iran. The United States was not prepared to do these things.
No meeting between Vance and Bani-Sadr ever took place. Bani-Sadr was dismissed
from his post as foreign minister and did not reappear until he became president of Iran in
January 1980. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh replaced him, a person who was close to Khomeini.
There was talk of putting the hostages on trial as spies. The United States privately sent a
stern warning through intermediaries that this would lead to grave consequences,
including military action. Carter repeated the warning in a meeting with the families of
the hostages, and elsewhere; and it then appeared in the New York Times in several
articles. There were several options available, including blockading Iran's ports and
• •

•

43

mining its waters.
The violence in Iran spilled over into Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In Saudi Arabia
a group of radicals invaded the mosque in Mecca, and an Indian newspaper reported that
Americans were involved. This in turn sparked riots in Pakistan, and radicals attacked
43
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and burned the United States embassy, killing an American sergeant. The entire Gulf
region shook with violence. The public and Congress both strongly supported Carter's
restraint as well as his resoluteness in refusing to capitulate to Iranian blackmail. The
administration tried to keep the public informed while at the same time protecting its
confidential sources. There was intensive scrutiny by the press.44 As the crisis wore on
there were many ups and downs; and Carter's attempts to keep the public informed
turned on him. He was attacked by the right as weak and vacillating, but this really
described the Iranians, not Carter. Time and again they negotiated in bad faith, and
strung the United States along.
Sanctions
Carter wanted suggestions for biting sanctions that would prod Iran and put more
pressure on the international community to force it to comply with international law.
Brzezinski recalls that there were various excuses for inaction by the different
departments. For example, the State Department was appalled when Brzezinski
suggested that the United States should punish Iranian diplomats in the same manner as
Iran had punished Americans; the Justice Department came up with reason after reason
why no action could be taken against Iranians in the US; and Treasury came up with
complicated excuses why economic sanctions would be counterproductive. The list went
on. Nonetheless, a series of measures were adopted. On the day before Carter ordered
Iranian "students" out of the country, the United States announced that it was deporting
all Iranians who were in the United States illegally. Pressure grew more intense. Apart
from the military option, a logical next step was to tighten the economic noose around
44
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Iran's neck. State and Treasury Department officials coordinated action with United
States allies. However, it soon became apparent that even the United States closest allies
had no taste for an oil embargo against their countries, nor would they endanger their
own diplomatic arrangements for the sake of American hostages. Only direct United
States action would have any real effect on the state of affairs.
Two days later after expelling the Iranians, Carter ordered that oil purchases from
Iran were to be discontinued, an act of considerable courage; then Iran countered with an
oil embargo against the US. It was then that Carter ordered the freeze on official Iranian
assets in the US. It applied to assets in United States banks, foreign branches, and
subsidiaries. The Iranians said they would not repay its foreign debts, then filed suit in
New York State Supreme Court against the shah, asking for $56.5 billion in damages.45
One theory on the freeze of Iranian assets postulates that certain United States banks,
especially Chase Manhattan, were in a declining financial situation, and believed it was
necessary to provoke an incident so that Iranian assets, which were deposited in Chase,
could be seized. The Iranian government was methodically withdrawing its deposits,
which was alarming in itself, but the government also hinted that it might not honor all
the shah's loans, especially those that involved the shah's old friend David Rockefeller.
The deposits remaining were approaching the amount of the loans, and bank officials
were frustrated because the Iranians always paid the interest on time. The needed
incident came when the shah was allowed into the country for medical treatment, which
helped to provoke the hostage taking. Ten days later Carter froze Iranian assets in the
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US. The American banks interpreted the freeze order to include assets located in their
foreign branches.
There is disagreement over whether sanctions accomplish their goals. Makio
Miyagawa argues that the hostages were freed in exchange for the lifting of economic
sanctions; Peter van Ham says that while the economic sanctions on Iran were useful in
demonstrating the West's firm resolve, in communicating political messages, and in
setting in motion the "mechanism of deterrence and compellence," the larger question of
whether they work was left unanswered. Mahvash Alerassool argues that the purpose of
the sanctions on Iran was to exert pressure to release the hostages and to compensate
American citizens who had claims against the regime that arose from the revolution.
Both of these aims were achieved. In the end, Iran recovered only $4 billion of its $14
billion of frozen assets in the United States, the remainder having been paid in
compensation. They were free to sue in American courts to try to recover more.47
The Carter Doctrine
Brzezinski writes that he became concerned that the approach to the crisis was
becoming "routinized," and questioned whether the administration should reassess its
entire overall strategy, accelerating and intensifying the pressure on Iran. The strategic
context changed radically in late December when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
Any action against Iran had to be considered within the larger context of Soviet ambitions
in the Gulf region. It became important to mobilize Islamic resistance against them; and
that meant avoiding any action that might divide opposition to Soviet expansion.
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Brzezinski believed that it was more important than ever before to avoid an IranianAmerican military confrontation. Vance also agreed that the United States had to
proceed with great care so it would not drive Iran straight into Soviet arms. (In retrospect,
it seems quite doubtful that Iran would have turned to the Russians. If anything, the
Soviet presence in Afghanistan might have constrained the Iranians from killing the
hostages.) In January, in Carter's State of the Union address, he announced what became
known as the Carter Doctrine.
"Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by
any means necessary, including military force.

Carter was the first president to state that the Persian Gulf was a "vital interest," and the
doctrine gave the United States policy responsibility in the region. At the time he made
the statement, it reflected United States intentions rather than capabilities. It was still
poorly equipped to respond to a major Soviet challenge in the region, but the Pentagon
began to move more quickly on the RDF and got access agreements with Oman, Kenya,
and Somalia, and talks were begun with Pakistan on countering Soviet intervention.
AWACS were deployed in Saudi Arabia and an Amphibious Ready Group was sent to
the Arabian Sea. Also, Carter's opinion of the Soviet Union changed dramatically, and he
became more assertive in his policies, not only because of the Afghanistan invasion, but
also because of their activity on the Horn of Africa.49
The Shah Decides to Leave the US
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In mid-November David Rockefeller called Carter to tell him that the shah was
responding well to treatment and was considering going back to Mexico. Carter had no
desire to involve official United States in any way with the shah's decision since it could
be interpreted that the United States was capitulating to Iranian pressure. As the shah
prepared to go back to Mexico, the administration hoped that this could trigger an end to
the crisis. The Mexican government had other ideas. It suddenly reversed its previous
decision to allow the shah to return. Carter was angry and incredulous. It was a bolt out
of the blue. Apparently, President Lopez Portillo had simply changed his mind. Anwar
Sadat, stepped into the breech and re-issued his invitation for the shah to come back to
Egypt - another act of courage by a man who had already performed many for the United
States and for Carter personally. Carter was reluctant to have him get into any more
trouble with the rest of the Arab world, and even his own people, so he called the
Egyptian ambassador, Ashraf Ghorbal who said that all of Sadat's top advisers were
worried about the consequences of such an act. Carter was torn between wanting the
shah to go to Egypt, and not wanting to hurt his friend Sadat. Sadat, for his part, wanted
the shah to stay in the United States, but did not want to hurt Carter.
Carter's other choice was to send the shah to a military base within the US. This
is what he decided to do. The shah ended up at Lackland Air Force Base, near San
Antonio. A few days later two genuine options opened up - South Africa and Panama.
Hamilton Jordan went to Panama to investigate that offer and was convinced that it was
genuine. Jordan and the president of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, had become friends
during the negotiations on the Panama Canal Treaties. He told Torrijos that Carter was
convinced that the hostage crisis could not be resolved as long as the shah was in the US.
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Torrijos agreed. Torrijos said that "the crisis is first and foremost the problem of the
United States.. ..But it is also the problem and the responsibility of the world community.
As long as diplomats can be held like those in Tehran, no diplomat is safe anywhere. You
tell the president that we will accept the Shah in Panama." Torrijos added that Panama
was a small country, but would be proud to make even a small contribution to resolving
the crisis. The government offered a villa on an island off its coast. Jordan telephoned
the president with the news that his friend down south was willing to "accept that gift."
The shah and his wife were in agreement with the arrangement, provided it had an
adequate communication system so that he could respond to Khomeini's charges against
him! The shah left the United States on December 15, but the hostages remained
incarcerated for thirteen more months, in spite of everyone's hope that the Panamanian
home to the shah would help to speed their release. Kissinger had a string of criticisms
about the administration, as if he and Nixon were totally innocent in the events of the
decade. Carter asked him to come to the White House for a talk so they could iron out
their differences. Kissinger promised his help on SALT and said that some of his
remarks had been made prior to the crisis and that he would avoid similar ones in the
future. Carter relates that things got better for a few days, but then reverted to normal.50
The UN and the Crisis
The United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions, the first was
Resolution 457 which called for Iran to release the hostages immediately and called on
Waldheim to use his offices to help implement this. The second, Resolution 461,
reaffirmed 457. Waldheim traveled to Iran on January 1, 1980 to try to break the
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stalemate. The United States position remained essentially the same. It agreed to work
out in advance an arrangement for the airing of Iranian grievances, but the tribunal would
not be instituted in advance. It also agreed, once the hostages were released, to seek a
resolution of all issues between the United States and Iran. Waldheim got an unpleasant
and threatening welcome and ended up believing his life had been threatened three times.
Chaos reigned. The Iranians also tried to twist the United States position by suggesting
that the commission could begin work prior to the hostages' release. Although Waldheim
was not immediately successful, the idea of an international commission eventually
became the core of the release plan that was worked out.
Waldheim's negative report to the UN opened the question of sanctions, but the
issue was vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union on January 12. Carter
publicly called the Soviets "outlaws." Eventually, even Cuba was embarrassed by them.
The United States decided to move ahead anyway. The allies of the United States
remained reluctant to participate. It seems that the president of Panama understood more
about the danger to all diplomats than many other countries. The allies asked the United
States to wait until after Iranian elections on January 29. Maybe someone would come to
power that would enter into serious negotiations. In the meantime, indirect channels
communicated that the Afghanistan invasion had made some in Iran seek some sort of
sign from the United States that it would help them move Khomeini towards a resolution
of the crisis. Carter, through Waldheim, sent a fuller statement of the United States
position. Without changing its basic stance, it was a bit more conciliatory in tone
regarding the grievances of many Iranians against the former regime and the frozen
assets. It reaffirmed its diplomatic recognition of the Islamic Republic and offered joint
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discussions on the problem in Afghanistan. A year later, the points iterated by Carter
formed the basis for the resolution of the crisis and the release of the hostages.51
The Diplomats Who Came in From the Cold
An episode unfolded that was far more fascinating and interesting than any Cold
War fiction could ever be. At the time the American embassy was overtaken, several
diplomats were able to escape and find refuge in the Canadian embassy. A few news
agencies knew about this, but at Carter's request did not reveal it. On January 14 the
Iranians barred all foreign journalists from the country. This was good because it would
reduce the madness outside of the American embassy that went on for the television
cameras every day. Perhaps the Iranians would calm down. Quiet did return on the
streets, and it seemed like an opportune time to try to get the diplomats out and back to
the US. Secret agents entered Iran to rehearse the plans with the Canadians and
Americans. The agents and the diplomats had to be given disguises and false documents,
and they needed enough training to convince the Iranians that they were normal travelers
and business visitors from other countries, including Canada. Carter relates that one
agent was sent in as a German, with a forged passport. His fake name had a middle
initial, "H," Custom officials commented that it was odd for a country to issue a passport
with an initial rather than the full name. The fast-thinking fellow said that his parents had
named him Hitler, and ever since the War he had been permitted to conceal his real name.
The official "winked and nodded knowingly, and waved him on through the gates." On
January 25 everything was in place. Three days later the six men were free. Until the
Canadians and United States agents were also safe, there could be no announcement of
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the successful hostage rescue, but when the news broke safely on January 31,
Ambassador Kenneth Taylor and the other Canadians became instant heroes.
This was not the only time that covert activities yielded some success. Lack of
direct lines of communication hampered progress. However, in January, Panama
contacted Hamilton Jordan and told him that Christian Bourguet, a French lawyer, and
Hector Villalon, an Argentinean businessman living in Paris who had ties to the
Revolutionary Council, wished to speak with someone in the administration about the
crisis. They set up a meeting in London and established a line of communication. The
United States, it was told, needed to create a more favorable atmosphere in which the
secular nationalists and religious pragmatists could convince Khomeini that the hostages
were a liability. Jordan recommended that the United States should "consider dropping
our insistence that the hostages be released before we would agree to an airing of
en

grievances.. .if, if that was the first step leading to the release."

Sanctions were

deferred in order to try to make this work. The work of the intermediaries and Jordan
was extremely secret, and highly dangerous. The Frenchman and the Argentinean
repeatedly risked their lives to help the United States.
A Winter Thaw
In Tehran the two men were able to meet on a regular basis with Ghotbzadeh, the
foreign minister, and Bani-Sadr, who was now president, along with others. The men
were designated to represent Iran in finding a way to end the crisis. Bani-Sadr cautioned
that he did not want to be called a moderate - he wanted to be known as a revolutionary.
He needed time to put his cabinet together, but that would be done by the end of
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February. He began to make speeches designed to isolate the militants from the general
public and to erase the aura of heroism. None of this could be revealed publicly, and the
American public grew more frustrated by the day.
Many United States allies were also frustrated and Carter had a hard time keeping
them on tack. Some such as Britain, Canada, Australia, Egypt, and Panama were staunch
in their support; but Germany was out and out critical of the British for supporting the
United States position, opposing any sanctions against Iran or the Soviets. The United
States had to move on its own, and the United Nations would be the intermediary. A
joint arrangement was worked out which involved a five-person commission visiting
Iran. Bani-Sadr and Carter had to approve some well-known third world leaders who
would make up the delegation. The UN representatives would not embarrass any of the
hostages or interrogate them. They would be moved to a hospital so that the United
States could be assured of their care. The commission would issue a report to the UN,
the hostages would be released, the report published, and Bani-Sadr and Carter would
issue statements previously agreed to. This was quite a change in the Iranian position,
and a small change for the US. It was now prepared to allow an investigation before the
hostages were released, as long as it was not published until afterward. Bani-Sadr told
Carter that Khomeini had generally approved the plan. A further meeting was held in
Paris with Jordan and an official who requested permanent anonymity. Jordan's report
was hazy on some points, but was better than most Carter had been receiving.54
The plan was complicated and everybody had to do and say their assigned duties
at every step. There were pitfalls, however; Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh were
incompatible and this made it difficult for Villalon and Bourguet to work with them.
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Also, Bani-Sadr was weak. The religious fundamentalist leaders opposed any action, and
Khomeini was unpredictable. The worst fears were confirmed. By the time the UN
commission arrived, Khomeini had said that the Iranian parliament would make the
ultimate decision. This signaled a serious delay. The militants holding the hostages were
defying orders of Bani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council that the delegation could visit
the hostages. They listened only to the Ayatollah who was secluded in Qom. Ahmad
Khomeini, the Ayatollah's son, finally spoke for his father and said the hostages should
be visited. Khomeini sent word that he wanted custody if they were transferred to the
government. Hope died the next day. Khomeini, the treacherous revolutionary posing as
a holy man, announced that he did not support the transfer of the hostages. The
Revolutionary Council refused to reconvene. The fanatics were clearly in charge. Carter
informed Congressional leaders, swearing them to secrecy. They unanimously
recommended patience so as not to cause harm to the hostages, no military action, and
keep faith in the UN. Chaos would reign in Iran for months more to come. Interestingly,
it was the Republicans who advocated no military action the strongest.35
Hopes Betrayed and Military Action
After the release plan collapsed, Mondale, Vance, and Carter received a full
briefing from the military on a rescue mission. The plans now developed were much
more feasible than the previous ones. They still needed more work, however. In the
meantime, the shah, ever the gadfly, left Panama and went to Egypt. The press blamed
Kissinger and Rockefeller. Carter strongly opposed this because of the danger to Sadat.
The shah was not concerned, claiming he was in danger in Panama, which was not true.
News stories said, without proof, that he had been arrested and faced extradition in
55

Ibid.; Crisis, 124; Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, 506-509.

401
Panama. Torrijos flatly denied this. The Iranians reacted as predicted. He was now
closer to Iran and away from extradition from Panama (something that was not going to
happen). The captors again threatened to hold trials and punish the hostages, and the
Revolutionary Council postponed indefinitely the runoff elections for the majlis, delaying
any consideration of the transfer or release of the captive men.
Carter let it be known that the United States was planning more stringent
sanctions, and possibly close Iran's ports if they were not released by the first of April.
Carter informed the allies that American patience was running out, and for the first time
he felt that they were finally on board with the United States. It seemed to work. Word
came to Carter that Bani-Sadr would make a statement at noon the next day Tehran time
(4:30 a.m. Washington), stating that the Revolutionary Council, with Khomeini's
approval, had decided to transfer the hostages from the students to the government on
Tuesday. Carter was to respond through the news media. They waited and waited for the
statement, but none came. However, CBS News reported that the Revolutionary Council
had voted to transfer the hostages, and the Swiss said that Bani-Sadr's message would be
forthcoming. Word again came that he would speak at noon in Tehran, and Carter
assembled his team at 5:00 a.m. This time he gave the speech. Carter gave the prearranged response, repeating it three times to the reporters in the Oval Office. This was a
positive sign indeed! The State Department acknowledged as well that the Iranians
planned for the majlis to resolve the crisis as soon as the new parliament could be
formed. But Bani-Sadr bailed out, and later in the day announced that the United States
had not met conditions that had been laid down for the transfer. The endorsement for the
hostage transfer that he had obtained from the Revolutionary Council had not been
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unanimous. Carter decided to impose the sanctions. Then, Ghotbzadeh sent word that
the United States had met the conditions. Later, Bani-Sadr said that the United States
response was adequate. Carter concluded that it was Ghotbsadeh who had the courage,
taking a lot of personal risk to resolve the crisis, and that Bani-Sadr was uncertain and
weak in a showdown. Carter was horrified when some news stories accused him of
arranging a phony exchange of messages to sway the outcome of the Wisconsin primary
which was held on the same day. Over time, this lie became a commonly accepted
refrain.5 As Hitler said in Mein Kampfwhen you tell the lie, tell a big one; then tell it
over and over and the people will accept it. This is still a viable political strategy.
The next day, April 2, Carter received a report that a small United States airplane
had flown hundreds of miles into Iran at a very low altitude, landed in the dessert,
examined it as a possible rescue staging site, and returned without detection. It was an
ideal location. The administration decided to move ahead with the plans for the mission.
On April 3 hopes were raised yet again that the hostages would be turned over to the
government. Again, Bani-Sadr proved to be weak and ineffective and the plan fell
through. It was obvious they were not going to be released. Momentum moved towards
the hawks in the White House. Carter moved ahead on the sanctions, broke off diplomatic
relations and expelled all Iranian diplomats, embargoed shipments of any goods to Iran
except food and medicine, and conducted a census of all financial claims against Iran.
The United States asked its allies to do likewise. The following day Henry Precht called
in the Iranian Ambassador to inform him that all their diplomats were to leave the
country immediately. The Ambassador got angry and told Precht that the hostages were
well cared for and were under the complete control of the government. Precht's response
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was "Bullshit!" according to Carter. The Ambassador stalked out of the building then
complained to the American press about the poor treatment and abusive language the
United States had subjected him to. In his diary Carter says
"I wrote Henry a note, saying that one of the elements of good diplomatic
language was to be concise and accurate and clear, and his reply to the Iranians
proved that he was a master of this technique.
French President Giscard D'Estaing telephoned Carter to let him know that the
European foreign ministers were meeting in Lisbon to prepare their demand for the
hostage release. If the Iranian response was negative or equivocal they would take
further action. Carter strongly encouraged this and told him that the United States
intended to take more actions soon and was considering military options. Another
serious development was Iraq's threat to invade Iran, which the Iranians blamed on the
United States. Carter had few options remaining. Either launch the rescue operation or
apply "direct application of force," as Brzezinski said.
There were no good historical analogies to guide the administration. The case of
the Pueblo, captured on January 22, 1968, resembled the situation the most; and the
negotiations for the release of the crew went on for eleven months. No options had been
built into the mission in case of capture, so by the time Washington knew the facts, the
crew had been moved inland and was deemed to be inaccessible. The Vietnam War also
played a role - no one wanted to risk hostilities with North Korea while the country was
so heavily involved in Vietnam. Much of the negotiations had been carried on through
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United States enemies; but Carter had a difficult time in even getting the allies on board
CO

with sanctions and punishment for Iran.
On April 11, Carter and his top advisers (except for Vance who was on a short
vacation),59 including the military leaders, met to discuss the rescue of the hostages. The
answers this time were much more satisfactory than before, and they decided to act. Once
Carter gave the order to go, there would be no interference from Washington. Harold
Brown said the rescue mission was the only worthwhile way to go. Mondale supported
the defense secretary, but Christopher favored more diplomacy, which was logical in the
absence of Vance. Jody Powell was at the meeting and relates that he and Brown agreed
that the United States had to try - there was no choice, even knowing that if it failed it
would mean the end of Carter's presidency. It was the best of a "lousy set of options."60
US covert agents moved freely into and out of Tehran, and provided valuable
information. An unnamed source knew where every American was located, how many
and what kind of guards were there at different times of the day and night, and much
more. Eight helicopters (two were backups) were to fly from aircraft carriers in the Gulf
of Oman to the site previously surveyed. There was a dirt road passing nearby, but the
team was prepared to detain any passersby until it was too late for the operation to be
interrupted. Carter emphasized that he did not want innocent bystanders harmed and he
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ordered the men to avoid bloodshed whenever possible. The most difficult parts of the
mission would be the early ones - getting to the embassy walls. The extraction of the
hostages was probably the easiest part.61
A serious question concerned the safety of Americans, many of whom were
journalists, who were still in Iran. If the rescue mission succeeded, they might in turn be
harmed. The president decided to use the volatile situation as an excuse to try to get them
to come home. On April 17 he held a news conference and said that he was prohibiting
all financial transactions between Iranians and Americans and barring all imports from
Iran, and that to protect United States citizens he was banning all travel to Iran. He went
on to ask that journalists and newsgathering organizations minimize their presence and
activities there. The idea was angrily received. Powell eventually lost his temper with
the lot of them and told Sandy Socolow of CBS that if he had his way he would ask the
Ayatollah to keep fifty journalists and give the United States back its diplomats. He later
regretted this, only because he wondered if it would tip the press off that something big
62

was up.
When Vance returned he objected to the idea of a rescue mission. He urged
patience, lest the hostages be harmed or killed; and he pointed out that generals rarely say
they "can't do something." Vance had convinced the allies to agree to sanctions and for
the United States to make a military move now would seem deceitful. He pointed out
that there were still hundreds of Americans still in Iran who could be put in jeopardy. He
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also warned of the possibility of an Islamic-Western war. No one changed his mind,
however.63
The mission commanders were Generals James B. Vaught and Philip C. Gast, and
Colonel Charles "Charging Charlie" Beckwith. Beckwith at first had a political distaste
for the president because he had pardoned Vietnam War draft dodgers, but was won over
to him because of his no nonsense manner. During the president's briefing, Beckwith was
even more impressed. He recalls that "I just didn't believe Jimmy Carter had the guts to
do it... .Before that meeting.. .1 wasn't a big Carter fan, but the man impressed me. He
wasn't going to allow the mission to be run by a goddamn committee... .It was a slick
command and control setup.... I was full of wonderment. The President had carved some
important history. I was proud to be an American and to have a president do what he'd
just done."64
There was no pretense that there would be no killing if the team made it to the
embassy. Beckwith said that the mission's objective inside the embassy compound was
to "take the guards out. We're going to shoot each of them twice, right between the
eyes." Warren Christopher was taken aback. Beckwith did not believe that the Iranians
in the Embassy would stand "toe to toe and slug it out. Yes, there would be the odd
person who would because of religion and beliefs shoot to the death... .we were prepared
to help him reach his maker."65
The plan was complicated, and the helicopters would be stretched to the limits of
their capabilities. Carter knew this; but he had to make the effort, in spite of the risk to
the hostages. Their lives were already at an extremely high level of risk because they
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were in the hands of an unpredictable rabble rouser. There was little chance that they
would be released for another two to three months at a minimum, or even five or six.
Meanwhile, Bruce Laingen.who was imprisoned in the foreign ministry building sent a
message through the Swiss ambassador recommending that the United States take strong
action against Iran. With the Charge's recommendation, and with no end in sight, Carter
gave the order to proceed. Right up to the time of the mission Carter received
intelligence information through United States agents in Iran, who were optimistic about
the mission.
Secrecy was of the utmost importance. Carter decided to inform one or two
Congressmen prior to the mission, and to inform more of the leadership after the mission
was well underway. The United States was forced to share the information with the
British government when a former British officer in Oman, who was in the employ of the
sultan, sent reports to London that the United States had planes in Oman and they were
loaded with ammunition and supplies for the Afghan freedom fighters. Christopher went
to London to brief Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Foreign Minister Peter
Carrington about the true purpose of the planes. Carter consulted with Senator Robert
Byrd about informing Congress, telling him that the mission was imminent, but not
disclosing the exact timing. The required military equipment also had to be moved into
position at key locations in the Middle East under the cover of other routine activities.
In the meantime, the USS Nimitz, the aircraft carrier from which the helicopters
were to take off, had already spent over ninety days at sea in the Indian Ocean because of
the tensions over Iran; but at the time of the decision it was in the Mediterranean. It
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charged full speed around the Cape Route and on to the Gulf of Oman, outrunning some
of its battle group. Some of its air wing had to be moved to Diego Garcia to make room
for the RH-53 helicopters; it got rid of its anti-submarine aircraft but kept most of its
fighters and attack planes in case they were needed. Supposedly they might have to
respond to something concerning Iran. The men on the carrier did not know a great deal,
especially when a "lot of people came aboard." The Nimitz crew assumed "something
big" was about to happen. The deck was so cluttered with RH-53s that their own aircraft
could not fly as much as usual for several days. A few days before the rescue attempt, air
wing personnel were to identify the aircraft as friendly. They painted stripes on the
underside of their planes' wings, for identification purposes, the same as United States
forces had done in preparation for D-Day.67
On April 24 the operation began; it became "one of the worst days of Carter's
life."

First, the helicopters ran into unpredicted dust storms, and two went down. Also,

Iran spotted two low flying aircraft with no lights. Then another helicopter had hydraulic
problems leaving the team with fewer helicopters than needed. Both commanders,
Beckwith who was on the ground, and Vaught who was in Egypt recommended to abort.
Carter went along with their recommendation. Then things got worse. One helicopter,
trying to refuel, crashed into a CI30, killing eight men and critically burning three
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Carter was stunned at the loss of life and insisted that he wanted to call the next of
kin personally. Brown talked him out of this. Carter had overwhelming support from
United States allies, especially Anwar Sadat. Even Henry Kissinger supported the effort
and made a statement to the media to this effect. Delta force, as the rescue team was
called, was devastated at the failure. Colonel Beckwith asked if Carter would let them try
again; but by this time the hostages were being dispersed to unknown locations, Iran's
vigilance would be even higher, there was no alternate plan, and to repeat the mission
could be suicidal.
Congressional hearings were held almost immediately. Congress wanted to know
whether the "failure was symptomatic of serious problems in the Defense Department, or
is an isolated failure." Secretary of the Navy, W. Graham Claytor testified that the
military people charged with constructing a rescue mission thought that they had come up
with a feasible plan. They knew that the mission would be difficult because of the
distance of Tehran from the aircraft carriers, but it was not impossible. Getting to the
intermediate refueling location was the most difficult part. In spite of this, everyone
involved thought it had an excellent chance of success. Air Force Lieutenant General
John S. Pustay also testified. He noted that equipment failures included navigational
equipment, rotor blade failure, and hydraulic failure. Congress was highly alarmed that
three of eight helicopters failed on the mission after they had "been talking around here
all year about readiness and maintenance and spare parts and mission capable aircraft."
The mission capable numbers were poor; and there was some disagreement between the
members of the subcommittee and the military on just how poor. Pustay said that the
Navy RH-53 helicopter, which was used on the mission, was at 54 percent for its regular
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role of minesweeping. Pustay pointed out that in a heavy lift role its readiness level was
at 80 percent. Jack Edwards, congressman from Alabama, cited a document which said
that the mission capable rate was 45.1 percent; the fully mission capable rate was only
17.3 percent. The subcommittee thought the military cut the margin of safety too close,
71

but the military disagreed.

Congress also asked about maintenance for the helicopters.

Had they been given the routine once-over or did they get special attention? The
testimony indicated that high quality maintenance was the order. However, the Nimitz
had no facilities or personnel trained for RH-53 helicopter maintenance. The RH-53
squadrons and the marine air crews brought their own people for the job, and only routine
maintenance could have been given under the circumstances.72
Later analysis on the part of the military revealed what some believe to be flaws
in the United States's ability to conduct unconventional warfare, especially the lack of a
"joint perspective." A six-officer review group headed by Admiral James L. Holloway
III delved into the military aspects of the failed attempt. Initially, the opinion of the six
was that the operation had been poorly planned and poorly executed. They later changed
their minds. Every member changed his opinion to one of the "greatest admiration for
the people who planned and tried to execute the most difficult operation you could
possibly have undertaken." Holloway said he thought the "mission had a 60 to 70%
chance of success and ran into some terribly bad luck." It offered the "best chance of
getting the hostages out alive and the least danger of starting a war with Iran." The
Holloway concluded that the risks were manageable, there was a good chance for
success, and the decision to attempt the rescue was justified. One military change that
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came about as a result of the failed rescue attempt, was the spread of the principle of joint
operations (interoperability) for the United States armed forces, which was codified in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the Cohen-Nunn Act which consolidated Special Forces
under a United States Special Operations Command. It was like a Phoenix rising from the
ashes.73
The Press
In his press conference of April 19, 1980, Carter shared his grief over the failure
of the mission. However, he said that
"There is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to
attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try. This is a sentiment shared by the men who
went on the mission." "As they left Iran, following an unpredictable accident
during the withdrawal stage, with eight of their fellow warriors dead, they
carefully released, without harm, 44 Iranians who had passed by the site and who
were detained to protect the integrity of the mission. This is in sharp comparison
to the ghoulish action of the terrorists and some of the Government officials in
Iran, in our Embassy this weekend, who displayed in a horrible exhibition of
inhumanity the bodies of our courageous Americans. This has aroused the disgust
and contempt of the rest of the world and indicates quite clearly the kinds of
people with whom we have been dealing in a peaceful effort to secure a resolution
of this crisis."
Judy Woodruff of NBC News actually asked why Carter was allowing his time to be
dominated by the hostage crisis when there were other international crises that needed
attention. Obviously, there were other things on his agenda. Since the hostages had been
taken captive, Carter had also worked on the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel,
forged a policy regarding the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, as well as domestic
issues of inflation and unemployment.
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Carter also had to respond to a rash of false news reports. One was that he had
cut back on Defense Department plans and thus made them inoperable; that Colonel
Beckwith and his men had not wanted to abort and Carter had terminated the mission
over their objections, accusations that were patently untrue. Beckwith met with Carter in
the Oval Office and gave Carter high praise, saying, with some embarrassment, that "My
men and I have decided that our boss, the President of the United States, is as tough as
woodpecker lips."75
Vance had opposed the mission and on the Monday before it took place, he
resigned, only the second secretary of state in the twentieth century to do so over a policy
disagreement. The first was William Jennings Bryan in 1915, secretary of state in the
Wilson administration. Both men were concerned that their administrations' actions
could lead the United States into a worse situation than it was already facing and that
there were still diplomatic avenues open that should be tried first. Vance thought that the
Iranians were close to forming a functional government that the United States could
negotiate with, and that substantial progress had been made in getting allied support for
sanctions. His views did not prevail, and the administration's only odd man out was now
simply out. To his credit, he never said "I told you so."76 Edmund Muskie was Carter's
choice as a replacement. The Vance Brzezinski split was now common knowledge, and
early in May the top advisers met with Carter at Camp David to discuss the relationship
between the State Department and the White House. Carter relates that any competition
between the two entities was of minimum concern for Muskie.
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The Aftermath of the Mission
The Iranians were shocked and confused when they learned of the mission. At
first, they claimed that they had fought it off, but were soon forced to admit that they had
not detected the penetration of their space. However, they displayed pictures of the
damaged aircraft as well as the bodies of the eight dead men, and claimed a victory over
the Great Satan. The country struggled with its election process and tried to form a
government; and Bani-Sadr reiterated that the parliament would make the final decision
on the hostages. In July the shah died. The original cause of the crisis was now moot.
Iran was a mess, with high inflation, unemployment at 40 percent, and oil revenues that
had shrunk to half the level necessary to keep the government operational. It was under
attack by the Kurds, threatened by other Iraqis and all the while they continued their
attacks on each other.
The rhetoric in Iran cooled down, but Carter still maintained pressure with the
trade embargo. The United States patrolled the seas off the coast of Iran and reminded
Iran that it could drastically interrupt their commerce if they put the hostages on trial, and
threatened military action if any were harmed. The hostage problem continued to be a
fact of daily life. Several months of Iranian inaction followed. Eventually, Bani-Sadr told
Khomeini that the hostage situation had to be resolved. The country desperately needed
to prepare for war, and that meant the blockade had to be lifted. The hostages were
returned to Tehran, but not to the embassy compound. They ended up in a prison built
during the shah's reign, which was still being used to torture Iranians. For the first time,
they were under the control of the government.77
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Finally, there was a gesture. An emissary of the Ayatollah, Sadegh Tabatabai,
sent word through the German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher that he wanted to
talk to a high level American official to work out terms for the release of the hostages.
The new proposals were generally acceptable. At the time the Soviets were building up
their forces along the Iranian border, and Warren Christopher was sent to Europe to
inform Britain, France, and Germany about this and discuss how to coordinate the
warning to the Soviets. Secretly, he also met with Tabatabai, who said he would give a
favorable recommendation to Khomeini.78
Bad luck interjected once again. The Iraqis invaded Iran on September 22, the
very day that Tabatabai was due back in Iran. The Iranians accused Carter of plotting
this, citing a meeting between Brzezinski and Hussein held in Jordan in July, a meeting
that Brzezinski, his colleagues, and the White House records claim never happened. That
did not matter to the Iranians, and they still cite it today. Their attention shifted away
from the hostages and to defending their country. Iran was totally disorganized and
could not use their military effectively, but were also paranoid about their Arab neighbors
and threatened Saudi Arabia and Oman. The United States discouraged these states from
allowing Iraq to launch attacks from their countries and deployed some AW ACS to the
Arabian Peninsula to help in their defense. Carter also prepared to send some F-15s. A
limited war continued, but Tabatabai was soon back in Bonn and the Iranian parliament
was discussing the terms for releasing the captives. The Germans reported that the
hostages were all back in the embassy, in good condition, and top Iranian officials
seemed to feel it was time to return them. However, they suggested a phased release, in
four groups, provided the United States agreed sequentially to some of their demands.
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Although this would have been a good sign of progress (something that might help in the
70

campaign) Carter rejected it, consistently replying "We want them all."

No one group

was more worthy than another.
When the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Rajai, came to New York in
October 1980 to plead the Iranians' case against Iraq in the UN, Carter suggested that he
speak with Muskie. He refused; however, the American position was driven home to him
by UN representatives of dozens of nations. They would not consider any of Rajai's
complaints as long as Iran held the Americans. Iran could continue to suffer under the
brunt of Saddam Hussein's attacks and the commercial embargo.
Late in October word came that Khomeini and the captors were ready to end the
stalemate. But there were hardliners who held out; they simply did not show up at
parliament. Finally, two days before the American election word came that the majlis
had finally gotten a quorum and had voted to approve of the release agreement. Carter
knew that if the hostages were released he would probably be re-elected; if not, he would
almost surely lose. He was in Chicago on the campaign trail when the news came and he
returned immediately to Washington. On reading the terms of the release, Carter realized
that the two sides were still far apart. The United States did not reject the proposal
outright and drafted a response to keep the discussions going. Word came that Khomeini
had told the militants to turn over the hostages to the government so that the students
could help in the war effort, and the government announced that the Algerians would be
responsible for the hostages. The United States did not know what that meant, and as the
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hours passed no other news came.80 The hostage story dominated the press, and when
they were not released, Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan.
Still, the hostage situation dominated Carter. There was a great deal of opposition
in Iran to freeing them in spite of the suffering of Iran itself, and much of the Carter
administration was pessimistic. Christopher went over the United States proposal with
the Algerian team, who thought it was reasonable, Carter decided to let Iran know that it
was the final offer. If they refused it they would have to start all over some time the next
year. Christopher went to Algeria to meet with their Foreign Minister Mohammad
Benyahia to impress upon him the finality of the United States position, which had not
changed materially since the first proposal almost a year previous. The Iranians moved
Bruce Laingen and his two fellow diplomats from the foreign ministry to another location
so that they could be with the other hostages and a few days later the Iranians sent a
response to the United States which verged on acceptance. The Iranian leaders asked the
majlis to authorize negotiations with the United States through Algeria to resolve the
issue. Christopher and Carter talked on Saturday night, January 17, and Christopher
thought there could be an agreement by noon Sunday. Work continued unabated in
Algeria and Tehran and by noon on Sunday Carter had signed the documents.
The transfer of Iranian assets was completed early on the morning of January 20.
There was nothing to do but wait. The hostages were expected to arrive in Germany on
January 21; and Reagan made an airplane available to Carter to meet them there. There
was, however, no movement in Tehran. Gary Sick stayed in touch with an aide to Carter
throughout the inauguration ceremony so that he could relay any news to him through a
Secret Service agent. Hamilton Jordan was with Sick and both had phones pressed
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against both ears and eyes on the television. One of the phones connected them to Carter
in his limousine as he rode with President-elect Reagan to the inauguration. The other
connected to an intelligence officer who was monitoring the situation at the Tehran
airport and two Algerian aircraft on the runway. 81
Finally as former President Carter was on his way by helicopter to Andrews Air
Force Base, first one plane, then a second took off from Mehrabad Airport in Tehran with
all hostages on board. The Iranians waited four hours to acknowledge the receipt of the
escrow message at 12:05, five minutes after Carter's administration came to an end. It
was one more humiliating shot at the Great Satan.82
CONCLUSIONS
By 1979 Carter had succeeded in restoring the moral authority in United States
foreign policy, and he and Harold Brown had begun to streamline the military into a more
modern force using high technology. The ability to respond militarily to events in the
Persian Gulf region in an expeditious manner was underway, and funding of the military
overall had begun to increase significantly. Carter received very little credit from the
American public for these changes, and the military was mostly hostile to him.83 Even as
Carter took a more aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union, the public became more
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disenchanted with him, in spite of wanting a more energetic policy of confrontation. This
was at least partly because the Iranian hostage crisis obscured how well the United States
was doing in rebuilding its military power.
Military power alone could not guarantee the safety of the hostages. An attack on
Iran would almost certainly have meant that the American diplomats there would come
home in coffins. Military answers are not always the right answers, although at times they
are. Carter, ever the peaceful and patient warrior, did not blunder into a war in the Persian
Gulf, just to save his presidency. His foreign policy's weight-bearing pillar remained a
concern for human rights, and this included the lives of the American hostages. Carter
was not unrealistic, however, and he tried to find a balance between power and principle
to safeguard the interests of the nation. This is sometimes referred to a realistic idealism.
The hostages came to mean a great deal to the people of the United States over
their 444 day ordeal, and getting them out alive became paramount. Jimmy Carter did
that, without compromising his own principles or those of the American people. The
United States never apologized to Iran and never turned over the shah. Because of its
own turmoil and illegal actions and also because of how Carter handled the crisis, Iran
became isolated both politically and economically, scorned by the world community. It
lost at least $10 billion of funds frozen by the United States by virtue of the agreement
that freed the hostages, and this was a powerful statement against terrorism in the world.
There are other, related, reasons why Carter lost the 1980 election. One major
problem was the press. They made little commentary on Reagan's proposals, generally
ignoring the consequences of them, and Democratic voices were simply ignored. Carter
and Mondale concluded that they had to comment themselves. This was a dangerous
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proposition given the propensity for the press to put a negative spin on Carter in general.
Out of a 48 month term in office, there was negative net press coverage in 47 of those
months. The press focused on things such as who should be included in the presidential
debates rather than on substantive issues, and created numerous misperceptions that
influenced the American electorate. The White House press corps had been scooped by
the local boys in the Watergate story, and they turned their anger on Carter for their own
failings.
Conservative religious and political groups also attacked Carter, accusing him of
being "soft on communism," of betraying American by "giving away the Panama Canal,"
and encouraging abortion and homosexuality. Jerry Falwell openly admitted to lying
about a meeting with Carter in the Oval Office where Carter supposedly told him he had
homosexuals in his administration. He had been there with twelve or fifteen other
religious leaders, but a tape recording of it revealed no such talk. Falwell repeated the lie
to the so-called "religious press" which readily embraced it.84
Carter's closest advisers have said that he did not want to hear how his stance on a
particular issue would affect him in the polls. Most presidents have probably said this,
but Carter was sincere. His administration has been referred to as the "trusteeship
presidency," because it recalls a tradition in which the elected official does what is best
for the country without regard to public opinion.85 During the hostage crisis he could
easily have resorted to strong military action to satisfy domestic opinion, but he knew this
would most probably lead to the death of the captives. The country, however, wanted a
more aggressive stance. They got it in the presidencies of Reagan, Bush 41, and Bush 43.
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Clinton, on the other hand, was criticized for not doing enough, then for doing too much.
Reagan made counterterrorism a central policy objective by using slogans, negotiations
and indulged in shady arms for hostages deals.
There have been continued suspicions about whether the Reagan campaign team
made a deal in 1980 to give Iran arms if they would keep the hostages until after the
election. Arms began to flow to Iran by way of Israel a few days after Reagan's
inauguration. Gary Sick became suspicious of the 1980 election when he began to
research Reagan's policies towards Iran. He interviewed hundreds of people in the US,
Europe, and the Middle East, and was told repeatedly that individuals associated with the
campaign met secretly with Iranian officials to delay the release of the hostages until after
the election. Sick's computerized database is the equivalent of thousands of pages, and
the story he tells is compelling. Five years later, another arms-for-hostages deal was
struck, (again courtesy of Israel) with the profits from the arms funding the Nicaraguan
Contras. With the deck thus stacked against Carter, he was certain to lose the election.
A serious problem for Carter was that there were no good options available help
secure the release of the hostages. He followed a policy of flexible response, trying
negotiations first, then sanctions, then the threat of a blockade. There was little available
militarily to help him. He used the military to mount the rescue mission, but that is not
quite the same as "military action." The Pueblo and Mayaguez incidents offered little in
the way of a helpful blueprint. After the Pueblo was seized, Lyndon Johnson assembled
his team and discussed military options. There were no good ones and none would
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necessarily secure the release of the crew, which had already been moved inland. It took
eleven months to gain their release. The Mayaguez was different. When initial
diplomatic efforts failed Gerald Ford turned to force quickly to prevent them from being
moved inland. The United States sank Cambodian ships and landed marines with support
from various naval ships. Unfortunately, 28 marines were killed during the attack and
many more could have been. The attack on Tang Island could have placed the lives of the
Mayaguez crew in jeopardy. The decision makers in the crisis wanted to stop the
deterioration of American prestige and credibility. Carter wanted to save the hostages.
Some believe that this played a role in how long the hostages remained captive.89
Carter had no fixed political ideology, or at least far less of one than Reagan. So
while Carter grappled with issues, studying them thoroughly, aware of the nuances,
Reagan knew in advance what to think about things he might know nothing about.
Reagan's thinking and ideological framework was set long before he became president in
1980. This ideology applies equally to those on the far left side of the ideological
spectrum. Carter was a moderate Democrat and because of this had trouble keeping many
of the congressional Democrats in line. Candidate Carter had been elected by a hair and
he had no mandate. President Carter had a moral ideology, however, and refused to
engage in senseless killing, which is why he chose not to militarily attack Iran during the
hostage crisis.90

See Christopher John Lamb, Belief Systems and Decision Making in the "Mayaguez" Crisis
(Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1989).
89
See Doyle McManus, Free at Last! (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Times, 1981), 235. Doyle
also faults Carter for ruling out direct military intervention, in spite of his admission that it would not work.
90
See, for example, Robert A. Wilson, ed., Character Above All (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1995), esp. "Jimmy Carter 1977-1981" by Hendrik Hertzberg; see also John Orman, Comparing
Presidential Behavior: Carter, Reagan, and the Macho Presidential Style, (New York: Greenwood Press,
1987), especially chapter one, "The Macho Presidential Style."

One of the hostages, William J. Daugherty recalls that the last thing he heard as
he ran for the airplane cabin after his release was one of the captors yelling, "Hey, wait!
Can you help get me a visa to America?"91
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION
This work has examined five issue areas of the Carter presidency within the broad
framework of power and principle: the Panama Canal Treaties, Southern Africa, arms
transfers, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis. It
concludes that Carter had many accomplishments in finding a middle way between these
two poles of state behavior, and that his accomplishments served the long range national
interests of the United States, especially from the perspective of what we know now. He
used the power of the United States to promote peace and maintain security. He also
aggressively re-asserted the idealism of the country, making United States foreign policy
more humane and moral. Although he did not totally accomplish all of his specific goals
studied in this work, he made progress on difficult issues and laid the bases for further
advances that his successors could build on.
Christian pragmatism and faith in American values were primary motivators in
Carter's pursuit of justice. He successfully combined hard and soft power and
understood well their uses. Carter's emphasis on democracy and human rights restored
the nation's post-Vietnam image and helped to win the Cold War. He set the example in
the post-Vietnam world, but notwithstanding Carter's reliance on diplomacy and his
uncompromising adherence to principle, he contributed substantially to the rise in defense
budgets and the rebuilding of the American military, after those budgets had been cut
during the Nixon-Ford administrations. He created the Rapid Deployment Force, which

grew into CENTCOM, to help protect vital United States interests in the Persian Gulf,
and he ordered the military to find ways to improve interoperability among their
branches. He successfully facilitated the Camp David Accords which led to a peace
treaty between Egypt and Israel, helping to calm the tinder box of the Middle East; and
his actions in Afghanistan led the Soviets to invade that country, a decisive contribution
to the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
Carter understood that power was more dispersed in the 1970s than ever before,
and he tried to work within that framework. The rise of Japan and the European
Community presented new challenges, because their cooperation could not always be
certain. This was especially evident in the Iranian hostage crisis when these allies were
reluctant to punish Iran with harsh sanctions because of their fear of losing access to
Iranian oil.
MIDDLE EAST
Carter fought hard for the rights of the Palestinian people to have their own state
and a voice in its creation. Although his hope for a comprehensive peace settlement in
the Middle East did not bear fruit, Carter did more for peace in that region than any other
president. The process he began was a promising step towards a comprehensive
settlement in the region. He was able to broker a bi-lateral agreement between Egypt and
Israel which has remained intact until this day. This stunning achievement, which
radically altered the relationship between the two countries, effectively removed the
Egyptian army from any future Arab-Israeli war, and contributed markedly to Israel's
security.
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Carter was highly criticized by many in both the Arab world and Israel. Hani alHassan, political advisor to Yasir Arafat, thought that the entire thing complicated
matters in the Middle East, believing that Begin walked away from the conference with
everything he needed. Sadat was effectively separated from the remainder of the Arab
nations , and Israel, along with the US, was free to go about its business of liquidating the
Palestinians.1 Eric Rouleau, Middle East editor of LeMonde, also agrees that Israel came
out far stronger than Egypt in the Accords and that they probably complicated things
more than smoothed them out. But he also points out that at least three myths were
shattered in the process. The first myth was that Israel had no choice but to assume that
no peace was possible with the Arabs. By signing the Accords, they tacitly admitted that
peace is possible based on a tradeoff- land for peace; second, Israeli settlements were
not sacred cows, they can be dismantled; and third, territories can be given up and
airfields abandoned (in Sinai) without a threat to Israeli security.2 Burton I. Kaufman is
also critical of the Camp David Accords, also arguing that they papered over the
problems in the Middle East, rather than solved them.3 James A. Bill and Carl Leiden
were also critical as well arguing that the Palestinian issues were not addressed either
thoroughly or conscientiously.4
Carter's warning to Israel that any lasting peace had to include a solution to the
Palestinian problem, and United Nations Resolution 242 had to be carried out, has proven
1
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to be true, although yet to be fulfilled. Carter's predecessors recognized that a
comprehensive peace was not doable, and they worked piecemeal on the issues, as did
Carter. No president since Carter has shown the patience, diligence, and the courage to
pursue the issue, mainly because there is little political gain to do so. For a president
often characterized as weak and vacillating, Carter took the boldest steps yet in the
pursuit of peace in an unstable and unpredictable region. Camp David was the most
promising step taken to date in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. For it to
reach its full promise, however, the United States must bring pressure to bear on both the
Palestinians and Israelis, something that it is currently unwilling to do.
PANAMA CANAL
Carter was also concerned that the rights and liberties of small nations, such as
Panama, were not to be violated by outside powers, including the United States. He
wanted to work with smaller countries on a shared agenda of human rights and
development issues, and to embrace a global community based on mutual respect and
multilateral cooperation. Carter hoped that solving the Panama Canal question would
send the same positive signal as the revocation of the Piatt Amendment in 1934.
Although Carter knew he would face a terrible political fight in Congress, he nonetheless
began negotiations shortly after being inaugurated. The flag waving faction in Congress
refused to believe that, while the Canal was still useful to the US, it was no longer vital.
Gaddis Smith is highly critical of Carter's Latin American policies in general, claiming
that the Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal did not help to alleviate other difficulties
in the region. While admitting that negotiating two treaties was a very smart approach,
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politically it was a disaster for both Carter and a number of senators.5 Richard Falk
argues that the new treaties did not go far enough in giving genuine sovereignty to
Panama and believes that the Panamanians would be unlikely to be satisfied for long.6
Carter was never held hostage to public opinion or re-election, although he
certainly wanted to be re-elected in 1980, and he believed in the justice of the Treaties
that gave sovereignty over the Canal to Panama, while allowing the United Statesto
defend it in case of emergency. Although the ratification of the Treaties worked over the
long term for the national interest, and the interests of Latin America, the victory was
pyrrhic for Carter, giving more potency to the neo-conservative movement. Still, all the
rhetoric about abandoning the national interest could have sabotaged what was truly in
the national interest. Had Carter not delivered on this issue, the United States would have
kept its big ditch, but would have been surrounded by hostile elements, and the Canal
would have been extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. As it stands today, it is
functioning well, and ships move through it faster than when it was under United States
control.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Walter LaFeber, another Latin American specialist, is also critical of the Carter
administration because of his human rights policies, which assuaged North American
consciences, and which he then admits saved Latin American lives. The principles,
however, helped to undermine Carter's policies in Central America because, even though
they stressed individual political and civil rights, they did not address the inequitable land

5

Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 115. See also Ronnie Dugger, On Reagan: The
Man and His Presidency (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983).
6
Falk, "Panama Treaty Trap Foreign Policy 30, 68-82.

428
n

distribution that produced the revolutionaries and atrocities. Jeane Kirkpatrick also
attacked Carter's actions in the region based on his human rights policies, borrowing an
old argument that surfaced in the 1940s that made a distinction between totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes. Totalitarian regimes such as the Soviet Union were to be avoided
and ostracized, authoritarian regimes could be useful.8
Although criticized by LaFeber for not doing enough and Kirkpatrick for doing
too much, Carter believed that in the long run "right" makes "might;" that the admiration
of the United States by others when it acts on its principles contributes significantly to the
influence, and thus the power, of America in the world. He is credited (or cursed) for
getting human rights issues back on the international agenda. Any choice between
"might" and "right" was always made "right." Choices that were not clear left him in the
middle, upholding the notion of American exceptionalism while working to secure the
national interest, as he saw it. He echoed Woodrow Wilson's idealism in working for the
right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, not only
in the Middle East, but also in Southern Africa. Born in segregated Georgia, Carter
inherited the legacy of the American Civil War; that is, the unwillingness of Southern
whites to accept as equal the children of liberated slaves. Blacks were unable to vote,
serve on juries, or participate in any way in the political process in the South. This
opened his eyes and mind to the black majorities in Southern Africa who lived within a
similar system. Although majority rule was not prevalent in the region when he left
office, the United States was the midwife in the birth of Zimbabwe, thereby launching a
process for the region that could not be stopped or reversed. Unfortunately, when the
7
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Cold War was over, Third World regions faded from the consciousness of Carter's
successors, and far less money was spent on development than had been spent on guns
and weapons. Much of Africa slunk back into its neglected corner.
Although legitimate "national interest" concerns prevented the massive reduction
in arms transfers that Carter hoped to achieve, such transfers slowed significantly during
his four years. From the start of the Cold War, preventing communist takeovers of
countries bordering the Soviet Union and China became a major part of the policy of
containment, with a related predisposition for arms transfers in the direction of the nearby
regimes. Carter set the precedent for restraint, however, by giving the State Department
some real authority for the first time in the management of any such sales. The trend
indicator values on actual deliveries of major conventional weapons in the SIPRI Arms
Transfers database decreased from 14,089 in 1977 to 9,752 in 19809. A ceiling on the
dollar amount of arms sales was imposed and respected. Carter also set in place an
institutional framework that established a rigorous review of significant proposed
commercial sales before formal letters of agreement were sent to recipient countries.
Nations guilty of gross violations of human rights were usually not entirely cut off, but
were categorized into different groups which permitted some differentiation between
recipient countries. Safety related items, for example, were routinely granted. Although
criticized on both sides of the political spectrum for not doing enough or for doing too
much, the administration seemed to strike a satisfactory balance of successfully reducing
arms sales while maintaining the national interest. Carter also did much more than his
predecessor to implement section 502B of the Arms Export Control Act (the major
human rights provision), which had passed over Ford's veto. Human rights got a
9
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reasonable hearing, and arms sales to eight Latin American countries dried up.
Withholding weapons based on human rights violations was a radical departure from the
past, and compared with other administrations Carter's policy was successful. He was
not radical, nor did he shift the "entire basis of foreign policy from power to principle,"
as some have accused.10 Carter did not simply criticize the morality of other regimes
based on human rights, but also tried to return the United States itself to a more prudent
and ethical course of action. He practiced the art of the possible.
Congress' continuing interest in human rights during the 1970s did not translate
into ratification of certain human rights conventions that were submitted to the Senate as
treaties. Long before Carter took office, and beginning in the early Cold War, objections
had been placed in a legalistic framework. The American Bar Association's Special
Committee on Peace and Law claimed that ratification of the Genocide Convention
would endanger the American way of life by interfering with the nation's internal affairs.
The Genocide Convention was also linked at that time to other human rights treaties. The
Bricker Amendment, which proposed to amend the treaty-making provisions of the
Constitution, became the lens through which human rights treaties were judged. It was
during these debates on the amendment, that the treaties were branded as dangerous, and
they never escaped from this. Getting them on the agenda became politically risky, but
politically risky issues never stopped Carter. He signed the Human Rights Covenants,
after careful study by the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and sent them on to
the Senate along with recommended attachments. Although every possible objection was
addressed they were still not ratified on the same legalistic objections as those raised
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during the 1950s, which implied that the United States system was not only superior to
any international covenant, but perfect in and of itself. Coinciding with the early stages
of the civil rights movement in the United States, this really concerned the dismantling of
the system of segregation and discrimination, the opposition to "socialist" ideas, and the
notion of a "world government."11 When the Senate failed to ratify the treaties, Carter
was seen as a president who could not work effectively with Congress.
There were very high barriers to implementing an even-handed policy on human
rights. These were summarized in 1978 in a Congressional Research Service report for
the House Committee on International Relations. For one thing, information available to
the United States was often sketchy. Amnesty International information was (and is)
generally considered to be reliable (by many but by no means all), but it mainly concerns
individuals. The report also pointed out that data collection had to cover a given period
of time, yet human rights violations often fluctuated wildly over time. Ranking countries
over such issues was difficult because of the emotions surrounding questionable activities
such as torture, or years spent in prison without trial, electric shock torture, and
mysterious disappearances, which made consensus predictably difficult, and it remains so
today. Also, there is the issue of realistic expectations. Countries vary widely in their
level of political and economic modernization, cultural patterns, ethnic and social
heterogeneity, and whether they are under outside threat. All of these characteristics play
a role in the extent to which human rights are respected. Carter was unable to solve these
problems, but his administration, using arms sales as leverage, tried hard to force other
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nations to improve their records.

Arms sales as leverage did not and could not work

with the Soviet Union. However, his defense of human rights and democracy did a great
1-5

deal to launch a post Cold War wave of democratization.
IRAN
Iran became Carter's nemesis. The shah was as weak and vacillating in 1979 as he
was in 1953 when the Eisenhower administration saved him, and his illness made things
worse. He never trusted Carter with his emphasis on human rights; and when Carter
instituted a more realistic arms sales policy towards Iran, the shah became suspicious that
the United States wanted to get rid of him. Conspiracy theories are popular in Iran, and,
probably because of its history, the people believe that important events are usually
inspired by foreigners. In the end, after so many years, the shah still failed to gain much
in the way of legitimacy in the eyes of his own people. To many, he was just another
brutal dictator. His White Revolution never delivered much on democracy, and the gap
between expectations and reality bred political decay. While Brzezinski argues that no
revolution is inevitable until it is over, it is certainly clear that major changes needed to
be made and the shah was not going to make them. Whether the changes came through
revolution or evolution, they were definitely coming, if not on Carter's watch, then soon.
Since evolutionary change seemed impossible, the nation turned to revolution, caught up
in the spell of a charismatic cleric. Nothing Carter did or could have done then would
have saved the relationship with Iran. If nothing else, the shah's death (in 1980) would
have brought about the revolutionary change that so many wanted.
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Poor intelligence on the situation in Iran hampered the administration, and the
options that surfaced for Carter were meager. One, which Vance and Mondale supported,
was to encourage the shah to make reforms and liberalize the regime, but with a history
of dithering, it was unlikely that this would happen in time. The second option, the "iron
fist," was supported by Brzezinski, Jordan, Powell, and later Brown, but was abhorrent to
Carter, the human rights champion. The president also had a strong aversion to meddling
in the internal affairs of other states. Iran was important to the security of the United
States and the shah had provided at least twenty-six years of stability and security in the
Persian Gulf region. A complicating factor for all was that no one knew that the shah
was sick - very sick. His illness very likely contributed to his indecisiveness, and he also
might have expected to be rescued again, as he had been in 1953. Precht and Sullivan
proposed a third option -drop the shah and establish a relationship with Khomeini, but
because of Brzezinski's opposition and Khomeini's shifting positions this was never
thoroughly explored. A valid criticism of Carter is that he should have acted in a way
that could have secured influence on the actors of a new regime. Some in the academic
field strongly favored Khomeini over the shah, but soon changed their minds. As it turned
out, Khomeini was a tease and a wild card, impossible to predict or depend on. Others
were also willing to deal with him because they believed he would never participate in
the formal government structure.

From what we know now, those in power in Iran, at

least from the revolution on, have consistently strung the United States along, playing on
the anti-Americanism that came out during that time. The divisions within Carter's top
advisers prevented any options, good or bad, from being adopted. The split between
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Vance and Brzezinski, usually kept beneath the surface, exploded with a vile energy over
Iran. After the shah left, the administration made some strides with the new government
in rebuilding the relationship. Business picked up between the two nations, and the
United States once again sold arms. The new Iranian government, however, was built on
quicksand, and soon became the puppet of Khomeini. Thinking that business as usual
could resume was a mistake in judgment on Carter's part.
There is disagreement over whether the United States should have allowed the
shah to come into the country for medical treatment. James Bill, for example, argues that
this was a fatal error. Others argue that the United States had always welcomed the
"tired, the poor, the huddled masses," and to do otherwise would violate American
principles. Carter could not turn away a sick man. When a group of students thirteen
days later seized the United States embassy in Tehran, Khomeini saw a way to use this to
unify the country and solidify his own power. The unifying element was a hatred for
America. It trumped all the internal divisions within the shah's opposition. Carter made
a serious error when he labeled the event a "crisis." The news media responded by
playing up the incident as front-page news, and the television media provided a forum for
irate Iranian militants to denounce the United States. Previously, the press had
underreported events, saying that the mass demonstrations and threats should not be
interpreted as being significant. Negative press coverage intensified for the remainder of
Carter's presidency.15 As Carter worked tirelessly to free the hostages, Khomeini became
smug. He ignored the economic noose that was slowly tightening around Iran's neck;
and he also ignored the attitude of the international community. Khomeini had gotten his
revolution, and now he had his power; Carter was the Great Satan. All was well - or so
15
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he thought. Suddenly, he had an aggressive Soviet Union in Afghanistan to his east, and
while he hated America, he also did not trust the Soviets (for good historical reasons). A
short time later, Carter announced the Carter Doctrine, a commitment to protect the vital
interests of the United States in the Gulf. Khomeini now had enemies on two sides.
Then came the hostage rescue attempt, and while it failed in its primary mission, it
frightened and surprised the Iranians who were horrified that their country had been
secretly penetrated while they slept. The United States was now building up its military,
sowing the seeds for what became Central Command in the region. Then, the
unthinkable happened - Iraq invaded Iran. Iran needed help, but the international
community was cold because of the hostages. Khomeini must have known that he
needed to reverse course. Carter refused to blunder into war with Iran, although this
might have re-elected him in 1980, but made it clear that there were military options if
the hostages were killed or put on trial. This is not to say that all the military options
were good. What would the United States gain by an attack on Iran, for example?
Carter's prudence and his use of smart power, led to a happier ending than might have
been expected. His first concern was to get the hostages out alive. His threat of force, the
rescue mission that hinted of more aggressive tactics, the sanctions, and the weight of the
international community behind the United States, saved them. After they were released,
Iran faced eight years of war with Iraq, a devastating war in terms of men and treasure.
Carter did not compromise relations with Iran, in spite of being adamant in his
determination to get the hostages out alive. He left Reagan with the ability to begin
anew, especially after the shah's death. However, within a few days of the inauguration,
American arms began flowing once again to Iran. During the Iran-Iraq war, while
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claiming to be neutral, the United States routinely provided Iraq with weapons, mostly by
allowing third parties to them, which was against the Arms Control Export Act. This
further poisoned the relationship with Iran. One later connection to Iran developed by
Reagan entangling the United States in a sordid arms-for-hostages swap, with a
corresponding illegal diversion of the profits to the Contras in Nicaragua. The
opportunity to build a viable relationship was gone, and Iran has been a problem for the
United States until the present day.
AFGHANISTAN
Although this work did not analyze the Afghanistan issue, some mention should
be made of it in these general conclusions because of its close proximity to and
entanglement with Iran. In April 1978 the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA), with the cooperation of the military, overthrew the government and instituted a
socialist, pro-Soviet state, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). The coalition
making up the PDPA soon fell apart, and those remaining in power signed a treaty of
friendship with the Soviets in December 1978. The United States faced yet another
policy dilemma, summed up in a secret memorandum to Vance just after the April
takeover: "We need to take into account the mix of nationalism and communism in the
new leadership and seek to avoid driving the regime into a closer embrace with the Soviet
Union than it might wish...." The memo also pointed out reasons for adopting a hard
line attitude.16 As a result the United States compromised, maintaining correct relations
with the government while, at the same time, keeping channels open to the opposition.
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As time passed, the Carter administration became more uncomfortable with the new
government, especially after the assassination of Ambassador Adolph Dubs. In March
1979 Afghans in the city of Herat waged jihad and massacred hundreds of DRA officials
and Soviet advisors. Zbigniew Brzezinski and others began to worry that the Soviets
might try to influence events in Iran or Pakistan. Afghanistan could potentially be a
launching pad for aggression in the vital Persian Gulf Region. Shortly after the Herat
uprising Brzezinski pushed a decision through the SCC to be "more sympathetic to those
Afghans who were determined to preserve their country's independence."17 This was
deliberately vague, but the evidence indicates that Brzezinski called for moderate covert
support for Afghan rebel groups which had set up headquarters in Pakistan. CIA and
State Department documents seized by the Iranian students during the takeover of the
American embassy in Tehran in November 1979 reveal that, beginning in April 1979
immediately following Brzezinski's SCC decision, the United States began meeting rebel
representatives.
Meanwhile, the government was losing support rapidly; they had lost control of
23 of 28 provinces to various rebel forces. Unable to stabilize the unruly government
through political means, the Soviets invaded in December 1979, deploying 100,000
troops to Afghanistan, potentially jeopardizing both Pakistan and Iran. Ironically, the
invasion demonstrated the limits of Soviet influence, but to many in the United States it
looked as if the strategic balance was shifting towards the Soviets. Although Carter
issued the Carter Doctrine, the United States was not interested in nor was it prepared for
war with the SU in Afghanistan or the Persian Gulf, and Carter looked for alternative
ways to slow down the potential Soviet drive toward the Gulf and "make Moscow pay a
17
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heavy price for its intervention." He called for economic sanctions against the Soviets
and a boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games being held in Moscow, sought military access
agreements with several South and Southwest Asian nations, and provided more covert
aid to the Mujahidin. Thus began a ten year violent struggle over an impoverished
country the size of Texas.

Conservatives opposed negotiations, distrusting the Soviet

Union to abide by any agreements, and United States moderates and liberals fell into line
with this thinking. Carter decided to pursue a two track approach: continue moderate
levels of covert aid while seeking a forum for a negotiated settlement. The press blamed
the president for the Soviet invasion. Carter said he thought that the Soviets had "acted
outrageously and .. .had made a tragic miscalculation." He wanted to make it as costly as
possible; and he succeeded. The Soviets hung around far too long, and this damaged their
military and weakened the entire nation, helping to lead to the end of the Cold War.
Afghanistan has a way of wearing down its invaders, and even successfully defended
itself against the British in the 1830s when they attempted to expand their influence in the
region beyond India.19 Brzezinski relates that while not pushing the Russians to
intervene, aiding the rebels would increase the chances that this would occur. When
asked if he regretted his actions, Brzezinski replied, "Regret what? That secret operation
was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and
you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote
to President Carter. We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam
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War. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the
government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of
the Soviet empire."
There are critics to this approach. Barnett Rubin points out that the
decolonization process in Asia forced Afghanistan into a "race for development,"
creating new political actors and conflicts within the country's society. The conflicts
among the new political actors drew in the two superpowers which put fifty times more
resources into destruction than they had into development. When Mikhail Gorbachev
took power in the Soviet Union, he began to re-think his country's relationship with the
United States. He wanted to institute some domestic reforms, and in order to do this he
needed to reduce tensions with the United States. One outcome of his thinking was the
decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. He became less interested in the
ideological slant of the Afghan government and began to talk in terms of a broader
coalition. Moscow also set 1988 as the date for withdrawal. Although some agreement
on Afghanistan was reached through the United Nations, what actually took place was
much different. When the Soviets actually withdrew, the United States found that it had
different objectives from the various Mujahidin groups it had backed. It became more
difficult to cooperate. As the final curtain of the Cold War came down, the United States
and Russia negotiated a settlement: both sides would end deliveries of weapons and aid
for the purchase of weapons to all parties and would work towards a UN sponsored
political solution. The end of the Cold War opened a Pandora's Box of difficulties, not
only in Afghanistan, but also in places such as Bosnia and Mogadishu. Even before the
20
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establishment of an interim UN government, murderous ethnic warfare broke out. The
main obstacle to civic order has been the amount of weapons that both superpowers
91

provided.
In 1979, the Carter administration did not expect to drive out the Soviets and set
up an alternative government. Many in the United States thought that Afghanistan was
already lost to communism, and the goal in arming the opposition was to impose costs on
the Soviets that would discourage it from further encroachment into the Gulf region.
President Reagan, on the other hand, widened the goals of United States policy as the
Soviets became more mired quicksand. He coordinated cooperation among various
partners in Southwest Asia through financial and security means. For example, he
discarded Carter's concerns about Pakistan's record on human rights and its nuclear
program and in 1981 instituted a five-year program of financial aid in the sum of $3.2
99

billion. No thought was given to the political situation in Afghanistan,

and when the

Cold War ended, multiple independent actors emerged with diverging agendas. Of the
two superpowers, one disappeared and the other disengaged, leaving Afghanistan to its
fate. Was Carter to blame? There is no doubt that he authorized covert aid to the rebels,
but it is unlikely that he would have expanded the goals of the policy in the way that
Reagan did. He retained a healthy skepticism of regimes with nasty human rights
records, and he would have been loathe to have sent $3.2 billion in aid to Pakistan, a
country that would also be the conduit for the arms moving into Afghanistan. He would,
however, have been much more willing to spend money on development aid after the
Cold War was over than were his successors. Carter attained his goal of halting the
21

Barnett R. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 3, 4-14 passim.
22
Ibid., 34, 35.

441
advance of the Soviet Union into the Gulf, a region vital to the interests of the US. The
costs to the United States under Carter were small, but the door was opened for Reagan's
expansion of both the goal and the costs. The withdrawal of the United States was a
pivotal event that contributed to the failure of the Afghan state and helped to turn it into a
training camp for terrorists.
MISPERCEPTIONS
It was seldom easy for Carter because he chose to work on some of the most
difficult, the most intractable and controversial, issues that the nation faced. His work on
these issues never brought him much praise, indeed he was usually criticized for his
efforts. He had an impressive capacity to grasp the details of the various issues he
worked on, and he has often been accused of neglecting strategic planning that might
have given his foreign policy more coherence. Part of the problem was the difference in
vision between Vance and Brzezinski, although, according to Carter, it was exaggerated.
Although they had different perceptions and priorities, they both supported the Panama
Canal Treaties, they both shared Carter's concern for human rights, they favored majority
rule in Southern Africa, and they favored a Middle East peace agreement. However, they
differed over Iran and East-West issues, and these were major. One thing that contributed
to the perceptions about the two men was their difference in style. Vance, according to
Carter did not like to brief the press on controversial issues, but Brzezinski was eager to
do so, and the press played up the personality conflicts and differences.

Also, the

administration's mid-term shift in focus on the international scene, while played up in the
press as indecisiveness, might not have been as dramatic as some have claimed. Both the
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first part, with its emphasis on human rights and an end to an all encompassing East-West
focus, and the second part, emphasizing a military buildup and sanctions against Soviet
adventures in Afghanistan, were also pursued by the Reagan administration and
contributed to the final collapse of the Soviet Union.24 The two parts, however, seem to
be in conflict with each other; yet while Carter was criticized, Reagan was praised.
Carter had a rocky relationship with both the press and Congress, because he
expected both institutions to do the right thing, and not the easy thing. He faced obstacles
not of his making in many issue areas, such as securing the passage of the United Nations
Human Rights Covenants and the Panama Canal Treaties, which required ratification by
Congress. The treaties on the Canal were eventually and painfully ratified, but Human
Rights Covenants were painfully not, in spite of a massive effort on the part of the
administration.
CONGRESS
Some have accused Carter of being anti-political, or anti politician, and indeed he
campaigned in 1976 as an "outsider," one who abhorred the politics as usual that brought
to the United States the Vietnam War and Watergate.26 Congress also reacted against the
"imperial presidency" of the Nixon years, and became much more assertive.

This work

has shown that Carter was not the typical politician. He pursued policies that he
perceived to be in the national interest, not his own political interest (to which he was not
oblivious), in spite of the unpopularity of many of them. His presidency has been
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described as a trusteeship because he believed that he had been entrusted to represent the
public interest that would serve America as a whole, not his own short-term political
considerations. Edmund Burke formulated this concept well. When he spoke to his
electors in Bristol in November 1774, he explained that "your representative owes you,
not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he
sacrifices it to your opinion."

Carter thought that someone should represent all the

American people and stand fast on critical issues, because Congress could not be trusted
to do so. Members of Congress represent districts or states, not the United States, and are
beholden to powerful lobbying groups. Carter recognized that members of Congress,
"buffeted from all sides, are much more vulnerable to these groups than is the President.
One branch of government must stand fast on a particular issue to prevent the triumph of
self-interest at the expense of the public."29
Charles Jones points out that the method of the trustee president favors
comprehensive-solutions to problems rather than issue by issue treatments. In the popular
manner of speaking, the trustee's preference is for "doing what's right, not what's
political;" this is a preference often attributed to Carter.30 Policies were usually evaluated
on the basis of their substantive merit, not their political worth. He campaigned openly
on his distaste of Washington politics; but he was expected to drop this attitude once
elected. He surprised everyone and did not change, and this caused many to criticize him
for being naive and inexperienced.
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himself admits, because he tackled so many issues that had been neglected because of
their difficulty. The Panama Canal negotiations, for example, had been going on at least
since the Johnson administration. Johnson, Nixon, and Ford all contributed to the
resolution of the problem, but none had the political courage to take the final steps
necessary to give control of the Canal to Panama. Many believed Carter was incompetent
because of inflation, unemployment, and the energy crisis, and even though he proposed
a number of major changes, Congress did not act on them, and special interests
dominated the discussions. The problem Carter faced in 1977 and 1978 was one of
image. He was unable to use public relations to get credit for his presidential victories.
Instead, he projected an image of incompetence.
Twentieth-century presidents have played a larger role in the legislative process
than nineteenth-century presidents. Only three presidents enjoyed marked success with
Congress, however: Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Ronald Reagan. Reagan
did not sustain this success throughout his second term. Carter came to office with a
large Democratic majority, but a huge change in circumstances and had little success.
Carter believes that if he had introduced legislation in more carefully orchestrated
phases, he could have avoided the image of undue haste and confusion. He also failed to
set priorities. On the other hand, when he introduced his tax reform program in
incremental units, he failed there as well.33 A very big problem was that his proposals
had very few "goodies" for Congress to take home; and he lauds Congress for their
courage in voting for a significant list of things because it was the right thing to do. He
relates that Howard Baker, senate minority leader, told him that if he voted right on many
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more issues he would lose the next election. Overall, Carter won about 75 percent of the
roll call votes during his four years in office on the issues on which the White House took
a clear position. In 1978 he scored victories about 85 percent of the time in the Senate,
which no one had done since the days of Lyndon Johnson.

His feelings about Congress

are mixed because when the interests of powerful lobbies were at stake, a majority of the
members yielded to their pressures. Carter writes of a flawed system and believes that
ultimately something would have to be done abut it.

From the perspective of what we

know now, it still needs fixing.
Presidents are expected to get Congress to work for them, and not the other way
around. Even when the White House is occupied by one party and Congress is
dominated by the other, the president is still supposed to lead Congress. The expectations
in the press that Carter would have an easy time implementing his policy agenda proved
false. The Democrats in Congress were not Carter Democrats, and Carter's electoral
margin was narrow, which works against successful presidential/congressional relations.
Nonetheless, the public holds the president responsible, whether Congress is difficult to
work with or not.36 The nature of the policy agenda helps to determine success or failure.
Charles Jones argues that presidents are constrained by policy agendas already in place
when they take office. Success is determined, to some extent, by whether they and
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Congress can agree on specific policy alternatives necessary to deal with existing
problems.37 Carter's own agenda was exceedingly ambitious.
The Carter Administration also made some early mistakes that seemed to alienate
many members of his own party in Congress. Tip O'Neill, for example, was miffed
when he and his family got poor seats for an inaugural gala at the Kennedy Center, and
Hamilton Jordon got the blame. "As far as Jordan was concerned, a House Speaker was
something you bought on sale at Radio Shack," and this hurt Carter long after the
incident was over.38 A more substantial blunder also occurred early in his term. In line
with his fiscal conservatism, Carter decided to eliminate a number of water projects
which he believed to be pork. Unfortunately for Carter, the affected Congressmen
believed them to be the life blood of service to their constituencies.39
Not only the presidency but also Congress was changed by Vietnam and
Watergate. Congress instituted several reforms and began to take a more assertive role in
policymaking. In the 1976 elections more Congressmen either retired or otherwise chose
not to run than in any other election since World War II; and this was then exceeded in
1978. The Democrats were in control, and many of them had never served with a
president from their own party. They were accustomed to being combative. The large
freshman classes were younger and activist-oriented, and were determined to make
changes. Carter had the bad luck to lose three senior Georgians to retirement, and power
in general was slipping away from the South. The new Georgia delegation was weak in
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terms of committee status and seniority. The new Senate was also getting younger and
more individualistic and energetic.
Conditions were ripe for reform, and Congress enacted more of them during the
1970s than in any other era in its history. Most were in place when Carter entered office;
and most members of Congress believed that the reforms had strengthened their
institution. Along with these reforms came changes in attitude that resulted in the
members being more interventionist than previously, because of the decline in the status
of the White House due to Watergate, media attention to Congress during Watergate, and
conflict over issues.40 Democratic or not, the majorities in both houses did not embrace
Carter as a long-awaited ally in the executive branch. There was a basic divide between
liberals and conservatives in the party that was challenging in itself. The voting alliance
of Republicans and Southern Democrats was stronger under Carter than under Lyndon
Johnson, for example, when he pushed his Great Society programs through Congress.
Congressional and presidential elections are less linked together than they once were.
Also, there was a move away from liberal positions on many issues.41 In addition, the
Democrats in Congress functioned with less unity and discipline and were less inclined
toward party responsibility than earlier Democratic Congresses that Democratic
presidents had faced.42 Also, Carter's narrow victory left many in Congress to conclude
that his policy proposals had no public mandate. But, as Carter relates, the most
important reason for conflicts was the "extremely controversial matters we would have to
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address...:" including the Panama Canal, government reorganization, deregulation of
major industries, Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, and SALT. None of these was likely to cause
enough public enthusiasm to unite Congress, or even the Democrats. Ironically, it was
the Republicans who gave Carter the margin of victory he needed on many of the issues.
Also, the press, in "rat-pack" fashion, began to question Carter's competency, leading
many to conclude that Democrat Carter could not get his Democratic Congress to pass his
legislative agenda. Carter, the outsider, seemingly did not know how to stroke members
of the senate and house to get what he wanted. Empirical evidence did not support these
ideas, but no matter. Also, Congress seemed to have an insatiable appetite for
"consultation," which Carter could never seem to meet. He was in office for less than a
week when Robert Byrd, senate majority leader, and Tip O'Neill, speaker of the house
complained to the press that they had not been adequately consulted.43
Carter said that he "learned the hard way that there was no party loyalty or
discipline when a complicated or controversial issue was at stake - none." Each
legislator had to be won over individually. A Congressional party leader told one of the
administration's aides that Carter was always well informed and always took the high
ground, talking about the merits of a project in terms of what was best for the nation, but
he had never taken him aside and said that he really needed his vote on whatever the
issue was. He never approached Congressmen in a personal or partisan sense. Aides
were corrected if they tried to argue the merits from a political perspective.44 Doing what
is right, rather than what is political, separated the substance from the process. Carter
focused on developing the "right" solution to problems, then a process was put into place
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to convince Congress that the solution was right. The Domestic Affairs and Policy Staff
(DPS) was charged with the responsibility of identifying major domestic policy issues
and providing options to the president on how to deal with them. DPS became a critical
unit in the administration, especially as Carter learned over time that policy politics was
an important element in success.45 The DPS was free to work on all aspects of issues,
including the political, and this resulted in a better operation by 1980. The Office of
Management and Budget was another resource Carter used to achieve his goals, because
of its wealth of expertise and experience. The Congressional liaison staff s job was to
sell the right policies to Congress with as little trade off as was possible. They had to do
this and still allow the president to maintain his independence, which Carter interpreted
as strength. He achieved a number of victories on issues that were unpopular in Congress
- executive re-organization, energy conservation and deregulation, ratification of the
Panama Canal Treaties, and the elimination of some water projects.46 The press gave him
little credit. For example, when the Panama Canal Treaties were ratified, the press
played up the courage of the Senators voting to pass them, rather than to the Carter team,
giving the Senate the public relations victory.
To a great extent, these successes came because Carter used the same attributes
that served him well when working on problems such as the Middle East or the Panama
Canal - patience, diligence, steadfastness, and prudence. They also came in spite of the
fact that some of the reforms in the organization of Congress undermined the power of
party leaders. The absence of discipline or consensus within the Democratic Party
strengthened the power of the lobbies, a dangerous development still lingering today.
45

See, for example, "The First Six Months," U.S. News and World Report, July 25, 1977; David
Broder, "The President Who Came in From the Outside," Washington Post July 31, 1977.
46
Charles O. Jones, "Carter and Congress: From the Outside In," 297.

450
Because party leadership could not reward or punish members for their actions, the
rewards or punishments held out by the special interests increased in importance.
THE PRESS
To say that the press was negative about Carter would be an understatement.
After his first month in office he never again received net positive monthly coverage, yet
he remained especially accessible to the press, genuinely wanting to make the people
understand what he was doing. During the latter half of 1980, the press unanimously
seemingly ignored any signing of legislation that Carter had proposed, something
unheard of. Coverage of Carter was even worse than that given to Nixon during
Watergate.47
One of the press' issues with Carter was his relationship with Congress. It
assumed that since he had a large Democratic majority, he would be a "legislativeinterventionist" president. According to some, this was not the case, and he was severely
criticized by the press for not living up to their expectations.

Unable to fit the mold of

former Democratic presidents like Lyndon Johnson or Franklin Roosevelt, comparisons
with any of them was usually unfavorable. When Carter emphasized problem solving
rather than Congressional negotiations and public speaking, journalists concluded he did
not know how to use the power of his office. Not much effort was made to evaluate
Carter on his own terms. In a post-Watergate context, journalists liked to focus on the
conclusion of the Republican's control of the executive branch and the end of the NixonFord era, giving little attention to Carter's agenda, but when they did pay attention, they
47
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criticized him for focusing on controversial issues which therefore made executiveCongressional cooperation more difficult. They focused on the process and not on the
successes he had, which were numerous. He was criticized for not defining specific
national goals; and when he did define a goal he was criticized for his choice.49
Most presidents and other politician address issues on the basis of how well they
will look in the mirror of public opinion, and whether the public will be impressed; not
whether the policy will be in the long term national interest of the United States.50 Not so
with Carter. He was never a hostage to reelection (although he genuinely wanted to be
reelected), and believed he should tend to the nation's business. This worked against him
in a number of ways, most notably during the Iranian hostage crisis. Carter's decision to
stay "close to Washington" became a backfiring policy because the media stayed close to
the story, something not in the administration's interests and this contributed to his
election loss in 1980. On the other hand, Carter believes that it was the constant attention
paid to the hostages that protected them from torture and even death.51
In some ways the country was of two minds after the Vietnam War. For a time it
abhorred military involvement with other nations, but as the Carter presidency wore on,
and the political right called for more action and less diplomacy, the nation became once
again desirous of demonstrating its military strength. Stanley Hoffman's Popeye
archetype eclipsed the missionary archetype, and the press contributed to the shift. The
tragedy in Iran became the flash point. George Will characterized Carter's sanctions
against Iran as ineffective and contributing to the erosion of respect for the US. Marvin
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Stone's editorial attributed the hostage takeover to the president's "abhorrence of power,"
obviously implying that military power was the only kind of power, something with
which this work disagrees. Joseph Kraft alleged that Carter's lack of resolve prolonged
the crisis as "public abandonment of the military option deepens the plight of the
hostages." Yet, Carter did not abandon the military option, and would have pursued it if
any of the hostages had been killed or put on trial; and Iran knew it.53 Turning to the
military option, from the perspective of what we know now, could easily have turned into
a tragedy for the US. It would take a huge amount of manpower to subdue the country,
which is approximately the size of Alaska, with a border of more than five thousand
kilometers in length, compared to Iraq which has a border of 3650 kilometers. An
aroused and angry population would complicate matters further, and might lead some to
conclude that the nuclear option was best - a dangerous proposition in any case,
especially in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan at the time. There was already a
danger that if the government of Iran crumbled, the Soviets could become more
adventurous and might have projected themselves into the situation. Brzezinski, who took
a hard line, later said that Carter should have taken the position that what was at stake in
the crisis were national honor and national security, not lives, and bombed Tehran. This,
of course, would have meant the murder of the hostages, if they were not dead already
from the bombing. Kennan told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the United
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Statesshould have declared the hostage seizure a hostile act, which "inaugurated an act of
war." 54
In any event, the hostages would most certainly have been killed, and this
translates into failure, not success. Carter prudently concluded that the military option
had to be the last option, and this prudence led to the eventual release of the men. Some
even accused Carter of using the hostage crisis to raise his standings in the polls and
Carter does believe that he would have been re-elected if he had "bombed Tehran... to
oblivion, until the hostages were released or incinerated." In addition to some on Carter's
staff, many Republicans also advocated precisely this kind of apocalyptic foreign
i-

55

policy.
The hostage crisis contributed substantially to the election loss of 1980, although
it was not the only issue. Economic woes also played a prominent role. Some also argue
that the loss was due to the extraordinarily negative press Carter got during his
presidency.56 Unfortunately for the administration, the one year anniversary of the
hostage taking occurred on election eve. The major networks concluded their broadcasts
with a story commemorating it, not talking about the upcoming election. Until that time,
Reagan and Carter were neck in neck, but that was the final straw in the peoples'
decision. Hamilton Jordan believes that Carter underestimated the "aggressiveness and
hostility of the White House press corps;" and many on his staff did not understand how
that press had changed in the 1970s. It had become openly cynical about the political
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en

process in general and the presidency specifically.

As stated several times previously,

from the current perspective, Carter's Iranian policies were as successful as one could
hope for. While some called for America to flex it military muscle, Carter got the
hostages out alive, which was his goal.
Even with this success, Carter was treated shabbily by the press. He relates that
during the transition to the Reagan administration, George Shultz and Alexander Haig
refused to be briefed on what was going on in the negotiations for the hostages' release.
When Reagan welcomed them back he said "Never, under my administration, will any
hostages be taken," a statement that regretfully proved to be false. But the press made a
huge issue about the fact that the airplane carrying them took off fifteen minutes after
Reagan became president, as if he was responsible for the happy outcome.58
THE LOST ELECTION OF 1980
The Carter presidency is the exception to the general rule that incumbents usually
get more and better press coverage than their challengers. In the 1980 election there were
fewer Carter stories than Reagan stories, except on domestic issues, and on those Carter
outnumbered Reagan only by 19 to 18. Reagan's stories landed on the front page slightly
more than Carter's,59 but Carter's coverage was usually negative. For forty-seven of the
forty-eight months he was in office, he received net negative coverage. The press even
stopped covering such things as signing statements, something almost unheard of. The
dominant theme in the press in 1980 was that Carter's actions were motivated solely by
his desire to be re-elected. Again, this work disagrees. Journalists, who had degraded
57
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him for being anti political or apolitical, now accused him of being the consummate
conniving politician.
Republicans charged Carter with betraying the country by "giving away" the
Panama Canal, promoting abortion and homosexuality, and damaging the family by his
support of the Equal Rights Amendment. He was also criticized by many as being too
open in his diplomacy, yet he had campaigned against the secrecy of the Nixon-Ford
years and had promised the American people that he would in fact be much more open
than his predecessors. He was true to his promise, and when questioned about this open
diplomacy on the issue of the Middle East in 1977, for example, Carter replied that the
American people need "to know the reason why we have not had a Middle Eastern
settlement in 30 years or maybe 2,000 years." He did not believe that the United States
should evolve a complicated position in a sensitive region and then just spring it on the
people.60
To conclude, this work has argued that the Carter presidency had significant
success on a number of foreign policy issues. It does not assert that all of his policies
were successful, nor were any perfect. He came to office during a time of transition in
the United States, and the globe, and was far ahead of his time in his vision of a less
ideologically driven world. He tried to point the country in new directions and he never
shrank from difficult issues. It took courage to try to solve seemingly intractable
problems, and he achieved more success than was realized at the time. Much of the
critical literature faults him either because he did not do more on issues such as arms
control, human rights, and the Middle East, or he did too much, thus endangering United
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States interests. His Christian principles informed much of his ambitious agenda, which
he pursued with patience, diligence, and prudence throughout his time in office and
beyond. Power and principle usually conflict in United States foreign policy, but both are
deeply embedded in it. The nation swings between Hoffmann's two archetypes of
Popeye and the Humanitarian; but the most successful foreign policy usually incorporates
both, and Carter tried, with more success than he is credited with, in achieving this goal,
and the overall general goals of his administration. The United States did not
automatically equate its interests with the survival of right-wing dictatorships, it was
cooler to regimes that grossly violated human rights, it tried to establish working business
relations with non-aligned nations, and it treated Third World states on their on merits,
not just as pawns in the East-West game. This was a record very worthy of further pursuit
by his successors.
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